NAHMIAS, Justice.
Lamar Hampton appeals from his convictions for the malice murder of Julian Smith, the aggravated assault of Kyzer Green, hindering the apprehension of a criminal, and tampering with evidence.1 We affirm the malice murder and aggravated assault convictions, but we vacate the sentence for hindering the apprehension of a criminal and remand for misdemeanor sentencing on the tampering with evidence conviction.
1. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, shows that on September 18, 2003, Smith and his friend Green went to the Bridge Creek Apartments to visit Smith’s girlfriend. When they were getting into their car to leave, a gunman began shooting at Smith, who told Green to run. Smith was hit four times in the head, once in the left shoulder, and once in the neck. He died as a result of his injuries. Green ran and was not hit by any bullets. Eyewitnesses could not identify the gunman because he was wearing a stocking over his head, but they testified that he leaned into Smith’s car, shot him at close range, and then fled in a Grand Am style car with tinted windows. Other evidence, including testimony from co-indictees Robert Jones and Shawn Venisee, showed that Hampton believed that Smith had shot and killed his close friend and Venisee’s brother, James Thomas, 18 days earlier and that Hampton orchestrated a hit on Smith that involved Blackshear as the shooter and Jones, Venisee, and Purvis Wallace in supporting roles. After the shooting, Hampton concealed Blackshear at his home [622]*622and directed that tinting be removed from the getaway car (a 2001 Oldsmobile Alero) and that the murder weapon (a .38 caliber revolver) be thrown away in a wooded area.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Hampton guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
2. This Court has held that the offense of hindering the apprehension of a criminal, see OCGA § 16-10-50, is the equivalent of the common law crime of being an accessory after the fact and that a party may not be convicted both of being a principal to the crime and an accessory after the fact. See Stanton v. State, 274 Ga. 21, 22 (549 SE2d 65) (2001); State v. Freeman, 272 Ga. 813, 815 (537 SE2d 92) (2000); Jordan v. State, 272 Ga. 395, 396-397 (530 SE2d 192) (2000). Based on these cases, Hampton correctly contends that he may not be convicted for both malice murder and hindering the apprehension of a criminal, but he incorrectly argues that the remedy is to set aside his conviction for malice murder.
Freeman, on which Hampton relies, involved an unusual fact pattern that distinguishes it from this case and our other cases on this issue. Freeman was indicted for two counts of malice murder, but only one is relevant here. On that count, Freeman requested a jury charge on hindering the apprehension of a criminal, incorrectly asserting that it was a lesser included offense of murder. See 272 Ga. at 813-814; Pressley v. State, 207 Ga. 274, 280 (61 SE2d 113) (1950) (holding that the crime of being an accessory after the fact, of which hindering is a statutory equivalent, is not a lesser included offense of murder). The State, however, did not object, and the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on hindering as a lesser included offense. The verdict form listed three offenses under the murder count: malice murder, felony murder, and hindering the apprehension of a criminal. See 272 Ga. at 814. The jury found Freeman not guilty of malice murder and guilty of the hindering charge but did not initially return a verdict on the felony murder charge. See id.
The trial court then directed the jury to attempt to reach a verdict on the felony murder charge, and the jury found Freeman guilty. See Freeman, 272 Ga. at 814. We concluded that the court erred by
requiring the jury to continue deliberations on the felony murder charge after it had found the defendant not guilty of [623]*623malice murder and guilty of the [supposedly lesser included offense of] hindering.... In other words, the jury was required to determine whether Freeman was a party to the crime of felony murder after it had already determined that he was an accessory after the fact.
Id. at 816. We therefore affirmed the trial court’s subsequent decision to vacate the felony murder conviction. See id.
Here, by contrast, the trial court did not require the jury to determine whether Hampton was a party to the crime of murder after the jury had already determined he was an accessory after the fact. Instead, as in Stanton and Jordan, the jury returned a verdict on all counts at the same time. In these circumstances, this Court has ruled, both before and since Freeman, that it is the conviction for hindering that must be set aside. See Stanton, 274 Ga. at 22; Jordan, 272 Ga. at 396-397. See also Thaxton v. State, 184 Ga. App. 779, 780 (362 SE2d 510) (1987) (affirming the defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter but reversing his conviction for hindering). Accordingly, we vacate Hampton’s hindering conviction but affirm his conviction for malice murder.
3. Hampton contends that the State proved that he tampered with evidence in his own case and not in the case of one of his co-defendants, so that he may be sentenced only for a misdemeanor. See White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 717 (699 SE2d 291) (2010) (explaining that under OCGA § 16-10-94 (c), a person may receive only misdemeanor punishment for tampering with evidence in his own case). The indictment charged Hampton with tampering with evidence “to prevent the apprehension of Russell Blackshear, [himself], and Shawn Demetris Venisee.” The indictment, along with the jury charge and the evidence, permitted the jury to find that Hampton tampered with the evidence in his case alone (a misdemeanor) or in either or both Blackshear’s and Venisee’s case (a felony). However, the verdict form simply contained a finding of guilty on the tampering count, making it impossible to determine if the jury found Hampton guilty of misdemeanor or felony tampering. Because Hampton must be given the benefit of the doubt in construing this ambiguous verdict, we vacate his felony tampering sentence and remand for misdemeanor sentencing. See Lindsey v. State, 262 Ga. 665, 665-666 (424 SE2d 616) (1993).
4. Hampton contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a new trial on the ground that the trial judge should have disqualified himself. Hampton argues that there was an appearance of partiality in the trial judge presiding over the trial because the judge’s former law partner had represented the estate of one of the victims, Julian Smith, in a premises liability lawsuit against the [624]
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NAHMIAS, Justice.
Lamar Hampton appeals from his convictions for the malice murder of Julian Smith, the aggravated assault of Kyzer Green, hindering the apprehension of a criminal, and tampering with evidence.1 We affirm the malice murder and aggravated assault convictions, but we vacate the sentence for hindering the apprehension of a criminal and remand for misdemeanor sentencing on the tampering with evidence conviction.
1. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, shows that on September 18, 2003, Smith and his friend Green went to the Bridge Creek Apartments to visit Smith’s girlfriend. When they were getting into their car to leave, a gunman began shooting at Smith, who told Green to run. Smith was hit four times in the head, once in the left shoulder, and once in the neck. He died as a result of his injuries. Green ran and was not hit by any bullets. Eyewitnesses could not identify the gunman because he was wearing a stocking over his head, but they testified that he leaned into Smith’s car, shot him at close range, and then fled in a Grand Am style car with tinted windows. Other evidence, including testimony from co-indictees Robert Jones and Shawn Venisee, showed that Hampton believed that Smith had shot and killed his close friend and Venisee’s brother, James Thomas, 18 days earlier and that Hampton orchestrated a hit on Smith that involved Blackshear as the shooter and Jones, Venisee, and Purvis Wallace in supporting roles. After the shooting, Hampton concealed Blackshear at his home [622]*622and directed that tinting be removed from the getaway car (a 2001 Oldsmobile Alero) and that the murder weapon (a .38 caliber revolver) be thrown away in a wooded area.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Hampton guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
2. This Court has held that the offense of hindering the apprehension of a criminal, see OCGA § 16-10-50, is the equivalent of the common law crime of being an accessory after the fact and that a party may not be convicted both of being a principal to the crime and an accessory after the fact. See Stanton v. State, 274 Ga. 21, 22 (549 SE2d 65) (2001); State v. Freeman, 272 Ga. 813, 815 (537 SE2d 92) (2000); Jordan v. State, 272 Ga. 395, 396-397 (530 SE2d 192) (2000). Based on these cases, Hampton correctly contends that he may not be convicted for both malice murder and hindering the apprehension of a criminal, but he incorrectly argues that the remedy is to set aside his conviction for malice murder.
Freeman, on which Hampton relies, involved an unusual fact pattern that distinguishes it from this case and our other cases on this issue. Freeman was indicted for two counts of malice murder, but only one is relevant here. On that count, Freeman requested a jury charge on hindering the apprehension of a criminal, incorrectly asserting that it was a lesser included offense of murder. See 272 Ga. at 813-814; Pressley v. State, 207 Ga. 274, 280 (61 SE2d 113) (1950) (holding that the crime of being an accessory after the fact, of which hindering is a statutory equivalent, is not a lesser included offense of murder). The State, however, did not object, and the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on hindering as a lesser included offense. The verdict form listed three offenses under the murder count: malice murder, felony murder, and hindering the apprehension of a criminal. See 272 Ga. at 814. The jury found Freeman not guilty of malice murder and guilty of the hindering charge but did not initially return a verdict on the felony murder charge. See id.
The trial court then directed the jury to attempt to reach a verdict on the felony murder charge, and the jury found Freeman guilty. See Freeman, 272 Ga. at 814. We concluded that the court erred by
requiring the jury to continue deliberations on the felony murder charge after it had found the defendant not guilty of [623]*623malice murder and guilty of the [supposedly lesser included offense of] hindering.... In other words, the jury was required to determine whether Freeman was a party to the crime of felony murder after it had already determined that he was an accessory after the fact.
Id. at 816. We therefore affirmed the trial court’s subsequent decision to vacate the felony murder conviction. See id.
Here, by contrast, the trial court did not require the jury to determine whether Hampton was a party to the crime of murder after the jury had already determined he was an accessory after the fact. Instead, as in Stanton and Jordan, the jury returned a verdict on all counts at the same time. In these circumstances, this Court has ruled, both before and since Freeman, that it is the conviction for hindering that must be set aside. See Stanton, 274 Ga. at 22; Jordan, 272 Ga. at 396-397. See also Thaxton v. State, 184 Ga. App. 779, 780 (362 SE2d 510) (1987) (affirming the defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter but reversing his conviction for hindering). Accordingly, we vacate Hampton’s hindering conviction but affirm his conviction for malice murder.
3. Hampton contends that the State proved that he tampered with evidence in his own case and not in the case of one of his co-defendants, so that he may be sentenced only for a misdemeanor. See White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 717 (699 SE2d 291) (2010) (explaining that under OCGA § 16-10-94 (c), a person may receive only misdemeanor punishment for tampering with evidence in his own case). The indictment charged Hampton with tampering with evidence “to prevent the apprehension of Russell Blackshear, [himself], and Shawn Demetris Venisee.” The indictment, along with the jury charge and the evidence, permitted the jury to find that Hampton tampered with the evidence in his case alone (a misdemeanor) or in either or both Blackshear’s and Venisee’s case (a felony). However, the verdict form simply contained a finding of guilty on the tampering count, making it impossible to determine if the jury found Hampton guilty of misdemeanor or felony tampering. Because Hampton must be given the benefit of the doubt in construing this ambiguous verdict, we vacate his felony tampering sentence and remand for misdemeanor sentencing. See Lindsey v. State, 262 Ga. 665, 665-666 (424 SE2d 616) (1993).
4. Hampton contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a new trial on the ground that the trial judge should have disqualified himself. Hampton argues that there was an appearance of partiality in the trial judge presiding over the trial because the judge’s former law partner had represented the estate of one of the victims, Julian Smith, in a premises liability lawsuit against the [624]*624apartment complex at which Blackshear shot and killed Smith. See Ga. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 (E) (1) (providing that “[jJudges shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: . .. (b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter”).
Hampton first raised a recusal issue in his amended motion for new trial filed on January 12, 2010, summarily asserting that the judge “had a conflict of interest in being the trial judge.” In another amended motion for new trial filed on March 25, 2010, Hampton alleged for the first time the specific ground for disqualification, although he did not support the motion with any affidavits. At the motion for new trial hearing, Hampton testified that he did not know about the partner’s representation of Smith’s estate until after his trial. The judge’s partner filed the civil lawsuit in 2003, and the judge was elected to the bench in 2004 and left the firm in January 2005. The partner testified that no one knew who shot Smith during the course of the litigation, which settled in 2006. At the hearing, the trial judge stated that he had never heard of Hampton until the criminal trial and had no knowledge while he was at the firm or after he left that his partner represented Smith’s estate. Hampton did not dispute the judge’s statements, but he nevertheless contended that the partner’s representation of Smith’s estate raised a disqualifying appearance of partiality under Canon 3 (E). Following the hearing, the trial court summarily denied Hampton’s amended motion for new trial.2
Although the trial court denied the recusal issue on the merits, we affirm that ruling on the preliminary ground that the motion was untimely. See Gude v. State, 289 Ga. 46 (709 SE2d 206) (2011) (affirming the denial of a motion to recuse under the right-for-any-reason rule). Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.1 provides that a recusal motion
shall be timely filed: in writing and all evidence thereon shall be presented by accompanying affidavit(s) which shall fully assert the facts upon which the motion is founded. Filing and presentation to the judge shall be not later than five (5) days after the affiant first learned of the alleged [625]*625grounds for disqualification, and not later than ten (10) days prior to the hearing or trial which is the subject of recusal or disqualification, unless good cause be shown for failure to meet such time requirements.
Rule 25.3 states that when a motion to recuse is filed, the trial judge “shall temporarily cease to act upon the merits of the matter and shall immediately determine the timeliness of the motion and the legal sufficiency of the affidavit.” (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals has said that “the first duty of such judge when a motion to recuse is filed” is to determine if it was timely. Christensen v. State, 245 Ga. App. 165, 171 (537 SE2d 446) (2000).
Here, letters that Hampton filed with the trial court show that he and his attorney knew of the purported ground for recusal at least two months before the January 12, 2010, amended motion for new trial that summarily raised the issue and at least four months before the March 25, 2010, amended motion for new trial that first alleged the facts on which the disqualification claim was based. Thus, the issue was not raised in a timely fashion, even assuming that an enumeration of error in an amended motion for new trial, rather than a motion to recuse with accompanying affidavits, is a proper method by which to raise a recusal issue. But see Christensen at 172 (holding that “[a]n extraordinary motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is an improper vehicle to raise a motion to recuse”).
In Thurman v. State, 249 Ga. App. 390 (547 SE2d 715) (2001), the Court of Appeals addressed a similar situation. Thurman discovered after his conviction and while his motion for new trial was pending that the prosecutor had been the trial judge’s former law clerk. Thurman waited, however, about seven months after learning that information to file a motion to recuse. See id. at 390. The Court of Appeals held that Thurman did not timely raise the recusal issue and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. See id. at 390-391. Likewise, in Christensen, the defendant filed a motion to recuse after his conviction that was based on grounds that occurred during and after trial (as well as an extraordinary motion for new trial on the same grounds). See 245 Ga. App. at 170-171. Because the “most recent in time grounds” for disqualification occurred 48 days before filing the motion to recuse, the Court of Appeals held that the motion was untimely. Id. at 171.
Here, Hampton waited much longer than five days after learning of the alleged ground for disqualification to raise the issue, and he made no attempt to show “good cause” for not raising the issue earlier. See USCR 25.1; Christensen, 245 Ga. App. at 171 (holding that the party seeking disqualification has the burden of asserting and showing “good cause”). The trial court therefore did not err in [626]*626denying the recusal claim.
5. Hampton contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to question Robert Jones, a co-indictee who testified for the State, about the amount of the bond that Jones received following his arrest on a murder charge in this case. “Defense counsel is entitled to a reasonable cross-examination on the relevant issue of whether [a] witness entertained any belief of personal benefit from testifying favorably for the prosecution.” State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 639 (571 SE2d 752) (2002). However, “ ‘the extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court,’ ” so long as the court does not “cut[ ] off all inquiry on a subject on which the defense is entitled to reasonable cross-examination.” Id. at 639-640 (citation omitted).
The trial court here allowed Hampton considerable leeway to question Jones about his motive to testify favorably for the State as well as many other credibility issues. Hampton was permitted to ask Jones if he had any outstanding criminal charges pending against him, and Jones acknowledged that he had been arrested for making a false statement to the police and for murder. Hampton also questioned Jones about, and Jones denied having, any deals with or promises from the State in exchange for his testimony.
The amount of Jones’ bond would not, by itself, indicate that he had any reason to testify “in an effort to please the prosecution.” Vogleson, 275 Ga. at 639. Hampton did not try to ask Jones whether the State had agreed not to oppose his request for a bond or had sought a reduced bond for him. Hampton had already denied any deals with or promises from the State, so if bias for the State was the ground on which Hampton contended his question was relevant, he needed to so advise the trial court and establish a foundation for the question. This case is therefore unlike Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338 (698 SE2d 301) (2010), where the defendant was barred from asking a testifying co-defendant about the fact that her deal with the State reduced her minimum time in prison from 30 years to two years (although that error was found to be harmless). See id. at 343. This case is also unlike the one on which Hampton relies, Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195 (702 SE2d 183) (2010), where the defendant was precluded from asking a testifying co-indictee if the State had consented to his bond (although the Court again found that any error was harmless). See id. at 199. Had there been evidence that Hampton believed that his bond amount was a “ ‘result of his cooperation’ ” or was related to “ ‘decisions made by the district attorney in exchange for the witness’s cooperation and testimony for the State,’ ” Manley, 287 Ga. at 340-341 (citation omitted), then the trial court’s ruling might have been erroneous. See also id. at 343 [627]*627(explaining that, at a minimum, “ ‘the witness would need to understand the parole disparity and its connection to the district attorney’s charging decisions for the issue to be open to cross-examination, as witnesses cannot be influenced by matters about which they are unaware.’ ” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, the amount of Jones’ bond was at most marginally relevant to his credibility, and it was not at all “pertinent to the bias [toward the State] of a co-indictee witness,” as the special concurrence incorrectly suggests. The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion to control cross-examination in this case.
6. Hampton finally contends that the trial court erred by considering in aggravation of punishment two of his prior convictions which resulted from guilty pleas that the State admitted were uncounseled. However, while Hampton objected to the court’s consideration of the uncounseled pleas, he did not obtain a ruling on his objection and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. See Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 602 (642 SE2d 28) (2007). In any event, although the trial court imposed maximum and consecutive sentences for Hampton’s convictions, the record does not indicate that the court relied on these prior convictions in any way, and the court had the authority to enter those sentences regardless of any prior convictions. See OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (providing that a trial court has the authority to enter a sentence “within the minimum and maximum ... prescribed by law”); OCGA § 17-10-10 (a) (granting trial courts the authority to impose consecutive sentences for multiple convictions on one indictment). We therefore cannot assume that the trial court relied on the prior convictions in sentencing Hampton. See State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 100 (686 SE2d 244) (2009) (explaining that trial courts are presumed to consider only relevant, legal evidence); Simmons v. State, 249 Ga. 860, 861 (295 SE2d 84) (1982) (same).
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded for resentencing.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., who concurs specially.