Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 17, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MICHAEL AMIR HALL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 26-6034 (D.C. No. 5:25-CV-00518-JD) MICHAEL MILLER, Warden; ALLEN (W.D. Okla.) GAMBLE CORRECTIONAL,
Respondents - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Michael Amir Hall proceeds pro se to request a certificate of
appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time-barred. 1 He also requests to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, we
grant Hall’s IFP motion, deny a COA, and dismiss this matter.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the *
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
Because Hall proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his arguments but 1
do not act as his advocate. See Greer v. Moon, 83 F.4th 1283, 1292 (10th Cir. 2023). Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 2
BACKGROUND
On May 12, 2022, Michael Amir Hall was convicted in Oklahoma state
court of aggravated trafficking in illegal drugs and unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute. 2 The court sentenced him to
twenty years’ imprisonment for the trafficking count and five years’
imprisonment for the possession count. The court agreed to run Hall’s
sentences concurrently and award him credit for time served. He appealed his
convictions to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed on
September 7, 2023.
About two years later, on May 21, 2024, Hall filed an application in
Oklahoma state court for postconviction relief. The state court denied relief,
and Hall’s appeal was unsuccessful.
On April 21, 2025, Hall filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Western District of Oklahoma. In response to an order to
cure deficiencies, he filed an amended petition on June 2, 2025. He raised two
purportedly distinct grounds for relief: he never had a lawful probable-cause
hearing, and no probable-cause hearing ever happened.
2 Hall’s federal petition says he was convicted in 2019. R. at 19. But the attachment to his original petition says it was on May 12, 2022. Id. at 8. The federal magistrate judge below took judicial notice of the Oklahoma state court docket, which shows that he was convicted on May 12, 2022. Id. at 38. Because “courts can take judicial notice of court records in related proceedings,” we use May 12, 2022, rather than the date on his petition. Fuqua v. Santa Fe Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 157 F.4th 1288, 1298 (10th Cir. 2025).
2 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 3
A magistrate judge recommended that Hall’s petition be denied as
untimely. Though Hall timely objected, the district court accepted the
recommendation and dismissed his petition with prejudice. Hall v. Miller,
No. CIV-25-00518, 2025 WL 2630738, at *1–2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2025).
The court reasoned that Hall’s objections to the magistrate’s recommendations
were conclusory and unspecific, so under the firm-waiver rule, he didn’t
preserve any issue for review. It also held that Hall didn’t timely file his habeas
petition, and that equitable tolling didn’t apply. So the court dismissed his
petition with prejudice and denied a COA. After unsuccessfully moving for
reconsideration, Hall timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“A state prisoner whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied by
a federal district court does not enjoy an absolute right to appeal.” Buck v.
Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017). Rather, the prisoner must first obtain a COA.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
appellate review. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
We will not grant a COA unless Hall makes “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Because the district
court denied Hall’s habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
merits of his constitutional claims, he must show both (1) “that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right,” and (2) “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
3 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 4
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We can address either requirement and,
if one is not met, we need not address the other. Id. at 485.
The district court denied Hall’s habeas petition under the firm-waiver
rule and for untimeliness. The court reasoned that Hall’s objections were
“conclusory,” and that the magistrate judge correctly determined that Hall’s
petition was untimely and that equitable tolling didn’t apply. Hall, 2025 WL
2630738, at *1–2. Hall didn’t file his § 2254 petition until April 21, 2025.
On appeal, Hall raises two issues. First, he argues that the district court
erred by treating his objections as insufficiently specific. Second, he argues
that his federal habeas deadline should have been equitably tolled because a
prison lockdown prevented timely filing of his habeas petition.
Neither argument would give reasonable jurists reason to debate whether
the district court’s procedural ruling was correct. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
I. Certificate of Appealability
A. Firm-Waiver Rule
To avoid our “firm waiver rule,” “a party’s objections to a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific.” Coomer
v. Make Your Life Epic, LLC, 140 F.4th 1269, 1277 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation
modified). “This means the objection must be sufficiently specific to focus the
district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in
dispute.” Id. (citation modified). But the firm-waiver rule has two exceptions:
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Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 17, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MICHAEL AMIR HALL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 26-6034 (D.C. No. 5:25-CV-00518-JD) MICHAEL MILLER, Warden; ALLEN (W.D. Okla.) GAMBLE CORRECTIONAL,
Respondents - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Michael Amir Hall proceeds pro se to request a certificate of
appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time-barred. 1 He also requests to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, we
grant Hall’s IFP motion, deny a COA, and dismiss this matter.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the *
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
Because Hall proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his arguments but 1
do not act as his advocate. See Greer v. Moon, 83 F.4th 1283, 1292 (10th Cir. 2023). Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 2
BACKGROUND
On May 12, 2022, Michael Amir Hall was convicted in Oklahoma state
court of aggravated trafficking in illegal drugs and unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute. 2 The court sentenced him to
twenty years’ imprisonment for the trafficking count and five years’
imprisonment for the possession count. The court agreed to run Hall’s
sentences concurrently and award him credit for time served. He appealed his
convictions to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed on
September 7, 2023.
About two years later, on May 21, 2024, Hall filed an application in
Oklahoma state court for postconviction relief. The state court denied relief,
and Hall’s appeal was unsuccessful.
On April 21, 2025, Hall filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Western District of Oklahoma. In response to an order to
cure deficiencies, he filed an amended petition on June 2, 2025. He raised two
purportedly distinct grounds for relief: he never had a lawful probable-cause
hearing, and no probable-cause hearing ever happened.
2 Hall’s federal petition says he was convicted in 2019. R. at 19. But the attachment to his original petition says it was on May 12, 2022. Id. at 8. The federal magistrate judge below took judicial notice of the Oklahoma state court docket, which shows that he was convicted on May 12, 2022. Id. at 38. Because “courts can take judicial notice of court records in related proceedings,” we use May 12, 2022, rather than the date on his petition. Fuqua v. Santa Fe Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 157 F.4th 1288, 1298 (10th Cir. 2025).
2 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 3
A magistrate judge recommended that Hall’s petition be denied as
untimely. Though Hall timely objected, the district court accepted the
recommendation and dismissed his petition with prejudice. Hall v. Miller,
No. CIV-25-00518, 2025 WL 2630738, at *1–2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2025).
The court reasoned that Hall’s objections to the magistrate’s recommendations
were conclusory and unspecific, so under the firm-waiver rule, he didn’t
preserve any issue for review. It also held that Hall didn’t timely file his habeas
petition, and that equitable tolling didn’t apply. So the court dismissed his
petition with prejudice and denied a COA. After unsuccessfully moving for
reconsideration, Hall timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“A state prisoner whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied by
a federal district court does not enjoy an absolute right to appeal.” Buck v.
Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017). Rather, the prisoner must first obtain a COA.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
appellate review. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
We will not grant a COA unless Hall makes “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Because the district
court denied Hall’s habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
merits of his constitutional claims, he must show both (1) “that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right,” and (2) “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
3 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 4
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We can address either requirement and,
if one is not met, we need not address the other. Id. at 485.
The district court denied Hall’s habeas petition under the firm-waiver
rule and for untimeliness. The court reasoned that Hall’s objections were
“conclusory,” and that the magistrate judge correctly determined that Hall’s
petition was untimely and that equitable tolling didn’t apply. Hall, 2025 WL
2630738, at *1–2. Hall didn’t file his § 2254 petition until April 21, 2025.
On appeal, Hall raises two issues. First, he argues that the district court
erred by treating his objections as insufficiently specific. Second, he argues
that his federal habeas deadline should have been equitably tolled because a
prison lockdown prevented timely filing of his habeas petition.
Neither argument would give reasonable jurists reason to debate whether
the district court’s procedural ruling was correct. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
I. Certificate of Appealability
A. Firm-Waiver Rule
To avoid our “firm waiver rule,” “a party’s objections to a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific.” Coomer
v. Make Your Life Epic, LLC, 140 F.4th 1269, 1277 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation
modified). “This means the objection must be sufficiently specific to focus the
district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in
dispute.” Id. (citation modified). But the firm-waiver rule has two exceptions:
4 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 5
(1) when a pro se litigant “has not been informed of the time period for
objecting and the consequences of failing to object,” or (2) when “the interests
of justice require review.” Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119
(10th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). For the interests-of-justice exception, we
consider “a pro se litigant’s effort to comply, the force and plausibility of the
explanation for his failure to comply, and the importance of the issues raised.”
Id. at 1220.
Hall argues that the interest-of-justice exception applies because the
“alleged delay [was] only seven days” and because he “attempted to challenge
the timeliness ruling in the district court.” Open. Br. at 6.
We’ve analogized the interest-of-justice exception to plain-error review.
See Morales-Fernandez, 418 F.3d at 1120; United States v. B.N.M., 107 F.4th
1152, 1169 (10th Cir. 2024). To show plain error, Hall would need to show
(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008).
Hall does not show error, much less error that is plain. Hall’s argument
for the interest-of-justice exception relies on the timeliness of his habeas
petition and his attempts to challenge the magistrate’s untimeliness
recommendation. Those reasons are about the habeas petition and its timeliness,
not about the objections he raised to the magistrate’s report and
recommendations. Thus, Hall doesn’t show how the district court erred by
5 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 6
failing to consider his objections, which were about Hall’s own failure to
exhaust his state-court remedies and raising new grounds for relief in his
habeas petition. So we are not persuaded that the interest of justice warrants
considering his objections. See B.N.M., 107 F.4th at 1152 (“[I]f a litigant fails
to make this [plain-error] showing, the firm-waiver rule ordinarily bars our
consideration of the waived issue.”).
But even if the interest-of-justice exception applied, Hall doesn’t get
around the more fundamental problem that his objections were vague and hard
to follow, even when construed liberally. As the district court concluded, the
objections were not “sufficiently specific to focus the district court’s
attention.” Coomer, 140 F.4th at 1277; see Hall, 2025 WL 2630738, at *1.
In other words, Hall argues that the firm-waiver rule doesn’t apply but doesn’t
challenge the district court’s reason for applying it. Thus, Hall doesn’t explain
his failure to comply with the firm-waiver rule. See Morales-Fernandez,
418 F.3d at 1220. So his argument would not give a reasonable jurist reason to
debate whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct. See Slack,
529 U.S. at 484.
B. Equitable Tolling
Hall also argues that equitable tolling applies, meaning that reasonable
jurists could debate whether Hall’s petition was seven days late. He argues that
a prison lockdown beginning around March 29, 2025, limited his access to a
law library and legal materials, and delayed mail pickup and processing.
6 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 7
Because Hall’s firm-waiver argument does not persuade us to grant a
COA and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations for
two alternative reasons—firm waiver and the statute of limitations—we need
not address this second argument. Nevertheless, because Hall is proceeding
pro se, we exercise our discretion to address his second argument. See Miller v.
Legacy Bank, 2024 WL 5154002, at *2 (10th Cir. 2024) (stating that,
“[i]n consideration of a pro se litigant, . . . we exercise our discretion to briefly
address” other arguments).
Typically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions “must be filed within one year after
a state judgment becomes final either by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of time for seeking direct review.” Al-Yousif v. Trani, 779 F.3d
1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2015). Equitable tolling can extend the limitations period
if an applicant “shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391 (2013) (citation omitted).
Hall’s argument fails on both fronts. First, he does not show that he was
diligently pursuing his rights. Hall’s one-year statute of limitations began on
December 7, 2023, ninety days after the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed his conviction and sentence. The statute of limitations tolled while
Hall’s petitions for postconviction relief were pending in state court, but it
resumed on September 24, 2024. At that point, Hall had 202 days left to file a
§ 2254 petition. He could have filed at any point during that period. The prison
7 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 8
lockdown didn’t begin until March 29, 2025. So Hall does not show that he
diligently pursued his rights.
Second, Hall doesn’t show that “some extraordinary circumstance stood
in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id., 569 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted).
We’ve previously held that a prison lockdown didn’t qualify as an
extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Dill v. Workman,
288 F. App’x 454, 457 (10th Cir. 2008). We’ve also held that “vague
allegations” about “alleged lack of access to legal materials or assistance”
during a prison lockdown did not justify equitable tolling. Parker v. Jones,
260 F. App’x 81, 85 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Phares v. Jones, 470 F. App’x
718, 719 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that “[t]he mere fact of a prison lockdown
. . . does not qualify as extraordinary absent some additional showing that the
circumstances prevented” timely filing). Though we do not doubt the hardship
of a prison lockdown, Hall provides no convincing reason to depart from our
earlier holdings.
Thus, because Hall does not show that he is entitled to equitable tolling,
reasonable jurists would not debate whether the district court’s procedural
ruling was correct. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
II. IFP Motion
Hall also seeks to proceed IFP. To proceed IFP on appeal, he “must
comply with the filing requirements” and show “a financial inability to pay the
required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on
8 Appellate Case: 26-6034 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 06/17/2026 Page: 9
the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” Watkins v. Leyba,
543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation modified). Hall meets his burden.
He shows no assets or income. And though his arguments are not persuasive,
they are not frivolous. So we grant his request to proceed IFP.
CONCLUSION
We deny Hall’s request for a COA, grant his IFP Motion, and dismiss
this matter.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge