UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
DEVON HARDEN,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-453
v. Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
STEVEN BARBER et al.,
Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity, First Amendment retaliation, Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement, and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment individual capacity claims against Defendants Barber, May, and Russell for excessive use of force remain in the case. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) and the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the
following IBC Correctional Officers in their official and personal capacities: Steven Barber, Brian May, and Marrietta Russell. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) Plaintiff alleges that, on May 6, 2024, Plaintiff was in the yard when he witnessed officers assaulting non-party Prisoner Rice by hitting and kicking Prisoner Rice, leaving Prisoner Rice unconscious, with a broken arm and a disfigured face. (Id., PageID.2.) Fearing for Prisoner Rice’s life, Plaintiff went to Prisoner Rice’s “aid” and was immediately taken to the ground by Defendant Barber. (Id.) Plaintiff then put his hands above his head in a “sign of surrender”; however, Defendants Barber and May began to punch, knee, and slam Plaintiff’s head to the ground. (Id.) Plaintiff called for help, but Defendant Russell sprayed Plaintiff with a chemical agent, saying,
“Stupid mother f*****. Ima [sic] kill you” and “Stupid b**** you have no idea what[’]s finna [sic] happen.” (Id. (asterisks added).) Following Defendants’ use of force, Plaintiff was handcuffed, taken to medical where Plaintiff received medical attention, and then taken to the segregation yard cages, where photographs were taken of Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id.) While in segregation, Plaintiff was not given supplies, bedsheets, or blankets. (Id.) He was charged with a class I misconduct of assault on staff for an assault resulting in serious physical injury but claims that “[t]here was no staff injury.” (Id.) The next day, Plaintiff was transferred from IBC to ICF where he was “promised by IBC officers, ‘You’ll be f***ed up again.’” (Id. (asterisks added).) Once at ICF, Plaintiff received “threats and acts of retaliation.” (Id.) Based on the facts as alleged, the Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s complaint to bring
claims of Eighth Amendment excessive force, Eighth Amendment unconstitutional conditions of confinement, First Amendment retaliation, and Fourteenth Amendment denial of procedural due process related to Plaintiff’s class I misconduct charge. Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id., PageID.3.) II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official and personal capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has
waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771. Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, and he fails to state a claim against Defendants in their official capacities upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief. Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an exception to sovereign immunity. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). The United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under Ex Parte Young for prospective injunctive relief should not be treated as an action against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985). Instead, the doctrine is a fiction recognizing that unconstitutional acts cannot have been authorized by the state and therefore cannot be considered as having been done under the state’s authority. Id. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to
avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, in itself, sufficiently prove that the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (addressing injunctive relief); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (addressing declaratory relief). The Sixth Circuit has held that transfer to another correctional facility moots a prisoner’s injunctive and declaratory claims. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisoner-plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when the prisoner was transferred from the prison about which he complained); Mowatt v. Brown, No. 89- 1955, 1990 WL 59896 (6th Cir. May 9, 1990); Tate v. Brown, No. 89-1944, 1990 WL 58403 (6th Cir. May 3, 1990); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff is no longer
confined at IBC, which is where he avers that Defendants are employed. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief does not relate to an ongoing violation and is not prospective. Thus, he cannot maintain his claims for injunctive relief against Defendants in their official capacity. For all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants in their official capacities upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. B. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological
justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011). There is an objective component and a subjective component to this type of Eighth Amendment claim. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask, “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The objective component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether
an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Here, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is apparent that some use of force may have been appropriate to restore order after Plaintiff went to “aid” Prisoner Rice in his struggle against officers. However, given the extent of the force described by Plaintiff, coupled with Defendant Russell’s statements, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force will not be dismissed on screening. C. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claims As it pertains to Plaintiff’s claim that he was deprived of “supplies,” bedsheets, and blankets from the time that he was taken to segregation on May 6, 2024, until his transfer the following day, the Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). “Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Consequently, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of- confinement claim.” Id. For a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994))
(applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844. Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was without unidentified “supplies,” bedsheets, and blankets
for a single day. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the named Defendants were personally involved in this denial. Moreover, his allegations regarding the denial of bedsheets and blankets do not rise to the level of “extreme deprivations” needed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Grissom v. Davis, 55 F. App’x 756, 757–58 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that seven-day period without mattress, blanket, or sheets did not deprive inmate of basic human needs or cause her to suffer serious harm); Wells v. Jefferson Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 35 F. App’x 142, 143 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that sleeping on a mattress on the floor in a cold cell for six days was not a constitutional violation). And Plaintiff’s reference to “supplies” is simply too vague to allow the Court to infer any constitutional violation. Indeed, in alleging that he was deprived of supplies, Plaintiff asks the Court to fabricate plausibility to his claim from mere ambiguity; but ambiguity does not support a
claim. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. D. First Amendment Retaliation Claims Plaintiff alleges that unidentified “IBC officers” told Plaintiff that he would be “f***ed up again” and that he later received “threats and acts of retaliation” at ICF. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) (asterisks added). Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). To set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to show that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Plaintiff fails to satisfy any of the foregoing elements with respect to the named Defendants. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Here, Plaintiff fails to set forth facts that would plausibly suggest any of the named Defendants engaged
in unlawful retaliation against Plaintiff. His allegations therefore fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and will be dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Moreover, even if Plaintiff had tied the named Defendants to the alleged “threats,” he has not described the alleged adverse acts experienced at ICF, a separate facility, nor has he tied the alleged “acts of retaliation” to the named Defendants. Plaintiff merely alleges the ultimate fact of retaliation without providing any supporting facts. Such “conclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts’” do not state a claim under § 1983. Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that in complaints screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lewis v. Jarvie, 20 F.
App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that “bare allegations of malice on the defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims” that will survive § 1915A screening” (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998))). Therefore, for each of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. E. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claims Plaintiff alleges that he was issued a class I misconduct report for assault on staff resulting in serious physical injury even though “[t]here was no staff injury.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) As a result, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation pending his transfer the following day. Plaintiff does not describe what, if any, sanctions he received as a result of the class I misconduct. The Court has liberally construed Plaintiff’s allegations to raise a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s
right to procedural due process premised on a false misconduct report. “The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). The elements of a procedural due process claim are (1) a life, liberty, or property interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause, and (2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without adequate process. Women's Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). “Without a protected liberty or property interest, there can be no federal procedural due process claim.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972)). The Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not apply to every change in a prisoner’s conditions of confinement. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for determining when a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995). According to the Court, a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence” or when a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 486–87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer- Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir. 1995). Without a protected liberty interest, a plaintiff cannot successfully claim that his due process rights were violated because “[p]rocess is not an end in itself.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). For example, in Sandin, the Court held that regardless of the mandatory language of the prison regulations, the inmate did not have a liberty interest because his placement in administrative segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship within the context of his prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see also
Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was found guilty of the class I misconduct charge. However, the Sixth Circuit has routinely held that misconduct convictions that do not result in the loss of good time are not atypical and significant deprivations and therefore do not implicate due process. See, e.g., Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F. App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2018); Carter v. Tucker, 69 F. App’x 678, 680 (6th Cir. 2003); Green v. Waldren, No. 99-1561, 2000 WL 876765, at *2 (6th Cir. June 23, 2000); Staffney v. Allen, No. 98-1880, 1999 WL 617967, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 1999). Plaintiff does not allege that the misconduct charge had any effect on the duration of his sentence. Plaintiff is serving sentences imposed in 2013, 2016, and 2021 for crimes committed in 2013, 2016, and 2019. See MDOC Offender Tracking Information System, https://mdocweb.state. mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=875599 (last visited Apr. 29, 2025). A prisoner like Plaintiff, who is serving indeterminate sentences for offenses committed after 2000, can
accumulate “disciplinary time” for a major misconduct conviction. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.34. Disciplinary time is considered by the Michigan Parole Board when it determines whether to grant parole. Id. § 800.34(2). It does not necessarily affect the length of a prisoner’s sentence because it is “simply a record that will be presented to the parole board to aid in its [parole] determination.” Taylor v. Lantagne, 418 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2011). Therefore, no misconduct conviction could have impacted the duration of Plaintiff’s sentence. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that any misconduct conviction resulted in an “atypical and significant hardship.” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts whatsoever regarding what sanctions, if any, he received because of the misconduct charge. Given the Court’s holding in Sandin, Plaintiff’s placement in segregation for
a single day before Plaintiff was transferred certainly falls far short of the atypical and significant hardship required to state a due process claim. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims based upon the allegedly false misconduct. Conclusion The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that the following claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c): official capacity, First Amendment retaliation, Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement, and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment individual claims against Defendants Barber, May, and Russell for excessive use of force remain in the case. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: May 29, 2025 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE