Hanton v. Leung

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 12, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-01421
StatusUnknown

This text of Hanton v. Leung (Hanton v. Leung) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hanton v. Leung, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TERRENCE HANTON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-1421(LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND JAY LEUNG, ANTHONY COCUZZA, and NATALIE ESCHAVEZ, of CVS Pharmacy, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297; and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131. He alleges that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against him because of his religion and sexual orientation. By order dated February 24, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against Natalie Eschavez, Anthony Cocuzza, and Jay Leung, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of his sexual orientation and religion while he was employed at CVS Pharmacy in Manhattan. Plaintiff asserts the following as the facts giving rise to his claims: Natalie Eschavez did not allow me to transfer to other CVS Pharmacy locations once she was hired as Training General Manager during the COVID-19 pandemic since the physical store location eventually changed its operating hours that was outside my work availability, And, made negative comments that was NOT a part of my sexual orientation about me, because she stated that the men that worked with her and affiliated with her were GAY! (ECF 1, at 5.)1 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and money damages. Plaintiff asserts that he filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received a Notice of Right to Sue on November 21, 2022. He does not attach the notice to the complaint. DISCUSSION A. Title VII Claims Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, or who has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under the statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by that statute, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim, and all spelling, irregular capitalization, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original, unless noted otherwise. work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under Title VII. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff does not name proper defendants Plaintiff cannot bring Title VII claims against Defendants Eschavez, Cocuzza, and Leung.

Title VII only provides for the liability of an employer and other covered entities, such as an employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The only proper defendant for an action under Title VII is a plaintiff’s employer or other entities covered by the statute. See Chibuzor v. Corwin, No. 20-CV-9643, 2020 WL 6905304, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2020); Mira v. Kingston, 218 F. Supp. 3d 229, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

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Hanton v. Leung, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hanton-v-leung-nysd-2023.