Haberl v. Rose

570 N.W.2d 664, 225 Mich. App. 254

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 25, 1997
• Docket: Docket 177337, 178284
• Status: Published

Opinions

Neff, P.J.

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s judgment of no cause of action following a jury trial on plaintiffs’ automobile negligence claim (Docket No. 177337) and defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for sanctions (Docket No. 178284). We vacate the trial court’s order, which found defendant entitled to governmental immunity and remand for entiy of a judgment on the jury’s verdict of $260,000 in favor of plaintiffs.

I

On July 5, 1991, defendant, while acting within the scope of her employment with a governmental employer and driving her own car, struck plaintiffs’ car, causing Mr. Haberl serious injuries. As a result, plaintiffs brought a negligence action against defendant for injuries sustained in the accident. Ultimately, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), arguing the claim was barred by governmental immunity pursuant to MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq. Plaintiffs responded that defendant was not protected by governmental immunity because she was liable under the civil liability act, MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101.

The trial court heard arguments concerning defendant’s motion for summary disposition and disagreed with plaintiffs’ analysis. The court stated that only the issue of “ownership liability” remained because it had not decided whether governmental immunity applied. According to the court, if the jury found defendant was acting within the scope of her employment when the accident occurred, then governmental immunity would be applicable, and plaintiffs’ case would fail.

At trial, the facts concerning the accident were essentially uncontested, with defendant admitting negligence and that her negligence caused plaintiffs’ injuries. The jury returned a verdict that defendant was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident and also awarded $260,000 in damages to plaintiffs.

The trial court then referred to the prior summary disposition hearing and stated that because defendant was found to have been acting within the scope of her employment, a judgment of no cause of action would be entered.

II

A

In 1986, the Michigan Legislature enacted 1986 PA 175, amending MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), which provides for individual statutory immunity. In doing so, the Legislature has provided for broad individual governmental immunity from tort liability in part as follows:

[E]ach officer and employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental agency . . . shall be immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the course of employment . . . while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met:

(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.

(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.

(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used in this subdivision, “gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. [MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2).]

However, a specific exception involving government-owned vehicles exists, which limits the broad sweep of governmental immunity. That statute provides:

Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner....[MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105).]

In Trommater v Michigan, 112 Mich App 459, 467; 316 NW2d 459 (1982), this Court held that this statutory exception “serves the purpose of ensuring that redress is available against the owner of the vehicle, in this case the state.”

B

This major exception to governmental immunity is consistent with the policy evident in the civil liability act, which imposes liability on the owners of privately owned vehicles.

l

The civil liability act provided in part at the time of the accident:

Nothing herein contained shall be construed to abridge the right of any person to prosecute a civil action for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from a violation of any of the provisions of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, his or her agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of the provisions of the statutes of the state or in the failure to observe such ordinary care in the operation of the motor vehicle as the rules of the common law requires. [MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1).[¹]

The purpose of this statute is to place the risk of damage or injury on the owner, the person who has ultimate control of the vehicle, as well as on the person who is in immediate control. North v Kolomyjec, 199 Mich App 724, 726; 502 NW2d 765 (1993). The public policy underlying the statute is to ensure financial responsibility for those injured as a result of negligent operation of motor vehicles. See Citizens Mut Automobile Ins Co v Fireman’s Fund Ins Co, 234 F Supp 931, 935 (WD Mich, 1964). This aspect of the owner liability statute was passed because the common-law liability “ ‘was unable to cope with the rising tide of injuries resulting from the use of the new mechanism, the automobile.’ ” Kolomyjec, supra at 726 (citation omitted).

Although the owner liability statute may have been enacted to create liability for a non-driving owner and prior cases have apparently assumed that limited application, there is no language in the statute warranting this conclusion². Indeed, the beginning of the statute explicitly preserves the common-law liability available against the owner.

Hence, we conclude that the owner liability statute applies here even though the owner of the automobile was also the negligent driver. MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1); see also Berry v Kipf, 160 Mich App 326, 328-329; 407 NW2d 648 (1987). Under common law, of course, an owner of a motor vehicle does not escape liability simply because the owner was driving. Also, our Supreme Court has held that the statute extended and complemented the common law with regard to liability. Frazier v Rumisek, 358 Mich 455, 457; 100 NW2d 442 (1960). It would be an anomalous result indeed if this statute, created to expand a plaintiff’s right of recovery, was employed instead as a bar to that recovery. This analysis compels the conclusion that the statute applies to the fact pattern presented in this case.

c

The question then becomes, which of these two seemingly conflicting statutes applies in this case. To answer the question, we turn to rules of statutory construction.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to identify and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). The first step in this process is to focus on the language of the statute. Id. If the statutory language is certain and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted. Id. Further, when this Court examines two statutes covering the same subject, it must construe them together to give meaning to both, if possible. Bauer v Dep’t of Treasury, 203 Mich App 97, 100; 512 NW2d 42 (1993). When two statutes conflict, however, and one is specific while the other more general, the specific statute prevails. Id.

Here, we conclude that the more specific of the two statutes is the civil liability statute. The broad grant of immunity provided in MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2), the statute on which defendant must rely, is general in nature, and applies to a variety of different situations. Further, MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), which directly relates to immunity involving a state-owned vehicle, by its terms does not apply. The civil liability statute, however, specifically provides that owners of automobiles are liable when the negligent use of their automobiles results in injury.³ Accordingly, we conclude that the civil liability statute governs the outcome in this case.

Our holding clearly achieves the intent and purpose of the civil liability statute. Indeed, it is even within the purpose of MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), which provides for governmental liability in negligence cases involving state-owned vehicles. As this Court stated in Trommater, supra at 467:

The statutory exception, confined solely to state-owned vehicles, serves the purpose of ensuring that redress is available against the owner of the vehicle, in this case the state. This is consistent with the Legislature’s imposition of liability on the owner of a privately owned vehicle under MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101. The exception also distinguishes between state-owned and privately owned vehicles so as to preserve governmental immunity from liability for accidents caused by vehicles that are neither kept nor maintained by the state. It is reasonable, at least, for the Legislature to provide that the state will not be held liable for vehicles over which it has no control. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, while this Court’s holding in Trommater, at first glance, could lead to an inference that MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) provides defendant with immunity, a closer analysis leads to a different conclusion. The holding in Trommater, simply stated, is that the government is not liable for negligence arising out of the use of privately owned vehicles. The Court was not presented with and did not decide the question whether individual owner liability arises in a situation where, as here, the private owner, a government employee who was in the course of her employment while driving her vehicle, also negligently caused the damages. Under these facts, because both MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) and MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101 were enacted to serve the same purpose — the imposition of liability on the owner of the vehicle— we conclude that to allow the result reached by the trial court in this case to stand would be to frustrate the puipose behind both statutes.

Were we to reach the result requested by defendant, the following anomalous results would follow: (1) if a government employee negligently caused an accident while driving a government-owned vehicle, the injured person would have redress against the owner of the vehicle, the government, MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105); (2) if a government employee negligently caused an accident while driving a motor vehicle owned by a third person, the injured person would have redress against the owner of the vehicle, the third person, MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101, see, e.g., Abrams v Sinon, 44 Mich App 166; 205 NW2d 295 (1972), aff'd 390 Mich 387; 212 NW2d 14 (1973); (3) if, however, a government employee negligently caused an accident while driving a motor vehicle owned by that employee, the injured person would have no redress. Not only, as stated above, would this result frustrate the clear policy in Michigan as statutorily expressed, it would also encourage governmental agencies to stop providing motor vehicles to their employees in order to avoid liability. Such a result would be untenable. Our dissenting colleague, in somewhat contradictory conclusions, opines that a broad reading of the immunity statute along with a narrow reading of the liability statute would lead us to the opposite result from the one reached here. To the contrary, reasoning along that track leads to a finding that defendant is liable. To conclude otherwise, as does the dissenter, requires reading language into the statutes that is not there and impermissibly steps into legislative territory. While we might agree that the Legislature would be well advised to create such an exception for people in the same circumstances as defendant, it has not done so and we decline the invitation to act in its stead. Indeed, it is the dissent that urges “re-writing” the statutes in question and advocates overstepping the bounds of proper judicial authority.

III

By enacting the civil liability act as well as carving a specific automobile exception from the broad govemmental immunity act, the Legislature expressed the intent that those who are injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle are entitled to compensation regardless of the ownership of the vehicle. To allow defendant to escape liability here would frustrate the purpose of the two statutes. To avoid this unacceptable result, we hold that the civil liability statute specifically applies to this case and controls the outcome.

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment of no cause of action is vacated and this case is remanded for entry of judgment on the juiy’s verdict of $260,000 in favor of plaintiffs.

IV

Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) of their claim that defendant acted with gross negligence. We disagree.

Pursuant to MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107) (2)(c), gross negligence is “conduct [which was] so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” Summary disposition is appropriate only where reasonable minds could not have reached different conclusions with regard to whether the defendant’s conduct amounted to gross negligence. Harris v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 219 Mich App 679, 694; 558 NW2d 225 (1996).

After careful review of the record, we agree with the trial court that plaintiffs failed to present evidence that would permit reasonable minds to differ regarding this issue. Although defendant’s acts were sufficient to constitute ordinary negligence, they did not rise to the level of gross negligence. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary disposition of plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim.

v

In her consolidated appeal (Docket No. 178284), defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.405. In light of our determination that the jury’s verdict must be reinstated, this issue is moot.

Vacated and remanded for entry of a judgment on the jury’s verdict of $260,000 in favor of plaintiffs. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiffs, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.

Markey, J., concurred.

1 In 1995, the Legislature enacted 1995 PA 98, which changed the language of the statute in part as follows:

This section shall not be construed to limit the right of a person to bring a civil action for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from a violation of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common law.

These minor grammatical changes do not alter either the statute’s clear meaning or our analysis.

2 The dissent assumes for purposes of analysis that the civil liability statute applies where the owner and the driver are the same person, a conclusion we find compelled by the plain language of the statute. See also Trommater, supra. However, in dicta and in factual situations different from this one, other writers have assumed that the legislative intent underlying the statute was to impose liability on owners for negligent operation by permissive third-party users only, essentially a negligent entrustment theory. Moore v Palmer, 350 Mich 363; 86 NW2d 585 (1957); Stapleton v Independent Brewing Co, 198 Mich 170; 164 NW 520 (1917); Kolomyjec, supra at 725-726. Although the legislative intent behind the enactment of this statute may have been to create liability where none previously existed for a nondriving owner of a vehicle, the statutory language is not so limiting. It applies by its own terms to create owner liability for “any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle....” MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1) (emphasis added).

3 There are really two parallel theories of liability here; defendant claims immunity from common-law negligence as the driver of the vehicle by virtue of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107) because she was a governmental employee in the course of her employment when the accident occurred. However, she enjoys no such immunity from the duties imposed on her as the owner of the vehicle by MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1).