COLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GRIFFIN, J., joined. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 914-21), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge.
Petitioner-Appellant Frederick Harris, a Kentucky state prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Harris invokes the case of Batson v. Kentucky to challenge the prosecution’s exercise of its peremptory strikes as race-based and therefore violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Upon conducting the requisite Batson analysis, the state trial court rejected Harris’s claims.
After Harris’s conviction but prior to his appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the defense team discovered that the courtroom cameras had turned on and captured a private conversation among the prosecutorial team as it was discussing the [905]*905exercise of its peremptory challenges. Notwithstanding this newly acquired evidence, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Harris’s conviction. Harris v. Kentucky, No.1998-SC-0414-MR (Ky. Feb. 24, 2000) (unpublished). In his petition for federal habeas corpus relief, the district court also found no violation of Batson.
On appeal, Harris now argues that the district court erred in its application of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) when it denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, Harris asserts that, in upholding the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s denial of his Batson challenges, the district court engaged in an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the newly discovered videotape evidence. For the following reasons, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Harris’s Batson claim and REMAND to the district court for a renewed Batson hearing in light of the after-acquired videotape evidence.
I.
A. Factual Background
On March 13, 1998, a Kentucky jury found Harris guilty of kidnapping, three counts of robbery, and being a persistent felony offender. According to the trial testimony of Barbara Morris, one of Harris’s companions, on July 20, 1997, Harris approached Morris while she was in a parking lot at a Kroger grocery store in Louisville, Kentucky. Brandishing a gun, Harris forced Morris into her own van and proceeded to drive the van out of the parking lot with the gun visible on his lap. Harris first drove the van to a wooded area in Indiana, where he searched through the contents of the vehicle and Morris’s purse. Harris then drove the van to a nearby bank, where he tested Morris’s automatic teller machine cards and attempted to withdraw money from her account. The attempt failed, however, because Morris could not remember the personal identification number required to access the account.
Harris proceeded to several retail stores and told Morris that she would not face any danger if she cooperated. The first store on their route was an H.H. Gregg electronics store in Clarksville, Indiana, where Harris purchased computer equipment and coerced Morris into writing a check to cover the costs. The pair then went to a nearby Office Max store, and Morris purchased more computer equipment on Harris’s behalf. Their next destination was a Target store, where Morris wrote another check for the purchase of a television and other goods Harris selected. The two proceeded back to Kentucky and made additional purchases at another H.H. Gregg store. After departing the second H.H. Gregg, Harris drove the van to a Kinko’s copy store to make copies of the receipts from his recent purchases and then to a White Castle franchise, where he bought forty dollars worth of fast food using Morris’s credit card.
Their final destination was another Kroger store, where Harris tried to use Morris’s credit card to buy over $800 in cigarettes. Upon hearing Harris’s order, an employee at Kroger became suspicious and called the police to report potentially fraudulent credit card activity. The police arrived at Kroger and, after hearing Morris’s account, arrested Harris. According to Morris, she remained with Harris over the entire nine-hour course of events and did not attempt to flee because Harris carried a gun with him at all times.
In contrast to Morris’s account of the events, Harris claims that their interaction [906]*906began at Morris’s initiation. Specifically, Harris alleges that Morris approached him in the Kroger parking lot and asked for his assistance in opening her van because she was carrying a load of groceries in her arms. After helping her, Harris proceeded to a bus stop to wait for a friend, Donnell Flippins, when Morris pulled alongside the stop and offered to give him a ride. Harris agreed to receive a ride because he “figured she wanted more than just to do someone a favor.” (JA 334.) Harris then asked Morris to drive him to Flippins’s residence. Once they arrived there, Harris dispatched Morris to purchase cigarettes, and, in the meantime, explained to Flippins that the two of them would be unable to undertake their usual Sunday scams, consisting of writing fraudulent checks to stores in exchange for goods and then returning the goods to the stores later that day for cash. Harris testified to telling Flippins that “I met this young lady, Barbara, and we’re going to spend some time together; she wants to spend some time with me.” (Id.)
Once Morris returned with the cigarettes, Harris and Morris left for Harris’s apartment so that the two of them could “spend some time together.” (Id.) Since a co-tenant was using the apartment, Harris directed Morris to drive them to his alternate home, where the two discussed their respective pasts and criminal histories with each other. Upon hearing of Harris’s criminal operations, Morris asked Harris if she could join his activities by offering her credit cards to buy goods that he could then sell to a “fence” for half the price. Pursuant to this arrangement, Harris accepted orders for various merchandise from his “fence” and used Morris’s credit card with her consent on the shopping spree delineated above. According to Harris’s version of the story, it was Morris’s request for protection that led him to carry a gun throughout the entire shopping spree. Moreover, Harris claimed that Morris voluntarily participated in all the shopping exchanges.
B. Procedural History
Based on the facts recounted above, the Commonwealth of Kentucky indicted Harris for kidnapping, three counts of robbery, and being a persistent felony offender. During the jury selection process, the prosecution exercised four of its nine peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective African-American jurors from the jury pool. Harris objected to the prosecution’s use of its challenges, claiming that the pattern of peremptory strikes established a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
In response to the alleged Batson violations, the prosecutor proffered race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Specifically, the prosecution explained that it excused juror 160 because he fell asleep during voir dire; juror 49 because she had difficulty following questions asked of her, was joking with a neighboring juror who was subsequently struck for cause, and had a grandson who was convicted for his involvement in a shooting; and juror 47 because she was a paralegal at a local law firm and had previously served as a juror in a robbery case in which Harris had been acquitted. The trial judge agreed that juror 160 had slept through a portion of the voir dire and that juror 49 appeared to have trouble understanding some of the questions posed to her. Therefore, the judge made a finding that the prosecution had employed all its peremptory strikes in a race-neutral fashion and rejected Harris’s Batson claim.
[907]*907Subsequently, on March 13, 1998, the jury found Harris guilty on all counts, and Harris was then sentenced to 75 years in prison. The Commonwealth also indicted Harris for possession of a handgun by a persistent felon, and Harris entered a guilty plea to this charge prior to the jury’s deliberation. The court accepted Harris’s plea and sentenced him to three years for the felon-in-possession charge, to run concurrently with the 75-year sentence.
After trial and sentencing, Harris’s counsel discovered that an in-court videotape system used to record court proceedings had reactivated during a recess when the chief prosecutor Dolan, the assistant prosecutor David Schuler, and the detective John Aubrey were engaged in a private discussion about how to exercise the last of their nine peremptory challenges. The discussion further made clear that the prosecutorial team had already decided how to allocate their previous eight peremptory strikes. The recorded conversation proceeded as follows:
DOLAN: Okay, this is who we got guys so far. We got 76, [name deleted]. That’s the guy we at first liked, but who had been accused by his girlfriend. We’ve got 128, [name deleted], kind of hippy, with the beard and the hair, who sat behind [name deleted]. He was on the not guilty jury. We’ve got [name deleted], 82. She was the last person on the second row. She was also a juror on the carrying concealed deadly weapon charge, which was a 10-2 to acquit. We’ve got [name deleted], who is the girl at Seiller and Handmaker [a local law firm]. We’ve got 77 [name deleted], who you originally liked, but who was a juror on the Robbery I case. We’ve got [name deleted], 138. She was the black female who said her cousins were charged and convicted of armed robbery. We’ve got [name deleted], 49, she’s the old lady, the black lady. The other one is already off. Then there’s [name deleted], 160, the first guy out here, who was sleeping. We’ve got one more to go. What do you guys think?
AUBREY: How about the lady that sat right here (gesturing)? She’s on her third criminal jury.
SCHULER: Have you got anything down for [name deleted], number 151?
DOLAN: He sat on a rape charge a long time ago.
SCHULER: He’s pretty old?
DOLAN: There are a lot of old people on here.
SCHULER: How about the guy in the first row, number 53? He was one of the ones who said he wanted to see some evidence? Black shirt. What does he do?
DOLAN: Supervisor at (unintelligible) ... I’m going to do this old guy, 152, because he was also on that jury, (emphasis added).
On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court,1 Harris characterized the videotape as “smoking gun” evidence of the prosecution’s reliance on race in employing its peremptory challenges, particularly with respect to juror 49 whom Dolan referred to as “the old lady, the black lady.” (JA [908]*908184.) Upon reviewing the videotaped evidence along with the trial court record, however, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the trial court’s decision and rejected Harris’s Batson claim. The court found that “[t]he record supports the prosecutor’s articulated reasons for striking juror 49, and the remarks he made during the partial recording of the peremptory strike conference do not tend to prove otherwise. Nor do they tend to prove that any of the other three peremptory strikes in question were racially motivated.” Harris v. Kentucky, No.1998-SC-0414MR at *9 (Ky. Feb. 24, 2000). Under the majority’s view, the prosecutor’s reference to juror 49 as “the old lady, the black lady” was “no more racist than [Harris’s own] referral to the victim as a ‘middle-aged white lady’ [in his trial testimony].” Harris, No.1998-SC-0414-MR at *8.
Furthermore, the court rejected Harris’s assertion that Dolan’s statement, “the other one is already off[,]” referred to another African-American woman in the jury pool “because none of the other six jurors who were excused for cause were African-American females.” Id. “More likely,” the court opined, “the remark referred to juror 155, with whom juror 49 had been seen talking and joking, and who had been excused for cause because she claimed to have witnessed a part of the crime....” Id.
Dissenting from the majority, however, three of the seven justices wrote separately to express their opinion that the case should have been remanded to the trial court to allow for consideration of the videotaped evidence. Because this footage was unavailable at the time of the trial court proceeding, the dissenters would have ordered the trial court to re-conduct a Batson hearing in light of the new evidence. Underlying the dissent’s recommendation was the belief that the trial court “sits in a superior position, after considering this new evidence together with the prior evidence, to finally determine whether a Batson violation occurred.” Id. at *2.
Additionally, the dissenting justices disapproved of the majority’s willingness to affirm the trial court’s Batson finding on what they called the “basis of probabilities.” Id. Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, the dissent instead recognized that Dolan’s statement that “the other one is already off’ could have just as plausibly referred to juror 138, an African-American woman whom the prosecution had already excused from the jury pool. Under this alternative reading, the dissent believed there was a “possibility that the Commonwealth exercised its challenges on the basis of race.” Id.
Following this decision from the Kentucky Supreme Court, Harris filed a motion in Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate his sentence. The trial court denied this motion, and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed. When Harris subsequently filed a motion for discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the court denied it.
Harris thus initiated the instant federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville on November 25, 2003. The district court denied Harris’s petition. Harris v. Haeberlin, No. 3:03CV-P754-H (W.D.Ky. March 16, 2005). With respect to Harris’s Batson claim, the district court detected “no error in the [Kentucky] circuit court’s application of the applicable three-step [Batson] process.” Id. at * 10. Additionally, the district court found that Harris had failed to proffer “clear and convincing evidence” to rebut the presumption of correctness underlying factual findings by state courts in habeas proceed[909]*909ings. Id. The district court further took notice of the fact that, at Harris’s trial, the jury itself contained some black members, thereby refuting any “pattern of purposeful racial discrimination in its selection.” Id.
After denying Harris’s habeas petition, the district court did find that Harris was entitled to a certificate of appealability on the Batson issue alone. While the district court concluded that no Batson violation had transpired during Harris’s trial, the court noted that “no less than three justices of the Kentucky Supreme Court would have remanded [Harris’s] case for an evidentiary hearing on [the Batson] issue.” Id. at *30. The number of dissenters in the Kentucky Supreme Court convinced the district court that “jurists of reason could find [the Kentucky Supreme Court’s] conclusion regarding [Harris’s] Batson claim to be debatable or wrong.” Id. Harris timely appealed to this Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We employ a de novo standard to review the district court’s legal conclusions in habeas proceedings. Miskel v. Karnes, 397 F.3d 446, 451 (6th Cir.2005); Dennis v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 511, 516-17 (6th Cir.2003). We generally review the district court’s factual findings under a clear-error standard. Dennis, 354 F.3d at 517.
Because Harris filed his habeas petition on November 25, 2003, after AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996, AEDPA governs our review of the decisions of the Kentucky trial and appellate courts. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 323, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (holding AEDPA applicable to petition filed after AEDPA’s effective date); Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir.2006).
In AEDPA, Congress provided that:
an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
In construing the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), provides us with guidance. Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant a petitioner’s writ “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Under the “unreasonable application” clause, habeas relief is available if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Dennis, 354 F.3d at 517 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495). This clause is also triggered when a “state court decision either unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from the Supreme Court precedent to a new context.” Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 669 (6th Cir.2006).
[910]*910Under both clauses, the Supreme Court has interpreted “clearly established Federal law” to encompass only its “holdings, as opposed to the dicta” in its opinions. Keith, 455 F.3d at 669 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495). And in both situations, the central inquiry is “whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable and not simply erroneous or incorrect.” Id. That is, in applying the “unreasonable application” clause, a reviewing court must be careful not to substitute its own judgment for that of the state court by equating the more stringent standard of “objectively unreasonable” with the more lax standard of “clear error.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002).
In addition to his § 2254(d)(1) claims, Harris also invokes § 2254(d)(2) to challenge the Kentucky Supreme Court’s finding of facts as unreasonable in light of the after-acquired videotape evidence. In assessing Harris’s factual claim, we accord a presumption of correctness to the Kentucky court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). Thus, we must accept the state court’s fact-finding, unless Harris submits evidence clearly and convincingly to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Notwithstanding the presumption of correctness, the Supreme Court has explained that the standard of § 2254(d)(2) is “demanding but not insatiable.” Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (internal quotations omitted)). Accordingly, “[e]ven in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.” Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 324, 123 S.Ct. 1029.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Harris tenders two grounds for reversing the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus. First, pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA, he argues that he is entitled to habeas relief on his Batson claim because “the Kentucky Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it independently analyzed significant factual evidence [from the videotape] that was not available to the trial court at the time it ruled on ... Harris’s Batson challenge.” (Appellant’s Br. at 36.) Second, pursuant to § 2254(d)(2) of AEDPA, he claims that the district court engaged in an unreasonable determination of the facts when it affirmed the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s denial of his Batson claim. Harris’s first argument, which is more narrow and procedural in scope, convinces us of the need for a remand to the district court to conduct a renewed Batson hearing in light of the videotaped evidence. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of Harris’s second argument.
In advancing his first argument, Harris surveys Batson and its progeny to find “wide recognition” for the proposition that appellate courts are ill-suited “on the basis of a cold record ... to assess subtle factual and atmospheric issues of credibility and motivation.” (Id.) For example, Harris cites to Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 [911]*911(1991) (opinion of KENNEDY, J.), to buttress his claim that, in the Batson context, “the evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Likewise, Harris points to Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 173, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005),2 in which the Supreme Court explained that trial judges should resolve Batson claims to avoid appellate guesswork: “[t]he disagreement among the state-court [appellate] judges who reviewed the record in this case illustrate the imprecision of relying on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination.” Harris thus marshals the foregoing cases to extract two principles governing Batson claims: (1) a trial court is best positioned to review evidence on the issue of discriminatory intent; and (2) the trial court must have access to the full evidentiary record before it can properly rule on a Batson challenge.
The state responds by invoking the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006). In that case, when the defendant opposed the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against juror 16, the prosecution explained that it disqualified her because she had rolled her eyes in response to a question from the court, was young and possibly too tolerant of drug crimes, and lacked sufficient connections to the community. Rice, 546 U.S. at 336, 126 S.Ct. 969. The trial court subsequently affirmed the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons. Id. at 337, 126 S.Ct. 969.
During the defendant’s habeas appeal before the Ninth Circuit, however, that court disagreed with the trial court’s credibility determination and found it factually unreasonable to accept the prosecution’s justifications based on juror 16’s demeanor and youth. Id. at 339, 126 S.Ct. 969; Collins v. Rice, 365 F.3d 667, 679-685 (9th Cir.2004) (Hall, J., dissenting). Conducting its own review of the underlying facts, the Ninth Circuit found the prosecutor lacking in credibility because she had previously referred to another juror as “young” despite that juror’s status as a grandmother, had attempted impermissibly to employ gender as a race-neutral basis for striking juror 16, and had claimed juror 16 would be too lenient toward a drug crime even though juror 16 expressed an affirmative belief that the crime at issue should be illegal. Id. at 340-41, 126 S.Ct. 969. After assessing the Ninth Circuit’s reasons for doubting the prosecutor’s credibility, the Supreme Court disagreed that the trial court’s factual findings were unreasonable. At most, the Supreme Court explained, “the trial court had reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility regarding [j]uror 16’s alleged improper demeanor,” but this does not translate into the “conclusion that the trial court had no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications.” Id. at 341, 126 S.Ct. 969. Overall, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision because the court “attempted] to use a set of debatable inferences to set aside the conclusion reached by the state court [in violation of] AEDPA’s requirements for granting a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 342, 126 S.Ct. 969.
In citing Rice, the State attempts to analogize the after-acquired videotape evidence, which the trial court in the instant [912]*912case was unable to consider because it had not yet surfaced, to the eye-rolling, which the trial court in Rice missed. The State’s argument would have it that, just as it was reasonable for the trial court to credit the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons without directly observing the alleged eye-rolling, it is reasonable for the Kentucky trial court to have credited the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons without examining the videotaped evidence.
We are unpersuaded, however, by the State’s invocation of Rice. First, Rice can be distinguished on the nature of its factual record. In that case, the factual record facing the state appellate court was identical to the factual record facing the state trial court. See 546 U.S. at 339, 126 S.Ct. 969 (noting that the state appellate court had “before it only the trial court record.”). In this case, however, the factual record facing the Kentucky Supreme Court differed considerably from the factual record facing the state trial court, due to the discovery of the videotaped evidence. Rice’s admonition to appellate courts to refrain from using “a set of debatable inferences” to displace the trial court’s findings must thus be confined to the context in which the trial and appellate courts have before them identical records. See id. at 341-42, 126 S.Ct. 969.
In a case such as the one before us, however, where the appellate court has before it new evidence providing direct information about the prosecutor’s state of mind, clearly established federal law regarding the trial court’s superiority in making credibility determinations in a Bat-son hearing persuades us that a remand is appropriate. In Hernandez, for example, a plurality of the Supreme Court explained that an appellate court should grant “[d]eference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent” because “ ‘the finding largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.’ ” 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). The Hernandez Court further elaborated that the “evaluation of a prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ ” Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). Because the after-acquired videotape is an ideal piece of evidence with which to assess prosecutorial credibility, the Kentucky Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, as enshrined in Hernandez, when it upheld the trial court’s Batson finding without allowing it to consider this new evidence.3
The dissent attacks our reliance on Hernandez as a basis of clearly established federal law by characterizing its contents as mere dicta. While the dissent is correct in pointing out that Hernandez is a plurality opinion, we cite to Hernandez for its explication of Batson’s holdings, which beyond doubt qualify as clearly established federal law.4 Turning directly to Batson, several aspects of the opinion con[913]*913vince us that the case in fact holds that trial courts, not appellate courts, are to assume the responsibility of making factual determinations regarding a prima facie showing of discrimination, the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation, and the ultimate existence of purposeful discrimination.
First, upon entertaining an appeal from the Kentucky Supreme Court, the Batson Court called for a remand directly to the Kentucky trial court, rather than the Kentucky Supreme Court. Specifically, the Batson Court held that
[b]eeause the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings. If the trial cow/i decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s conviction be reversed.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added).
It is the Batson Court’s instruction to the trial court to engage in the relevant fact-finding regarding racial discrimination that persuades us that federal law clearly situates trial courts as the arbiters of Batson determinations.
Furthermore, the Batson opinion is replete with references to the trial court’s central role in assessing the facts necessary to conduct the three-step inquiry into allegations of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. For example, Batson maintains that “[i]n deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances.” Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Batson Court vests its “confidence” in “trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, ... to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges create a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added). Batson further holds “the trial court will then have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added). In explaining its assignment of the Batson inquiry to trial courts, the Court emphasizes that “findings in the context under consideration here will largely turn on evaluation of credibility.” Id. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Accordingly, the Court informs reviewing courts that they “ordinarily should give those findings great deference.” Id.
In emphasizing the holdings of Batson, the Hernandez plurality explains
In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859.
In the instant case, the after-acquired evidence contained in the videotape is undoubtedly an example of such “best evidence” because it captures the “demeanor of ... attorney [Dolan] who exercise[d] the challenge^].” See id. Thus, while the dissent is correct in stating that Hernandez never expressly precludes appellate courts from considering the effect of new evidence, given the rarity of such best evidence, we believe Batson requires that [914]*914the trial court, not the appellate court, assess the prosecutor’s demeanor as captured on the videotape.
The dissent rather boldly claims that our holding today eviscerates the well-established role of appellate courts in fact-finding. Our holding, however, neither accomplishes such a thing, nor even ventures to accomplish such a thing. Rather, we merely hold that when after-acquired “best evidence” bearing on prosecutorial demeanor surfaces, it is the trial court, not the appellate court, that should consider the evidence as part of the Batson fact-finding process. Due to the narrowness of our holding, it would be unnecessary, and indeed premature, to delineate a more precise formula for permissible appellate court fact-finding.
Beyond clearly established federal law, the record does not reflect that Harris is at fault for the delayed discovery of the videotape evidence. If the tape were uncovered prior to the end of the trial in state court, there would undoubtedly have been a second Batson hearing to account for this new evidence. Because Harris acted with due diligence in reporting the discovery of the tape upon locating it after trial, we believe that procedural equity likewise requires a second Batson hearing. Accordingly, a remand is proper to reassess prosecutorial credibility in light of the videotaped evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.