Haas v. Harris

436 F. Supp. 279, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14538
CourtDistrict Court, D. Rhode Island
DecidedAugust 11, 1977
DocketCiv. A. 77-0235, 77-0244
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 436 F. Supp. 279 (Haas v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haas v. Harris, 436 F. Supp. 279, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14538 (D.R.I. 1977).

Opinion

OPINION

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

The above-captioned cases came on to be heard in consolidated proceedings on June 8, 1977. They arise from a three-way dispute among plaintiffs, tenants in federally subsidized housing (hereafter sometimes referred to as the tenants), defendant Secretary and various officials of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereafter referred to collectively as the Secretary), and defendants owner/developer/managers of the housing complexes where plaintiffs reside (hereafter sometimes referred to as the landlords). The landlords seek to impose a rent increase on plaintiffs, which must be approved by HUD. The tenants seek to enjoin the Secretary from approving this increase. The landlords, not surprisingly, oppose tenants’ motion, but, in the case of defendant Kings Grant Co., suggest that the Secretary be ordered to pay an operating subsidy that will ease or eliminate any burden on the tenants that the increase would otherwise cause. The Secretary refuses to pay the subsidy and will approve the increases unless enjoined. She moves for dismissal or stay of these actions and for the denial of all relief to the tenants. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that a preliminary injunction must issue restraining the Secretary from assessing on plaintiffs and their class that portion of the proposed rent increase which would be covered by the operating subsidy. The Court further concludes that further proceedings must be stayed in these cases, pending definitive resolution of the issues involved by the United States Supreme Court in cases now before that tribunal.

A. Background

Kings Grant and Oxbow Farms, the housing developments where plaintiff tenants reside, are subsidized under section 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l (1970). As part of the subsidy scheme, section 236 landlords receive “production subsidies” whereby their mortgage interest payments are substantially reduced. In addition, another subsidy, known as a “deep subsidy”, may be paid to landlords on behalf of certain tenants whose rental payments would otherwise exceed 25% of their adjusted income.

In spite of these two subsidies, housing costs to defendant landlords and rents to tenants have increased in recent years, due in part to steep increases in local property taxes and fuel and utilities costs. To remedy these problems, Congress, in 1974, authorized a further subsidy for section 236 project owners, known as an “operating subsidy”, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-l(f) and (g). Under the operating subsidy program, the Secretary is authorized to establish the initial cost of property taxes and utilities in section 236 projects (the “initial operating expense level”) and to subsidize the increased local taxes and utilities costs that landlords incur over and above that figure so as to insure that these expenses are not responsible for driving rents up above 30% of tenants’ incomes.

It is the operating subsidy that is at the heart of the present controversy. The Secretary has steadfastly refused to implement the operating subsidy, maintaining that the *281 decision whether to calculate and pay the subsidy is left entirely to her discretion. The courts that have thus far ruled on the matter have uniformly disagreed with this position, holding the subsidy to be mandatory and ordering the Secretary to implement it. See, e. g., Underwood v. Hills, 414 F.Supp. 526 (D.D.C.), appeal pending, (D.C. Cir.); order stayed, 429 U.S. 892, 97 S.Ct. 250, 50 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976) and cases cited therein. A definitive answer on this issue may be expected when the Supreme Court decides two cases raising the same legal issues as those raised in Underwood, Abrams v. Hills, 547 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Harris v. Abrams, 431 U.S. 928, 97 S.Ct. 2630, 53 L.Ed.2d 243, 45 U.S.L.W. 3763 (1977) and Ross v. Community Services, Inc., 405 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975), aff’d mem. 544 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Harris v. Ross, 431 U.S. 928, 97 S.Ct. 2630, 53 L.Ed.2d 243, 45 U.S.L.W. 3763 (1977). In the meantime the Supreme Court has stayed Judge Pratt’s order in Underwood, in which the Secretary was required to begin implementing the operating subsidy program on a nation-wide basis.

B. The Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay

It is the Secretary’s position that plaintiffs in this case are part of the nationwide class of tenants certified by Judge Pratt in Underwood v. Hills, 414 F.Supp. at 531, and that their claims were litigated, or could have been litigated, in Underwood. Accordingly, the Secretary argues, the present action should be dismissed or stayed by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata. Alternatively, the Secretary argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim that her approval of the challenged rent increases is contrary to law.

Under ordinary circumstances, the Court would agree with the Secretary that the relief here sought is barred by principles of res judicata. Examination of the Underwood papers reveals that the Underwood plaintiffs argued two theories before Judge Pratt: 1) that the Secretary was obliged to implement the operating subsidy program and (2) that the Secretary was not permitted to pass along rent increases to tenants without taking into account the operating subsidies that she was required to implement. Judge Pratt gave summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the first claim, and did not rule on the second claim. As relief, Judge Pratt ordered implementation of the subsidy program nationwide. It was this order, involving as it did a significant expenditure of federal funds, that the Supreme Court stayed. The effect of the Supreme Court’s action, of course, was to insure that either the tenants or the landlord, but not HUD, would bear the temporary burden of rent increases that HUD might approve, since there would be no operating subsidy to absorb the increases. The Underwood plaintiffs therefore had open to them a second line of attack: Judge Pratt’s order, stayed by the Supreme Court, dealt only with the issue of whether the Secretary should pay the operating subsidy; it left undecided the issue of who—as between landlord and tenant—should bear the burden of the rent increase while the subsidy question awaited final resolution. 1 There is no indication that the Supreme Court was presented with, or purported to decide, this question. Decision of this question would have required a ruling on the Underwood

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dubose v. Harris
82 F.R.D. 582 (D. Connecticut, 1979)
Taylor v. Harris
452 F. Supp. 88 (D. Connecticut, 1978)
Moorehead v. Harris
448 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. New York, 1978)
Gibson v. Harris
438 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Virginia, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
436 F. Supp. 279, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haas-v-harris-rid-1977.