NORTHROP, Chief Judge.
This action comes now before the Court on plaintiffs’ prayer for declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) to declare “unconstitutional and contrary to Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the United States” Section 105A, Article 100 of the Maryland Code, which, summarized, prohibits the use of persons categorized as “helpers” on state construction projects. Md.Ann. Code Art. 100, § 105A (Cum.Supp.1975). Jurisdiction is properly invoked by the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), federal question jurisdiction, and also 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)(4) (1970), the general civil rights authorizing statute, by amended complaint. A three-judge District Court is appropriate for this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).1
[258]*258FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1970, the Maryland Legislature enacted a prevailing wage law applicable to all public works projects in Maryland in excess of $500,000. Now codified in Md.Ann.Code Art. 100 § 96 et seq. (Cum. Supp.1975). In 1978, the Legislature added to the statute Section 105A, “Employment of Apprentices,” the subject of the within controversy. Section 105A, in effect, specifically precluded the use of “helpers”2 and authorized the use of apprentices3 on public works projects valued over $500,000. Section 105A mandated that:
No person classified as a helper or trainee shall be employed on public works. Only apprentices in a trade, craft or occupation for which an apprenticeship program has been approved by the apprenticeship and training council of the Department of Licensing and Regulation shall be employed on public works. Each apprentice employed on a public works shall be paid not less than the percentages, as set forth in such approved apprenticeship program, of the journeyman mechanic’s prevailing hourly rate of wages as determined by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry for such journeyman mechanic in the trade, craft or occupation in which the apprentice is employed on the public works.
Plaintiffs in this action are persons who are employed, or have been employed, as helpers in Maryland. They claim to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 105A. Their complaint states that as a result of the [259]*259statute they “will continue to be deprived from working on public works projects of the State of Maryland thereby impairing their ability to earn their livings and support themselves and their families. . . . ” Moreover, plaintiffs assert that Section 105A works as “an invidious, arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional discrimination against them . . . [which] deprives them of the equal protection of the laws. . ” Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4.
Defendants assert that the statute is constitutionally valid since there is a rational basis and compelling state interest to proscribe employment of helpers on public works projects. Defendants aver that “Maryland has the authority consistent with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate an occupation or craft affecting the public interest by establishing qualifications which are reasonably related to insuring the competency of its practitioners within that occupation.” Defendants’ Answer to Complaint at 2-3.
The matter was heard before this Court on October 20 and 21, 1975. The Court therein received substantial testimony designed to buttress the respective parties’ contentions and legal theories.
FINDINGS OF LAW AND FACTS
To properly adjudicate the merits of plaintiffs’ allegation of denial of equal protection, this Court must consider three significant questions: (1) What standard should be employed to determine whether the statute in question violates the equal protection clause — the “rational basis” or the “compelling state interest” test? (2) If the “rational basis” standard is invoked, how is it to be defined? and (3) Do the facts as presented-in the pleadings and at the trial satisfy the standard?
Recently, when adjudicating allegations of equal protection violations, courts have subjected statutes to two forms of scrutiny — the low scrutiny test or the “rational basis” test and the strict scrutiny test, or the “compelling state interest” test. Of the two tests, the more stringent test has been applied m two situations: those in which the basis of the distinction or classification drawn by the state is inherently suspect; and those in which the effect of the distinction is to impair a person’s fundamental rights. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 178-81, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1408-09, 31 L.Ed.2d 768, 780-82 (1972). If the classification in question rests on either inherently suspect grounds or hinders a fundamental right, it will only be sustained if the enactment is shown to promote a compelling state interest. Cf., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972). The Supreme Court, over the last few decades, has identified certain classifications as suspect, for example— race, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 89 S.Ct. 557, 21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969); McLaughlin v. State, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944); alienage or national origin, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); Oyama v. State, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. 249 (1948); illegitimacy, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1972); religion, Sherbert v. Verner, 373 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); or, in certain instances, wealth, see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) [citing numerous cases which held that discrimination between rich and poor as such is a suspect classification].
The plaintiffs do not contend, nor do the facts illustrate, a suspect classification under any of the foregoing. However, plaintiffs do argue that the strict standard is applicable to review of Section 105A because of the statute’s interference with a “fundamental” right — the right to work. Plaintiffs contend that this Court has been presented a sound basis for employing the compélling state interest test (while conceding that the so-called right to work has never been adjudged fundamental, calling for strict analysis). They reveal this basis in their [260]*260Answer to Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2:
The pursuit of happiness is recognized as a fundamental right to which all citizens are entitled. In today’s society, happiness is inexorably related to one’s economic status. The right to earn the means by which one pursues happiness can then be said to be fundamental.
While this argument is somewhat ingenious, we are not persuaded that this alleged right was ever intended to be, or should be, a fundamental right. Legislation requiring strict scrutiny is envisioned as being more than that which merely affects economics, but is “legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.” Skinner v. State, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660 (1942). The theory derives principally from Skinner, where the Supreme Court first spoke of certain rights as being fundamental:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. strict scrutiny of classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.
Id. (emphasis added). (See Griswold v. State, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), wherein not procreating is declared a fundamental right also.)
Subsequent to Skinner, the Court declared other rights to be so fundamental as to require strict scrutiny — voting, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1964); freedom from incarceration due to indigency, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1970); right to travel, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1968); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966); and certain criminal procedures, cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956).
However, as conceded by the plaintiffs, courts have never seen fit to declare that the right to seek employment, unfettered by government regulation, is fundamental. In fact, courts have consistently refused to employ the strict compelling interest standard and opted for the lower scrutiny test for purely economic matters, such as the instant situation. See e. g., Two-Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551 (1960); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528, 79 S.Ct. 437, 441, 3 L.Ed.2d 480, 485 (1959); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110, 69 S.Ct. 463, 465, 93 L.Ed. 533, 538 (1949); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340-41, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377 (1910); Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 867, aff’d., 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 (1968). Specifically on point with the instant case are numerous cases which applied the rationality test to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Com’rs., 330 U.S. 552, 67 S.Ct. 910, 91 L.Ed. 1093 (1947). See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1959).
In Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Com’rs., supra, the bellwether employment case, the Supreme Court dealt with a statute similar to Section 105 of the Maryland Code. Plaintiffs therein, ship pilots, contested a Louisiana statute allowing only state-qualified pilots to navigate seagoing vessels into New Orleans [261]*261harbor. The statute, in pertinent part, specified that a person could only become a state-qualified pilot after completion of a six-month apprentice program, which plaintiffs asserted was firmly under the pilot association’s control. As a result, plaintiffs alleged that only family or friends of the incumbent pilots could ever become qualified to navigate ships into the harbor.4
After noting that pilots are essential to avoid traffic congestions and accidents and that pilotage is “a highly personalized” calling, the Court analyzed the problem:
We are asked, in effect, to say that Louisiana is without constitutional authority to conclude that apprenticeship under persons specially interested in a pilot’s future is the best way to fit him for duty as a pilot officer in the service of the State.
330 U.S. at 559, 67 S.Ct. at 914, 91 L.Ed. at 1098. The Court thereafter came to the following conclusion:
The practice of nepotism in appointing public servants has been a subject of controversy in this country throughout our history. * * * We can only assume that the Louisiana legislature weighed the obvious possibility of evil against whatever useful function a closely knit pilotage system may serve. Thus the advantages of early experience under friendly supervision in the locality of the pilot’s training, the benefits to morale and esprit de corps which family and neighborly tradition might contribute, the close association in which pilots must work and live in their pilot communities and on the water, and the discipline and regulation which is imposed to assure the State competent pilot service after appointment, might have prompted the legislature to permit Louisiana pilot officers to select those with whom they would serve.
The object of the entire pilotage law . is to secure for the State and others interested the safest and most efficiently operated pilotage system practicable. We cannot say that the method adopted in Louisiana for the selection of pilots is unrelated to this objective.
Id. at 563-64, 67 S.Ct. at 915-16, 91 L.Ed. at 1100.
Perhaps even a more striking case of the Supreme Court’s application of this minimal review of state statutes can be found in Railway Express, where a New York City traffic regulation was contested in part as being in violation of the equal protection clause. The regulation in question prohibited the operation of any advertising vehicle on the streets, except those vehicles which displayed business notices or advertisements of the products of the owner and which were not used merely or mainly for advertising. Railway Express was convicted and fined for violation of the regulation because the advertising on its trucks was largely unconnected with its business. The transportation agency contended that: “one of the appellant’s [Railway Express’] trucks carrying the advertisement of a commercial house would not cause any greater distraction of pedestrians and vehicle drivers than if the commercial house carried the same advertisement on its own truck.” 336 U.S. at 109-10, 69 S.Ct. at 465, 93 L.Ed. at 538. In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, the Court held:
That, however, is a superficial way of analyzing the problem, even if we assume that it is premised on the correct construction- of the regulation. The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use. It would [262]*262take a degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case. If that judgment is correct, the advertising displays that are exempt have less incidence on traffic than those of appellants.
We cannot say that the judgment is not an allowable one. Yet if it is, the classification has relation to the purpose for which it is made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection.
336 U.S. at 110, 69 S.Ct. at 465, 93 L.Ed. at 538.
Consequently, since the rationale of the foregoing cases still obtain, this Court has no doubt that the low scrutiny rationality test is to be applied herein. We therefore turn to the second question presented, that of which definition of rationality is to be applied.
For many years the low scrutiny equal protection standard had never been specifically defined, but the cases offered an amalgam of reasoning out of which a principle emerged — that for a statute to be declared constitutional, it need only be shown that the statute was the type of statute a “rational” legislature could enact. See e. g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Com’rs., supra; Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 55 S.Ct. 538, 79 L.Ed. 1070 (1934); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., supra; Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 19 S.Ct. 609, 43 L.Ed. 909 (1898). The Supreme Court in 1961, in McGowan v. State, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, distilled the applicable precedent into what has since been cited as a generalized compendium setting forth the parameters of the theory;
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425, 81 S.Ct. at 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d at 399 (emphasis added).5
[263]*263Plaintiffs, however, contend that the Supreme Court in recent years has been retreating from the criteria outlined in McGowan and that a new equal protection test is emerging. They bottom this contention on an article written by Gerald Gunther which appeared in the Harvard Law Review, In Search Of Evolving Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1972), wherein the author contended that the traditional standard (McGowan) was being, or should have been, replaced by a new standard — that the legislative means “substantially further” the legislative purpose of the statute.
After careful consideration of the article and thesis presented therein, this Court is of the opinion that, for two reasons, time has proven this theory invalid for our purposes. First, by Gunther’s own choice of title, it must be recognized that the article deals with an evolving model, not an established or even an accepted model. The author hopes that his theory will appeal to and influence the changing mind of the present Court. Apparently, these expectations have not borne fruit: Gunther’s theory, written in 1972, has not yet been adopted or even cited by the Supreme Court.6 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has often cited McGowan, and its progeny (such as Dandridge v. Williams, supra),7 as controlling any examination of regulations which do not impinge fundamental rights or establish suspect classifications. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 769, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2469, 45 L.Ed.2d 522, 541 (1975); Fuller v. State, 417 U.S. 40, 48, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 2122, 40 L.Ed.2d 642, 651 (1974); Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 541, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1381, 39 L.Ed.2d 577, 590 (1974); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 1175, 35 L.Ed.2d 572, 576 (1973); and Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 1731, 32 L.Ed.2d 285, 295 (1972).8 It is patent, after a careful reading of these cases, that McGowan and/or Dandridge still establish the norm in cases involving economic regulations and stand as palpable evidence of the Court’s rejection of Gunther’s theory.
Secondly, plaintiffs cite a number of cases set forth in Gunther’s article to buttress their contention that the standard is evolving; but these cases are in-apposite to the instant case. While the cases cited by plaintiff illustrate situations wherein the Court declared the statute in question unconstitutional, the statutes in those cases were clearly dissimilar to the one at hand — James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972) [struck, on equitable grounds, statute allowing state to recover defense costs from indigents]; Jack[264]*264son v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972) [struck commitment statute for incompetent criminal defendants since no reasonable basis shown]; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, [workman’s compensation statute denying equal recovery for dependent unacknowledged illegitimates stricken as having no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise]; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972) [remanded for hearing on renewal of commitment pursuant to Sex Crimes Act]; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) [no basis for prohibition of distributing contraceptives to single persons]. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) [arbitrary statutory preference of males as estate administrators].
A perusal of these cases reveals, not a retreat from the rationale of McGowan or Dandridge, but a judicial recognition of the unusual circumstances presented to the Court in those cases. More importantly, none involve purely economic regulation as the one before this Court. Assuming, arguendo, that the court was fashioning a new intermediate standard somewhere between the rationality test and the compelling interest test, the instant case — a purely economic case— would not fall within the purview of such a rule.9
Therefore, since the applicable standard for the instant review is provided by McGowan and Dandridge, this leads to the third and final question— whether the statute satisfies the standard postulated therein. As quoted previously, McGowan, inter alia, mandates that the constitutionality of a statute turns on there being “any state of facts reasonably . . . conceived to justify it .• . .” even if the law “results in some inequality. . . .” 366 U.S. at 425-26, 81 S.Ct. at 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d at 399. Consequently, it is incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the facts illustrate “any conceivable state of facts to justify” Section 105A of the Maryland Code.
At the October trial, plaintiffs’ witnesses, in the aggregate, portrayed helpers as mature, knowledgeable, and dedicated workers;10 they consistently rejected allegations proffered by the defendants that use of apprentices in lieu of helpers either increased safety, improved economy, or improved the product. One such witness, Mr. Albert C. Seeman, President of Association of Builders and Contractors of Maryland, testified that he believed a comparison of the progression of an apprentice and a helper would reveal that for a number of years the helper possesses greater skills. Generally, he testified, three or four years elapsed before the apprentice surpassed the helper in expertise. There[265]*265fore, plaintiff contends that during the early years of the worker’s vocation the helper would produce a superior product, with more safety. Moreover, plaintiffs proffered testimony that certain jobs, especially in the tile and terrazzo field, were traditionally handled solely by the helper; that neither journeyman nor apprentice were qualified to perform specific aspects of a tile construction job.11
Defendants’ witnesses on the other hand, categorically disputed plaintiffs’ testimony concerning Section 105A and produced witnesses who testified that the use of apprentices rather than helpers was highly beneficial for numerous reasons. Much of the testimony centered around a comparison of the available formal apprentice instruction programs — union and non-union — with the absolute paucity of formal training available to the helper. The apprentice program was described as requiring attendance at up to two hundred classroom hours for as many as five years, with a comprehensive curriculum designed to examine in depth the multifarious phases and subtleties of the trade.12
In essence, defendants’ witnesses testified that the end product of these extensive training programs was a well-rounded highly skilled journeyman able to function more efficiently, and more safely, at his trade than his untrained coworker. The entire thrust of the testimony was that requiring apprenticeship inures to the benefit of all — the worker himself, his co-worker, and society as a whole.
In light of the evidence elicited, it is clear that defendants have satisfied the McGowan standard by establishing a set of facts which reasonably justifies the statute. A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that an extensively trained worker, should, on the whole, be a superior, more adept craftsman. The apprentice should be able to perform with more efficacy than the helper whose knowledge is limited by the extent of his on-the-job experiences, since the apprentice has the benefit of similar experiences plus knowledge gained in the classroom. Not limited to what he learns by osmosis, the apprentice should be more competent in all branches of the trade and be better able to utilize imagination, ability, and knowledge to produce a better product.
The testimony and arguments of counsel lead to three legitimate purposes which support the regulation contained in Section 105A:
1. Section 105A promotes a work product produced under safer working conditions.
[266]*2662. Section 105A enhances the social conditions of the state by reducing unemployment and encouraging helpers to obtain skilled training which will increase their marketability.13
3. Section 105A promotes the welfare of the construction industry and the quality of the product by encouraging formalized apprentices training, the results of which are: (a) more skilled craftsmen of all-round competence, (b) more skilled craftsmen who are able to work without close supervision, and (c) more skilled craftsmen who are able to adapt to constantly changing work procedures.
These results, which are likely to flow from Section 105A, are palpably sufficient to pass McGowan scrutiny by clearly offering a legitimate purpose for the statute.
One further note, whether the foregoing results actually derive from the statute is irrelevant to the within examination, for it is not the function of this Court to weigh the statute’s effectiveness. As the Supreme Court stated:
We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or desirable, or “whether it is based on assumptions scientifically substantiated.” Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional. . Our task, however, is not to weigh this statute’s effectiveness but its constitutionality.
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 132, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 2031, 32 L.Ed.2d 600, 605 (1972) (citations omitted and emphasis added).
Since this Court need only find “a conceivable state of facts” in justification of the statute to establish its constitutionality, and three valid justifications have been elicited, we declare Section 105A constitutional. It is a typical state regulatory statute, apparently reasonable, not arbitrary, which has a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation with all similarly situated persons being treated alike. Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989, 990 (1920). Consequently, since this statute passes constitutional muster, plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment must be denied.
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS this 6th day of April, 1976, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED as follows:
That plaintiffs’ Petition for Declaratory Judgment BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED.