Harris v. Estrada

District Court, D. New Mexico·Decided April 10, 2025·No. 1:25-cv-00053·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

CRAIG MITCHELL HARRIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case 1:25-cv-0053-WJ-KRS ) ISMAEL ESTRADA and SAIA MOTOR ) FREIGHT LINE, LLC, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND TO FILE RULE 7.1 STATEMENT THIS MATTER is before the Court sua sponte upon its review of Defendants’ First Amended Notice of Removal. (Doc. 10). On March 3, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Amend Notice of Removal (Doc. 7), in which it ordered Defendants to amend their notice of removal to properly allege the elements required for diversity jurisdiction, as set forth in the Order to Amend. Thereafter, Defendants filed their First Amended Notice of Removal (Doc. 10), which fails to correct the pleading deficiencies in the original Notice of Removal as set forth in the Court’s Order to Amend. Accordingly, Defendants are now ordered to show cause why the undersigned should not recommend that the case be remanded to state court due to deficient jurisdictional allegations. The Order to Amend identified two deficiencies in the jurisdictional allegations of the Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). First, Defendants were directed to amend the jurisdictional allegations in the Notice of Removal regarding Defendant Estrada. The Notice of Removal alleged that Estrada was a resident of Texas. As the Order to Amend explained, an individual’s citizenship for purposes of the diversity statute is determined by domicile rather than residence. See (Doc. 7 at 2 (citing, inter alia, Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C. v. Century Surety Co., 781 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2015) (“an allegation that a party ... is a resident of a state is not equivalent to an allegation of citizenship and is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the District Court”))). The First Amended Notice of Removal purports to correct the jurisdictional allegations regarding Defendant Estrada by alleging that Estrada “is a resident and citizen of” Texas. (Doc.

10 ¶ 8 (emphasis added)). But the addition of the phrase “and citizen” does not cure the defect in the original jurisdictional allegations because it states a legal conclusion (citizen), which continues to be based solely on the factual allegation of residence. “Mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough; the party pleading jurisdiction ‘must allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction.’” Celli v. Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 327 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Penteco Corp. v. Union Gas Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991)). Furthermore, the facts alleged to show the citizenship of the party in question must satisfy the plausibility pleading standard. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). As Defendants were previously informed, citizenship turns on domicile, which is defined as residency combined with an intent to remain indefinitely in the place in question. See (Doc. 7 at 2 (citing

Crawley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 776, 678 (10th Cir. 1983)). For the Court to plausibly conclude that Defendant Estrada is a citizen of Texas, Defendants must allege, if they are able to do so, that Estrada is domiciled in Texas, or, in other words, that he resides in Texas with the intent of remaining there indefinitely. The second jurisdictional defect identified by the Order to Amend concerns the Notice of Removal’s allegations regarding the citizenship of Defendant SAIA Motor Freight Line, LLC. As the Order to Amend explained, a limited liability company takes the citizenship of all its members, and when an entity is composed of multiple layers of constituent entities, the citizenship determination requires an exploration of the citizenship of the constituent entities as far down as necessary to unravel fully the citizenship of the entity before the court. See (Doc. 7 at 4 (quoting Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C., 781 F.3d at 1238, and Woodward, Inc. v. Zhro Sols., LLC, No. 18- CV-01468-PAB, 2018 WL 11455060, at *2 (D. Colo. June 13, 2018))). The First Amended Notice of Removal attempts to correct the deficient allegations

regarding the citizenship of Defendant SAIA Motor Freight Line, LLC by alleging that SAIA “does not have any members that are incorporated or have a principal place of business in the state of New Mexico.” (Doc. 12 ¶ 10). In the first place, this allegation assumes, without affirmatively alleging, that all members of SAIA Motor Freight Line are corporations, whose citizenship would be determined by their place of incorporation and principal place of business. But the Court cannot plausibly conclude the members are all corporations when Defendants have neither alleged they are nor identified the entities in question. Moreover, “[a]lleging a party is not a citizen of a particular state has been found insufficient to give jurisdiction.” PDII, LLC v. Sky Aircraft Maint., LLC, No. 1:24CV430, 2024 WL 4349081, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2024) (quoting Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 324 (1888)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24CV430, 2024

WL 4542810 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 22, 2024); accord D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra, 661 F.3d 124, 126 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Cameron remains the governing precedent.”); SunTrust Bank v. Vill. at Fair Oaks Owner, LLC, 766 F. Supp. 2d 686, 693-94 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citing Cameron for the rule “that negative allegations of citizenship are insufficient to establish diversity of citizenship”); Thurston v. Page, 920 F. Supp. 152, 154 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing 13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3611, at 517–18 (2d ed. 1984), for the proposition that “[a] negative statement that a party is not a citizen of a particular state is not sufficient because it does not eliminate the possibility that the party is not a citizen of any state’”). As in Pentair Flow Techs., LLC v. L.I. Dev. Kansas City, LLC, No. 22-2241-JAR-ADM, 2022 WL 2290532, (D. Kan. June 24, 2022), Defendants’ allegations are deficient because they have “not identified defendant’s members, let alone alleged their citizenship. Rather, [Defendants] simply state[ ] that [SAIA] [“does not have any members that are citizens of New Mexico” (Doc.

12 ¶ 10)].” Pentair Flow Techs, 2022 WL 2290532, at *1 (internal citations omitted). “[W]hen a removing party ‘pleads a negative, merely alleging that [its] members are not citizens of certain states,’ that party has ‘failed to satisfy [its] burden of establishing diversity of citizenship.’” PDII, LLC, 2024 WL 4349081, at *3 (quoting Percival Ptners. Ltd. v. Nduom, No. 1:22-CV-16 (RDA/WEF), 2023 WL 2088421, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2023), aff’d, 99 F.4th 696 (4th Cir. 2024)); accord Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant parties.”); Receivership Est. of Mann Bracken, LLP v. Cline, No. RWT 12CV292, 2012 WL 2921355, at *5 (D. Md. July 16, 2012).1 Thus, Defendants may not rely on a negative allegation of citizenship as to SAIA, but must instead “specifically identify” each member of that

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Related

Cameron v. Hodges
127 U.S. 322 (Supreme Court, 1888)
Celli v. Shoell
40 F.3d 324 (Tenth Circuit, 1994)
Simmons v. Rosenberg
572 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. New York, 1983)
Suntrust Bank v. Village at Fair Oaks Owner, LLC
766 F. Supp. 2d 686 (E.D. Virginia, 2011)
Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C. v. Century Surety Co.
781 F.3d 1233 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
Thurston v. Page
920 F. Supp. 152 (D. Kansas, 1996)
Percival Partners Limited v. Paa Nduom
99 F.4th 696 (Fourth Circuit, 2024)