CALVERT, Chief Justice.
The motion for rehearing filed herein by respondent is granted; the judgment entered on November 29, 1967, is set aside; the opinions filed on that date are withdrawn, and the opinion and judgment set out below are substituted.
This is a workman’s compensation case. The case was tried to a jury and judgment was rendered upon the jury’s verdict awarding the respondent-employee, Agnes King, a recovery of compensation benefits. The court of civil appeals affirmed. 408 S.W.2d 790. We reverse the judgments of the courts below and remand the cause to the trial court for retrial.
By way of special defense to Mrs. King’s suit, Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, the insurance carrier, pleaded that Mrs. King was not an employee of Musser Motors, Inc., its assured, at the time and on the occasion of her injury, but was a domestic servant of an officer of the corporation.1 Domestic servants are excluded from coverage afforded by our Workmen’s Compensation Act. Article 8306, Section 2, Vernon’s Ann.Tex. Civ. Stats.
The case was submitted to the jury on special issues. In answer to Special Issues Nos. 1 and 2, the jury found that Mrs. [217]*217King sustained an accidental injury on May 6, 1964. Special Issue No. 2-A inquired, “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Agnes King was not hired or retained by Musser Motors, Inc. as a domestic servant?” To this issue, the jury answered, “She was not hired or retained by Musser Motors [as a domestic servant].” In answer to Special Issue No. 2-B, the jury found that on the date of her injury Mrs. King was an employee of Musser Motors, Inc. Special Issue No. 2-C inquired, “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such injury, if any, was sustained in the course of her employment with Musser Motors, Inc.?” In connection with this issue the court instructed the jury as follows: “‘Injury sustained in the course of employment,’ as used in this charge is meant all injuries of every kind and character, having to do with or originating from the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer, received by the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer, whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere.” The jury answered this issue, “Yes.”
Hardware has presented only one point of error on appeal as a basis for its contention that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment should be rendered that the plaintiff take nothing. The point of error as stated in Hardware’s brief in the court of civil appeals is as follows: “The error of the Court in entering judgment for the Appellee and overruling Appellants’ amended motion for a new trial because there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that the Appellee was not hired or retained as a domestic servant.” We treat this point of error as stating that the trial court erred in entering judgment for Mrs. King because the evidence establishes conclusively that she was hired or retained by Musser Motors as a domestic servant. As thus restated, the question presented is whether the trial court erred in entering judgment for Mrs. King if the evidence shows conclusively that Mrs. King was hired or retained by Musser Motors as a domestic servant. We hold that it did not.
Examination of the trial court’s charge as a whole clearly indicates that it was tried on the theory that the terms of Mrs. King’s contract of employment with Musser Motors was determinative of her right to compensation benefits; that if Mrs. King was “hired or retained” as a domestic servant, she was not entitled to compensation benefits, but that she was entitled to benefits if she was “hired or retained” as an employee of the business establishment. Special Issue No. 2-A speaks only to- Mrs. King’s contract of employment; it does not speak to the particular type of work in which she was engaged at the time of her injury.
The evidence shows that Mrs. King was employed by Musser Motors some eight or ten years prior to the trial of this case. The evidence in the record, which we need not detail, establishes conclusively that Mrs. King was “hired or retained” by Musser Motors in two- capacities, as a domestic servant in the homes of officers of the company and as a janitress at the company’s place of business. If we substitute for the jury’s answer to Special Issue No. 2-A the answer which we have found is conclusively established by the evidence as the correct answer to the issue, that is, that Mrs. King was employed as a domestic servant and as a janitress, we yet cannot say that the answer is a sound reason for holding that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for Mrs. King. The reason we cannot do so is because the answer does not establish that she was injured while performing work in her employment as a domestic servant.
A person’s contract of employment may provide for services in two capacities or enterprises, in one of which he is covered by the Compensation Act and in the other of which he is not covered. Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n. v. Derrick, 207 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.Civ.App.1947, writ ref’d n. r. e.). If [218]*218injured while performing work or services in a capacity or an enterprise covered by the Act, he may recover benefits; but if injured while performing work or services in a capacity or an enterprise excluded from coverage, he may not recover. Denny v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, etc., 172 Wash. 631, 21 P.2d 275, at 278 (1933); Maeda v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 192 Wash. 87, 72 P.2d 1034, at 1035 (1937). See also 172 A.L.R. 382.
Hardware argues in this court, as it did in the court of civil appeals, that the evidence establishes conclusively that Mrs. King’s injury was sustained while she was performing services in her capacity as a domestic servant. The impediment to consideration of this argument is that Hardware has no- point of error to which it is reasonably related or referable. It presented a motion for instructed verdict in the trial court at the close of all the evidence on the ground that “the evidence of record conclusively establishes that at the time of the injury * * * the plaintiff herein was a domestic servant. * * * ” The trial court overruled the motion. The action of the trial court in overruling the motion was assigned as error in the motion for new trial, but at no stage of the appeal has Hardware complained that the trial court erred in overruling the motion. If it had done so, we would have an entirely different question presented for our consideration. Not having complained of this action of the trial court, the error, if any, in overruling the motion has been waived. Moreover, as is pointed out above, the court submitted Special Issue No. 2-C inquiring, in effect, if Mrs. King’s injuries originated in “the work, business, trade or profession” of Musser Motors, Inc., and Hardware did not object to its submission on the ground that there was no evidence of probative force to support its submission. Neither has Hardware presented a point of error at any stage of the appeal asserting that the jury’s affirmative answer to Issue No. 2-C is not supported by evidence.
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CALVERT, Chief Justice.
The motion for rehearing filed herein by respondent is granted; the judgment entered on November 29, 1967, is set aside; the opinions filed on that date are withdrawn, and the opinion and judgment set out below are substituted.
This is a workman’s compensation case. The case was tried to a jury and judgment was rendered upon the jury’s verdict awarding the respondent-employee, Agnes King, a recovery of compensation benefits. The court of civil appeals affirmed. 408 S.W.2d 790. We reverse the judgments of the courts below and remand the cause to the trial court for retrial.
By way of special defense to Mrs. King’s suit, Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, the insurance carrier, pleaded that Mrs. King was not an employee of Musser Motors, Inc., its assured, at the time and on the occasion of her injury, but was a domestic servant of an officer of the corporation.1 Domestic servants are excluded from coverage afforded by our Workmen’s Compensation Act. Article 8306, Section 2, Vernon’s Ann.Tex. Civ. Stats.
The case was submitted to the jury on special issues. In answer to Special Issues Nos. 1 and 2, the jury found that Mrs. [217]*217King sustained an accidental injury on May 6, 1964. Special Issue No. 2-A inquired, “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Agnes King was not hired or retained by Musser Motors, Inc. as a domestic servant?” To this issue, the jury answered, “She was not hired or retained by Musser Motors [as a domestic servant].” In answer to Special Issue No. 2-B, the jury found that on the date of her injury Mrs. King was an employee of Musser Motors, Inc. Special Issue No. 2-C inquired, “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such injury, if any, was sustained in the course of her employment with Musser Motors, Inc.?” In connection with this issue the court instructed the jury as follows: “‘Injury sustained in the course of employment,’ as used in this charge is meant all injuries of every kind and character, having to do with or originating from the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer, received by the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer, whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere.” The jury answered this issue, “Yes.”
Hardware has presented only one point of error on appeal as a basis for its contention that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment should be rendered that the plaintiff take nothing. The point of error as stated in Hardware’s brief in the court of civil appeals is as follows: “The error of the Court in entering judgment for the Appellee and overruling Appellants’ amended motion for a new trial because there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that the Appellee was not hired or retained as a domestic servant.” We treat this point of error as stating that the trial court erred in entering judgment for Mrs. King because the evidence establishes conclusively that she was hired or retained by Musser Motors as a domestic servant. As thus restated, the question presented is whether the trial court erred in entering judgment for Mrs. King if the evidence shows conclusively that Mrs. King was hired or retained by Musser Motors as a domestic servant. We hold that it did not.
Examination of the trial court’s charge as a whole clearly indicates that it was tried on the theory that the terms of Mrs. King’s contract of employment with Musser Motors was determinative of her right to compensation benefits; that if Mrs. King was “hired or retained” as a domestic servant, she was not entitled to compensation benefits, but that she was entitled to benefits if she was “hired or retained” as an employee of the business establishment. Special Issue No. 2-A speaks only to- Mrs. King’s contract of employment; it does not speak to the particular type of work in which she was engaged at the time of her injury.
The evidence shows that Mrs. King was employed by Musser Motors some eight or ten years prior to the trial of this case. The evidence in the record, which we need not detail, establishes conclusively that Mrs. King was “hired or retained” by Musser Motors in two- capacities, as a domestic servant in the homes of officers of the company and as a janitress at the company’s place of business. If we substitute for the jury’s answer to Special Issue No. 2-A the answer which we have found is conclusively established by the evidence as the correct answer to the issue, that is, that Mrs. King was employed as a domestic servant and as a janitress, we yet cannot say that the answer is a sound reason for holding that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for Mrs. King. The reason we cannot do so is because the answer does not establish that she was injured while performing work in her employment as a domestic servant.
A person’s contract of employment may provide for services in two capacities or enterprises, in one of which he is covered by the Compensation Act and in the other of which he is not covered. Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n. v. Derrick, 207 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.Civ.App.1947, writ ref’d n. r. e.). If [218]*218injured while performing work or services in a capacity or an enterprise covered by the Act, he may recover benefits; but if injured while performing work or services in a capacity or an enterprise excluded from coverage, he may not recover. Denny v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, etc., 172 Wash. 631, 21 P.2d 275, at 278 (1933); Maeda v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 192 Wash. 87, 72 P.2d 1034, at 1035 (1937). See also 172 A.L.R. 382.
Hardware argues in this court, as it did in the court of civil appeals, that the evidence establishes conclusively that Mrs. King’s injury was sustained while she was performing services in her capacity as a domestic servant. The impediment to consideration of this argument is that Hardware has no- point of error to which it is reasonably related or referable. It presented a motion for instructed verdict in the trial court at the close of all the evidence on the ground that “the evidence of record conclusively establishes that at the time of the injury * * * the plaintiff herein was a domestic servant. * * * ” The trial court overruled the motion. The action of the trial court in overruling the motion was assigned as error in the motion for new trial, but at no stage of the appeal has Hardware complained that the trial court erred in overruling the motion. If it had done so, we would have an entirely different question presented for our consideration. Not having complained of this action of the trial court, the error, if any, in overruling the motion has been waived. Moreover, as is pointed out above, the court submitted Special Issue No. 2-C inquiring, in effect, if Mrs. King’s injuries originated in “the work, business, trade or profession” of Musser Motors, Inc., and Hardware did not object to its submission on the ground that there was no evidence of probative force to support its submission. Neither has Hardware presented a point of error at any stage of the appeal asserting that the jury’s affirmative answer to Issue No. 2-C is not supported by evidence. Again, if it had done so-, we would have a different question for consideration. In short, even under our liberal rules for interpreting points of error in the light of arguments made under them, we do not feel justified in transposing a complaint directed at the jury’s answer to one special issue into a complaint directed at action of the trial court in overruling a motion for instructed verdict or in the submission of another special issue, or at the jury’s answer to- such other issue. This court could not render a take-nothing judgment against Mrs. King without setting aside the jury’s answer to Special Issue No. 2-C, an answer which has not been attacked by Hardware.
The only other action of the trial court which is complained of in this court as error is its refusal to submit Hardware’s requested special issue with its accompanying instruction, which reads as follows:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time and on the occasion in question, the plaintiff, Agnes L. King, was not a domestic servant?
“Answer: ‘She was not a domestic servant,’ or ‘She was a domestic servant.’
“We, the Jury answer:_
“Domestic Servant as used in this charge means a person who primarily is employed in and about the maintenance of a home itself. Such a person is a household servant working within the house for the upkeep thereof, and the care, comfort and convenience of the occupants thereof.”
We sustain this point of error. The requested special issue does not speak to the contract of employment. It speaks to the status of Mrs. King “at the time and on the occasion” of her injury. Since the evidence establishes conclusively that Mrs. King was employed in two- capacities, the crucial question in the case is, as pointed out above, whether she was injured while performing services in her capacity as a domestic servant. Perhaps the requested issue could have been better worded to frame the crucial [219]*219inquiry, but in our opinion it meets the requirements laid down by Rule 279, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, for reversal in that it is “in substantially correct wording.” Moreover, in our opinion refusal to submit the issue probably resulted in an improper judgment, and thus requires reversal of the trial court’s judgment. Rule 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Hardware was entitled to have this issue submitted in clear and unambiguous language. It was obviously not so submitted in Special Issue No. 2-C.
If the evidence on a retrial of the case is the same with reference to the contract of employment, no special issue should be submitted with respect thereto since we have held that the evidence establishes conclusively that Mrs. King was employed as a janitress in Musser Motors’ place of business and as a domestic servant in the homes of officers of the company. If the evidence is sufficient to take the issue to the jury, a proper special issue should be submitted inquiring whether Mrs. King was injured while performing services as a domestic servant.
The judgments of the court of civil appeals and the trial court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court.