Harris v. American Behavioral Health System

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 5, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00989
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM HARRIS, CASE NO. C23-0989-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS 10 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM, et al., 11

Defendant(s). 12

13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s 14 miscellaneous motions. Dkt. Nos. 25, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 48. After reviewing the parties’ 15 briefing and the balance of the record, the Court grants Defendants’ motion (Dkt. No. 25) and 16 denies Plaintiff’s motions (Dkt. Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 48). 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff Christopher William Harris entered a substance abuse treatment program at 19 Defendant American Behavioral Health System (“ABHS”) on May 15, 2023. Dkt. No. 7 at 10. 20 Harris signed an information release permitting ABHS to contact Harris’s supervising officer or 21 any other supervising agent of the court if he left the treatment program before completion. Id. 22 The release identifies United States Probation Officer Lisa Combs as Harris’s supervising officer. 23 Id. 24 1 Harris received a letter from ABHS on June 5, 2023, notifying him that a disclosure of his 2 health information, which constituted “a potential violation of [federal regulations,] occurred[.]” 3 Dkt. No. 7 at 12. The potential violation consisted of a phone call from Defendant Jessica Donyes

4 (an ABHS employee) to Officer Combs requesting “collateral information” (id.) as well as emails 5 from Donyes to Officer Combs providing “an update and progress on [Harris].” Id. Harris was 6 released from ABHS on June 7, 2023. Dkt. No. 7 at 9. 7 On June 22, 2023, Harris appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge Brian Tsuchida for an 8 evidentiary hearing in a criminal proceeding unrelated to this case (hereinafter “the criminal 9 case”).1 See U.S. v. Harris, No. 23-cr-0019-RAJ (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2023), Dkt. No. 36. 10 Apparently, at that hearing, the information disclosed by Donyes to Officer Combs was read aloud, 11 and Judge Tsuchida subsequently modified the terms of Harris’s bond. See Dkt. No. 7 at 8. 12 Harris filed this action in July 2023, alleging four causes of action against ABHS and 13 Donyes: (1) violation of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”); (2) 14 negligence; (3) breach of contract; and (4) defamation. Dkt. No. 7. Harris sought $75,000 in 15 damages per “person sep[a]rate” and dismissal of the charges in the criminal case. Id. at 8. 16 Defendants2 filed a motion to dismiss in October 2023, contending that Donyes should be 17 dismissed because Harris failed to serve her within 90 days, and that, in the alternative, Harris’s 18 complaint should be dismissed because he has failed to state claims upon which relief may be 19 granted. Dkt. No. 25. 20 // 21

22 1 The Court takes judicial notice that Harris was a defendant in a criminal case in this district, United States v. Harris, No. 23-cr-0019-RAJ (W.D. Wash.). See U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 23 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (federal courts may “take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue” (cleaned up)). 2 Although Harris’s complaint also lists “Prosecuting Attorney” and Combs as defendants, the record shows 24 that he served only ABHS. See Dkt. No. 7 at 7, Dkt. No. 13. 1 II. ANALYSIS 2 A. Harris has Failed to State Claims Upon Which Relief may be Granted. 3 A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should be granted

4 if “‘the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, [do not] entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.’” 5 Chavez v. U.S., 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 6 10-04341 CRB, 2011 WL 6140912, at *3 (N.C. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011)). 7 With these standards in mind, the Court considers the sufficiency of Harris’s allegations as 8 to each claim referenced in his complaint. 9 1. HIPAA 10 HIPAA generally prohibits the disclosure of an individual’s protected health information 11 unless authorized by the individual. See U.S. v. Elliott, 676 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 (D. Md. 2009). 12 HIPAA does not, however, provide a private right of action if an unauthorized disclosure occurs.

13 See Grant v. Alperovich, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1366 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citing Webb v. Smart 14 Document Sols., LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007)). 15 Harris alleges that Defendants violated his right to the privacy of his medical records under 16 HIPAA by disclosing information related to his treatment and care to his probation officer, 17 inconsistent with the information release he signed. See Dkt. No. 7 at 8–11. Specifically, Harris 18 alleges that Defendants violated HIPAA in disclosing to his probation officer statements Harris 19 made to his provider regarding his drug use as well as the reason why he was seeking treatment. 20 Id. 21 Defendants argue that, assuming that the alleged disclosures occurred, and even if those 22 disclosures contravened HIPAA, because HIPAA does not authorize a private right of action,

23 Harris’s claim fails. Dkt. No. 25 at 7. Defendants further contend that to the extent Harris 24 characterizes the alleged HIPAA violation as a violation of his civil rights, the alleged disclosure 1 was not “shocking, degrading, egregious, humiliating, or flagrant” and therefore fails to violate 2 Harris’s civil rights. Id. at 8. 3 Neither of Harris’s responses to Defendants’ motion to dismiss address the legal support

4 for his HIPAA claim. See Dkt. Nos. 31, 35. Because HIPAA does not authorize a private right of 5 action, and because the alleged HIPAA violation is not sufficiently egregious to infringe upon 6 Harris’s civil rights, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. See Dalessio v. 7 Univ. of Wash., No. C17-642 MJP, 2019 WL 2409607, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2019), aff’d, 8 816 F. App’x 121 (9th Cir. 2020). 9 2. Negligence 10 Harris alleges that the Defendants negligently disclosed his private medical information to 11 his probation officer, who discussed the information with the prosecutor in the criminal case. See 12 Dkt. No. 7 at 20.

13 Defendants argue that Harris has failed to plead facts necessary to establish all of the 14 elements of a negligence claim. Dkt. No. 25 at 8–9. A plaintiff must establish four elements to 15 state a claim for negligence: (1) the defendant owes plaintiff a duty, (2) the defendant breached 16 that duty, (3) plaintiff was injured, and (4) the breach was the proximate cause of the injury. 17 Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce Cty., 192 P.3d 886, 889 (Wash. 2008). Defendants contend that, even 18 assuming Harris has alleged that the first two elements are met, he has not alleged any facts 19 connecting the disclosure of his medical information with any particular outcome in the criminal 20 case. Dkt. No. 25 at 8–9. Defendants emphasize (id.) that Harris was found to have violated the 21 terms of his bond conditions, and that his violations are unrelated to Defendants’ disclosure of 22 Harris’s medical information. See Dkt. No. 7 at 9.

23 Neither of Harris’s responses to Defendants’ motion to dismiss address the causation 24 element of his negligence claim or otherwise identify a connection between the disclosure and an 1 injury. See Dkt. Nos. 31, 35. Because Harris has failed to plead facts to support his negligence 2 claim, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss it. 3 3. Breach of Contract

4 Harris alleges that Defendants breached the information release he signed by disclosing his 5 medical information to his probation officer. Dkt. No. 7 at 8. A plaintiff must establish three 6 elements to state a claim for breach of contract: (1) a contract between plaintiff and defendant 7 imposed a duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach was the proximate cause 8 of injury to plaintiff. Nw. Indep. Forest Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 899 P.2d 6, 9 (Wash. 9 Ct. App. 1995). Defendants contend that even assuming Harris has alleged that the first two 10 elements are met, he has not alleged any facts connecting the disclosure of his medical information 11 with an injury. Dkt. No. 25 at 9–10. 12 The Court agrees. As explained above with respect to the negligence claim, neither

13 Harris’s complaint nor his responses to Defendants’ motion to dismiss identifies a connection 14 between the disclosure of his medical information and an injury of any kind. Dkt. Nos. 7, 31, 35. 15 Because Harris has failed to plead facts to support his claim for breach of contract, the Court grants 16 Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim. 17 4. Defamation 18 Harris alleges that Donyes defamed and slandered him by disclosing his medical 19 information directly to his probation officer and indirectly to the prosecutor in the criminal case. 20 Dkt. No. 7 at 8. A defamation claim must be premised on a statement that is provably false and 21 must result in damages. Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 943 P.2d 350, 356–57 (Wash. Ct. 22 App. 1997). A statement that expresses an opinion is not provably false, and plaintiff bears the

23 burden of proving falsity. Id. 24 1 Defendants contend that Harris’s defamation claim is premised on statements — namely 2 Donyes’s representation that Harris was in denial about his drug use and “butting heads” with her, 3 that he had lied about whether he had been court-ordered to participate in treatment, and whether

4 he admitted to a counselor that he had pointed lasers at airplanes (the charge at issue in the criminal 5 case) — that are not provably false. Dkt. No. 25 at 10–11. Whether Harris was in denial about 6 his drug use or was “butting heads” with his counselor is merely a statement of Donyes’s opinion 7 and thus cannot form the basis of a defamation claim. Schmalenberg, 943 P.2d at 357. As to the 8 reasons why Harris sought treatment, Harris believes that because he “self-admitted” to treatment 9 at ABHS, his treatment was not court-ordered. See Dkt. No. 31 at 1–2. But the probation report 10 excerpted in Harris’s complaint indicates that he sought treatment at ABHS because his probation 11 officer instructed him to participate in treatment. See Dkt. No. 7 at 9. 12 Furthermore, even if Harris could prove that he did not admit to his counselor that he

13 pointed lasers at airplanes, or could prove that the counselor mischaracterized his attitude or any 14 of the other statements at issue, Harris has failed to allege facts indicating that these statements 15 caused the damage he complains of. Rather, according to the excerpt of the probation report 16 attached to the complaint (Dkt. No. 7 at 9), Harris’s bond was modified due to his repeated 17 violations of the conditions of his bond, rather than any of Defendants’ disclosures of private 18 information. The physical and emotional hardships that Harris alleges resulted from those 19 modifications (e.g., Dkt. No. 30 at 4; Dkt. No. 37 at 3) cannot be attributed to Defendants’ 20 disclosures if those disclosures did not result in the modifications of his bond conditions. 3 See, 21 3 The Court takes judicial notice of the public docket of the criminal case, which indicates that at the hearing 22 where Defendants’ disclosures were read, Harris admitted certain violations of his bond conditions, and that the modification of his bond conditions was based on those admissions. See U.S. v. Harris, No. 23-cr-0019-RAJ (W.D. 23 Wash. June 22, 2023), Dkt. No. 36. The Court’s judicial notice is limited to the docket entry summarizing the evidentiary hearing that culminated in the modification of the bond proceedings because that summary is not subject to dispute as to its authenticity. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689–90 (9th Cir. 2001) (“On a Rule 24 1 e.g., Dkt. No. 30 at 2–5. Without an alleged causal link between the allegedly false statements and 2 the element of damages, Harris has failed to plead all of the required elements of a defamation 3 claim. See Schmalenberg, 943 P.2d at 363–64 (explaining that proximate cause is an element of

4 defamation in Washington). 5 Because Harris has failed to plead facts to support his defamation claim, the Court grants 6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss it. 7 B. Harris’s Proposed Amendments Do Not Cure the Deficiencies in his Complaint.

8 After Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Harris filed multiple motions to amend his 9 complaint to add defendants and claims for constitutional violations, and to request additional 10 damages. See Dkt. Nos. 38–39. 11 Although the motions for leave to amend attempt to add claims for constitutional violations 12 based on the same conduct referenced in the original complaint, Harris has not identified a 13 constitutional right that has been violated by the conduct of current Defendants or those he seeks 14 to add as defendants. Dkt. Nos. 38–39. Nor do any of the proposed amendments cure the 15 deficiencies identified in the previous section, because they are premised on claims that cannot be 16 sustained. Id. Because amendment would therefore be futile, the Court denies Harris’s motions 17 for leave to amend his complaint. See Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004) 18 (“Futility alone can justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”). 19 // 20 // 21 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, when a court takes judicial notice of another court’s opinion, it may do so not for the truth 22 of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity.” (cleaned up)). 23 The Court also takes judicial notice of Harris’s subsequent guilty plea in the criminal case (U.S. v. Harris, No. 23-cr-0019-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2023), Dkt. No. 57), which further indicates that even if Defendants falsely stated that Harris admitted to a counselor that he pointed lasers at airplanes, that report was not the cause of any harm 24 to Harris that would not have occurred for other reasons. 1 C. Harris’s Motion to Transfer Venue is Denied. 2 Harris filed a motion to transfer venue to the Tacoma division of the Western District of 3 Washington, suggesting that it would be inappropriate to have his case heard in this Court (in the

4 Seattle division) because of a potential conflict of interest stemming from the proximity of the 5 Court to the proceedings in the criminal case and individuals referenced in Harris’s complaint, 6 including Harris’s probation officer. Dkt. No. 40. Harris additionally argued that this Court’s 7 denial of various motions Harris has filed in this matter further demonstrates bias against him that 8 warrants transfer of this case out of Seattle. Dkt. No. 50. 9 Harris has not shown that venue is inappropriate in Seattle under the assignment rules of 10 this district, however. See Local Civil Rule 3(d) & (e). Nor has Harris shown that a transfer to 11 Tacoma would address the proximity concerns, given that the Seattle and Tacoma divisions of this 12 Court work together in the same district. Finally, while the Court is sympathetic to the difficulties

13 faced by pro se litigants, the Court cannot grant Harris relief where the law does not provide it. 14 Specifically, Harris’s prior motions sought relief unavailable under the Federal Rules of Civil 15 Procedure or other applicable law. See Dkt. Nos. 24, 43. As such, the Court’s disposition of 16 Harris’s motions to date does not provide a basis on which to transfer this case to the Tacoma 17 division. Accordingly, Harris’s motion to transfer venue is denied. 18 D. Harris’s Miscellaneous Motions are Denied. 19 Because the Court finds that Harris’s claims should be dismissed, Harris’s other motions 20 for discovery, subpoenas, summary judgment, declaratory relief and information regarding 21 defense counsel are unwarranted and therefore denied. 22 //

23 // 24 // 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions (Dkt. No. 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 3 48) and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 25. The clerk is directed to

4 administratively close this case. 5 Dated this 5th day of January, 2024. 6 A 7 Kymberly K. Evanson 8 United States District Judge

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