Hamilton Nat. Bank v. United States
This text of 99 F.2d 570 (Hamilton Nat. Bank v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appeal from a judgment dismissing appellant’s petition to recover the aggregate amount of certain stamp taxes theretofore paid under protest upon participating certificates issued by appellant. Appellant made timely claim for refund, and upon its rejection this suit was instituted.
The sole legal question is whether the participating certificates were corporate securities within the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, Section 800, schedule A(l), 44 Stat. 101, 26 U.S.C.A. § 901, which imposed a tax of five cents on each $100 par value “On all bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness issued by any corporation, and all instruments, however termed, issued by any corporation with interest coupons or in registered form, known generally as corporate securities * * * .”1
If the papers issued were securities-within the statute, the tax was properly collected and the judgment must be affirmed.
Appellant is a national bank engaged in the usual banking business. Its stockholders Own the stock of the Hamilton Securities Corporation, a Tennessee corporation engaged in lending money on mortgages and other securities. The Hamilton Securities Corporation had its offices in appellant’s bank, and the method of doing business between it and appellant was in brief as follows:
Upon the application of an investor, appellant would receive his money and credit it to the so-called agency account, from which appellant would draw funds to acquire from the Securities Corporation or from others, mortgages which then were placed in a pool established to secure the participation certificates which were issued to each investor in return for his funds deposited in the agency account. Mortgage notes or bonds of face value sufficient to equal the value of outstanding certificates were held in the pool separate from the assets of the bank. Appellant reserved the right to and did substitute other securities for those in the pool. The participation certificates were registered and carried interest coupons numbered serially. Copy of [572]*572the certificate and of the coupons attached thereto are printed in the margin.2
When mortgages were paid off, the sum realized would be credited to the agency [573]*573account and other securities would be acquired to replenish the mortgages in the pool.
While appellant’s stockholders, by virtue of their ownership of the stock of the Securities Corporation, benefited by the profits in these transactions, appellant itself in no way profited by them.
Appellant contends that the participating certificate is not one of the documents described in the statute, and hence is not taxable.
We think that the court correctly dismissed the petition. The fact that appellant made no profit is immaterial. The tax is levied not upon a profit, but upon the document itself, if it comes within the statutory definition. In physical form this paper had all the characteristics of a corporate security, and all the advantages inherent in that form. It was registered and numbered, assignable by endorsement, and carried interest coupons serially numbered. This is a matter of importance in the decision of stamp tax cases. Lawyers’ Mortgage Co. v. Anderson, 2 Cir., 67 F.2d 889; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 100, 103, 47 S.Ct. 263, 71 L.Ed. 558.
While the participating certificate falls within the broader definitions of bond, debenture and corporate security given in certain standard dictionaries ,and digests [Cf. Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Welch, 9 Cir., 38 F.2d 184, 186], we rest our decision upon the proposition (1) that it is a certificate of indebtedness, and (2) that it falls within the class of instruments known generally as corporate securities and described in the last clause of the schedule. In the certificate appellant not only agrees to pay to the holder his pro rata share of interest collected on the notes and bonds, but also at maturity to “account” to the holder for the value of his pro rata interest in the principal of such notes and bonds. Under it appellant was obligated to pay the certificate holder the pro rata value of the notes and bonds on the date of maturity of the certificate. Appellant contends that “to account” is not equivalent to “pay,” although it concedes that it was under an obligation to “account in money.” This, we think, is a distinction without a difference. Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Welch, supra, held a similar certificate taxable under the same statute. The fact that in the certificate there construed the purchaser was promised payment of the full amount of the face value of the certificate instead of the value of the pro rata interest in the securities in the pool, as in the instant case, is immaterial. The test is not the payment of par value as opposed to actual value, but the existence of an obligation to pay. Here such an obligation was stated on the face of the certificate, and hence the paper is a certificate of indebtedness. Cf. Lawyers’ Mortgage Co. v. Anderson, supra; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 2 Cir., 67 F.2d 892.
Appellant seeks to avoid the effect of these holdings, which turn partly upon a finding that similar certificates fall within the statute .because they were “known generally as corporate securities,” by emphasizing a finding of the District Court that “The Participation Certificates used by the plaintiff were not known as Corporate Securities, and were not generally regarded in Chattanooga and vicinity as Corporate Securities.” We think that this finding is not equivalent to a finding that such certificates are not “known generally” as corporate securities. It was the intention of Congress to enact a broad and comprehensive provision in this statute [Willcuts v. Investors’ Syndicate, 8 Cir., 57 F.2d 811], and the sweeping character of the provision under discussion supports the contention of the appellee that the term “corporate securities” is employed here in the general sense of evidences of debt. In Lederer v. Fidelity Trust Co., 267 U.S. 17, 45 S.Ct. 206, 69 L.Ed. 494, similar certificates were held to be corporate securities and taxable under the statute. We quote from the opinion (pages 21, 22, 45 S.Ct. page 207):
“As a matter of common speech, to which the statute refers, we have no doubt that these instruments would be known as corporate securities. They would be called so more accurately than some other documents which we believe also would be known generally by that name. Their purpose, as stated in the agreement of the trustee with the railroad, is to secure payment to the holder with interest. They do nothing else. We do not regard the precise limits of the Trust Company’s undertaking as important. If it were only to collect and pay money received by the Company under the secured contract of the Railroad it would be a security for money payment. * * * But be the undertaking greater or less, the security better or worse, we can[574]
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
99 F.2d 570, 21 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1163, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 2925, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hamilton-nat-bank-v-united-states-ca6-1938.