Hall v. United States

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 27, 2023
• Docket: 2:21-cv-00992
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT SEATTLE

6 RANDY LEE HALL, Case No. C21-992RSM 7

8 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 9 v.

10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 Respondent. 12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Before the Court is Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 15 16 Sentence. Dkt. #1. Randy Lee Hall challenges the 90-month and 120-month sentences 17 imposed on him by this Court following his guilty plea to three counts including assault of 18 federal officers and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Id. at 1; Case No. 2:16-cr- 19 00225-RSM, Dkts. #106 and #107. Petitioner asserts five ineffective assistance of counsel 20 claims. After full consideration of the record, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court 21 22 DENIES Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion. 23 II. BACKGROUND 24 The Court generally agrees with the relevant background facts as set forth by the 25 Government and demonstrated by court records. See Dkt. #5 at 2–9. Mr. Hall has failed to file 26 a reply brief and therefore does not dispute this largely procedural background. The Court will 27 28 attempt to focus only on those facts necessary for a ruling. In late spring of 2016, law enforcement became aware of information tying Mr. Hall to 1 2 an April 2016 drive-by shooting in Seattle. At the end of June 2016, an ATF special agent, two 3 ATF task-force agents, and Washington State Department of Corrections Officer Kris Rongen 4 attempted to arrest Mr. Hall on an unrelated misdemeanor warrant in the parking lot outside the 5 apartment where he lived. Dkt. #5-1 at 32 (the Plea Agreement in the underlying criminal 6 case). As Mr. Hall approached the door of his car, the arrest team pulled up behind his car, 7 8 identified themselves as police, and ordered him to get on the ground so that they could arrest 9 him. Id. The officers had their guns drawn in the “low-ready” position. Mr. Hall did not 10 comply with the officers’ commands. Instead he walked over to the driver’s side door, opened 11 it, and sat down in the driver’s seat sideways with his feet out. He started the car. Id. Officer 12 13 Rongen holstered his firearm, drew his Taser, and started to approach. Id. Mr. Hall reached his 14 hand down toward the floorboard of his car, picked up a semi-automatic pistol, and pointed it at 15 Officer Rongen and the three other agents. Id. Officer Rongen yelled “Taser” and used it. Id. 16 at 33. Mr. Hall then shot Officer Rongen twice, striking him in the left shin and kneecap. Id. 17 Two of the other agents then returned fire; Mr. Hall was hit by multiple rounds in the shoulder 18 19 and upper arm. Id. Everyone survived. 20 After the above incident, ATF agents obtained a search warrant for Mr. Hall’s 21 apartment, finding ammunition for several firearms. Id. 22 The second superseding indictment charged Mr. Hall with assault of federal officers and 23 assault of a person assisting federal officers, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b); 24 25 two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 26 924(c)(1(A)(i) – (iii); and unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 27 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id. at 12. The first 924(c) count in the indictment carried a mandatory- 28 minimum penalty of ten years of imprisonment, which the district court would have been 1 2 required to impose consecutive to any sentence imposed on the other counts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(D) (2016). At the time of the second superseding indictment, the second 4 924(c) count carried a mandatory-minimum penalty of twenty-five years of imprisonment, 5 which the district court would have been required to impose consecutive to the ten-year 6 mandatory minimum for the first 924(c) count and any sentence it imposed for the other counts. 7 8 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(D) (2017). 9 In October 2018, Mr. Hall (represented by defense counsel Lee Edmond) filed a motion 10 in limine to prevent the United States from using certain evidence at trial. Dkt. #5-2 at 4. 11 Hall’s motion, the government’s response, and the hearing before the district court reflect that 12 13 the government had developed evidence showing Hall’s involvement not only in the charged 14 offenses, but also in the April 2016 drive-by shooting. Id. at 4, 22, and 58. 15 After a hearing, this Court denied Hall’s motion in limine to exclude evidence relating 16 to the April 2016 drive-by shooting. Id. at 80–81. The Court concluded that the evidence was 17 relevant to establishing elements of the charged offenses, including the two assault counts and 18 19 the offense of possession of ammunition. Id. The Court found that the evidence was relevant 20 to countering Hall’s defense that he did not purposefully shoot Officer Rongen but rather the 21 “effects of the taser ma[d]e him do it.” Id. at 81. The Court found that the evidence was not 22 unfairly prejudicial. Id. 23 In March of 2019, Mr. Hall entered into a plea agreement where the Government 24 25 dropped three counts, resulting in a new mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. The 26 agreement also provided that, in exchange for Hall’s guilty plea and satisfaction of the terms of 27 the agreement, the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office would forgo charges arising 28 from the April 2016 drive-by shooting, including charges of assault in the first degree, drive-by 1 2 shooting, and unlawful possession of firearm in the first degree. See Dkt. #5-1 at 34–35. The 3 plea agreement included an appellate waiver in which Hall agreed, “on the condition that the 4 Court imposes a custodial sentence of not more than 19 years,” to waive “any right conferred 5 by Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 to appeal the sentence,” and “any right to bring a 6 collateral attack against the conviction and sentence, including any restitution order imposed, 7 8 except as it may relate to the effectiveness of legal representation.” Id. at 36. The plea 9 agreement also stated that Hall “has entered into this Plea Agreement freely and voluntarily and 10 that no threats or promises, other than the promises contained in this agreement, were made to 11 induce Defendant to enter this plea of guilty.” Id. at 37. 12 13 Mr. Hall pleaded guilty at a hearing before a magistrate judge. See id. at 39 (transcript 14 of change of plea hearing). The magistrate judge reviewed the elements of each charge to 15 which Mr. Hall was admitting guilt, asked him to confirm that he understood each of the 16 elements, and confirmed that he understood the factual assertions in the plea satisfying each 17 element. The magistrate judge reviewed various provisions of the agreement, including the 18 19 rights that Hall was waiving by pleading guilty. Hall affirmed that he was aware of the 20 potential penalties and the rights that he was giving up. The magistrate judge had the 21 prosecutor summarize the factual basis for the plea set out in the plea agreement and asked Hall 22 to affirm that he was agreeing to all those facts, which he did. The magistrate judge then 23 confirmed that Hall had the opportunity to review the agreement, discuss it with his lawyer, and 24 25 make an intelligent decision before he signed it. Specifically, the magistrate judge asked Hall: 26 “And you know, you are represented in court by a lawyer, and before coming to court today did 27 you have enough time to discuss the whole case, I guess including your state matters, which are 28 possibly pending, with your lawyer to make an intelligent decision about pleading guilty or 1 2 doing something else? Did you have enough time to do that?” Id. at 53. Hall answered, “Yes.” 3 Id. The magistrate judge asked whether Hall was giving up his rights and pleading guilty freely 4 and voluntarily, and Hall answered, “Yeah.” Id. Lee Edmond, Hall’s attorney, affirmed that he 5 was not aware of any reasons that the magistrate judge should not accept Hall’s guilty plea. 6 Hall then pleaded guilty to counts 1-3 in the superseding indictment. The magistrate judge told 7 8 Hall that he would prepare a report recommending that the district court accept his plea and that 9 Hall would have the opportunity to file objections to the report. Hall filed no objection. 10 Mr. Hall’s sentencing memorandum stated he “fully accepts responsibility for his 11 intentional act of firing his weapon and wounding Officer Rongen.” Id. at 61. 12 13 The sentencing hearing occurred on October 25, 2019. Dkt. #106. Hall told the Court 14 that he did not “wake up every day thinking about, ‘Oh, I got warrants. I want to shoot my way 15 out of this situation,’ or anything like that.” Id. at 87. He explained that there were “some 16 things that—in this plea that I took. And I asked for some language changes. I asked for, like, 17 certain things, but I kind of felt like my life was pinned to the floor.” Id. Hall also asserted that 18 19 Mr. Edmond had not shared the sentencing memorandum with him before he filed it and said 20 that he did not agree with some of the statements made in the memo. Id. at 91. The Court 21 asked whether Hall had the opportunity to discuss the sentencing memo with Mr. Edmond 22 since it had been filed, and Hall confirmed that he had. The Court asked Hall: “Do you feel 23 you’ve had enough of an opportunity now?” Id. at 92. Hall replied, “Yeah, but it’s too late. 24 25 You have it. You read it.” Id. 26 Mr. Hall then said: 27 I don’t want to prolong this, Your Honor. This burden – this 28 situation has broken me down so much, to where I feel like the officer deserve whatever justices that he wants out of me. I feel 1 like that, you know, they think I'm a risk to the community. If 2 that's what it is, then I just want to get this over with, behind. I’m tired of bringing my family up here to this federal courthouse, 3 embarrassing them.

4 Id. The Court responded that Hall had an absolute right to review the sentencing memorandum 5 before it was filed and asked whether Hall was willing to waive that right “understanding what 6 is in the memo now.” Id. at 93. Hall responded, “Yes. Yes. I just want to waive it, Your 7 8 Honor.” Id. 9 The Court sentenced Hall to 90 months of imprisonment for the two assault charges and 10 the mandatory-minimum 120 months of imprisonment, consecutive to the other charges, for the 11 use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Id. at 100. 12 13 Mr. Hall filed a direct appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which raised 14 only two issues: (1) whether the district court had impermissibly burdened his right to counsel 15 by warning Hall that it would not appoint a fourth attorney for him if he could not get along 16 with Mr. Edmond; and (2) whether the magistrate judge who conducted the change-of-plea 17 hearing violated Rule 11 by failing to expressly inquire into whether Hall’s guilty plea resulted 18 19 from “force or threats.” The Ninth Circuit rejected Hall’s arguments and affirmed his 20 conviction. Dkt. #5-3. 21 Mr. Hall filed this instant petition pro se on July 22, 2021. Dkt. #1. He asserts five 22 ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, Hall claims that Mr. Edmond was ineffective by 23 failing to “ask for an evidentiary hearing” at which he could have presented an expert witness 24 25 on “stun guns” (Tasers) to establish that Hall “accidentally discharge[d]” his firearm at Officer 26 Rongen. Second, Hall claims: that Mr. Edmond “threaten[ed]” and “lied” to him to “get [Hall] 27 to take the [plea] deal;” Hall essentially repeats the same argument he made on direct appeal – 28 that the district court forced Hall to plead guilty by stating that it would not appoint Hall a 1 2 fourth defense counsel. Hall’s third claim is that Mr. Edmond was ineffective by advising him 3 that a consequence of not entering the guilty plea was that state prosecutors would charge him 4 with offenses arising out of the April 2016 drive-by shooting and that those charges carried a 5 sentence of up to 27 years. Hall’s fourth claim is that Mr. Edmond was ineffective because he 6 failed to explain the appellate waiver provision of the plea agreement and as a result Hall 7 8 “didn’t fully understand” the agreement. Finally, Hall claims that Mr. Edmond was ineffective 9 because he filed the defense sentencing memo without allowing Hall to review it beforehand. 10 In his filing, Mr. Hall fails to support his assertions with record citations, exhibits, a 11 declaration, or any other evidence. 12 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 A. Legal Standard 15 A motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits a federal prisoner in custody to collaterally 16 challenge his sentence on the grounds that it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or 17 laws of the United States, or that the Court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence or that the 18 19 sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law. 20 A petitioner seeking relief under Section 2255 must file his motion with the one-year 21 statute of limitations set forth in § 2255(f). 22 A claim may not be raised in a Section 2255 motion if the defendant had a full 23 opportunity to be heard on the claim during the trial phase and on direct appeal. See Massaro 24 25 v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1693 (2003). Where a defendant fails to raise an issue before 26 the trial court, or presents the claim but then abandons it, and fails to include it on direct appeal, 27 the issue is deemed “defaulted” and may not be raised under Section 2255 except under 28 unusual circumstances. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998); see also United 1 2 States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1149 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2007). Unless the petitioner can 3 overcome this procedural default, the Court cannot reach the merits of his claims. See Bousley, 4 523 U.S. at 622. To do so, the petitioner must “show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double 5 procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he complains.” 6 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982).1 To demonstrate “cause” for procedural 7 8 default, a defendant generally must show that “some objective factor external to the defense” 9 impeded his adherence to a procedural rule. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. See also United States v. 10 Skurdal, 341 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has held that “cause” for 11 failure to raise an issue exists “where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not 12 13 reasonably available to counsel.” Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). The “prejudice” prong 14 of the test requires demonstrating “not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of 15 prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire 16 trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Frady, 456 at 170. 17 B. Analysis 18 19 There is no dispute that Mr. Hall meets the “custody” requirement of the statute and that 20 this Motion is timely under § 2255(f). This is not a second or successive petition. 21 Hall’s argument that the district court forced him to enter a guilty plea was raised on 22 direct appeal and rejected by the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, the claim is procedurally defaulted. 23 Massaro, 123 S. Ct. at 1693. 24 25 Ineffective assistance claims may be brought on collateral review even if not raised on 26 direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). The standards to be applied 27

28 1 Another means by which procedural default may be excused is by establishing actual innocence. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622. to ineffective assistance claims are those defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 1 2 (1984). Such a claim has two components: inadequate performance by counsel, and prejudice 3 resulting from that inadequate performance. To prevail, a defendant first must show that “in 4 light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 5 professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “This requires showing that 6 counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 7 8 defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. However, “[a] fair assessment of attorney 9 performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 10 to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 11 from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 688 (citation omitted). The presumption is that 12 13 counsel was competent. Id. Even if the first part of the Strickland test is satisfied, a defendant 14 is not entitled to relief unless he can show prejudice. Id. at 687. A defendant “must show that 15 there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 16 and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 17 The Government responds to each of Mr. Hall’s claims. In response to the first claim, 18 19 the Government argues that defense counsel made the right decision to drop the “taser made me 20 do it” defense, that the Court noted at sentencing that the evidence was “pretty strong” that Hall 21 did not accidentally discharge his firearm, and that in any event Hall waived his right to file 22 pretrial motions and mount a trial defense in the plea agreement. Dkt. #5 at 11–12. For the 23 second claim, the Government states “Hall fails to provide any specific evidence or reason to 24 25 believe that occurred” and that “[t]he overall record in the case is inconsistent with Hall’s 26 claim.” Id. at 12. The Government calls the third claim frivolous and unsupported by the 27 record, praising defense counsel’s ability to secure the plea agreement. Id. at 13. The fourth 28 claim is argued to be inconsistent with Mr. Hall’s statements in both the plea agreement and 1 2 plea colloquy. Id. Regarding the final claim, the Government states that even assuming Mr. 3 Edmond’s act of filing the defense sentencing memo without allowing Hall to review it 4 beforehand was deficient, Hall suffered no prejudice. Id. at 14. This lack of prejudice is shown 5 by Hall’s statements at sentencing, where he essentially waived this claim. Id. 6 Mr. Hall has failed to file a reply brief addressing the Government’s valid points on 7 8 these issues. 9 Considering all of the above, the Court finds that Mr. Hall has failed to show that his 10 counsel committed any error, or that he would not have pleaded guilty or that his counsel 11 otherwise “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 12 13 the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland at 687. The only possible error, failing to 14 review the defense sentencing memo, did not result in the prejudice required under the second 15 prong of Strickland. The Court agrees with the Government that there is no reason to believe 16 that “the result of the proceedings would have been different” had Hall reviewed the sentencing 17 memorandum earlier. See Dkt. #5 at 14. 18 19 C. Certificate of Appealability 20 A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief under § 2255 may appeal this Court’s 21 dismissal of his petition only after obtaining a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) from a 22 district or circuit judge. A COA may issue only where a petitioner has made “a substantial 23 showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). A petitioner 24 25 satisfies this standard “by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district 26 court’s resolution of [her] constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues 27 presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 28 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). The Court finds that the law and 1 2 facts above are clear and there is no basis to issue a COA. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Having considered Petitioner’s Motion, the Government’s Response, and the remainder 5 of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS: 6 1. Petitioner’s Motion under § 2255 (Dkt. #1) is DENIED. No COA shall be issued. 7 8 2. This matter is now CLOSED. 9 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to forward a copy of this Order to Petitioner and 10 all counsel of record. 11 DATED this 27th day of January, 2023. 12 13 A 14 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28