Hamilton v. Moseley

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANNY HAMILTON, Case No.: 21cv2032-CAB-AHB CC22MX910/CDCR #T61263, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR Plaintiff, 13 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [Doc. vs. No. 35] 14

15 KATHLEEN ALLISON, Secretary of the 16 California Department of Corrections and 17 Rehabilitation, et al., 18 Defendants. 19 20 Danny Hamilton (Plaintiff) is a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Contra 21 Costa County West County Detention Facility. He is proceeding pro se, and has filed a 22 civil rights Complaint (and First Amended Complaint) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 23 (ECF Nos. 1 and 8). On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Appointment of 24 Counsel.” (ECF No. 35.) 25 I. Motion to Appoint Counsel 26 Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint counsel for him because he is indigent, 27 incarcerated, and “unlearned in the law.” (ECF No. 35 at 1-2.) 28 However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. 1 of Social Servs, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2 2009). And while 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) grants the district court limited discretion to 3 “request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of 4 America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion is exercised only in 5 “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 6 Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires the Court “to consider 7 whether there is a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is 8 unable to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” 9 Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Palmer, 560 F.3d 10 at 970). 11 The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice at this time because nothing 12 in either his First Amended Complaint or his Motion to Appoint Counsel suggests he is 13 incapable of articulating the factual basis for his claims, which appear “relatively 14 straightforward.” Id. In fact, the Court found, based on its screening of Plaintiff’s First 15 Amended Complaint and applying the liberal standards of construction required in pro se 16 cases, see Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting court’s 17 “obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 18 pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt”), that Plaintiff 19 has pleaded sufficient factual content to state a plausible claim for relief against all 20 defendants except defendant Allison, who has been dismissed from the case. 21 At the same time, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, by itself, while sufficient 22 to state a claim, does not yet demonstrate a “likelihood” of success on the merits. Id. 23 Therefore, the Court finds no “exceptional circumstances” exist to justify the 24 appointment of counsel at this time. See, e.g., Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th 25 Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of counsel where prisoner was able to articulate his 26 inadequate medical care claims in light of the complexity of the issues involved, but 27 found unlikely to succeed on the merits). 28 / / / 1 Conclusion and Order 2 For the reasons discussed, the Court: 3 DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 35). 4 Dated: June 23, 2022 ©; Z 5 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 ee