MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY:
This is an appeal from a decree and order granting a permanent injunction, enjoining the operation of bars and slot machines and gambling upon or within the confines of the described municipal public park owned by the city of Poison in Lake county, Montana.
Prior to 1936 the Poison Country Club, then an unincorporated association, owned a tract of land, about one-half mile northeast of the Poison city limits, on which golf was played.
To qualify for federal grants of W. P. A. funds, available to municipal corporations and other public agencies but not obtainable by private persons, the Poison Country Club, on July 7, 1936, conveyed the aforesaid property to the city of Poison for development and use as a municipal park, recreational grounds, and golf course purposes, by deed as follows:
“This indenture, made the 7th day of July, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-six, between the [472]*472Poison Country Club, a corporation, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Montana, with its principal place of business and Post Office address at Poison, Montana, party of the first part, and the City of Poison, in Lake County, a municipal corporation of the State of Montana, party of the second part.
“Witnesseth. That the said party of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One and no/100 Dollars ($1.00) and other good and valuable consideration, lawful money of the United States of America to it in hand paid by the said party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do remise, release and forever quitclaim unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and assigns, the following described real estate, situated in the County of Lake, and State of Montana, to-wit:
“Lot Four (4) and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (NW%SW%) of Section Two (2) in Township Twenty-two (22) North of Range Twenty (20) West, according to the United States government survey thereof, save and excepting from, however, all easements for rights of way heretofore granted to the Northern Pacific Railway Company for railroad purposes, and likewise all easements for rights of way heretofore granted for and on behalf of the public highway purposes and any right of way heretofore granted or now existing for pole lines or ditches and likewise this conveyance shall be subject to flowage rights now or hereafter constructed, excepting therefrom, that portion of said tract of land which lies south of the U. S. Highway No. 93, containing approximately four (4) acres, more or less.
‘ ‘ Together with all the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof; and also all the estate, right, title, interest, property, possession, claim and demand whatsoever, as well in law as in equity for the said party of the first part, of, in or to the said premises, and every part and parcel thereof.
[473]*473‘ ‘ To have and to hold, all and singular, the said premises, with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever, for municipal park, recreational grounds and golf course purposes.
“This grant is made and accepted upon condition that said tract of land shall be used for park, recreational grounds and golf course purposes, and upon condition that, in the event the same ceases to be used, maintained and kept up for such purposes then the title to said land and premises together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon, shall revert to the grantor herein named and that the grantee will reconvey such title to said grantor, and upon further condition that the grantee herein will by ordinance or resolution create and provide a park Board or Commission, consisting of three members to be appointed by the Mayor of the City of Poison, one of whom shall be a member of the City Council of the City of Polsdn, and the other two shall be members in good standing of the Poison Country Club, and that said park Board or Commission shall be vested with power and authority to govern and manage said park, recreational grounds and golf course and to make reasonable rules and regulations for the use thereof by the public. ’ ’
The city accepted the deed and by ordinance assumed to create a city park board and to prescribe its duties.
Through grants of public funds obtained by the city through the federal W. P. A., augmented by contributions received from the people of the city of Poison and different interested groups and organizations, a large building was erected on the tract.
Assuming to act under the authority of section 72 of a city ordinance, Article XIY, on March 10, 1948, such park board so created by said ordinance, entered into a lease agreement with the Poison Country Club then and now a private corporation, whereby the said park board leased to the Poison Country Club the lower portion of the large building and the playing area of the golf course, all located on the property described in the above deed, for a term of five years from April 20, 1948. As rent the club is to pay to the city of Poison all green fees and membership [474]*474fees collected by tbe club. Tbe park board on behalf of the, city of Poison agreed to keep up and maintain the leased property and pay for all water, lights and heat and it was agreed the Poison Country Club could not sublease the property or any part thereof without consent of the park board.
Similar arrangements without any lease have been in operation between the city of Poison and the Poison Country Club since the completion of the building in 1937 or 1938 prior to the said lease and apparently no objections were encountered until about two years ago when the Poison Country Club, after the execution of the lease, installed a bar and began selling beer and liquor and operating slot machines in what is called the bar or club room on the leased lower floor of the large building, from which portion of the building and premises the general public was and is excluded. The kitchen and rooms occupied as living quarters by the manager and his family are also located on this first floor. The manager also serves the members of the Poison Country Club with beer or liquors as required.
The plaintiff in his complaint alleges that at all times material to this action he is and has been a taxpayer in the city of Poison, Montana, and as such brings this action on his own behalf and on behalf of other taxpayers similarly situated; that the property is held in trust by the city of Poison for a specific purpose, under the terms and conditions imposed in the deed to the city, being for municipal park, recreational, and golf course'purposes, and to the use and benefit of the general public for those purposes only; that a bar and slot machines operated at, in and upon these premises interferes with the general public’s use of the property and that the action of the defendants has been in total disregard of their duties and obligations to and toward the citizens of Poison and this plaintiff.
This taxpayer’s action is brought to protect the interests and rights of the inhabitants of Poison in and to the property deeded to the city of Poison and the complaint on its face clearly states a cause of action, showing plaintiff to be entitled prima facie to an injunction. See McClintock v. City of Great Falls, [475]*47553 Mont. 221, 163 Pac. 99; Lloyd v. City of Great Falls, 107 Mont. 442, 86 Pac. (2d) 395; Colwell v. City of Great Falls, 117 Mont. 126, 138, 157 Pac. (2d) 1013; Milligan v. City of Miles City, 51 Mont. 374, 382, 153 Pac. 276, L. R. A. 1916C, 395, and eases therein cited.
The deed is absolute in its terms and conveyed the fee simple title to the property therein described to the city where it has since remained.
A city or town is but an assemblage of inhabitants living in the vicinity of each other and not separated by any other intervening division of the state and having a designated number of inhabitants, and when organized as a municipal corporation such step is taken for the purpose, mainly, that the people within its territorial limits may thereby be enabled, for their own interest and advantage, to administer their local and internal concerns. The property covered by the above described deed, while running to the city, is in fact a trust, the city council being the trustees holding the legal title, and the equitable title being in the cestui que trust, being the inhabitants, the public, of the city of Poison.
“A fundamental essential to the existence of any trust is the separation of the legal estate from the beneficial enjoyment * * 26 R. C. L., “Trusts,” sec. 22, p. 1186; Doan v. Vestry of Parish of Ascension, 103 Md. 662, 64 A. 314 and note 7 L. R. A., N. S., 1119, 115 Am. St. Rep. 379; Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117, 15 L. R. A. 470, 31 Am. St. Rep. 637.
This beneficial enjoyment, or, in other words, the equitable title to the subject matter of the trust, is vested in the person or persons for whose benefit the trust is created, known as the cestui que trust. See Dillenbeck v. Pinnell, 121 Iowa, 201, 96 N. W. 860.
For whose benefit was this trust now under consideration created ? Surely not for the Country Club. The property is but the subject matter of the trust, legal title to which is vested in the trustees, in this case the city council, for the use and benefit [476]*476of all the inhabitants of the city of Poison generally, they being the ones entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of the property thus created and dedicated for a particular purpose. See Town of Cascade v. Cascade County, 75 Mont. 304, 243 Pac. 806.
A different construction is placed upon dedications made by individuals from those made by the public. The former are construed strictly according to the terms of the grant, while in the latter eases a less strict construction is adopted. See Spires v. City of Los Angeles, 150 Cal. 64, 87 Pac. 1026, 11 Ann. Cas. 465; Village of Riverside v. MacLain, 210 Ill. 308, 71 N. E. 408, 66 L. R. A. 288, 102 Am. St. Rep. 164.
The property herein was deeded to the city under restrictions as to its use, with a reversion clause. The property, in the very nature of it, was to be enjoyed by the public at large and neither the city nor its officers may allow its use to be diverted to uses other than those specified and prescribed in the grant.
Passing for the moment the other questions attempted to be raised herein, and confining ourselves to a consideration of the terms of the deed granting the property to the city, it is clearly apparent that the uses for which this property may be leased are limited by the terms of the grant and dedication. In other words, the city or a park board, if one was created, cannot lease or use, or allow its tenants to use, the property for purposes not authorized by the terms of the grant, such use would be in violation of the trust imposed. See Stone v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal. App. 192, 299 Pac. 838.
In Sharp v. City of Guthrie, Okl. Supp., 145 Pac. 764, 766, the court said: “Defining the interest of the complaining taxpayer in the parks to be that of cestui que trust and that the suit, in effect, was to preserve and enforce a trust, the court [in Davenport v. Buffington et al., 8 Cir., 97 F. 234, 38 C. C. A. 453, 46 L. R. A. 377] said:
“ ‘Now, the enforcement of trusts is one of the great heads of equity jurisdiction. The land in these parks, if it was really dedicated to the use of the public for park purposes, is held in trust for that use, and courts of equity always interfere at the [477]*477suit of a cestui que trust or a cestui que use to prohibit a violation of the trust, or a destruction of the right of user. The appellee Tarrant is one of the cestuis que use for -whom these parks are held in trust, and the inevitable conclusion is that his interest in them is ample to enable him to maintain a suit in equity to prevent their diversion to private uses.’
“It would serve no useful purpose to cite any considerable number of authorities in support of a doctrine so well established.” See Perry Public Library Ass’n v. Lobsitz, 35 Okla. 576, 130 Pac. 919, 45 L. R. A., N. S., 368; Warren v. Mayor of Lyons City, 22 Iowa 351; Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92, 7 L. R. A. 765; Church v. City of Portland, 18 Or. 73, 22 Pac. 528, 6 L. R. A. 259.
The court sitting in equity is authorized, if not required, to determine all disputes incidental to the controversy. See Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 7 Cir., 135 F. (2d) 365; Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City of Chicago, 352 Ill. 11, 185 N. E. 170, 87 A. L. R. 742.
It is a general rule, set forth by statutes in most states, that where property is consecrated to public use, by dedication of the owner the municipality within whose borders the premises are situate takes it as trustee for the public and for the special uses designated by the dedicator.
Section 11-1004, R. C. M. 1947, provides in part: “Any city or town organized under the laws of the state of Montana is hereby empowered and given the right to accept, receive, take, hold, own, and possess any gift, donation, grant, devise, or bequest, or any property, real, personal, or mixed, or any improved or unimproved park or playground, * * ® and the right to own, hold, work, and improve the same; and said gifts, donations, grants, bequests, or devises made to any officer or board of any' such city or town shall be considered a gift, donation, grant, bequest, or devise made for the use and benefit of any such city or town, and shall he administered and used, hy such city or town for the particular purpose for which the same was given, donated, granted, bequeathed, or devised.” (Emphasis supplied.)
[478]*478B. C. M. 1947, see. 11-1005, as far as pertinent here, provides : “Any donation, gift, or grant may be made by any person, company, copartnership, or corporation to any city or town * * * of any property, real, personal, or mixed, or any improved or unimproved park or playground * * * but in the event that any gift, donation, grant, devise, or bequest shall be made to any such city or town, or to any officer or board of such city or town, the same shall be construed as a gift, donation, grant, devise, or bequest to such city or town, and shall he administered and used for such city or town, and for the particular purpose for vdiieh the same was given, donated, granted, bequeathed, or devised.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, as the empowering statute impressed this property with a trust, by accepting the deed the city of Poison, through its council as trustees, may not be heard to repudiate the trust or be permitted to allow the trust property to be used for a different purpose than that for which it was dedicated.
“* « * we think it cannot now be doubted that a city owns and its officials administer its streets and parks; not as private proprietors, but as trustees for the people. While streets and parks are to be administered primarily for the use of the people for travel and recreation it is equally certain that, consistent with such uses, the public places of a city must be open for the use of the people in order that they may exercise their rights of free speech and assembly.” Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 3 Cir., 101 F. (2d) 774, 785, Id., 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423.
“Here the uses for which the premises in controversy were dedicated were for the purposes of a public park and common, 'and for the recreation and amusement of the public. These uses were not only declared by the dedicator, but they were assented to by the village * * *. It results that the village cannot employ these premises, or any portion of them, for any additional purpose, * * *.” Village of Riverside v. MacLain, supra [210 Ill. 308, 71 N. E. 415],
Equity looks at the whole situation and grants or withholds [479]*479relief as good conscience dictates. 30 C. J. S., Equity, sec. 89, p. 456; Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Allen, 270 Mich. 272, 259 N. W. 281.
When a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction for any purpose, it is empowered to determine all questions involved in the ease and do complete justice. See Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City of Chicago, supra.
That public bodies and public officers may be restrained by injunction from proceeding in violation of law, to the prejudice of the public, or to the injury of individual rights, cannot be questioned. A usurpation of powers may by this process be prevented, in a proper ease, and a waste, misapplication, or diversion of public property or trust property or funds be enjoined. See People of New York v. Canal Board of New York, 55 N. Y. 390, 393. See note in 2 Am. St. Rep. at page 92; 43 C. J. S., Injunctions, see. 108, p. 614, see. 110, p. 631, sec. 111, p. 633, and sec. 119, p. 650; and cases cited; Pughe v. Lyle, D. C., 10 F. Supp. 245, 248.
Our legislature has granted further power and authority to city and town councils to deal with park property by amending section 5039.61, by Chapter 35, Laws of 1937, R. C. M. 1947, sec. 11-964, as follows: ‘ The city or town council has power; to sell, dispose of, or lease any property belonging to a city or town, provided, however, that such lease or transfer be made by ordinance or resolution passed by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the council; and provided further that if such property '‘be held in trust for a specific purpose such sale or lease thereof be approved by a majority vote of taxpayers of such municipality cast at an election called for that purpose; and provided further that nothing herein contained shall be construed to abrogate the power of the board of park commissioners to lease all lands owned by the city heretofore acquired for parks within the limitations prescribed by sub-division 5 of Section 5162, Revised Codes of Montana of 1935.” (Emphasis supplied.) Subdivision 5 of R. C. M. 1947, see. 62-204, grants the power to the park board, where one is authorized by statute, to lease all lands owned [480]*480and theretofore acquired for parks, by the city which, in the judgment of the board, it shall not be advisable to improve as parks, and of course this proviso has no application to the lands here involved which are admittedly being improved for park, recreational grounds and golf course purposes.
The purpose of this amendment is manifest. It is to give to the inhabitant taxpayer of the city his right to a voice in tie determination of whether or not his equitable title as beneficiary shall be alienated and to bring the proceeding within the constitutional mandate, in regard to improved public trust park property.
Cities and towns are creatures, created by legislative enactments, and this court has held that, “Municipalities have only such powers as are expressly granted.” Lazich v. City of Butte, 116 Mont. 386, 390, 154 Pac. (2d) 260, 261. Again the court has stated, quoting from 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (5th Ed.), sec. 237, “ ‘ Of every municipal corporation the charter or statute by which it is created is'its organic act. Neither the corporation nor its officers can clo any act, or make any contract, or incur any liability, not authorized thereby or by some legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are void.” Milligan v. City of Miles City, supra [51 Mont. 374, 153 Pac. 278], and cases therein cited at page 382. (Emphasis supplied.) See Stephens v. City of Great Falls, 119 Mont. 368, 175 Pac. (2d) 408.
“Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot-be contravened by a private agreement.” B. C. M. 1947, sec. 49-105.
What is the public policy of the state, and what is contrary to it, are questions to be determined, not by the private convictions or notions of the persons who happen for the time to be exercising judicial functions, but by reference to the enactments of the law-making power, and, in the absence of them, to the decisions of the courts. And when the legislature, exercising its constitutional powers, has spoken upon a particular sub[481]*481ject, its utterance is the public policy of the state on that subject. See State ex rel. McCarten v. Corwin, 119 Mont. 520, at page 529, 177 Pac. (2d) 189 and cases cited; also MacGinniss v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co., 29 Mont. 428, 75 Pac. 89; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U. S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007; Parchen v. Chessman, 49 Mont. 326, 334, 142 Pac. 631, 146 Pac. 469, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 681; Board of County Commissioners of Gunnison County v. Buckley, Colo. 1949, 213 Pac. (2d) 608, 611.
While this section R. C. M. 1947, see. 11-964, as amended by Chapter 35, Laws of 1937, was urged by the plaintiff in Col-well v. City of Great Falls, supra, and relied on by defendants here, this court stated in that case, “Section 5039.61, supra, was designed to permit the cities and towns of this State, with the approval of a majority vote of their taxpayers, to sell or lease their property which was held in trust for a specific purpose, in abrogation of, or in substantial interference with, the use of the property for such specific purpose. There are no such facts in this case, hence it was not necessary for the defendant city to secure the approval as contemplated by the provisions of Section 5039.61, supra.” [117 Mont. 126, 157 Pac. (2d) 1022.] In other words, this court found that under the lease there under consideration all rights of the public were protected.
In the case at bar, the lease to the Poison Country Club, even if otherwise legal, contains no provision or provisions safeguarding the rights of the inhabitants of Poison to their use of the property in accordance with the dedication.
Defendants in their brief have cited Chapter 71, Laws of 1939, and appear to rely on its provisions for the leasing of the property in question. However, we find no merit in such contention. Said Chapter 71 applies only to a program of public recreation and playgrounds, but does not apply to the facts and circumstances and conditions here under consideration, as it does not authorize leasing of trust property, nor may the legislature authorize such a city to delegate municipal governmental functions whatever. Sec. 36, Art. Y, Montana Constitution; State ex rel. [482]*482Brooks v. Cook, 84 Mont. 478, 484, 485, 276 Pac. 958; 43 C. J., “Municipal Corporations,” p. 183, sec. 180.
The city of Poison, being a city of the third class, has not been authorized by the legislature to appoint a park board, hence the city council is the only authority given the power to lease, sell and manage its parks.
The authority to maintain and manage and control a public park, that has been dedicated to a city of the third class is essentially a part of the machinery of government of the city necessary to maintain the park for the benefit of the public. It follows as a matter of course that the acts of the city therein are municipal in character, and such may not be delegated. Sec. 36, Art. V, Montana Constitution.
It is apparent that the city of Poison, being the legal owner of the public park and the buildings thereon here involved holds in trust the same for the inhabitants of the city of Poison, who are the equitable owners thereof, and the property being improved park property, limited by private grant and dedicated for special purposes, it may not be used for any other purposes or uses.
The city is expressly empowered by the provisions of Chapter 35, Laws of 1937, to lease any property belonging to it to the Country Club or to any other private corporation, association or person, provided the terms of such lease do not interfere with the use by the inhabitants of the municipality for the purposes for which the property was dedicated and is held in trust. See Colwell v. City of Great Falls, supra.
Such leasing proposition shall be submitted to the taxpayers of the city to be approved by a majority vote cast at a special election called for that purpose. This is the procedure prescribed by our legislature. It therefore constitutes the public policy of the state and the only lawful method of leasing trust property under the facts herein.
The purported lease on which the defendants base their claimed rights has no standing under the law for it was executed by an unauthorized body of men without sanction of [483]*483the law, who assumed to, and did usurp the power and prerogatives of the duly constituted and legal council of the city, which alone is clothed with the requisite power and authority under the facts here, to deal with the public trust property of a third-class city of this state, and they may not neglect, abandon, nor surrender their duties as trustees, nor allow nor condone the exercise by someone else of their power relating thereto.
The legislative power vested in municipal bodies cannot be bartered away in such manner as to disable them from the performance of their public functions. Wabash R. Co. v. City of Defiance, 167 U. S. 88, 17 S. Ct. 748, 42 L. Ed. 87; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611, 84 Am. Dec. 314.
* * a municipality * * * has no power to enter into contracts which curtail or prohibit an exercise of its legislative or administrative authority * * State ex rel. Townsend v. Board of Park Com’rs, 100 Minn. 150, 110 N. W. 1121, 9 L. R. A., N. S., 1045; Nebraska City v. Nebraska City Speed & Fair Ass’n, 107 Neb. 576, 186 N. W. 374, 376, 377.
Counsel for defendants contend that without the revenue from the Poison Country Club it would be impossible for the city of Poison to maintain this property from the possible sources of revenue available to it. While the record in the case does not show the actual or estimated over-all expense of maintaining this park property, or whether the maximum levy allowed by law has been made by the city, yet none can deny that the city of Poison is a very prosperous and fine propertied community, and should its assessed valuation be no more than a million and a quarter dollars, the maximum levy of six mills on each dollar of such assessed valuation, sec. 4, Ch. 71, Laws of 1945, would provide $13,500 annually for the purposes there considered.
Accordingly the purported lease of March 10, 1948, between A. H. Papke, R. S. Stoudt, J. H. Hanson, as the purported park board of the city of Poison, Montana, as first parties, and the Poison Country Club, a corporation, second party, purporting to lease to the second party the lower portion of the clubhouse and the playing area of the golf course on Lot Four, and the [484]*484northwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section two, township 22 north, range 20 west, M. M., is clearly void and of no effect. “Time does not confirm a void act.” R. C. M. 1947, sec. 49-131; State ex rel. Boorman v. State Board of Land Com’rs, 109 Mont. 127, 94 Pac. (2d) 201, 204.
This court, speaking through Chief Justice Brantly, after quoting the statutes conferring powers on cities and towns, said, ‘ ‘ * * * by the great weight of authority it is held to be exclusive and to apply to all municipal bodies. It falls within the general rule that, when the Legislature has prescribed the mode by which a given power is to be exercised by a municipality, this mode must be pursued. It is the measure of power on that subject; and any attempt to pursue any other mode fails to bind the municipality at all. Contracts entered into in disregard of the limitations are void.” Missoula Street Ry. Co. v. City of Missoula, 47 Mont. 85, 95, 130 Pac. 771, 773.
“It is considered that a contract void in its inception is not validated by performance and remains a void contract.” Bechthold v. City of Mauwatosa, 228 Wis. 544, 277 N. W. 657, 280 N W. 320, 322. See R. C. M. 1947, sec. 59-501.
The legislature has enacted: ‘ ‘ That is not lawful which is: 1. Contrary to an express provision of law; 2. Contrary to the policy of express law, though not expressly prohibited * * *” R. C. M. 1947, sec. 13-801. Contracts made in violation of express statutes are contrary to public policy and absolutely and wholly void and of no legal effect. See Lebcher v. Board of Com’rs of Custer County, 9 Mont. 315, 320, 23 Pac. 713, 714; State ex rel. Lambert v. Coad, 23 Mont. 131, 57 Pac. 1092; Missoula Street Ry. Co. v. City of Missoula, supra.
The rule is well stated as, “A void contract is no contract at all; it binds no one and is a mere nullity. * * * It requires no disaffirmance to avoid it and it cannot be validated by ratification. A contract wholly void is void as to everybody whose rights would be affected by it if valid.” 12 Am. Jur., “Contracts,” sec. 10, p. 507. “A void contract need not be rescinded.” 12 Am. Jur., “Contracts,” sec. 437, p. 1017.
[485]*485In 6 R. C. L., Contracts, sec. 98, pp. 692, 693, it is said: “At no time in the history of the common law were contracts in violation of law regarded as valid. * * * A contract, though it may be based on consent, derives its obligatory force from the sanction of the law. It would therefore be anomalous indeed if the law were to sanction contracts which violate the law. * * * The whole doctrine relating to illegal contracts is founded on a regard for the public welfare. In fact, it has been asserted that the maintenance of this doctrine is essential to the preservation of the state.” State ex rel. Helena Water Co. v. City of Helena, 24 Mont. 521, 63 Pac. 99, 105, 55 L. R. A. 336, 81 Am. St. Rep. 453.
The order and judgment of the district court perpetually enjoining defendants from operating or attempting to operate thereunder, was and is correct under the law and the facts.
Having reached these conclusions, the other contentions raised need not be considered. The decree and order of the trial court are affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIR and ASSOCIATE JUSTICE METCALF, concur.