308 Ga. 652 FINAL COPY
S20A0489. OLIVER v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Appellant Jacquan Oliver entered a negotiated plea of guilty to
felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Alexander
Mixon.1 He now appeals from his conviction and sentence, arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion in finding a factual basis
for his guilty plea and in determining that his guilty plea was
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Because Oliver’s
1 The crimes occurred on November 24, 2018. In December 2018, a Dougherty County grand jury indicted Oliver and five others – Jacquarius Oliver, Jacquavious Oliver, Jaylen Miller, Iren Carter, and Mickee Carter – for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, and first degree forgery. Oliver and Jacquarius Oliver were separately indicted for possession of a handgun by a person under the age of 18. Jacquavious Oliver was separately indicted for tampering with evidence. On September 29, 2019, Oliver entered a negotiated plea of guilty to felony murder and was sentenced to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole. As to Oliver, the remaining counts were nolle prossed. After Oliver filed a timely notice of appeal on October 11, 2019, the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2019 and thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. claims are without merit, we affirm.
1. Oliver’s first claim — that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding a sufficient factual basis for his plea — is
clearly belied by the record. At Oliver’s guilty plea hearing, the State
proffered the following evidence. On November 24, 2018, police
officers responded to a vacant home in Albany where Mixon, a
restaurant delivery driver, had been shot through the neck while
attempting to deliver an order; Mixon later died as a result of his
wound.2 Investigating officers determined that the phone used to
place the delivery order belonged to the mother of co-indictee Jaylen
Miller and that Miller was in possession of the phone when the order
was placed. During interviews with the Albany Police Department,
Miller explained that the co-indictees had placed the order and
planned to offer the delivery driver counterfeit money. If the driver
refused to accept the counterfeit bills, they planned to rob the driver
of the food. Miller drove the group to the vacant home, and Oliver
and co-indictee Iren Carter exited the vehicle to take the food from
2 The record does not disclose further details of the shooting. Mixon. Miller also told police that after the shooting, he and his co-
indictees went to Jacquavious Oliver’s house in Albany where Oliver
left the gun. Officers executed a search warrant at the address and
recovered the gun used in the crime, which Jacquavious Oliver
admitted to having hidden in a cereal box.
Oliver, Jacquarius Oliver, Iren Carter, and Mickee Carter each
made incriminating statements to police. Oliver admitted both that
he owned the gun used in the murder and that he participated in
the murder, although he identified Iren Carter as the shooter. Iren
Carter, on the other hand, identified Oliver as the shooter. The State
also noted that three of Oliver’s co-indictees, all of whom entered
guilty pleas to crimes arising from the shooting, had stated at their
plea hearings that Oliver admitted to them that he shot the victim.
Also, when Oliver and Iren Carter returned to Miller’s vehicle after
the shooting, Iren Carter carried the food while Oliver held the gun.3
Following the State’s recitation of facts, the trial court asked
3 The State explained at Oliver’s guilty plea hearing that two of Oliver’s
co-indictees testified to this fact at their own guilty plea hearings. Oliver, under oath, whether he had heard the State’s recitation of
facts and whether Oliver was pleading guilty to the murder of
Mixon, as established by those facts. Oliver answered both questions
in the affirmative. The trial court found on the record that there was
a sufficient factual basis for Oliver’s guilty plea and thereafter
accepted the plea.
Oliver now argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea was
inadequate because, during his interview with police, he had
identified Iren Carter as the shooter. Uniform Superior Court Rule
33.9 provides that a trial court, before entering a judgment upon a
guilty plea, must make an “inquiry on the record as may satisfy the
[trial court] that there is a factual basis for the plea.” “The rule
requires nothing more than that the trial court make itself aware of
the factual basis of the plea.” Freeman v. State, 297 Ga. 146, 150 (3)
(771 SE2d 889) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, the State proffered a detailed factual basis that
established Oliver’s guilt, at a minimum, as a party to the crime of
felony murder. Specifically, the facts recited by the State showed that Oliver participated in planning the crime, that he was one of
the two participants to exit the vehicle and confront the victim, that
he provided the gun used to shoot the victim, that he hid the gun at
Jacquavious Oliver’s house after the shooting, and that he admitted
to at least three of his co-indictees that he shot Mixon. These facts
establish a sufficient factual basis for Oliver’s guilty plea to felony
murder, “either as a direct participant or as a party to the crime.
The trial court’s acceptance of [Oliver’s] plea establishes that it was
satisfied with the recitation presented at the plea hearing, and we
see no error in that finding.” Roberts v. State, 298 Ga. 331, 331-332
(1) (782 SE2d 1) (2016) (citation omitted). See also Williams v. State,
304 Ga. 658, 661 (1) (821 SE2d 351) (2018) (“Whether a person is a
party to a crime may be inferred from that person’s presence,
companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the crime.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)); Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 367
(1) (b) (695 SE2d 591) (2010) (concluding adequate factual basis for
appellant’s guilty plea was presented “despite the existence of
several contradictory accounts of the crimes that had been given previously by [the appellant] and his [co-defendants]”).
2. Oliver also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that
his guilty plea was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
because the trial court failed to engage in a colloquy with him
regarding the privilege against self-incrimination, the right of
confrontation, and the right to a trial by a jury of his peers and
instead asked only whether he understood “all of [his] legal rights.”
It is well settled that, “[w]hen a judgment of conviction and sentence
are entered upon a plea of guilty, the record must establish that the
defendant at the time of his plea was aware of the essential
constitutional protections . . . that he waives by pleading guilty and
consenting to judgment without a trial.” Mims v. State, 299 Ga. 578,
581 (2) (a) (787 SE2d 237) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that Oliver’s claim is
without merit.
Although Oliver correctly asserts that the trial court failed to
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308 Ga. 652 FINAL COPY
S20A0489. OLIVER v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Appellant Jacquan Oliver entered a negotiated plea of guilty to
felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Alexander
Mixon.1 He now appeals from his conviction and sentence, arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion in finding a factual basis
for his guilty plea and in determining that his guilty plea was
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Because Oliver’s
1 The crimes occurred on November 24, 2018. In December 2018, a Dougherty County grand jury indicted Oliver and five others – Jacquarius Oliver, Jacquavious Oliver, Jaylen Miller, Iren Carter, and Mickee Carter – for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, and first degree forgery. Oliver and Jacquarius Oliver were separately indicted for possession of a handgun by a person under the age of 18. Jacquavious Oliver was separately indicted for tampering with evidence. On September 29, 2019, Oliver entered a negotiated plea of guilty to felony murder and was sentenced to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole. As to Oliver, the remaining counts were nolle prossed. After Oliver filed a timely notice of appeal on October 11, 2019, the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2019 and thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. claims are without merit, we affirm.
1. Oliver’s first claim — that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding a sufficient factual basis for his plea — is
clearly belied by the record. At Oliver’s guilty plea hearing, the State
proffered the following evidence. On November 24, 2018, police
officers responded to a vacant home in Albany where Mixon, a
restaurant delivery driver, had been shot through the neck while
attempting to deliver an order; Mixon later died as a result of his
wound.2 Investigating officers determined that the phone used to
place the delivery order belonged to the mother of co-indictee Jaylen
Miller and that Miller was in possession of the phone when the order
was placed. During interviews with the Albany Police Department,
Miller explained that the co-indictees had placed the order and
planned to offer the delivery driver counterfeit money. If the driver
refused to accept the counterfeit bills, they planned to rob the driver
of the food. Miller drove the group to the vacant home, and Oliver
and co-indictee Iren Carter exited the vehicle to take the food from
2 The record does not disclose further details of the shooting. Mixon. Miller also told police that after the shooting, he and his co-
indictees went to Jacquavious Oliver’s house in Albany where Oliver
left the gun. Officers executed a search warrant at the address and
recovered the gun used in the crime, which Jacquavious Oliver
admitted to having hidden in a cereal box.
Oliver, Jacquarius Oliver, Iren Carter, and Mickee Carter each
made incriminating statements to police. Oliver admitted both that
he owned the gun used in the murder and that he participated in
the murder, although he identified Iren Carter as the shooter. Iren
Carter, on the other hand, identified Oliver as the shooter. The State
also noted that three of Oliver’s co-indictees, all of whom entered
guilty pleas to crimes arising from the shooting, had stated at their
plea hearings that Oliver admitted to them that he shot the victim.
Also, when Oliver and Iren Carter returned to Miller’s vehicle after
the shooting, Iren Carter carried the food while Oliver held the gun.3
Following the State’s recitation of facts, the trial court asked
3 The State explained at Oliver’s guilty plea hearing that two of Oliver’s
co-indictees testified to this fact at their own guilty plea hearings. Oliver, under oath, whether he had heard the State’s recitation of
facts and whether Oliver was pleading guilty to the murder of
Mixon, as established by those facts. Oliver answered both questions
in the affirmative. The trial court found on the record that there was
a sufficient factual basis for Oliver’s guilty plea and thereafter
accepted the plea.
Oliver now argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea was
inadequate because, during his interview with police, he had
identified Iren Carter as the shooter. Uniform Superior Court Rule
33.9 provides that a trial court, before entering a judgment upon a
guilty plea, must make an “inquiry on the record as may satisfy the
[trial court] that there is a factual basis for the plea.” “The rule
requires nothing more than that the trial court make itself aware of
the factual basis of the plea.” Freeman v. State, 297 Ga. 146, 150 (3)
(771 SE2d 889) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, the State proffered a detailed factual basis that
established Oliver’s guilt, at a minimum, as a party to the crime of
felony murder. Specifically, the facts recited by the State showed that Oliver participated in planning the crime, that he was one of
the two participants to exit the vehicle and confront the victim, that
he provided the gun used to shoot the victim, that he hid the gun at
Jacquavious Oliver’s house after the shooting, and that he admitted
to at least three of his co-indictees that he shot Mixon. These facts
establish a sufficient factual basis for Oliver’s guilty plea to felony
murder, “either as a direct participant or as a party to the crime.
The trial court’s acceptance of [Oliver’s] plea establishes that it was
satisfied with the recitation presented at the plea hearing, and we
see no error in that finding.” Roberts v. State, 298 Ga. 331, 331-332
(1) (782 SE2d 1) (2016) (citation omitted). See also Williams v. State,
304 Ga. 658, 661 (1) (821 SE2d 351) (2018) (“Whether a person is a
party to a crime may be inferred from that person’s presence,
companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the crime.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)); Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 367
(1) (b) (695 SE2d 591) (2010) (concluding adequate factual basis for
appellant’s guilty plea was presented “despite the existence of
several contradictory accounts of the crimes that had been given previously by [the appellant] and his [co-defendants]”).
2. Oliver also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that
his guilty plea was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
because the trial court failed to engage in a colloquy with him
regarding the privilege against self-incrimination, the right of
confrontation, and the right to a trial by a jury of his peers and
instead asked only whether he understood “all of [his] legal rights.”
It is well settled that, “[w]hen a judgment of conviction and sentence
are entered upon a plea of guilty, the record must establish that the
defendant at the time of his plea was aware of the essential
constitutional protections . . . that he waives by pleading guilty and
consenting to judgment without a trial.” Mims v. State, 299 Ga. 578,
581 (2) (a) (787 SE2d 237) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that Oliver’s claim is
without merit.
Although Oliver correctly asserts that the trial court failed to
specifically advise him of each of the rights he would waive by
pleading guilty, the record reflects that Oliver was, in fact, informed of his rights. Oliver, who was 18 years old and went to school
through the ninth grade, signed and initialed an “Advice and Waiver
of Rights Form.” The form advised Oliver that he had the right to a
trial by jury; that he was presumed innocent of all charges and that
the State bore the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; that he had the right to confront witnesses called against him
and to examine them; that he had the right to testify and present
witnesses on his own behalf; that he had the right to subpoena
witnesses to appear in court; that he had the right to be assisted by
an attorney during trial; and that he had the right not to testify at
trial. The form also asked whether Oliver understood that by
pleading guilty, he was waiving or giving up these rights. Oliver
initialed each of these questions in the affirmative. See Brown v.
State, 290 Ga. 50, 51-52 (1) (718 SE2d 1) (2011) (waiver-of-rights
form is “some affirmative evidence that either the trial court or trial
counsel entered into a colloquy with defendant” and explained his
constitutional rights).
Moreover, Oliver testified that he understood his rights and that plea counsel had reviewed his rights with him and answered
any questions he had.4 And when asked by the trial court whether
he had any further questions for the court regarding his rights,
Oliver responded in the negative. Finally, the Advice and Waiver of
Rights Form included an order by the trial court entered at the time
of the guilty plea in which the trial court found that the plea was
“freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made.” Under these
circumstances, we conclude that Oliver was advised of his rights and
that he understood that he was waiving those rights by pleading
guilty.5 See Brooks v. State, 299 Ga. 474, 477 (3) (788 SE2d 766)
(2016) (defendant adequately informed of constitutional rights
where defendant signed waiver-of-rights form and testified that plea
4 Oliver likewise initialed the blank for a “yes” response to the question
“Did your lawyer fully explain to you all your legal rights contained in this Advice and Waiver of Rights form?” Plea counsel also certified that Oliver read the form or the form was read to him in its entirety, that she fully explained each of the rights in the form to Oliver, and that she answered all of Oliver’s questions about his rights and other matters in the form. 5 In a third enumeration, Oliver argues that the trial court erred by
sentencing him to serve life in prison because, he asserts, there was an insufficient factual basis for his guilty plea to felony murder and his plea was not entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. However, in view of our dispositions above, this claim also fails. counsel reviewed the form with him). The trial court properly
accepted Oliver’s guilty plea.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED MAY 4, 2020. Murder. Dougherty Superior Court. Before Judge Lockette. Troy E. Golden, for appellant. Gregory W. Edwards, District Attorney, Harold R. Moroz, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.