NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 20-2490 __________
GWENDOLYN WILSON, Appellant
v.
HILLSBOROUGH TOWNSHIP CONSTRUCTION/BUILDING DEPARTMENT; HILLSBOROUGH TOWNSHIP TAX ASSESSOR; TOWNSHIP OF HILLSBOROUGH ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-19-cv-18598) District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 16, 2021
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 18, 2021) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Gwendolyn Wilson, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. the District Court’s dismissal of claims she filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) against the Hillsborough Township Construction/Building
Department, the Hillsborough Township Tax Assessor, and Hillsborough Township
itself. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment that
Wilson’s claims are barred by res judicata.
I.
The history of this case is set forth in our prior decision. See Wilson v.
Hillsborough Twp. Constr. Dep’t, 779 F. App’x 969, 971 (3d Cir. 2019). Accordingly,
we will only recite the facts necessary for our discussion.
In 2017, Wilson brought claims pursuant to section 1983 and the FHA against
defendants, alleging they did not perform building inspections when necessary, did not
provide her notice when they did perform the inspections, and artificially inflated the
value of her property relative to her neighbors. See D.N.J. Case No. 3-17-cv-00995.
Wilson filed an amended complaint on February 20, 2018 (the “Prior Complaint”). On
defendants’ motion, the District Court dismissed Wilson’s amended complaint for failure
to state a claim, granting Wilson express leave to amend her complaint within 30 days to
state a valid claim for municipal liability based on a discriminatory policy or custom. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–92 (1978). Rather than do so, Wilson
appealed, electing to stand on her complaint, thereby converting the District Court’s order
to a final, appealable order. See Wilson, 779 F. App’x at 971 n.3 (citing Borelli v. City of
Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam)). We summarily affirmed the
2 District Court’s judgment.
While her appeal was pending, Wilson filed this action in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, which transferred the action to the District of New Jersey.
Wilson then filed the operative amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss on the
grounds that Wilson’s claims are barred by res judicata. The District Court granted the
motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Wilson now appeals.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the application of res judicata. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 584 F.3d 169, 172
(3d Cir. 2009). “Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars a party from initiating
a second suit against the same adversary based on the same ‘cause of action’ as the first
suit.” Duhaney v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010). A party
seeking to invoke res judicata must establish three elements: “(1) a final judgment on the
merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent
suit based on the same cause of action.” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960,
963 (3d Cir. 1991). “The doctrine of res judicata bars not only claims that were brought
in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought.” In re Mullarkey, 536
F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). In determining whether the same cause of action is
involved, the courts look to the “essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise
3 to the various legal claims.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir.
2010) (citations omitted).
III.
We agree with the District Court that Wilson’s claims are precluded, as all three
prongs are met here. First, there was a final judgment on the merits in her prior case, as
the dismissal with leave to amend converted into a final judgment when Wilson elected to
stand on her complaint. See Hoffman v. Nordic Nats., Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir.
2016). Second, Wilson filed the instant suit against the same municipal entities as the
prior suit, naming Hillsborough Township and two of its departments.
Third, Wilson’s claims against the municipal defendants either were brought or
could have been brought in the prior action. Wilson divided her amended complaint in
the instant case into six “causes of action,” and, as the District Court noted in its order,
“the first four causes of action . . . all appear to be identical to the four causes of action
that were asserted by [Wilson] in the Prior Complaint.” Order 4, ECF No. 22.1 As to the
first, second, and fourth, we agree that they are identical and unquestionably precluded.
There is one minor variation in the third cause of action—a variation upon which
Wilson relies on appeal. In that claim, Wilson asserted that defendants violated the FHA
by inflating her property’s value relative to her white neighbors by assuming without
inspection that she had an updated kitchen and finished basement. She asserts in her reply
1 Wilson’s “sixth cause of action” was directed at the District Court itself, improperly relying on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to seek reconsideration and invalidation of orders entered in the prior action. The District Court dismissed that claim and, finding no error in its determination, we will affirm. 4 brief on appeal that: “There exist no claims in Plaintiffs February 20, 2018 First
Amended Complaint about an updated kitchen or a finished basement.” Appellant’s
Reply Br. 2, CA3 ECF No. 26. This assertion is flatly contradicted by a comparison of
the filings. In the Prior Complaint, Wilson claimed that: “The Defendant, Hillsborough
Township [Tax Assessor] retaliated against Plaintiff by increasing her property tax
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 20-2490 __________
GWENDOLYN WILSON, Appellant
v.
HILLSBOROUGH TOWNSHIP CONSTRUCTION/BUILDING DEPARTMENT; HILLSBOROUGH TOWNSHIP TAX ASSESSOR; TOWNSHIP OF HILLSBOROUGH ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-19-cv-18598) District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 16, 2021
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 18, 2021) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Gwendolyn Wilson, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. the District Court’s dismissal of claims she filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) against the Hillsborough Township Construction/Building
Department, the Hillsborough Township Tax Assessor, and Hillsborough Township
itself. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment that
Wilson’s claims are barred by res judicata.
I.
The history of this case is set forth in our prior decision. See Wilson v.
Hillsborough Twp. Constr. Dep’t, 779 F. App’x 969, 971 (3d Cir. 2019). Accordingly,
we will only recite the facts necessary for our discussion.
In 2017, Wilson brought claims pursuant to section 1983 and the FHA against
defendants, alleging they did not perform building inspections when necessary, did not
provide her notice when they did perform the inspections, and artificially inflated the
value of her property relative to her neighbors. See D.N.J. Case No. 3-17-cv-00995.
Wilson filed an amended complaint on February 20, 2018 (the “Prior Complaint”). On
defendants’ motion, the District Court dismissed Wilson’s amended complaint for failure
to state a claim, granting Wilson express leave to amend her complaint within 30 days to
state a valid claim for municipal liability based on a discriminatory policy or custom. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–92 (1978). Rather than do so, Wilson
appealed, electing to stand on her complaint, thereby converting the District Court’s order
to a final, appealable order. See Wilson, 779 F. App’x at 971 n.3 (citing Borelli v. City of
Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam)). We summarily affirmed the
2 District Court’s judgment.
While her appeal was pending, Wilson filed this action in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, which transferred the action to the District of New Jersey.
Wilson then filed the operative amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss on the
grounds that Wilson’s claims are barred by res judicata. The District Court granted the
motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Wilson now appeals.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the application of res judicata. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 584 F.3d 169, 172
(3d Cir. 2009). “Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars a party from initiating
a second suit against the same adversary based on the same ‘cause of action’ as the first
suit.” Duhaney v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010). A party
seeking to invoke res judicata must establish three elements: “(1) a final judgment on the
merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent
suit based on the same cause of action.” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960,
963 (3d Cir. 1991). “The doctrine of res judicata bars not only claims that were brought
in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought.” In re Mullarkey, 536
F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). In determining whether the same cause of action is
involved, the courts look to the “essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise
3 to the various legal claims.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir.
2010) (citations omitted).
III.
We agree with the District Court that Wilson’s claims are precluded, as all three
prongs are met here. First, there was a final judgment on the merits in her prior case, as
the dismissal with leave to amend converted into a final judgment when Wilson elected to
stand on her complaint. See Hoffman v. Nordic Nats., Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir.
2016). Second, Wilson filed the instant suit against the same municipal entities as the
prior suit, naming Hillsborough Township and two of its departments.
Third, Wilson’s claims against the municipal defendants either were brought or
could have been brought in the prior action. Wilson divided her amended complaint in
the instant case into six “causes of action,” and, as the District Court noted in its order,
“the first four causes of action . . . all appear to be identical to the four causes of action
that were asserted by [Wilson] in the Prior Complaint.” Order 4, ECF No. 22.1 As to the
first, second, and fourth, we agree that they are identical and unquestionably precluded.
There is one minor variation in the third cause of action—a variation upon which
Wilson relies on appeal. In that claim, Wilson asserted that defendants violated the FHA
by inflating her property’s value relative to her white neighbors by assuming without
inspection that she had an updated kitchen and finished basement. She asserts in her reply
1 Wilson’s “sixth cause of action” was directed at the District Court itself, improperly relying on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to seek reconsideration and invalidation of orders entered in the prior action. The District Court dismissed that claim and, finding no error in its determination, we will affirm. 4 brief on appeal that: “There exist no claims in Plaintiffs February 20, 2018 First
Amended Complaint about an updated kitchen or a finished basement.” Appellant’s
Reply Br. 2, CA3 ECF No. 26. This assertion is flatly contradicted by a comparison of
the filings. In the Prior Complaint, Wilson claimed that: “The Defendant, Hillsborough
Township [Tax Assessor] retaliated against Plaintiff by increasing her property tax
assessments for ‘UPGRADED KITCHEN’ and ‘FINISHED BASEMENT.’” Prior
Compl. at 12 (brackets in original). In the operative amended complaint in this action, she
again claims: “The Defendant, Hillsborough Township [Tax Assessor] retaliated against
Plaintiff by increasing her property tax assessments for ‘UPGRADED KITCHEN’ and
‘FINISHED BASEMENT’ (See TA 1, TA 2, TA 3).” Am. Compl. 14, ECF No. 9
(brackets in original). The minor variation is the citation to exhibits she attached to the
amended complaint in this action. Those exhibits show that she received notice of a tax
assessment increasing the estimated value of her home dated February 13, 2018, one
week before she filed the Prior Complaint. See ECF No. 9-1 at 30.
Because plaintiffs have no duty to amend or supplement their pleadings, normally
“res judicata does not bar claims that are predicated on events that postdate the filing of
the initial complaint.” Morgan v. Covington Twp., 648 F.3d 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2011). The
alleged retaliation does postdate the filing of Wilson’s initial complaint in the prior action
in 2017. As such, she had no duty to amend to include that claim in the Prior Complaint.
As the above comparison shows, though, Wilson did in fact amend and include this
claim. Simply presenting new allegations or new evidence in support of old allegations is
not sufficient to overcome the preclusive effect of a prior suit on the same cause of action
5 if the “thrust of the two complaints remain[s] practically identical.” Churchill v. Star
Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 195 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover, in the prior action, both the District
Court and this Court specifically rejected her allegation that “the Hillsborough Township
Tax Assessor somehow over-valued her property in its tax assessments and under-valued
the property improvements of her neighbors.” Wilson, 779 F. App’x at 971. Wilson has
not presented a new claim; she merely appended documentary evidence to support a
claim identical to one she pursued in the prior action. Therefore, the claim is barred.
As to the fifth cause of action Wilson asserts here, it does not suffer the same
infirmity of being completely reproduced from the Prior Complaint. However, the claim
repeats a slew of allegations contained in the other claims, about inspections, permitting,
and tax assessments, and again frames them as both discriminatory and retaliatory. Even
if it could be said that Wilson articulates a new legal theory or attempts to allege the
policy or custom for which she was granted leave to amend the Prior Complaint, she
cannot overcome the preclusive effect of having brought a prior action based on the same
underlying events. See Hoffman, 837 F.3d at 280; Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261; Elkadrawy,
584 F.3d at 173.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.