Haley Jr. v. Monroe County

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 1, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-0542
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) WILLIAM C. HALEY JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00542 (UNA) ) MONROE COUNTY, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, and his pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. The Court grants

the IFP Application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff, a resident of Rochester, New York, sues Monroe County New York, the Monroe

County Family Court and one of its judges, the Monroe County Sherriff’s Office, the Monroe

County Public Defender’s Office, a guardian ad litem, and a court-appointed mediator. See Compl.

at 5. He challenges multiple determinations and other actions related to child custody and

visitation proceedings held by the Monroe County Family Court, which ultimately, on October 5,

2025, resulted in an order of protection for his minor child, all of which allegedly violated several

of Plaintiff’s civil rights. See id. at 3–12. He demands damages and equitable relief, including

vacating all orders of protection, restoring his parental decision-making authority and his contact

with the minor child, enjoining any state proceedings taken against him, and an order directing the local Monroe County courts to preserve and produce evidence and case records. See id. at 4, 10,

12–13.

Plaintiff has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1332. Relevant here, federal district courts generally lack jurisdiction to review or interfere

with judicial decisions by state courts. See Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals,

83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing District of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476

(1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Indeed, the domestic relations

exception deprives a federal district court of the “power to issue . . . child custody decrees,”

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992), or to make other related decisions, see Bennett

v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (explaining that domestic relationship exception

divests federal court of jurisdiction over “grant[ing] a divorce, determin[ing] alimony or support

obligations, or resolv[ing] parental conflicts over the custody of their children”). State custody

determinations generally fail to implicate any constitutional or federal statutory right, and as such,

they must be contested in the local court where the proceedings were held. See Lassiter v.

Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (no constitutional right to counsel in civil

actions where plaintiff's personal liberty is not at stake); see also Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042 (child

custody issues uniquely suited to resolution in local courts). Simply put, “[e]vents may not have

unfolded as [p]laintiff wished, but his dissatisfaction . . . [does] not form a basis” for a civil rights

violation. See Melton v. Dittrict of Columbia, 85 F. Supp. 3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 2015).

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had established subject matter jurisdiction, venue is improper

in this District. Venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any defendant resides,

if all defendants reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) in a district in which a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) in a district in which any defendant

may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (providing dismissal for improper venue). Here, all of the

parties are located in New York, and all of the alleged actions and omissions giving rise to

Plaintiff’s claims also occurred there. As pleaded, this action bears no connection to the District

of Columbia.

Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are

dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: May 1, 2026 ___________/s/____________ RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge