Opinion issued January 22, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00399-CV ——————————— HARRIS COUNTY, Appellant V. MICHAEL J. HALL, Appellee
On Appeal from the 125th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2023-58319
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Harris County (the “County”) challenges the trial court’s order
denying its plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment motion in an
employment discrimination suit brought by appellee Michael J. Hall. The County
contends that the trial court erred because Hall failed to produce evidence generating a fact issue as to whether the County’s governmental immunity to suit
was waived. We reverse and render judgment dismissing Hall’s claims against the
County.
Background
Hall began working for the Harris County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”) in
2012 as a detention officer and subsequently as a detention training officer in the
Harris County Jail. The essential duties of a detention officer in the Harris County
jail include the proper care, custody, and control of inmates housed in the County’s
jail facilities.
Beginning in 2020, Hall started missing work, sometimes without letting the
County know of his intended absence. He last reported to work in May 2020. In
August 2020, he was advised that he would soon exhaust his paid leave. In October
2020, Hall requested a six-month leave of absence (“LOA”) due to a diagnosis of
Non-Alcoholic Cirrhosis of the Liver Stage IV and the need for subsequent
surgery, treatment, and recovery. The request was approved. In April 2021, Hall
submitted a second LOA request for six additional months of leave. The request
was approved.
On September 1, 2021, he requested to transfer to a civilian position,
claiming, among other restrictions, that he could not have any contact with
inmates. The request was denied. On September 15, 2021, Hall submitted a third
2 LOA request, stating that he could not work and requesting another six-month
leave. The request was denied. Following the third LOA request, the HCSO
terminated Hall’s employment effective October 6, 2021. The termination letter
cited Hall’s lack of current Commission of Law Enforcement (“TCOLE”) license.
The letter stated that his leave of absence was rescinded due to a poor attendance
record.
Hall filed an EEOC complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission on
Civil Rights alleging discrimination based on disability and retaliation. He then
sued the County alleging violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act (“TCHRA”), specifically that he was discriminated and retaliated against
because of his disability.
The County filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary
judgment asserting its immunity and arguing Hall failed to establish that immunity
had been waived. The County alleged that Hall failed to establish a prima facie
case of disability discrimination or retaliation, that Hall had not exhausted his
administrative remedies with regard to his retaliation and aiding and abetting
discrimination claims, and that there was no cause of action for practice and
pattern discrimination for which governmental immunity can be waived. The
County attached as evidence Hall’s attendance record, LOA requests, transfer
requests, emails related to his requests, the Sherriff’s office’s transfer and leave
3 policies, Hall’s deposition, and records of Hall’s long term disability payments.
Hall responded and attached his own declaration and deposition excerpts from
various HCSO employees.
The trial court denied the County’s plea to the jurisdiction and summary
judgment motion. This interlocutory appeal followed.1
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A. Governmental Immunity and Plea to the Jurisdiction
Governmental units are immune from suit unless immunity is clearly and
unambiguously waived by state law. City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d
523, 528 (Tex. 2022); see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034 (“[I]n order to preserve the
legislature’s interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriates
process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless
the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”). Because
governmental immunity is jurisdictional, it is properly raised through a plea to the
jurisdiction, which we review de novo. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642
(Tex. 2007).
1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (stating that an immediate appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction filed by a governmental unit); PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juv. Just. Dep’t, 593 S.W.3d 296, 301 n.1 (Tex. 2019) (noting that an interlocutory appeal may be taken under § 51.014(a)(8) “from a refusal to dismiss for want of jurisdiction whether the jurisdictional argument is presented by plea to the jurisdiction or some other vehicle, such as a motion for summary judgment”) (internal citation removed). 4 A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that functions generally to defeat
an action without regard to whether the plaintiff’s asserted claims have merit.
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012).
The plea challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep Sch.
Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether a trial court has subject
matter jurisdiction and “[w]hether a pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively
demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction” are questions of law that we
review de novo. Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex.
2016) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226
(Tex. 2004)).
The plaintiff has the initial burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that
the trial court has jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852
S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993); see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635. “If the plaintiff
pleaded facts making out a prima facie case and the governmental unit instead
challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider the relevant evidence
submitted.” Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Douglas, 544 S.W.3d 486, 492
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at
635. “The analysis then ‘mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment.’” Tex.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Garcia, 372
S.W.3d at 635).
5 B. Summary Judgment
A movant for traditional summary judgment has the burden to establish that
no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). If the nonmovant produces more than a
scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue on the challenged elements, then summary
judgment is improper. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437
S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014). “More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the
evidence ‘rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to
differ in their conclusions.’” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751
(Tex. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711
(Tex. 1997)). Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is “so
weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion” of a fact. Ford
Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).
“We review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo.” Scripps
NP Operating, LLC v. Carter, 573 S.W.3d 781, 790 (Tex. 2019). The evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts against the motion. Buck v. Palmer,
381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam); Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d
417, 424 (Tex. 2009).
6 C. TCHRA
The TCHRA prohibits, among other things, age, disability, and national
origin discrimination and retaliation by employers. See TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.051,
21.055, 21.105. The TCHRA waives immunity from suit “for statutory violations,
which means the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute
absent” a “claim for conduct that actually violates the statute.” Alamo Heights
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 763, 770 (Tex. 2018); see TEX. LAB.
CODE § 21.254. If a plaintiff fails to allege a violation of the TCHRA, then the trial
court does not have jurisdiction, and the claim should be dismissed. Garcia, 372
S.W.3d at 637.
“We follow the burden-shifting framework the United States Supreme Court
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, [411 U.S. 792 (1973)].” Tex.
Tech. Univ. Health Sciences Ctr.-El Paso v. Flores 612 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex.
2020); Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782.
Under this framework: (1) the plaintiff must first create a presumption of illegal discrimination by establishing a prima facie case; (2) the defendant must then rebut that presumption by producing evidence of a legitimate-nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action; and (3) the plaintiff must then overcome the rebuttal evidence by producing evidence that the defendant’s stated reason is a mere pretext.
Flores, 612 S.W.3d at 305; Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782. If a plaintiff fails to
establish a prima facie case against a governmental unit or overcome the rebuttal
7 evidence, then the trial court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. See
Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26.
Among the express purposes of the TCHRA are to “provide for the
execution of the policies” of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of
the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and their subsequent
amendments. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.001(1), (3). Thus, we look to those analogous
federal statutes and the cases interpreting them in applying the TCHRA. Lara, 625
S.W.3d at 52; see Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 578 n.16 (5th
Cir. 2020).
Analysis
The County asserts that the trial court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the
claims against it because Hall failed to establish a prima facie case against it for
any of his causes of action. We consider each of Hall’s claims in turn.
A. Disability Discrimination Claim
The Labor Code prohibits discrimination that occurs “because of or on the
basis of a physical or mental condition that does not impair an individual’s ability
to reasonably perform a job.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.105. To establish a prima facie
case of disability discrimination under the TCHRA, Hall has the burden to show
(1) he has a disability, (2) he is qualified for the job, and (3) he suffered an adverse
employment decision because of his disability. Lara, 625 S.W.3d at 61 (citing
8 Green v. Dallas Cnty. Schs., 537 S.W.3d 501, 503 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam)); see
Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 436 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); see also TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.105
(noting that, for purposes of TCHRA, disability means “a physical or mental
condition that does not impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform a
job.”).
The County argues that Hall cannot establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination because he cannot meet his burden as to the second element: that he
was qualified for the position he held at the time he was fired. The County argues
that Hall was not qualified to work in the Harris County jail because at the time of
his termination, his jailer’s license had expired. We agree.
A plaintiff can show the “qualification” element in one of two ways: (1) by
proving that he can perform all essential job functions with or without
modifications or accommodations; or (2) by showing that some reasonable
accommodation by the employer would enable him to perform the job. Donaldson,
495 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093
(5th Cir. 1996)).
Hall was not qualified to perform the essential functions of a detention
officer in the Harris County jail. The evidence shows that Hall’s TCOLE license
was suspended at the time of his termination, rendering him unqualified to work as
9 a detention officer or detention training officer in the jail. Hall argues that he later
received a waiver from TCOLE for the licensure requirement, but Hall did not seek
that waiver until after his separation notice. To avoid summary judgment, the
plaintiff must show that he was qualified at the time of his termination. Moss v.
Harris Cnty. Constable Precinct One, 851 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2017). The
evidence reflects that at the time of his termination, Hall was not qualified to
perform his job duties because his jailer’s license was not in good standing.
Hall failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination
because he could not establish that at the time of his termination he was qualified
for the job. Absent a viable claim for disability discrimination, the County’s
immunity is not waived, the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim, and the claim must be dismissed. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 637. The
trial court erred by not dismissing Hall’s disability discrimination claim against the
B. Failure to Accommodate Claim
An employer violates the TCHRA if the employer, “fail[s] or refuse[s] to
make a reasonable workplace accommodation to a known physical or mental
limitation of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
employee.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.128(a); Harris Ctr. for Mental Health & IDD v.
McLeod, No. 01-22-00947-CV, 2024 WL 1383271, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston
10 [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The elements of a failure to
accommodate claim are: (1) the individual has a disability; (2) the employer had
notice of the disability; (3) with a reasonable accommodation, the individual could
perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) the employer refused to
make the accommodation. Datar v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 518 S.W.3d 467,
474 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
To the extent Hall argues that the County failed to accommodate him in his
jailer position, we have explained supra that at the time of termination, Hall was
not a qualified employee because his TCOLE license had lapsed. See TEX. LAB.
CODE § 21.128(a) (stating employer violates TCHRA if fails to make reasonable
workplace accommodation for “otherwise qualified” employee with disability).
Moreover, Hall submitted a third LOA request after his transfer request which
stated that he was unable to work at all. Therefore, Hall has not produced
controverting evidence indicating that he could in fact work.
Hall also argues that the County failed to accommodate him when it did not
transfer him to a different position. The evidence reflects that Hall failed to request
transfer to a specific and available position. He also did not allege facts to show
that he met the qualifications of that position. See Moss, 851 F.3d at 419 (holding
plaintiff did not meet burden of raising fact issue regarding whether transferring
him to light duty position would be reasonable accommodation because he failed
11 to present evidence that such position was vacant at time of termination or that he
could perform its duties). Hall’s summary judgment evidence includes depositions
from various County employees stating generally that civilian positions are usually
available. Hall failed to present any evidence that a specific civilian duty position,
which is a different job than what he had, was vacant at the time of his termination
or that he could perform the essential functions of a civilian position.
Because Hall failed to provide evidence of a specific civilian position where
he could be accommodated or evidence that he was a qualified employee who
could be accommodated in his jailer position, he cannot establish a prima facie
case of his failure to accommodate claim. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
denying the County’s summary judgment motion on Hall’s failure to accommodate
claim, and the claim must be dismissed.
C. Retaliation Claim
The County argues that the trial court erred in denying its summary
judgment motion on Hall’s retaliation claim because Hall failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, and even assuming he did, Hall did not establish a prima
facie case of retaliation.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the TCHRA, an
employee must demonstrate that (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the
TCHRA, (2) he experienced a material adverse employment action, and (3) a
12 causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Alamo
Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782.
“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to
filing a civil action alleging violations of the [T]CHRA.” Bering v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice-PFCMOD, No. 02-24-00033-CV, 2024 WL 4455843, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 10, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Hoffmann-LaRoche
Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tex. 2004)). As a governmental entity,
Harris County is immune from suit absent a waiver of immunity, and all statutory
prerequisites to suit are jurisdictional. Id. A TCHRA plaintiff’s exhaustion of
administrative remedies “begins by filing [an administrative] complaint.” Waffle
House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 804–05 (Tex. 2010). Filing an
administrative complaint does not give the plaintiff carte blanche to pursue other
TCHRA claims that he might later devise. Bering, 2024 WL 4455843, at *2. The
resulting TCHRA lawsuit is confined to claims specifically identified in the
administrative complaint and to those factually related claims that could
“reasonably be expected to grow out of the agency’s investigation of the claims” in
the administrative complaint. Univ of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Carroll,
No. 01-23-0014-CV, 2024 WL 3417051, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
July 16, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Cuadra v. Declaration Title Co.,
682 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.)). When
13 determining an administrative complaint’s scope, the crucial element of a charge of
discrimination “is the factual statement contained in the administrative complaint.”
Carroll, 2024 WL 3417051, at *7 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see
TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.201(c)(2) (requiring administrative complaint to state “the
facts on which the complaint is based”).
Hall filed a form EEOC complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission.
On the form, he checked boxes indicating he alleged discrimination based on
retaliation and disability. He included a three-typed-page factual statement
outlining his complaint. The factual statement does not mention retaliation or
termination for engaging in a protected activity. On the last page of the charge, he
states that he was “dismissed on inadequate information . . . based on sheer
neglect.” He does not state that he was terminated because he engaged in a
protected activity.
Hall’s petition states that the County “retaliated unlawfully” when it
terminated Hall for engaging in a protected activity “by opposing a discriminatory
practice on 9/20/21 with Paul Mendez HR Analyst.” Later, in his deposition, Hall
stated that he called Mendez, a human resources representative with the County, on
September 20, 2021, and expressed that he believed he was discriminated against
by the County based on his medical condition.
14 We conclude that Hall’s charge does not include an adequate factual basis to
put the County on notice that he was complaining that he was retaliated against
based on his disability. Therefore, Hall did not exhaust his administrative remedies
as to this claim. Since Hall failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the
County’s immunity with regard to Hall’s TCHRA retaliation claim has not been
waived. The trial court erred in denying the County’s summary judgment motion
on this claim.
D. “Practice and Pattern” Discrimination Claim
Hall’s petition alleges that the County has a pattern and practice of
discrimination against minority employees. The County asserts that the TCHRA
does not waive governmental immunity for such a claim and that Hall also failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
The TCHRA waives immunity when a plaintiff alleges a violation of the
TCHRA by pleading facts that fall under a cause of action within the statute.
Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770. The TCHRA does not contain a cause of action
for a pattern and practice of discrimination. See TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.001–23.003
(employment discrimination). Therefore, the County’s immunity is not waived.
Moreover, Hall’s EEOC charge does not contain factual statements alleging a
pattern and practice claim. Carroll, 2024 WL 3417051, at *7 (stating TCHRA
lawsuit is confined to claims brought in administrative charge). Even if the
15 TCHRA waived immunity for this claim, Hall did not administratively exhaust his
remedies. Id. (stating TCHRA lawsuit is confined to claims brought in
administrative charge).
The trial court erred by denying the County’s summary judgment motion
related to this claim.
E. Aiding and Abetting Discrimination Claim
The County argues that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment
on Hall’s aiding and abetting discrimination claim. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.056
(stating it is a violation “if [a]n employer . . . aids, abets incites, or coerces a person
to engage in a discriminatory practice.”). As explained supra, Hall failed to meet
his burden to show that Harris County engaged in a discriminatory practice. Hall
therefore cannot establish a prima facie case that the County aided or abetted a
person to engage in a discriminatory practice. Moreover, Hall failed to exhaust
administrative remedies because his EEOC charge does not include facts or
statements alleging an aiding and abetting claim. Carroll, 2024 WL 3417051, at *7
(stating TCHRA lawsuit is confined to claims brought in administrative charge).
Hall’s EEOC charge did not include factual statements alleging that the County
enticed any other party to commit discriminatory practices.
16 Because Hall failed to establish a prima facie case of aiding and abetting
discrimination, the County’s immunity from suit is not waived. The trial court
erred by denying the County’s summary judgment motion on this claim.
Conclusion
Having determined that the County’s immunity from suit is not waived for
any of Hall’s claims against it, we reverse and render judgment dismissing Hall’s
claims against the County.
Susanna Dokupil Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Morgan and Dokupil.