STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-15-81
HANCOCK COUNTY, ) ) Petitioner ) v. ) ORDER ON MOTIONS TO ) DISMISS JOSEPH FITZPATRICK, et al., ) ) Respondent. )
I. Background
30-A M.R.S. § 701 was enacted in July 2015. The statute limits each Maine
county in its collection of taxes for the operation of a county jail. Hancock County
was limited to $1,670,136 in the fiscal year 2014-2015. Hancock County Jail's costs
and expenses exceeded the budget for that fiscal year as set by the Maine Board
of Corrections (Board). Because of the new law, Hancock County was not able to
make up the shortfall with tax revenues. The budget shortfall was approximately
$121,154.87.
At the same time that 30-A M.R.S. § 701 was enacted, 34-A M.R.S. § 1210
D was also enacted. 34-A M.R.S. § 1210-D establishes the County Jail Operations
Fund and dictates the terms of administration and distribution of the fund . The
Statute provides that counties must use 30% of distributions from the Fund for
"community corrections" and may use the remaining 70% for jail operations. Id.
The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") is tasked to
"receive, administer and distribute to the county and regional jails funding
1 provided through the General Fund, Other Special Revenue Funds and any
federal and grant funds in accordance" with statute. 34-A M.R.S. § 1402(12).
On July 24, 2015, Hancock County sent a letter and Notice of Claim to
Treasurer of the State of Maine an~ the Commissioner of the DOC seeking
reimbursement for the cost overrun of the Hancock County Jail citing to the
statutory limitations on Hancock County and powers granted to the DOC. On
September 15, 2015, Hancock County provided an Amended Notice of Claim.
Hancock County claims that the DOC never responded to the Notice of Claim.
The DOC argues that it was not obligated to respond.
II. Standard of Review
The DOC moves to dismiss Count I for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). The DOC moves to dismiss Counts II and III as a
duplicative of Count I. Oral argument on the motions was held on June 6, 2016.
a. Motion to Dismiss - M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
The Superior Court's jurisdiction over administrative appeals is limited.
"Only an appeal from final agency action automatically removes jurisdiction
from the administrative agency to the court system." Eastern Maine Medical Center
v. Maine Health Care Finance Com., 601 A.2d 99, 101 (Me. 1992). According to 5
M.R.S. § 11002, a petition for administrative appeal by an aggrieved party must
be filed within 30 days of the agency decision or within 6 months of when a
decision could have been expected where there was no determination by the
administrative agency. 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). Without a properly filed appeal, the
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.
Dismissal is appropriate where the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). "When a motion to dismiss is based on the court's lack of
2 subject matter jurisdiction, we make no favorable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff such as we do when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted." Tomer v. Me. Human Rights Comm 'n,
2008 ME 190, 91 9, 962 A.2d 335; See Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2004 ME 4, P 17,
840 A.2d 708, 711; Persson v. Dep 't of Human Servs., 2001 ME 124, P 8, 775 A.2d
363, 365; Davric Me. Corp. v. Bangor Historic Track, Inc., 2000 ME 102, P 6, 751 A.2d
1024, 1028.
b. Motion to Dismiss - M.R. Civ. P. 12(b )(6)
In analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court
"examine[s) the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff to determine
whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Doe v. Graham, 2009
ME 88, 91 2, 977 A.2d 391, quoting Saunders, 2006 ME 94, 91 8, 902 A.2d 30. "For a
court to properly dismiss a claim for failure to state a cause of action, it must
appear 'beyond doubt that [the) plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of
facts that might be proven in support of the claim."' Dragomir v. Spring Harbor
Hosp., 2009 ME 51, 9115, 970 A.2d 310, quoting Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882,
885 (Me. 1995).
"If a claim for review of governmental action under this rule is joined with
a claim alleging an independent basis for relief from governmental action, the
petition shall contain a separate count for each claim for relief asserted, setting
forth the facts relied upon, the legal basis of the claim, and the relief requested."
M.R. Civ. P. 80C(i). "When a claim joined with an SOC or B Petition is duplicative
of the Petition, the Law Court has affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal on that
3 ground." Breton v. Mayhew, 2015 Me. Super. LEXIS 186, *3, (citing Kane v. Comm'r
of the Dep't of Health and Human Services, 2008 ME 185, 9I9I 30-32, 960 A.2d 1196).
III. Discussion
a. Timeliness
The DOC moves the Court to dismiss Hancock County's action for
administrative review on the basis that the petition was not timely filed. Where
an agency has taken action, a petitioner must petition for review within thirty
days of the date of that action. Where the agency has failed to act, a petitioner has
six months from the date an action would have been expected to file an appeal.
See 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3).
Hancock County requested additional funds from the DOC to make up
for the shortfall in the 2014-2015 budget on July 24, 2015. Primarily, the DOC
contends that the Board, which is no longer in existence, was the proper agency
to challenge, not the DOC. The DOC alleges that Hancock County's remedy
would have been to challenge the budget when the Board set it. Further, the
DOC alleges that the DOC is not obligated to respond to a Notice of Claim
concerning a budget set in for 2014-2015 by the Board because it is not the
successor agency to the Board. Hancock County asserts that the statutory
structure enacted in 2015 made it impossible for Hancock County to make up for
the shortfall in any way except to seek funding from the County Jail Operations
Fund pursuant to 34-A M.R.S. § 1210-D.
In Somerset County v. Me. Dep't ofCorrections, the Law Court discussed the
appropriateness of substituting the DOC for the no longer existing Board.
Somerset County v. Me. Dep't of Corrections, 2016 ME 33, ir,r 2-6, 133 A.3d 1006. The
4 Law Court notes that '"'a pending suit, even if properly instituted against an
existing governmental agency, [must] abate when the agency dissolves without a
successor assuming its powers and functions." Id. at
Court determined that substitution was appropriate in that case because
pursuant to the legislation that abolished the Board, the money in the Board's
budget was to be carried forward to the County Jail Operations Fund General
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-15-81
HANCOCK COUNTY, ) ) Petitioner ) v. ) ORDER ON MOTIONS TO ) DISMISS JOSEPH FITZPATRICK, et al., ) ) Respondent. )
I. Background
30-A M.R.S. § 701 was enacted in July 2015. The statute limits each Maine
county in its collection of taxes for the operation of a county jail. Hancock County
was limited to $1,670,136 in the fiscal year 2014-2015. Hancock County Jail's costs
and expenses exceeded the budget for that fiscal year as set by the Maine Board
of Corrections (Board). Because of the new law, Hancock County was not able to
make up the shortfall with tax revenues. The budget shortfall was approximately
$121,154.87.
At the same time that 30-A M.R.S. § 701 was enacted, 34-A M.R.S. § 1210
D was also enacted. 34-A M.R.S. § 1210-D establishes the County Jail Operations
Fund and dictates the terms of administration and distribution of the fund . The
Statute provides that counties must use 30% of distributions from the Fund for
"community corrections" and may use the remaining 70% for jail operations. Id.
The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") is tasked to
"receive, administer and distribute to the county and regional jails funding
1 provided through the General Fund, Other Special Revenue Funds and any
federal and grant funds in accordance" with statute. 34-A M.R.S. § 1402(12).
On July 24, 2015, Hancock County sent a letter and Notice of Claim to
Treasurer of the State of Maine an~ the Commissioner of the DOC seeking
reimbursement for the cost overrun of the Hancock County Jail citing to the
statutory limitations on Hancock County and powers granted to the DOC. On
September 15, 2015, Hancock County provided an Amended Notice of Claim.
Hancock County claims that the DOC never responded to the Notice of Claim.
The DOC argues that it was not obligated to respond.
II. Standard of Review
The DOC moves to dismiss Count I for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). The DOC moves to dismiss Counts II and III as a
duplicative of Count I. Oral argument on the motions was held on June 6, 2016.
a. Motion to Dismiss - M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
The Superior Court's jurisdiction over administrative appeals is limited.
"Only an appeal from final agency action automatically removes jurisdiction
from the administrative agency to the court system." Eastern Maine Medical Center
v. Maine Health Care Finance Com., 601 A.2d 99, 101 (Me. 1992). According to 5
M.R.S. § 11002, a petition for administrative appeal by an aggrieved party must
be filed within 30 days of the agency decision or within 6 months of when a
decision could have been expected where there was no determination by the
administrative agency. 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). Without a properly filed appeal, the
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.
Dismissal is appropriate where the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). "When a motion to dismiss is based on the court's lack of
2 subject matter jurisdiction, we make no favorable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff such as we do when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted." Tomer v. Me. Human Rights Comm 'n,
2008 ME 190, 91 9, 962 A.2d 335; See Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2004 ME 4, P 17,
840 A.2d 708, 711; Persson v. Dep 't of Human Servs., 2001 ME 124, P 8, 775 A.2d
363, 365; Davric Me. Corp. v. Bangor Historic Track, Inc., 2000 ME 102, P 6, 751 A.2d
1024, 1028.
b. Motion to Dismiss - M.R. Civ. P. 12(b )(6)
In analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court
"examine[s) the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff to determine
whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Doe v. Graham, 2009
ME 88, 91 2, 977 A.2d 391, quoting Saunders, 2006 ME 94, 91 8, 902 A.2d 30. "For a
court to properly dismiss a claim for failure to state a cause of action, it must
appear 'beyond doubt that [the) plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of
facts that might be proven in support of the claim."' Dragomir v. Spring Harbor
Hosp., 2009 ME 51, 9115, 970 A.2d 310, quoting Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882,
885 (Me. 1995).
"If a claim for review of governmental action under this rule is joined with
a claim alleging an independent basis for relief from governmental action, the
petition shall contain a separate count for each claim for relief asserted, setting
forth the facts relied upon, the legal basis of the claim, and the relief requested."
M.R. Civ. P. 80C(i). "When a claim joined with an SOC or B Petition is duplicative
of the Petition, the Law Court has affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal on that
3 ground." Breton v. Mayhew, 2015 Me. Super. LEXIS 186, *3, (citing Kane v. Comm'r
of the Dep't of Health and Human Services, 2008 ME 185, 9I9I 30-32, 960 A.2d 1196).
III. Discussion
a. Timeliness
The DOC moves the Court to dismiss Hancock County's action for
administrative review on the basis that the petition was not timely filed. Where
an agency has taken action, a petitioner must petition for review within thirty
days of the date of that action. Where the agency has failed to act, a petitioner has
six months from the date an action would have been expected to file an appeal.
See 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3).
Hancock County requested additional funds from the DOC to make up
for the shortfall in the 2014-2015 budget on July 24, 2015. Primarily, the DOC
contends that the Board, which is no longer in existence, was the proper agency
to challenge, not the DOC. The DOC alleges that Hancock County's remedy
would have been to challenge the budget when the Board set it. Further, the
DOC alleges that the DOC is not obligated to respond to a Notice of Claim
concerning a budget set in for 2014-2015 by the Board because it is not the
successor agency to the Board. Hancock County asserts that the statutory
structure enacted in 2015 made it impossible for Hancock County to make up for
the shortfall in any way except to seek funding from the County Jail Operations
Fund pursuant to 34-A M.R.S. § 1210-D.
In Somerset County v. Me. Dep't ofCorrections, the Law Court discussed the
appropriateness of substituting the DOC for the no longer existing Board.
Somerset County v. Me. Dep't of Corrections, 2016 ME 33, ir,r 2-6, 133 A.3d 1006. The
4 Law Court notes that '"'a pending suit, even if properly instituted against an
existing governmental agency, [must] abate when the agency dissolves without a
successor assuming its powers and functions." Id. at
Court determined that substitution was appropriate in that case because
pursuant to the legislation that abolished the Board, the money in the Board's
budget was to be carried forward to the County Jail Operations Fund General
Fund account administered by DOC. Id. at
Similarly, in the case at hand, "the process by which the Board was
eliminated preserved the justiciability of this action." Id. at
was abolished, the funding that was previously held by the Board is now held by
the DOC for distribution to county jails. Therefore, for the purpose of the 12(b)(l)
motion to dismiss, the Court finds that substitution of the DOC for the Board is . 1 appropriate.
The DOC argues that even if the Court finds that substitution of the DOC
for the Board is appropriate, the Court should find that payments made to
Hancock County were responsive to Hancock County's notice of claim. Because
Hancock County did not appeal the amount of funding received within 30 days
of issuance, the DOC argues that the appeal is untimely. The DOC provided
$319,161 in funds to Hancock County for the Hancock County Jail on September
8, 2015 and $4,701.94 on October 19, 2015. The parties are in agreement that the
funds sent in September and October 2015 were allocated for the 2015-2016 fiscal
year and not the year in question. The DOC contends that the funds represent the
DOC' s response to Hancock County's request for reimbursement. Therefore, the
1 This issue has not been fully briefed by the parties and is fitting for argument at the summary judgment phase.
5 DOC contends that the statute of limitations on appealing the DOC action was
November 28, 2015, 30 days after the funds were issued. Hancock County
contends that the funds were issued with regards to the 2015-2016 fiscal year and
no action was taken on Hancock County's request with regards to the 2014-2015
fiscal year. Therefore, because no response was issued on Hancock County's
notice of claim, the petition for administrative review was due to be filed by no
earlier than January 24, 2016, six months after the initial request was made.
As the funds issued on September 8, 2015 and October 19, 2015 were
earmarked for the 2015-2016 fiscal year, sending these checks as not responsive
to Hancock County's Notice of Claim for fiscal year 2014-2015. Therefore, the
Court denies the DOC' s Motion to Dismiss for untimeliness of the petition.
b. Independent Claims
The DOC moves the Court to dismiss Counts II & III as duplicative of
Hancock County's SOC administrative appeal. In Count II, Hancock County
seeks declaratory relief that the DOC and the Commissioner are required to
distribute DOC funding to Hancock County to satisfy the County Jail's cost
overrun. Count III is an action for recovery of debt. The DOC contends that the
facts relied upon, the legal basis for the claim, and the relief requested by
Petitioner in each of the independent claims are the same as those relied upon by
Petitioner for the SOC claim. The DOC seeks dismissal of the independent claims
on the basis that they are duplicative of Petitioner's SOC petition.
Hancock County argues that the legal basis for the claim and the relief
requested are not the same in Counts II and III as the facts and relief requested in
the administrative appeal. Hancock County alleges that unlike the SOC action,
the action for declaratory relief is seeking an order from the Court interpreting
6 the statute and declaring the rights of the parties. According to Hancock
County's responsive pleading to the DOC's motion to dismiss, Hancock County
is challenging the constitutionality of the statutory structure of repayment.2
Hancock County argues that unlike in other cases, such as Fisher v. Dame, 433
A.2d 366 (Me. 1981), that find that the administrative remedy established by the
legislature is meant to be exclusive, there is no "clearly defined statutory
procedure for seeking review". On that basis Hancock County argues that
declaratory relief would not be duplicative of the administrative review.
According to Hancock County, the action for recovery of debt is
distinguishable from the action for administrative review because where Count I
is seeking review of the DOC' s alleged failure to act, Count III seeks recovery of
the debt owed by the DOC when the DOC did not respond to Hancock County's
request for funds for the 2014-2015 fiscal year.
The facts and the remedy sought remain the same across all three counts,
namely that Hancock County seeks an order from the Court remanding the
action to the DOC with the guidance that the requested funding should be
provided. The Court is able to consider the constitutionality of the statutes as
well as whether to provide guidance to the administrative body in its analysis of
the BOC. Because neither Count II nor Count III seeks anything separate from that
sought in Count I, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III as
duplicative.
IV. Conclusion
The Court denies the DOC's Motion to Dismiss Count I.
2 The constitutionality of the statutes are not raised in the Complaint.
7 • • t •
The Court grants the DOC' s Motion to Dismiss Counts II & III.
No independent claims remain; therefore, the Court need not specify the
future course of proceeding.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference
in accordance with M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
DATE: June 7, 2016 Michaela Murphy Justice, Superior Court