Hamilton Buggy Co. v. Iowa Buggy Co.

55 N.W. 496, 88 Iowa 364
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMay 20, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 55 N.W. 496 (Hamilton Buggy Co. v. Iowa Buggy Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hamilton Buggy Co. v. Iowa Buggy Co., 55 N.W. 496, 88 Iowa 364 (iowa 1893).

Opinion

Kinne, J.

The plaintiff commenced an action by attachment against the defendant, claiming about two thousand, eight hundred dollars, and on October 25, 1890, caused one Cook to .be garnished therein. December 20, 1890, Cook answered as garnishee, denying any indebtedness to the defendant, and averring that he had been indebted to the defendant in October, 1890, about one thousand, eight hundred dollars; that on October 10,1890, he received from the defendant a written notice of. the assignment of said debt to the intervenor. January 7, 1891, the Western Mining & Investment Company filed a petition of intervention, claiming the account or property in the garnishee’s hands. On January 10, 1891, the plaintiff filed its answer to the petition of intervention, denying the intervenor’s ownership of the indebtedness, and averring that the transfer of it to the intervenor was without consideration, fraudulent, and void. June 6, 1891, judgment was rendered in the main action against the defendant. The cause, as to the issues joined between the plaintiff and the intervenor, was tried to a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, from which the intervenor appeals.

1. practice assafpment sufficiency. I. The plaintiff insists that the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error are not sufficiently specific. Each and all of these assignments relate to the admission of evidence against the objection of the intervenor, and each assignment sufficiently points out the error, naming 'the witness, and specifying the evidence and rulings objected to. To require more would entail an unnecessary burden upon the appellants. While the law contemplates that such assignments shall clearly point out the error complained of, it is not necessary to incumber the record by setting out the whole examination in which the error is claimed to [368]*368have occurred. Union Building Association v. Rockford Ins. Co., 83 Iowa, 647.

It is urged that the thirteenth assignment of error is insufficient. It reads: “The court erred in overruling intervenor’s motion to direct a verdict for intervenor.” The motion referred to contains twelve distinct grounds. The assignment of error is insufficient in not pointing out the particular ground, or grounds, of error complained of. Betts v. City of Glenwood, 521 Iowa, 126. The same objection is made to the sixteenth and seventeenth assignments, which are substantially in the same form, and for the reason last stated can not be considered.

The following assignments of error are assailed as being too indefinite: “20. The verdict is contrary to law.” “23. The court erred in rendering judgment upon the verdict.” These assignments are too general. They do not point out or suggest wherein the verdict is contrary to law, or wherein the entry of judgment was error. Brigham v. Retelsdorf, 73 Iowa, 714; Vanderberg v. Camp, 68 Iowa, 212; Betts v. City of Glenwood, 52 Iowa, 126; Tomblin v. Ball, 46 Iowa, 190.

2. fraud: evitenporaneous transactions. II. H. B. Cunningham, a witness for the intervenor, identified the minute book of the defendant company, whereupon the intervenor introduced in evidence that part of page 11 0£ gaj^ showed the action of the board of directors of the defendant ordering the assignment of accounts to the intervenor, to pay notes held by it against the defendant. On cross-examination the plaintiff, against the intervenor’s objection, was permitted to read in evidence the remainder of the minutes- of said meeting of the defendant. They related to the assignment of certain notes and accounts to other creditors of the company; also to the fixing and payment of the salaries of the defendant’s officers. The plaintiff contends that this, being a part of the [369]*369same record, was admissible, under section 3650 of the Code. Clearly, this evidence was not admissible under the provisions of the section quoted. It did not relate to the same subject, but it did relate to acts of the defendant which took place at the same time the transfer of the accounts was made. It was proper to show that, at the time the intervenor claimed that the defendant assigned the account to it, the defendant was engaged in disposing of its other property. True, the facts shown might not, of themselves, show fraud, but were proper to be taken into consideration with all. other facts and circumstances in determining the intent with which the defendant acted in its transfer of the accounts of the intervenor. Of course, to bind the intervenor by such transactions, even if fraudulent on the part of defendant, it must be made to appear that the intervenor was a party to the fraud. Again, the manner in which these two corporations had conducted their business, as hereinafter referred to, warranted great latitude in the admission of such testimony.

3 _._. business relation of parties. III. The plaintiff called as a witness J. T. James, president of the defendant, and examined him as to. who constituted the stockholders of said company, who were officers of the intervenor, their residence, and relationship to the stockholders and officers of the defendant. It is urged that this was error. Some of the facts touching the stock of the defendant were also testified to by the witness Leiser, and, while error is assigned on the admission of his evidence, it is not argued. Other facts sworn to by James were established by the books of the defendant, which we, for _ reasons hereafter stated, hold were properly admitted. Again, much latitude is allowed in the examination of witnesses in cases where fraud is the subject of the inquiry. The relationship of the officers of the defendant and the [370]*370intervenor was clearly within th£ reasonable limits of the investigation in such a case, and was a proper matter to be shown. The fact that the' witness was president of the defendant company, and at the same time secretary of the- intervenor, might be material, in connection with other facts and circumstances, in tending to show that the transaction in controversy was fraudulent.

4. —: —: account. IY. It is urged that the court erred in admitting in evidence the books of the defendant, and also of the accounts of James and Cunningham therein, who were officers of the defendant. It is claimed that the intervenor is a stranger to the transactions of the defendant, and hence can not be bound by any entries that may be found in its books. The law undoubtedly' is that the entries in the books of a company are not evidence as against strangers. The evidence shows that the defendant and the intervenor used the same books. Witness Leiser testifies: “I think the Western Mining & Investment Company owned the Iowa Buggy Company. Mr. James was then manager. It was doing business at that time under the name of the Iowa- Buggy Company. I do not know how long the Western Mining & Investment Company did business as the Iowa Buggy Company. These books do not show. There are no books that I know of that would show. I kept these books fór the Iowa Buggy Company while they were doing business under that name. They are the only books I kept for the company.” From the evidence before us it is impossible to say when the career of one corporation ended, and the other began its operations. It can not, with any degree of certainty, be said that the intervenor was a stranger to the entries in these books, and hence we can not say that the court erred in admitting them.

[371]*3715.

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Bluebook (online)
55 N.W. 496, 88 Iowa 364, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hamilton-buggy-co-v-iowa-buggy-co-iowa-1893.