Gwen v. Masher

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided October 9, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-08197·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO MDR 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Gerald Vaughn Gwen, No. CV 20-08197-PCT-JAT (JFM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Scott Mascher, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff Gerald Vaughn Gwen, who is confined in the Yavapai 16 County Detention Center, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983, a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and an Application to Proceed In Forma 18 Pauperis. On August 28, 2020, he filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 19 and lodged a proposed Amended Complaint. In a September 8, 2020 Order, the Court 20 denied the deficient Application to Proceed, gave Plaintiff thirty days to pay the filing and 21 administrative fees or file a complete Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and 22 denied without prejudice the Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and the 23 Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 24 On September 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 8), an 25 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 9), a Response to Court’s Order Directing 26 Resubmission, and a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 12).1 The Court will grant the 27 28 1 Both the Response to Court’s Order and Motion to Appoint Counsel list multiple case numbers. Plaintiff should take note that he may not file a single pleading with more than one case number on it. If Plaintiff wants the Court to take action in more than one 1 Application to Proceed, dismiss the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend, and 2 deny the Motion to Appoint Counsel.2 3 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 4 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 5 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing 7 fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited 8 to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 10 agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 11 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 12 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 13 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 14 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 15 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 16 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 17 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 18 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 19 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 20 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 21 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 22 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 23 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 24 . . . . 25 . . . .

26 of his cases, he must file a separate original pleading and copy for the Judge, with the appropriate case number, in each of the cases. 27 2 Plaintiff’s Response relates to an Order issued in Plaintiff’s other pending lawsuit, 28 Gwen v. Mascher, CV 20-08225-PCT-JAT (JFM). Thus, the Court will take no action on the Response in this case. 1 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 2 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 3 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 4 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 5 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 6 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 7 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 8 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 9 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 10 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 11 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 12 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 13 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 14 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 15 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 16 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 17 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 18 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but 19 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 20 to amend. 21 III. First Amended Complaint 22 In his six-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants Yavapai 23 County Sheriff Scott Mascher and Captain J. Newnun. In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff 24 seeks monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. 25 In Count One, Plaintiff raises claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 26 relating to adequate food and nutrition. Plaintiff asserts Defendants, “in their command 27 role,” were in a position to “affect the day-to-day decisions and[,] through policy, 28 procedure, [and] directives[,] directly and indirectly demonstrate deliberate indifference” 1 and thereby “deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional right[s] of due process [and] equal 2 protection[], resulting in wa[n]ton unnecessary infliction of irreparable injuries.” Plaintiff 3 contends there are “discriminatory practices in offering [meals with] higher caloric, quality, 4 quantity and higher nutritional value to inmates identified as special dietary non-medical, 5 which [are] not equal or co[m]mensurate to [meals given to] sim[i]larly situated inmates.” 6 Plaintiff asserts the Detention Center has a “discriminatory practice” of charging a 7 “class of people” for daily meals, but “pardons a class of people.” He claims the Detention 8 Center “collects [money for meals] from inmates who have mon[ey] in their inmate trust 9 accounts,” but does not collect money from inmates who are indigent or have no money in 10 their inmate accounts.

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