314 Ga. 488 FINAL COPY
S22G0019. HALL et al. v. DAVIS LAWN CARE SERVICE, INC. et al.
PINSON, Justice.
A conservator of a minor is a person appointed by a court to
take care of the minor’s property. On appointment, the conservator
gains the “exclusive power” to “[b]ring, defend, or participate in legal
. . . proceedings” on the minor’s behalf. OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6).
In this case, a conservator was appointed after the minor
children’s grandmother had already brought a wrongful-death
lawsuit on their behalf. The conservator tried in various ways to
exercise his litigation powers, with the apparent goal of dismissing
the grandmother’s lawsuit and bringing a similar one in a different
county. The conservator was eventually joined as an “involuntary
plaintiff” in the grandmother’s lawsuit, see OCGA § 9-11-19 (a), and
his further attempts to gain control of the litigation, in that court
and others, were rejected. He appealed several rulings unfavorable to him, but in Hall v. Hill, 360 Ga. App. 635 (859 SE2d 897) (2021),
the Court of Appeals concluded that he had forfeited his exclusive
power under OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6) earlier in the case when he
declined to join the grandmother’s case voluntarily and sought its
dismissal.
We granted certiorari to review that holding. For reasons we
explain below, we hold that a conservator who declines to join
preexisting litigation voluntarily and seeks to have that litigation
dismissed does not thereby forfeit his exclusive power to participate
in that litigation after he is joined as a party under OCGA § 9-11-
19 (a). So we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding, vacate
the parts of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affected by it, and remand
the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
1. (a) In May 2016, Shauntrice Jones died in a car accident.
Soon after, her mother, Margaret Hill, brought a wrongful-death
case against both the driver of the pickup truck that hit Jones’s car
and his employer, Davis Lawn Care Service, Inc. She brought that
2 case on behalf of Jones’s two minor children as their next friend, and
she filed it in Thomas County Superior Court. A week later, Hill
petitioned that court to be appointed as the children’s guardian ad
litem, and the court appointed her that same day under OCGA § 9-
11-17 (c) for the purpose of pursuing the wrongful-death claims.1
Around the same time, Hill petitioned the Mitchell County
Probate Court to appoint her as the children’s conservator.2 Maurice
Williams, the father of one of the children, objected and asked the
probate court to appoint Michael Hall, the County Administrator, as
conservator. While those petitions were pending, Williams moved
for a stay in the Thomas County case pending the probate court’s
1 If an infant or incompetent person is not otherwise represented in a
case, OCGA § 9-11-17 (c) requires the court to either appoint a guardian ad litem or “make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.” That provision also prohibits a next friend from receiving the proceeds of an action on behalf of an infant or incompetent person without first entering into a bond to the Governor that is approved by the court. Id. 2 A conservator “receive[s], collect[s], and make[s] decisions regarding
the minor’s property” and “act[s] as a fiduciary in the minor’s best interest.” OCGA § 29-3-21 (a). The conservator also has the “exclusive power” to, among other things, “[b]ring, defend, or participate in legal, equitable, or administrative proceedings, including alternative dispute resolution, as are appropriate for the support, care, education, health, or welfare of the minor in the name of or on behalf of the minor.” OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6). 3 ruling on the appointment of a conservator. He noted that “[o]nce
that is done, the [superior c]ourt can allow the proper party(s) [sic]
to be substituted in and/or intervene as the minors’ proper
representative.” Six months later, in January 2017, the probate
court appointed Hall as the children’s conservator and
administrator of Jones’s estate.
Hall began efforts to pursue wrongful-death claims on the
children’s behalf in Gwinnett County instead of Thomas County. He
first filed a wrongful-death action on the children’s behalf in
Gwinnett County State Court, alleging their wrongful-death claims
as well as survival claims on behalf of Jones’s estate. Then, in the
Thomas County case, he filed a “Notice to Court of Improper Plaintiff
and Counsel and Request for Dismissal Without Prejudice.” In that
filing, he contended that he, not Hill, was the proper person to assert
wrongful-death claims on behalf of the children. Hall, who was
represented by the same lawyer who had represented Williams in
the case, stated that Williams’s earlier motion to allow substitution
or intervention after a conservator was appointed was “hereby
4 withdrawn.” Hall further declared that he had “no intention of
appearing in or pursuing this case in this [c]ourt” and had made the
filing “only as a special appearance and not as a party.” Finally, Hall
asked the court to dismiss the case without prejudice.
The defendants in the Thomas County case, however, tried to
keep the case there. In that case, they moved to consolidate the
Gwinnett County case and join Hall as a plaintiff in Thomas County.
After a hearing, the Thomas County Superior Court issued
orders addressing the various filings before it. Those orders
ultimately (1) denied Williams’s earlier request to remove Hill as
guardian ad litem; (2) denied Hall’s “Notice to Court of Improper
Plaintiff and Counsel and Request for Dismissal Without Prejudice”
because Hill, as guardian ad litem, was the proper party to file the
lawsuit; (3) consolidated the wrongful-death and survival claims in
the Gwinnett County case with the Thomas County case; and (4)
joined Hall as an involuntary plaintiff under OCGA § 9-11-19 (a) in
his capacities as administrator of Jones’s estate and conservator for
5 the minor children.3
After the dust settled, Hall continued his efforts to take control
of the litigation on behalf of the children. He first moved to remove
Hill as a plaintiff, citing OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6) (vesting in a
conservator the “exclusive power to . . . participate in legal . . .
proceedings . . . as are appropriate for the support, care, education,
health, or welfare of the minor in the name of or on behalf of the
minor”). The court denied the motion, reasoning that it was no
different from the earlier filings and ruling that Hill would remain
in the case (but not addressing Hall’s argument under OCGA § 29-
3-22 (a) (6)). Hall then moved for reconsideration and separately
moved for a declaratory judgment that he had the sole right to
control the case; the court denied the motions.
Undeterred, Hall tried to move the litigation back to Gwinnett
3 Hill points out that the court initially entered two orders that joined
Hall only in his capacity as administrator. But the court’s final amended order joined Hall in his capacities as administrator and conservator. See OCGA § 15- 1-3 (6).
6 County and put it under his control. In the Thomas County case, he
filed a voluntary dismissal of the claims from the Gwinnett County
case that had been consolidated with the Thomas County case. He
then filed a renewal lawsuit in Gwinnett County State Court.4 And
he then filed a complaint in Gwinnett County Superior Court
seeking, among other things, to enjoin Hill and the defendants in
both cases from interfering with his pursuit of the wrongful-death
and survival claims.
Hill responded on both fronts. In the Gwinnett County
Superior Court case, she moved to dismiss the case or transfer it to
the Thomas County Superior Court. In April 2020, the Gwinnett
County Superior Court denied Hall’s request for a preliminary
injunction and granted Hill’s motion to dismiss. In Thomas County,
Hill moved to remove Hall from the case and enjoin him from
“thwarting [its] prosecution,” arguing that the court had determined
that she was the proper party to bring the wrongful-death claims on
4 The Court of Appeals noted that Hall represented that the renewal
lawsuit remains pending. See Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 637 n.1. He does not repeat that representation before us. 7 behalf of the children and asserting that Hall did not satisfy the
criteria for joinder under OCGA § 9-11-19 (a). Hall filed a cross-
motion to remove Hill from the case and to enjoin her from
proceeding with her wrongful-death claims.
In August 2020, the Thomas County Superior Court issued
three orders: (1) an order striking Hall’s dismissal of his Gwinnett
County State Court claims, which had been consolidated with the
Thomas County case; (2) an order removing Hall as a plaintiff in the
Thomas County case and enjoining him from further filings; and (3)
an order denying Hall’s cross-motion to remove and enjoin Hill.
(b) Hall appealed the August 2020 Thomas County Superior
Court orders and the April 2020 Gwinnett County Superior Court
order, and the Court of Appeals decided the two appeals in one
opinion. See Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 635-636.
In Division 1 (a), the court addressed Hall’s argument that he
had the exclusive right to pursue the wrongful-death claims because
he was the children’s conservator. See Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 637-
640. The court first determined that Hill, who was acting as next
8 friend when she filed the Thomas County case and was later
appointed as the minors’ guardian ad litem, was the proper person
to initiate the lawsuit at that time because no conservator had been
appointed. See id. at 638 (citing OCGA § 9-11-17 (c)).
The Court of Appeals then quoted OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6),
which says:
Without court order, the appointment of a conservator shall vest in the conservator the exclusive power to . . . [b]ring, defend, or participate in legal, equitable, or administrative proceedings, including alternative dispute resolution, as are appropriate for the support, care, education, health, or welfare of the minor in the name of or on behalf of the minor.
The court explained that this language was “clear and unambiguous:
after being appointed, the conservator alone has the power to bring,
defend, or participate in an action on behalf of the minor.” Hall, 360
Ga. App. at 639. The Court of Appeals then asked: “how does the
conservator exercise this power if a case on behalf of the minor has
been properly initiated before the conservator is appointed?” Id.
Noting Hall’s argument that a “guardian ad litem must step
aside when a conservator is appointed,” the Court of Appeals said
9 that “the traditional mechanisms for non-parties to participate in
lawsuits are through intervention, interpleader, and substitution.”
Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 639. The court then pointed out that Hall
withdrew “any motion to intervene” in the Thomas County case,
“stating that he had ‘no intention of appearing in or pursuing (the)
case in this Court, and . . . ma(d)e this filing only as a special
appearance and not as a party,’” and that he asked the Thomas
County court to dismiss the case without prejudice. Id. at 640.
Describing these actions as “contrary to exercising his ‘exclusive
power’ to ‘participate in’ the existing litigation,” the Court of Appeals
held that
although Hall had the exclusive power to participate in the wrongful death action pending in the Superior Court of Thomas County, he expressly declined to exercise that right. So, any error on the part of the trial court in interfering with Hall’s exclusive power as conservator to proceed on behalf of the minor children was self-induced by Hall and provides no ground for reversal.
Id.5
5 In Division 1 (b), the Court of Appeals rejected Hall’s argument that he
could assert claims on behalf of the minors under OCGA § 51-1-9, which says,
10 In Division 4, the Court of Appeals concluded that the superior
court did not err by striking Hall’s voluntary dismissal of the claims
he had asserted in the Gwinnett County State Court case, which had
been consolidated with the Thomas County case. See Hall, 360 Ga.
App. at 644. The court determined, however, that the trial court
erred by dismissing Hall from the Thomas County case and
enjoining him from further filings, because “as the administrator of
[Jones’s] estate . . . , he was the proper party to bring claims on
behalf of [Jones’s] estate.” Id. So the court reversed the trial court’s
order dismissing and enjoining Hall in his capacity as
administrator. See id.
Finally, in Division 5, the Court of Appeals rejected Hall’s
“[e]very person may recover for torts committed to himself, his wife, his child, his ward, or his servant.” See Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 641. And in Division 1 (c), the court declined to address Hall’s claim that he had the exclusive right to assert claims for the estate, because the trial court had not ruled on that issue. See id. In Division 2, the court held that the Thomas County court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hall’s request to vacate its order appointing Hill as guardian ad litem. See id. at 641-643. In Division 3, the court concluded that the Thomas County court properly joined Hall as a plaintiff and consolidated the children’s wrongful death lawsuit with the lawsuit brought on behalf of Jones’s estate. See id. at 643-644.
11 claim that the Gwinnett County Superior Court erred by denying
his request for a preliminary injunction and dismissing his case. See
Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 645. The court restated its holding in Division
1 (a) that Hall forfeited his exclusive power to assert claims on
behalf of the children because he failed to use “one of the established
mechanisms for a non-party to participate in” Hill’s lawsuit. Id. The
court then noted that Hall’s lawsuit in the Gwinnett County
Superior Court sought to enjoin Hill from “‘interfering in any way
with (his) pursuit of the wrongful death and survival claims for the
minors[ ] and their mother’s estate.’” Id. The court concluded that
“Hall tried to evade the Superior Court of Thomas County’s orders,
but because he had an adequate remedy at law to appeal the decision
of the Superior Court of Thomas County, he could not collaterally
attack that court’s ruling through an injunction.” Id.
We granted Hall’s petition for certiorari, asking:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that a conservator of minors [Hall] had forfeited his exclusive power to participate in litigation on behalf of the minors under OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6) after being involuntarily joined in litigation that had been initiated by the minors’
12 guardian ad litem [Hill] prior to the conservator’s appointment[.]
2. A conservator of a minor is a person appointed by a court to
“receive, collect, and make decisions” about the minor’s property.
OCGA § 29-3-21 (a). That appointment comes with a set of “exclusive
power[s].” OCGA § 29-3-22 (a). One of these is the power to litigate
for the minor: to “[b]ring, defend, or participate in” lawsuits and
other proceedings “as are appropriate for the support, care,
education, health, or welfare of the minor in the name of or on behalf
of the minor.” OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6).
Two features of this exclusive litigation power are notable.
First, like the other powers granted to conservators under this
provision, this power is an “exclusive power.” OCGA § 29-3-22 (a).
As used here, an “exclusive” power is one that is “limited to
possession, control, or use by a single individual” and thus
“exclud[es] others from participation.” Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 436 (11th ed. 2006) (defining “exclusive” in
13 this context as “limiting or limited to possession, control, or use by a
single individual” and “excluding others from participation”). See
also Black’s Law Dictionary 1358 (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“exclusive power” as “[a] power held by only one person or
authoritative body”).6 So this grant of power allows a conservator not
only to “[b]ring, defend, or participate in” these proceedings “in the
name of or on behalf of the minor,” but also to exclude others from
doing so. See Mary F. Radford, Georgia Guardianship and
Conservatorship § 3:8 (Sept. 2021 update) (explaining that OCGA §
29-3-22 (a) (6) is an “exclusive power” which “means that [it] may be
exercised only by the conservator and not by the minor or any other
individual or entity”).
Second, this exclusive power is conferred on the conservator
automatically. The statute provides that “[w]ithout court order, the
appointment of a conservator shall vest in the conservator the
exclusive power to” participate in legal proceedings for the minor.
6 Because OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6) was enacted in 2004, we cite dictionaries published close in time to that enactment. 14 OCGA § 29-3-22 (a). So the appointment itself gives the conservator
the immediate authority to exercise this exclusive power. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 747 (2d pocket ed. 2001) (defining “vest” in
this context as “[t]o give (a person) an immediate, fixed right of
present or future enjoyment”); Mary F. Radford, Georgia
Guardianship and Conservatorship § 3:8 (Sept. 2021 update)
(explaining that the powers granted under OCGA § 29-3-22 (a)
“inure automatically to the conservator upon appointment”).
3. None of the above is disputed here. As the Court of Appeals
put it, “after being appointed, the conservator alone has the power
to bring, defend, or participate in an action on behalf of the minor.”
Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 639. Thus, at the moment Hall was appointed
as conservator, he alone held the legal authority to participate in
legal proceedings on behalf of the minor children. This includes the
wrongful-death case that was already pending in Thomas County.
See id. at 640 (acknowledging that “Hall had the exclusive power to
participate in the wrongful death action pending in the Superior
Court of Thomas County”). That case was properly brought by Hill
15 as next friend of the children before Hall was appointed, see id. at
638 (citing OCGA § 9-11-17 (c)), but once he was, it was his
prerogative to participate on their behalf and to exclude Hill or
anyone else from doing so.
The problem, as the Court of Appeals saw it, was that Hall did
not act like someone exercising that power. Rather than seeking to
join the case as a party through intervention, interpleader, or
substitution, he asked the court to dismiss the case and said he did
not intend to appear or pursue the case in that court. Viewing these
actions as “contrary to exercising his ‘exclusive power’ to ‘participate
in’ the existing litigation,” Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 640, the Court of
Appeals concluded that Hall “forfeited” his power to participate in
the case—even after the trial court joined him as an involuntary
plaintiff under OCGA § 9-11-19. Id. at 645.
We must reject this conclusion. As affirmative support for it,
the Court of Appeals relied on only a single case about “invited
error.” See Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 640 (citing Mary Allen Realty &
Mgmt., LLC v. Harris, 354 Ga. App. 858, 862 (841 SE2d 748) (2020)).
16 But invited error arises when the complaining party did something
to invite the decision that the party later appealed as error. See
Carnett’s, Inc. v. Hammond, 279 Ga. 125, 130 (610 SE2d 529) (2005)
(“A party cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his
own conduct produced or aided in causing.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). And here, Hall only ever tried, in various
ways, to bring the wrongful-death action in Gwinnett County,
dismiss the Thomas County case, and remove Hill as a party
litigating on the children’s behalf. The various rulings on appeal
rejected those attempts, and we see no evidence here that Hall did
anything to invite that defeat.
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion also conflicts with two
relevant statutes. First, the court’s theory of forfeiture is
inconsistent with OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6)’s grant of exclusive power
to litigate on a minor’s behalf. The Court of Appeals reasoned that
declining to join the Thomas County case and seeking to dismiss it
amounted to forfeiture because those actions were “contrary to
exercising” a conservator’s exclusive litigation power. Not so. As we
17 explained above, this “exclusive power” includes not only the
affirmative power to bring, defend, and participate in litigation on
the minor’s behalf, but also the power to exclude others from doing
those things. Thus, a conservator who declines to join litigation
brought by another on the minor’s behalf and seeks to have that
litigation dismissed is not acting “contrary to” exercising his
exclusive power: he is trying to exercise it.
Take this case. Hall, the children’s conservator, apparently
wanted to bring the wrongful-death case on their behalf in Gwinnett
County, and not in Thomas County. By the time he was appointed,
it was too late to prevent such a case from being brought in Thomas
County because Hill’s case was already pending there. But it was
still well within Hall’s authority under OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6) to
exclude others, including Hill, from “participat[ing]” in that case on
the children’s behalf, and to seek to end that litigation (in favor of
pursuing the Gwinnett County litigation or otherwise). And that is
exactly what he tried to do. Putting aside whether Hall made the
appropriate procedural choices for achieving his litigation goals
18 (more on that below), these very actions, which the Court of Appeals
cited to show that he forfeited his exclusive power, were plainly
attempts to exercise that power. Speaking generally, we reject the
notion that a conservator can forfeit the exclusive power to litigate
on a minor’s behalf by trying to exercise that power.
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion also conflicts with the
involuntary-joinder provision of OCGA § 9-11-19 (a). That statute
expressly contemplates joinder of a person who has “refuse[d]” to
participate in a case. OCGA § 9-11-19 (a) (“If [a person] should join
as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant or, in
a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.”). And when that person is
joined despite that refusal, he is made a “party,” with all the
attendant rights and obligations, so the interests of parties and
nonparties can be protected. See id. (requiring a person who meets
statutory criteria to be “joined as a party in the action” and, “if he
has not been so joined,” requires the court to “order that he be made
a party” (emphasis added)). See also, e.g., Nashville Restaurant
Mgmt., LLC v. Gwinnett County, 288 Ga. 664, 665 (706 SE2d 451)
19 (2011) (holding that the trial court erred by entering an order on the
same day that the appellant was joined as a party under OCGA § 9-
11-19 (a), because the “appellant did not receive notice and have an
opportunity for a hearing where it, as a party to the proceedings,
could have voiced its objections” (emphasis added)). Yet under the
Court of Appeals’ reasoning, a conservator who is joined as a party
after refusing to use a “traditional mechanism[ ]” for joining
voluntarily has nonetheless forfeited his right to participate in the
case.7 This would render OCGA § 9-11-19 (a) ineffective in every
such case.8 This result, too, requires us to reject the Court of Appeals’
7 We note that the Court of Appeals’ list of “traditional mechanisms” non-
parties use to join a pending case—intervention, interpleader, and substitution—is incomplete. Hall, 360 Ga. App. at 639. In addition to joinder under OCGA § 9-11-19, other procedures for participating in a pending case include permissive joinder, see OCGA § 9-11-20 (a), and class actions, see OCGA § 9-11-23 (a). 8 Although we do not address here whether the trial court properly joined
Hall as an involuntary plaintiff under OCGA § 9-11-19 (a), we note that a conservator may often be a necessary party in litigation involving minors when one has been appointed. Conservators hold not only the exclusive power to litigate on a minor’s behalf, OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6), but also the exclusive power to “[r]eceive, collect, and hold the minor’s property,” OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (4), and to settle claims on the minor’s behalf, OCGA § 29-3-3 (b) (“If the minor has a conservator, the only person who can compromise a minor’s claim is the conservator.”).
20 forfeiture holding.9
For these reasons, we hold that a conservator who declines to
join preexisting litigation voluntarily and seeks to have that
litigation dismissed does not thereby forfeit his exclusive power to
participate in that litigation after he is joined as a party under
OCGA § 9-11-19 (a).
In so holding, we do not resolve a separate procedural question
lurking in this case: if, as here, a case is brought on a minor’s behalf
before a conservator is appointed, what procedural steps, if any,
must the new conservator take to exercise his exclusive power to
participate in it on the minor’s behalf? Much of the parties’ briefing
addresses that question, and in particular, whether a conservator
must first become a party to the case if he wants to exercise that
9 Hill defends the Thomas County court’s actions—in particular, consolidating the Gwinnett County case—as consistent with OCGA § 9-2-5, which deals with abatement of duplicate lawsuits. But this and similar arguments about whether that court and the other trial courts here properly dealt with the flurry of filings and multiple lawsuits as a matter of procedure do not bear on the separate question of whether Hall forfeited his power as conservator to make litigation decisions on behalf of the minor children. Because we asked only that latter question in this case, we decline to address Hill’s abatement argument.
21 exclusive litigation power. But in granting certiorari, we did not ask
this question, and it is not presented here because Hall was made a
party when the trial court joined him as party under OCGA § 9-11-
19 (a).10
4. Our holding requires that we reverse the Court of Appeals’
holding in Division 1 (a) of its opinion. We also vacate the portion of
Division 4 affirming the Thomas County Superior Court’s order
striking Hall’s voluntary dismissal of the consolidated Gwinnett
County State Court claims. That conclusion should be considered
anew in light of our holding that Hall did not forfeit his exclusive
power to participate in that litigation as conservator on behalf of the
10 We note as a general matter that an argument that the appointment
of a conservator precludes another party from continuing to sue on a minor’s behalf would be an argument that the other party lacks capacity or authority to bring or defend the action in a representative capacity. See Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Tinsley Mill Village, 249 Ga. 769, 772 (294 SE2d 495) (1982) (describing condominium association’s authority to sue on behalf of its members as “capacity to sue”); OCGA § 9-11-17 (b) (“The capacity of an individual, including one acting in a representative capacity, to bring or defend an action shall be determined by the law of this state.”). Under the Civil Practice Act, “[w]hen a party desires to raise an issue as to . . . the capacity of any party to bring or defend an action, or the authority of a party to bring or defend an action in a representative capacity,” the party must raise it “by specific negative averment.” OCGA § 9-11-9 (a). 22 minor children after he was joined as a party. And we vacate
Division 5 of the court’s opinion because the holding in that division
was based on the court’s forfeiture holding in Division 1 (a). We
express no opinion about the balance of the Court of Appeals
opinion. We remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
Decided August 23, 2022.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 360 Ga. App.
635.
Speckhals Law, Trent B. Speckhals; Charles M. Cork III, for
appellant.
Young Thagard Hoffman Smith & Lawrence, John H. Smith,
Jr., William J. Purvis; William U. Norwood III; YES Law Group,
Yehuda Smolar; Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles,
23 Thomas P. Willingham, Mary L. Miller; Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, Richard K. Hines V; Alexander & Vann, Raleigh W.
Rollins, for appellees.
Roy M. Sobelson; Morgan & Disalvo, Allison L. Byrd; Melinda
C. Pillow; McCurdy & Candler, Brian M. Deutsch; Baumbusch Law,
Millie Baumbusch; Cohen Pollock Merlin Turner, Kevin T.
O’Sullivan; The Pollan Law Firm, David P. Pollan; Robinson &
Blazer, Mark A. C. Robinson; Siedentopf Law, Sarah E. Siedentopf;
Spencer Law, Deana M. Spencer; Pacer Law, Linda S. Pacer;
Ruthann P. Lacey; Hamida Jackson-Little; Weinberg Elder Law,
Diane B. Weinberg, amici curiae.