Guzman v. Graham Packaging Co., L.P.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 17, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00498
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDREINA GUZMAN,

12 Plaintiff, No. 2:24-cv-00498-TLN-AC 13 v. 14 GRAHAM PACKAGING CO., L.P., et al., ORDER 15 Defendants.

16 17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Andreina Guzman’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to 18 Amend. (ECF No. 19.) Defendants Graham Packaging Company, L.P., Graham Packaging Pet 19 Technologies, Inc., and Aman Singh (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 20 20.) Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 22.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is 21 GRANTED. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The instant matter arises from alleged employment discrimination based on pregnancy. 3 The Court need not repeat the factual background here, as it is set forth in full in the Court’s 4 September 25, 2024 Order denying Plaintiff’s motion to remand and granting in part and denying 5 in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 15.) On October 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed the 6 operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging the following claims: (1) retaliation in 7 violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) failure to prevent 8 discrimination; (3) retaliation in violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”); (4) 9 retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”); (5) pregnancy/sex 10 discrimination in violation of FEHA; (6) violation of the California pregnancy disability leave 11 law; and (7) wrongful termination. (ECF No. 17.) On November 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed the 12 instant motion to amend. 13 II. STANDARD OF LAW 14 Granting or denying leave to amend a complaint rests in the sound discretion of the 15 district court. Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Rhoden v. 16 United States, 55 F.3d 428, 432 (9th Cir. 1995)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 17 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the 18 court’s leave,” and the “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has considered five factors in determining whether leave to amend 20 should be given: “(1) bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of 21 amendment; and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” In re W. States 22 Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 23 III. ANALYSIS 24 Plaintiff argues the Court should grant her motion based on a lack of undue delay, undue 25 prejudice, and futility. (ECF No. 19.) Defendants oppose, asserting Plaintiff’s motion is not 26 made in good faith, will cause undue delay, will significantly prejudice Defendants, and would be 27 futile. (ECF No. 20.) The Court will consider each of these factors in turn. 28 /// 1 A. Undue Prejudice 2 Prejudice is the factor that weighs most heavily in the Court’s analysis of whether to grant 3 leave to amend. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 4 Courts have found proposed amendments prejudicial where leave to amend is requested as a 5 relevant discovery deadline nears or has already passed. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., 6 Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). “The party opposing leave to amend bears the burden of 7 showing prejudice.” United States v. Somnia, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 3d 947, 958 (E.D. Cal. 2018) 8 (quoting Serpa v. SBC Telecomms., 318 F. Supp. 2d 865, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). 9 Plaintiff argues she recently discovered she was not a “salary” employee but rather a 10 “salary non-exempt” employee, which means that she was at all times entitled to timely and 11 uninterrupted meal and rest breaks (which she maintains she frequently failed to receive) or 12 premium pay in lieu thereof. (ECF No. 19 at 8.) Plaintiff contends that if she does not allege her 13 California Labor Code claims in the instant suit, she will either be forced to initiate a separate 14 action against Defendants or be forever barred from receiving the earned compensation 15 Defendants have refused to remit to her. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts the new amended claims would 16 not greatly change the parties’ positions in this action as she is merely adding California Labor 17 Code claims that will not impact her other claims. (Id. at 8–9.) 18 In opposition, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s proposed amendments would drastically 19 impact their position in the case as they would be compelled to incur additional time and expense 20 to file another motion to dismiss and would have to oppose a likely second motion to remand. 21 (ECF No. 20 at 10.) Defendants contend permitting four new additional claims against Singh 22 would require substantial additional participation by him in this litigation. (Id. at 10–11.) 23 In reply, Plaintiff asserts that denial of amendment due to anticipated additional motion 24 practice is unavailing, as the case is in its earliest stages — no trial date has been set and the 25 procedural posture of this case is far removed from any notion of “undue delay.” (ECF No. 22 at 26 6.) Plaintiff further asserts the standard costs and burdens of litigation, such as additional 27 discovery or motion practice, do not constitute sufficient prejudice to deny amendment. (Id. at 7.) 28 /// 1 Here, the Court finds any potential prejudice to Defendants is minimal. As Plaintiff 2 correctly notes, this case in still in the early stages of litigation. The Court therefore finds 3 unpersuasive Defendants’ argument that adding new claims is prejudicial because it will likely 4 lead to additional motion practice and further participation by Singh in this litigation. See DCD 5 Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[L]iberality in granting leave to 6 amend is not dependent on whether the amendment will add causes of action or parties.”). 7 Further, “a court evaluates prejudice in terms of, e.g., whether discovery cut-offs have passed, 8 how close trial is, and so forth.” Yates v. Auto City 76, 299 F.R.D. 611, 614 (N.D. Cal. 2013). In 9 this matter, discovery is in its very early stages, no deadlines have passed, and Defendants have 10 failed to meet their burden to show the type of prejudice that is usually cognizable by courts. See 11 id.; Naranjo v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-CV-02748-LHK, 2015 WL 913031, at *4 (N.D. 12 Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) (“Prejudice has been found where the ‘parties have engaged in voluminous 13 and protracted discovery’ prior to amendment, or where ‘[e]xpense, delay, and wear and tear on 14 individuals and companies’ is shown.” (internal citation omitted)). Because Defendants have not 15 shown they will suffer prejudice, they “must make a ‘strong showing’ of ‘any of the 16 remaining . . . factors . . . to overcome ‘the presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting 17 leave to amend.’” Naranjo, 2015 WL 913031, at *5 (citing Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052). 18 B. Bad Faith/Undue Delay1 19 “Relevant to evaluating the delay issue is whether the moving party knew or should have 20 known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.” Jackson v. Bank 21 of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. Komie v. Buehler Corp., 449 F.2d 644, 648 (9th 22 Cir. 1971) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, where 23 the moving party filed a motion to amend 31 months after the answer was filed). Even if 24 Plaintiff’s delay was unreasonable, however, “[u]ndue delay by itself . . . is insufficient to justify 25 denying a motion to amend.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999). 26 /// 27 1 Because the parties making overlapping arguments with respect to bad faith and undue 28 delay, the Court will consider both together. 1 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s motive for requesting leave to amend is not in good faith 2 because Plaintiff seeks to “destroy the ground upon which removal was based” and file a motion 3 to remand based on the newly alleged California Labor Code violations. (ECF No. 20 at 8.) 4 Defendants contend Plaintiff requested and received her complete personnel file and payroll 5 records a year prior, in October 2023, which indicated her classification as a non-exempt full-time 6 employee. (Id. at 9.) Defendants maintain either Plaintiff’s counsel never reviewed the 7 documents they requested or Plaintiff and her counsel were aware of the classification at least 8 three months prior to the filing of the original Complaint and made a strategic decision to draft 9 and file the original Complaint without any California Labor Code violations. (Id.) Defendants 10 argue Plaintiff had ample time to amend her Complaint during the eight-month period between 11 the filing of her motion to remand and the Court’s decision to deny that motion. (Id. at 10.) 12 Defendants note that if the Court grants this motion, they will have to file another motion to 13 dismiss to address “these new baseless causes of action,” which will “cause yet a further 14 unnecessary delay[.]” (Id.) 15 In reply, Plaintiff asserts the facts demonstrate she and her counsel acted promptly and in 16 good faith in discovering these claims, which counsel attests in a sworn declaration emerged mid- 17 October 2024 during a detailed review of the case file. (ECF No. 22 at 3.) Plaintiff maintains 18 Defendants’ unsupported allegations of prior knowledge and bad faith fail, as sworn testimony 19 (the timeline of discovery detailed in the Falakassa Declaration) carries significant evidentiary 20 weight and Defendants do not provide direct evidence to contradict the declaration. (Id. at 3–4.) 21 Plaintiff also argues Defendants’ argument that the motion to amend should be denied on a 22 speculative and unfounded assertion that it is motivated by a future attempt to remand the action 23 is premature and procedurally improper. (Id. at 4–6.) Plaintiff also notes that amendments are 24 primarily denied when they would cause undue delay in conducting a trial and Defendants cite no 25 such scenario here. (Id. at 6.) 26 As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the only issue before the Court is 27 whether she should be allowed to amend her operative complaint — not whether she seeks to 28 1 remand this action.2 (ECF No. 22 at 4.) The Court therefore rejects Defendants’ bad faith 2 argument on this basis. (See ECF No. 20 at 8–9.) With respect to whether Plaintiff and/or her 3 counsel unduly delayed as they should have known sooner the basis for her state law claims, the 4 Court again notes the case is in its early stages. Further, the parties do not appear to argue that 5 the additional claims would substantially complicate or delay the case for new discovery. See 6 Loehr v. Ventura County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding 7 district court’s denial of motion to amend where plaintiff sought to add seven pendent state law 8 claims, three new federal claims, and new allegations). Defendants also do not cite to any 9 authority for the proposition that an eight-month delay alone suffices to establish undue delay. 10 (See ECF No. 20 at 10–11.) 11 Further, despite any evidence that Plaintiff “knew or should have known about the facts 12 and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading, this consideration is not dispositive 13 of undue delay, especially where Defendant[s] make[] no assertion that allowing such amendment 14 would result in undue prejudice.” Viewsonic Corp. v. Electrograph Sys., Inc., No. CV 09-04093- 15 SJO-JCX, 2010 WL 11509169, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2010) (citing AmerisourceBergen Corp. 16 v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 952–54 (9th Cir. 2006)). Further, “where a defendant is on 17 notice of facts contained in an amendment to a complaint, there is no serious prejudice to 18 defendant in allowing the amendment.” Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 813 F.2d 19 1480, 1493 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds by 485 U.S. 931 (1988) (noting that 20 “[m]ere delay in proffering an amendment does not justify denying leave to amend”)). The Court 21 therefore finds Defendants have not sufficiently established Plaintiff unduly delayed in filing the 22 instant motion and Defendants face no prejudice from Plaintiff’s proposed amendment. 23 /// 24 2 Defendants correctly cite to Ninth Circuit case law for the proposition that “if a case was 25 properly removed, a plaintiff cannot thereafter oust the federal court of jurisdiction by unilaterally changing the case so as to destroy the ground upon which removal was based.” (ECF No. 20 at 8 26 (citing Millar v. BART Dist., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).) The Millar court 27 went on to say that “[c]ourts uniformly have held that if a claim ‘arising under’ federal law existed at the time of removal, the federal court has discretion to retain jurisdiction to adjudicate 28 pendent state law claims even if at some point the federal claim has been dropped.” Id. 1 C. Futility 2 “[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the 3 amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.” Miller v. Rykoff- 4 Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988), implied overruling recog. on other grounds by 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see also U.S. v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th 6 Cir. 2011) (“[D]ismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo 7 review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” (citations and internal 8 quotation marks omitted)) . Denial of such motions on futility grounds is “rare.” Netbula, LLC v. 9 Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003). “Ordinarily, courts will defer 10 consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to 11 amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Id. (citation omitted). 12 Plaintiff argues the proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) is not futile as she 13 alleges she was not afforded the opportunity to take uninterrupted meal and/or rest breaks 14 approximately one to three times per week. (ECF No. 19 at 9–10.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges 15 she worked for Defendants at the front desk and Defendants and their customers would routinely 16 ask Plaintiff work-related questions while she was on meal and/or rest breaks. (Id.) Plaintiff 17 further argues that it is not futile to name Singh as liable for the alleged Labor Code violations 18 because Singh was personally involved in the alleged wage and hour violations and/or “engaged 19 in individual wrongdoing” in his capacity as Defendants’ plant controller. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff 20 notes Singh signed off on her and other non-exempt employees’ biweekly timesheets to approve 21 hours worked and witnessed Plaintiff suffer from missed meal and/or rest breaks, but did nothing 22 to rectify the missed breaks or ensure she was paid premium pay for missed or non-compliant 23 meal and/or rest breaks. (Id. at 10–11.) In opposition, Defendants assert Plaintiff’s California 24 Labor Code claims are futile, conclusory, and lack the required factual support. (ECF No. 20 at 25 11–13.) 26 Based on the Court’s finding that there is no prejudice, bad faith, or undue delay, the 27 Court declines to deny Plaintiff’s motion purely on futility grounds. See Rivkin v. J.P. Morgan 28 Chase, N.A., No. 2:14-cv-026620-TLN-EFB, 2016 WL 6094485, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1 2016) (“[A] court need not deny a plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend based on futility alone.”). 2 The Court therefore defers addressing Defendants’ arguments on the merits of Plaintiff’s 3 proposed additional claims at this juncture. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. (ECF No. 6 19.) Plaintiff shall file her amended complaint not later than thirty (30) days from the electronic 7 filing date of this Order. Defendants’ responsive pleading is due not later than twenty-one (21) 8 days after Plaintiff files her amended complaint. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Date: June 16, 2025 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28