Espinosa v. State

907 S.E.2d 691, 320 Ga. 98

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: October 15, 2024
• Docket: S24A1090
• Status: Published

Opinion

320 Ga. 98 FINAL COPY

S24A1090. ESPINOSA v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

On August 11, 2021, Andy Espinosa pleaded guilty to the

malice murder of Zachary Mejia and to other related offenses.1 On

1 Zachary died on December 9, 2020. On January 26, 2021, a Chattooga

County grand jury indicted Espinosa for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), felony murder predicated on cruelty to children (Count 3), aggravated assault (family violence) (Count 4), cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 5), two counts of possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Counts 6 and 7), and cruelty to children in the third degree (Count 8). On August 11, 2021, Espinosa pleaded guilty on all counts without a recommendation as to sentencing from the State. The trial court sentenced Espinosa to serve life without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive sentence of five years to serve on Count 6, and a concurrent 12-month sentence on Count 8. Counts 4 and 7 merged for sentencing purposes. Though the trial court purported to merge the felony murder counts, they were actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-72 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). We also note that, although the trial court merged Count 5 with Count 1, the crimes of malice murder and cruelty to children in the first degree do not merge. See Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 234-35 (4) (830 SE2d 143) (2019) (noting that “even if the same conduct establishes the commission of both malice murder and cruelty to children [in the first degree], the two crimes do not merge”) (citation and punctuation omitted). However, the State has not cross-appealed on this issue, and we decline to correct the error in this case. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696-97 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017) (though appellate court has discretion to correct merger error, when the error benefits the defendant and the State fails to raise it by cross-appeal, this Court will only exercise its discretion to correct such error in exceptional circumstances). appeal, Espinosa claims that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea because plea counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of an insanity defense.

For the following reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

trial court’s ruling and affirm.

1. In presenting its factual basis for the guilty plea, the State

proffered the following. Espinosa was living with his girlfriend,

Sarah Mejia, and her four children. Zachary was the eldest at 15

years old. On December 8, 2020, Espinosa and Zachary got into a

physical fight, and Zachary “got the better of” Espinosa. Espinosa

felt “humiliated and embarrassed” following the fight and continued

to feel that way when he went to work the next day. The next day,

Espinosa made a search on Quora — a question and answer blog

website — that read “What does it feel like to murder someone?”2

On that same day, Espinosa returned home from work, saw

Zachary’s lights on through his window, and thought Zachary “must

2 Records were obtained from the Quora website and showed that the

search had been made several hours prior to the stabbing. 2 want something with [him] again.” Espinosa grabbed a knife from

his car and entered the home. He immediately opened the door to

Zachary’s room, saw Zachary, and rushed at him. Espinosa stabbed

Zachary repeatedly with the knife and then called 9-1-1. Sheriff’s

deputies arrived and arrested Espinosa. Espinosa later claimed that

he told officers at the scene that he had “snapped” and was taken

over by a “demon” during the stabbing.3 An investigator who

responded to the 9-1-1 call noted that Zachary had suffered five stab

wounds — to the right eyebrow, the neck (a major wound), the left

upper back, the left mid torso, and the left lower torso — and

sustained 11 additional lacerations. Zachary was transported to the

hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries. The youngest of the

four children was the only other person in the home at the time of

the stabbing.

Following the State’s proffer, the court went through the plea

colloquy with Espinosa. Espinosa stated that he had gone over the

3 Espinosa made these claims at the motion to withdraw guilty plea hearing. During the guilty plea hearing, however, Espinosa never referenced a demon or any other similar reason for his actions. 3 plea form with his counsel, gave true answers to the questions, and

signed the form after they talked. Espinosa affirmed that he

understood the charges. He also confirmed that he had “plenty of

time” to talk with his counsel, told counsel everything he knew about

the case, and was satisfied with counsel’s representation thus far.

Plea counsel agreed that he had discussed Espinosa’s constitutional

rights at length with him, and the court reviewed those rights again

with Espinosa to ensure his understanding. The court described the

sentencing ranges for each of the eight counts against Espinosa and

explained that the maximum possible sentence Espinosa could face

was life without the possibility of parole, plus five years consecutive

and an additional 12 months consecutive. The court also explained

that it could sentence Espinosa in the same manner after a trial as

it could at the guilty plea hearing.

Espinosa then pleaded guilty to the eight charges against him

“of [his] own free will,” with an understanding of “the consequences

of his pleas.” The court accepted each of the pleas and sentenced

Espinosa.

4 On September 7, 2021, Espinosa — through new counsel —

timely filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea, alleging that his plea

counsel was ineffective and that a withdrawal was necessary to

correct the manifest injustice that resulted.4 A motion to withdraw

guilty plea hearing was held on February 23, 2024. At that hearing,

new counsel argued that plea counsel failed to adequately

investigate Espinosa’s state of mind and that had he done so, he

would have advised Espinosa of a colorable insanity defense.

At the hearing, plea counsel testified that he had practiced in

Georgia since 2007. He had worked both as a public defender and in

private practice as a criminal defense attorney and had handled

thousands of felony cases. Counsel explained the way he typically

handled a murder case, i.e., meeting with the client, requesting

discovery, taking discovery to the client to go over it with them,

4 The deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is the end of

the term in which a trial court enters a judgment of conviction and sentence is pronounced. See Harris v. State, 319 Ga. 133, 136 (1) (b) & n.2 (902 SE2d 574) (2024). Espinosa entered his guilty plea, was sentenced, and moved to withdraw his guilty plea within the same term of court. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (22) (B) (terms of court for Chattooga County Superior Court begin on the first Monday in February and August). 5 speaking with family members, talking to the district attorney about

possible non-jury resolutions, and relaying those to the client.

Counsel testified that he received Espinosa’s case about a year

before the plea hearing took place; that Espinosa described having

“rage” come over him when he got home on December 9, 2020; and

that Espinosa acted rationally in calling 9-1-1 afterward and was

able to talk to law enforcement at the scene about what happened.

After reviewing discovery and based on his conversations with

Espinosa, counsel “didn’t really see a defense at all” for the case and

had ruled out “pretty much everything.” He could not recall if there

was any law enforcement body camera footage of Espinosa at the

time of his arrest describing the homicide (i.e., indicating that

Espinosa “snapped” or anything about a demon). He had no

recollection of Espinosa ever talking about demons coming over him,

blanking out, or not remembering what happened on the night of the

stabbing. As such, he did not ask Espinosa about his mental health

or attempt to further ascertain his state of mind that night.

Espinosa told him early on that “he did not want to go to trial” and

6 instead “wanted to find another resolution.” Counsel spoke with the

district attorney about Espinosa’s interest in a non-jury disposition

if he could get something less than life without parole, but the

district attorney would not consider it. Counsel explained this to

Espinosa and told him that he could go to trial but thought the

chances of succeeding were “slim to none.” Espinosa indicated he

would rather take the plea than go to trial. Counsel testified that he

met with Espinosa four or five times before the plea — spending a

total of about eight hours with him — and at no point did he suggest

that there might be a colorable defense because he “couldn’t think of

one” to offer and “didn’t see a way for [an insanity defense] to be

successful.”

Counsel believed a plea would be Espinosa’s best chance at

receiving parole and would avoid painting Espinosa in a worse light,

given the evidence about him that would be introduced at a trial.

Counsel also noted that, at the sentencing hearing, Espinosa made

no mention that a demon was to blame for the stabbing; instead, he

provided reasons for his anger: Zachary was “heading in the wrong

7 direction,” acted distant from his mom and Espinosa, and “started

to act just like his brother being disrespectful, talking back, not

following the house rules, things of that nature.” Ultimately, counsel

testified that he did not believe there was any lapse of reason when

Espinosa took Zachary’s life and felt that Espinosa could distinguish

right from wrong at the time of the stabbing.

Espinosa testified at the hearing, however, that he told plea

counsel during their first meeting (or at least at some point) that he

came home from work on December 9, 2020, “something got over into

[his] head and [he] snapped, like a demon,” and “[s]omething

compelled [him] to do something evil.” He did not understand what

he was doing was wrong during the stabbing and was “incapable of

doing the right thing” at the time. Plea counsel did not follow up

about his mental state during the homicide. Instead, counsel advised

him to go forward with the plea deal, specifically because he believed

the judge’s gender might incline her to give a lesser sentence.

Espinosa took counsel’s advice to accept the plea, but he claimed

that he would not have done so if counsel had told him about the

8 insanity defense.

2. Espinosa argues that plea counsel was ineffective because he

failed to advise him of a “colorable insanity defense,” and that the

trial court erred in refusing him to withdraw his guilty plea based

on counsel’s ineffectiveness.

After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea

only to correct a “manifest injustice,” such as if a defendant was

denied effective assistance of counsel. Hood v. State, 315 Ga. 809,

812 (1) (884 SE2d 901) (2023). To prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Espinosa must show that plea counsel’s

performance was constitutionally deficient and that he was

prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

To prove deficient performance, Espinosa “must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide

range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s

decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.” Hood, 315 Ga. at 812 (1) (cleaned up). To establish

9 prejudice “in the guilty plea context, [Espinosa] must demonstrate

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going

to trial.” Id. at 813 (1) (cleaned up). If Espinosa fails to meet his

burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, “the reviewing

court does not have to examine the other prong.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted).

“This Court accepts a superior court’s factual findings and

credibility determinations on an ineffectiveness claim unless they

are clearly erroneous, but we apply legal principles to the facts de

novo.” Hood, 315 Ga. at 813 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted).

And “[t]he court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will

not be disturbed absent an obvious abuse of discretion.” Wright v.

State, 314 Ga. 355, 357-58 (877 SE2d 178) (2022) (cleaned up).

Because judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly

deferential, there is a strong presumption that a lawyer rendered

reasonable professional assistance. See Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268,

270 (2) (a) (737 SE2d 98) (2013).

10 Espinosa has failed to establish that plea counsel’s decision not

to advise him of a possible insanity defense (and instead to

recommend a plea) was objectively unreasonable. Espinosa does not

claim on appeal that he had past mental health issues or records

that plea counsel should have reviewed, nor does he present any

expert evidence supporting that he was actually insane at the time

of the stabbing. Instead, Espinosa argues that because he told

officers after the stabbing that a “demon got into [him],” counsel

should have advised him of an insanity defense. However, based on

his many years of experience, multiple conversations with and

observations of Espinosa, counsel made the strategic choice to advise

Espinosa to pursue a plea with the hope of obtaining a sentence of

life with the possibility of parole rather than proffering a defense

that counsel believed was inconsistent with the facts, including that

Espinosa conducted an Internet search about murdering someone

on the same day as the stabbing and after the stabbing, called 9-1-1

and spoke intelligently with the responding law enforcement

officers. Moreover, the trial court was authorized to credit plea

11 counsel’s testimony over Espinosa’s regarding whether they had

discussed Espinosa’s allegedly being overcome by some sort of

“demon” or “evil.” See Simmons v. State, 314 Ga. 883, 892 (3) (c) (880

SE2d 125) (2022) (explaining that a trial court, as finder of fact, is

“entitled to credit [plea] counsel’s testimony as to [his] efforts to

investigate [a] case”). Espinosa has not presented evidence that

overcomes the strong presumption of reasonableness, so it cannot be

said that counsel chose an objectively unreasonable course of action

under the circumstances. See McKiernan v. State, 288 Ga. 140, 142

(1) (702 SE2d 170) (2010) (no ineffective assistance when plea

counsel spoke with the defendant’s psychiatrist and based on that

information as well as his own observations of the defendant “made

a strategic choice that an incapacity defense was not in his client’s

best interest”).

The trial court concluded that Espinosa failed to show that his

plea counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Because

the record supports the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Espinosa’s motion to

12 withdraw his guilty plea.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided October 15, 2024.

Murder. Chattooga Superior Court. Before Judge Graham.

The Bullard Firm, Brandon A. Bullard, Audra M. Murphey, for

appellant.

Clayton M. Fuller, District Attorney, Herbert E. Franklin, Jr.,

Bruce E. Roberts, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C.

Malcolm, Matthew B. Crowder, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant

Attorneys General, for appellee.