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Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCOT-XX-XXXXXXX 22-MAY-2026 09:12 AM Dkt. 91 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---oOo--- ________________________________________________________________
DREW GUTSCHMIDT, ANDREW BLACK, MICHAEL MORRISON, TERRI MORRISON, ASH SAULSBURY, and LILA TRETIKOV, Individuals, Appellants,
vs.
MAUI PLANNING COMMISSION, COUNTY OF MAUI; and GOODFELLOW BROS., LLC., a domestic limited liability company, Appellees. ________________________________________________________________
SCOT-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE MAUI PLANNING COMMISSION (MPC DOCKET NO. SUP 220210001)
McKENNA, ACTING C.J., GINOZA, AND EDDINS, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE JOHNSON, IN PLACE OF DEVENS, C.J., RECUSED, AND CIRCUIT JUDGE DeWEESE, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
MAY 22, 2026
OPINION OF THE COURT BY GINOZA, J.
I. Introduction
Appellants are Drew Gutschmidt, Andrew Black, Michael
Morrison, Terri Morrison, Ash Saulsbury, and Lila Tretikov *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
(Appellants), all residents or owners of property in the Makila
Plantation neighborhood in Launiupoko, Maui. The Appellee is
Goodfellow Bros., LLC (Goodfellow), who applied for a special
use permit (SUP) to engage in rock-crushing on approximately
twelve acres of fallow agricultural land about a mile away from
the Makila Plantation neighborhood. At issue in this matter is
whether the Maui Planning Commission (MPC) properly denied
Appellants’ untimely petition to intervene in Goodfellow’s SUP
public hearing. Appellants also challenge the issuance of the
SUP. We hold that the MPC properly denied Appellants’ petition
to intervene because Appellants did not show good cause as to
why they waited until the eve of the public hearing to file a
petition to intervene. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of
Appellants’ challenge to the issuance of the SUP.
II. Background
A. Goodfellow’s SUP Application
In January 2021, Goodfellow submitted a Land Use
Commission (LUC) Special Permit Application to the Maui Planning
Department (MPD) for a project titled “Rock Crushing Site Makila
Ranches II Lot 10.” The project land is zoned for agricultural
use under the State Land Use Plan, the Maui Island Plan, and the
West Maui Community Plan. It is outside the growth boundaries
of the Maui Island Plan. Goodfellow described the property as
“undeveloped, vacant, and fallow land that is enclosed by a
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fence[,]” surrounded by “fallow, vacant agricultural lands in
all directions.” The soil is characterized as “generally stony
and silty clay.”
Goodfellow proposed to use the land as a “temporary
rock crushing facility” that will process rocks for commercial
use as “aggregate for local construction.” The rocks would be
extracted from the site itself or trucked over from off-site.
The rocks would then be crushed and stockpiled on-site until
sold. The project was intended to “establish a local source for
aggregate” for West Maui construction projects.
Goodfellow did not plan to crush rock materials every
day. It acknowledged that its operations would likely produce
dust and noise. It proposed mitigating these impacts using dust
screens and non-potable water, as well as limiting operations to
daylight hours. Goodfellow estimated that, on average, five
individuals and two vehicles would work onsite. There would be
a trailer for administrative purposes and no permanent
structures erected. Crushing equipment (excavators, loaders,
crushers, screens, and conveyors) would be mobile.
Positive impacts included diverting rocks and boulders
from the Central Maui Landfill and from illegal dumping on
public and private property. Goodfellow also stated that its
rock-crushing operations would decrease traffic from
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construction vehicles coming to West Maui from Central and South
Maui quarries.
Goodfellow asserted that the proposed project was not
a permissible use under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 205-4.5
(2017) in the State agricultural district, but that the project
was an “unusual and reasonable use” with a special use permit,
under HRS § 205-6 (2017) and Hawaiʻi Administrative Rules (HAR)
§ 15-15-95 (eff. 2019). Goodfellow also noted that “mining and
resource extraction” are special uses under Maui County Code
(MCC) Chapter 19.30A.060 (eff. 2016) if a special use permit is
obtained. MCC § 19.04.040 (eff. 2018) (titled “Definitions”)
defines “Resource extraction” as “activities engaged in the
exploration, mining and processing of natural deposits of rock,
gravel, sand, and topsoil.” As the property was under fifteen
acres in size, the SUP would be processed by the MPD and acted
upon by the MPC. Goodfellow asked that the permit be for
fifteen years.
B. Notification of the Public Hearing
Starting in 2022, Goodfellow engaged in community
outreach. On September 22, 2022, Goodfellow coordinated with
the Makila Plantation Homeowners Association to hold an
informational Zoom meeting with homeowners about its rock-
crushing proposal. Appellant Black attended that meeting.
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On July 3, 2023, Goodfellow mailed a letter of
notification to all owners and recorded lessees within 500 feet
of the subject property, to whom notice of the SUP application
was required to be given. The letter included a location map;
described the SUP application; and informed them of the
scheduled August 8, 2023 hearing date, time, and place.
On July 7, 2023, MPC published a notice in The Maui
News notifying the public of a meeting on August 8, 2023
regarding Goodfellow’s request for the SUP. The notice also
informed the public of the following information, highlighted in
bold: “The deadline for the filing of a timely petition to
intervene if the first public hearing date is August 8, 2023 is
July 25, 2023.”
On July 20, 2023, the Makila Plantation Homeowners
Association forwarded an email from Goodfellow inviting
homeowners to an informational meeting about its SUP
application.
On August 1, 2023, MPC published notice of its regular
remote public hearing on its website. Goodfellow’s SUP
application was on the agenda. Also hyperlinked to the agenda
was MPD’s Report and Recommendation, which recommended that the
MPC approve Goodfellow’s SUP for five years, with conditions.
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C. Written Testimony from the Appellants
Between August 4 and 7, 2023, each of the Appellants
submitted written testimony to the MPC. They each (1) raised
concerns with noise, dust, water use, and traffic; (2) asserted
that Goodfellow should have given them formal notice of the
public hearing, even though such notice was not required because
Appellants are not adjacent property owners within 500 feet of
the site; and (3) stated their desire to obtain legal counsel.
Appellants questioned Goodfellow’s activities on the
property. Appellants Michael and Terri Morrison stated, “Per
our discussion with Goodfellow the other day, they have no plans
on doing any type of mineral processing on dirt from this site,
just rock crushing, storing rock from numerous other locations
and then hauling rock to and from the location.” Appellant
Saulsbury doubted that Goodfellow would even engage in rock-
crushing on the property. He stated that Goodfellow posted an
“admission . . . on a private website . . . on July 14[, 2023]”
that it had “no intent of mining anything.” He included a
screenshot of the website in which Goodfellow did not expressly
state that it had “no intent of mining anything” but did state
that it could not eliminate the “rock-crushing” component of its
application because it was that component that qualified its
activities as a “special use” (i.e., “mining and resource
extraction”) in the agricultural district.
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The Appellants asked the MPC to defer, deny or
suspend the SUP application.
D. Appellants’ Petition to Intervene
On August 7, 2023, twenty hours before the scheduled
hearing, Appellants submitted a Petition to Intervene to the
MPC. Appellants emailed the petition to the MPC at 1:06 p.m.
Appellants stated that they “own property and/or reside in the
nearby Makila Plantation neighborhood in Launiupoko[,]” and
their “homes are located within approximately one mile of the
project site. . . .” They brought their Petition to Intervene
pursuant to Rules of Practice and Procedure for the Maui
Planning Commission (RPPMPC or MPC rules) § 12-201-40 (eff.
2001), which is titled “Petition filing,” and which states the
following:
(a) Petitions to intervene shall be in conformity with section 12-201-20 herein and shall be filed with the commission and served upon the applicant no less than ten days before the first public hearing date. Untimely petitions will not be permitted except for good cause, but in no event will intervention be permitted after the commission has taken the final vote on the matter before it.
(b) The petition to intervene shall be accompanied by a filing fee in the amount established in the county budget.
The Appellants conceded that their “petition is not
being submitted ten days prior to the first public hearing date
on August 8, 2023,” but stated that it was submitted “prior to a
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final vote on the matter” and was “late for good cause.” They
asserted the following:
The [Appellants] only recently learned of the Application and its potential adverse effects on neighboring properties. The [Appellants] were first made aware of the existence of the Application on July 20, 2023 [through an] email from the Makila Homeowner’s Association. The [Appellants] were invited to and participated in an August 3, 2023 information session by the Goodfellow [sic]. Subsequent to the information session, the [Appellants] received, for the first time, the Maui Planning Commission agenda for the public hearing including full details of the application and the Maui Planning Department report. Given the preceding events, the [Appellants] did not have the information to decide to intervene by July 25, 2023, ten days prior to the public hearing, and were therefore ill positioned to petition to intervene on a timely basis.
On the merits of the SUP application, the Appellants argued that
they were concerned about the dust, noise, heavy truck traffic,
increased demand on non-potable water, and impact on peace and
quiet that the rock-crushing operation would have on their
properties, their agricultural activities, and on Launiupoko
Beach Park.
E. The Public Hearing on the SUP
On August 8, 2023, the MPC held a public hearing on
Goodfellow’s SUP application, which it characterized as a
contested case. Goodfellow made a presentation, noting that,
“[s]tarting from last year [2022],” Goodfellow “had several
meetings with the community, including the nearby [homeowners
associations], . . . Councilmember Paltin and stakeholders . . .
Uilani Kapu of the Aha Moku Council, Kai Nishiki and the West
Maui Land Company.” The hearing was then open to public
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testimony, and Appellants Gutschmidt, Saulsbury, Black, and
Michael Morrison each testified. Then a community member
testified in support of the project and stated that four out of
the six intervenors did not occupy the homes they own in Makila
Plantation. He speculated that the intervenors did not know of
the rock-crushing proposal because they do not live on Maui
full-time. Another community member also testified in support
of the project and criticized opponents as “Launiupoko folks”:
“largely affluent, largely not living there, and it feels really
like NIMBY. . . .”
The MPC then took up the petition to intervene. Black
testified that he received a forwarded email to the Makila
Plantation Homeowners Association from Goodfellow, sent on July
20, 2023, inviting homeowners to learn about Goodfellow’s SUP
application on August 3, 2023. He stated this was the first
time he had heard of the public hearing scheduled for August 8,
2023.
One of Goodfellow’s representatives, Leilani Pulmano
(Pulmano), addressed Black’s testimony. She stated that Black
was present at an informational Zoom meeting Goodfellow held
with homeowners of Makila Plantation on September 22, 2022 and
knew about Goodfellow’s proposal then. She also testified that
Goodfellow was prejudiced by the untimely petition to intervene
because it was “unable to secure an attorney.” Black then
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testified that the September 2022 Zoom meeting was “vague,” and
he did not know Goodfellow was seeking a SUP.
At that point in the hearing, two of the six
commissioners stated that they had not received the petition to
intervene. The proceedings were recessed for those two
commissioners to review the petition. Once the hearing was
reconvened, commission counsel stated that the MPC could grant
the petition to intervene, in which case the MPC “would move to
a sort of more formal contested case hearing and [it would] be
done for today with the item.” Commission counsel also stated
that the MPC could deny the petition to intervene, then “move
forward with . . . decision making. . . .”
One of the commissioners then asked commission counsel
to define “good cause.” Counsel stated that it was a
“sufficient reason” or a “good . . . excusable reason” to have
missed the intervention deadline. Counsel stated that the term
was broad and gave the commission discretion.
Pulmano then further testified to address Black’s
testimony. She testified that Goodfellow was only required to
give notice to adjoining or abutting landowners, so its efforts
at reaching out to two nearby homeowners associations was
“[a]bove and beyond” that requirement. Pulmano further
testified that the Makila Plantation Homeowners Association’s
property manager set up the informational meeting with
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homeowners via Zoom in September 2022. She stated that
Goodfellow explained at that informational meeting that it was
seeking a special use permit. The SUP application had been
submitted to MPD in January 2021.
Then, once the MPD notified Goodfellow that its SUP
application was coming up for a public hearing, Goodfellow
emailed the homeowners association property managers again on
July 5, 2023 to set up a follow-up meeting with owners. Pulmano
testified that the Makila Plantation Homeowners Association
property manager was on vacation at the time but acknowledged
Goodfellow’s email on July 14, 2023. The property manager sent
out an email to homeowners on July 20, 2023, and set up the
meeting on August 3, 2023.
Black then testified that he attended the September
2022 informational Zoom meeting but could confirm that
Gutschmidt, Saulsbury, and Tretikov did not attend that meeting,
and was not sure if the Morrisons attended. One of the
commissioners then asked Black if he was “a full-time resident
of Hawaii.” Black stated that he lived on Maui and in British
Columbia, Canada.
Appellant Saulsbury then testified that he had not
attended the informational Zoom meeting in September 2022 and
became a full-time Maui resident a month later. Michael
Morrison also testified that he and his wife did not attend the
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September 2022 informational Zoom meeting because they were “not
in the state” at the time. He stated that he and his wife are
full-time Maui residents. Both Saulsbury and Michael Morrison
testified that the first time either had heard details of the
SUP application up for public hearing was on August 3, 2023.
Pulmano countered that a public notice of the hearing
was published in The Maui News on July 7, 2023. A Maui County
staff member noted that all of the SUP application documents
were available online for public review at that time and had
been available since the end of January 2021.
One of the commissioners moved to deny the petition to
intervene because “the applicant [Goodfellow] and the commission
did not have time to prepare” for it. The motion was seconded
by another commissioner, who added the following:
Just to our intervenors, you know, living away from where is submitting of legal papers tend to be really unkind to those who live farther and being from a person who lives two hours away just to be able to file something. I’ve taken these kind of deadlines quite seriously. And so, with the amount of time that you had and you were informed about the information, I do feel that you had a sufficient amount of time to be able to submit your papers on a timely matter. So, on the basis of the late notice is the reason why I am denying the intervention.
(Unedited.) Two other commissioners added the following
comments:
Dr. Deakos: [I]t sounds to me like the applicant made every effort and went above and beyond to notify beyond what the requirements were. I don’t think there was anything malicious on either side. I do feel the intervenors, you know, navigating those . . . the map sites and knowing where to find stuff. I try to track stuff all the time and, and it gets past me. So, it’s I think it was
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an honest mistake. I don’t think there’s any malicious intent with the intervention. But you know, there are rules for the deadline for application and unfortunately, that deadline was missed. So, I would probably support the denial. Thank you.
. . . .
Ms. Thayer: I would just say that I’m supporting what the other commissioners have said, that this was an untimely filing. And then the next question after that is was good cause shown. And as Commissioner Deakos mentioned and the other commissioners, that there was lots of notice prior to this application or intervention being filed. But having said that, I do understand how hard it is for somebody who’s not in this world to find this stuff online. But it sounds like it was known that there was a rock crushing facility well before ten days prior to this public hearing. So, based on that, I side with the motion.
The MPC voted 6-0 to deny the petition to intervene.
The public hearing on Goodfellow’s SUP application
resumed. Pulmano clarified that Goodfellow is “not quarrying or
mining . . . on the site.” She stated that Goodfellow had
previously asked to remove the rock-crushing activity in its SUP
application but was told by the MPD that it could not. Pulmano
then stated that her understanding was that Goodfellow could
just store rock materials on the subject property, which it was
willing to do. At the end of the public hearing, the MPC voted
to approve Goodfellow’s SUP application, with amended conditions
and additional conditions. Two of the additional conditions
were (1) that there would be “no coring, mining or rock
crushing” on the property; and (2) that “the aggregate and
material created and/or stored on the property shall be utilized
for projects in West Maui.”
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F. The MPC’s Decision
On April 30, 2024, the MPC filed its “Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order Denying a
Petition to Intervene for a Land Use Commission Special Permit
for Goodfellow Bros. LLC” (Decision). The MPC found that
Appellants had sufficient notice of the public hearing and
sufficient time to prepare a petition to intervene. It also
found that Appellants’ petition to intervene was untimely filed
without good cause. The MPC’s conclusions of law were as
follows:
2. The [Appellants] failed to file a petition to intervene ten days prior to the public hearing date as required by Rule 12-201-40 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Maui Planning Commission.
3. The term “good cause,” as used in Rule 12-201-40 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Maui Planning Commission, requires the commission to decide whether proposed intervenors that filed untimely petitions “have sufficient reason to have not filed within the ten-day period.” (Exhibit B, p.42; see also Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 146 Hawaiʻi 354, 363, 463 P.3d 1011, 1020 (2020) (defining “good cause” as “sufficient reason, depending upon the circumstances of the individual case, and that a finding of its existence lies largely in the discretion of the court.”).
4. The [Appellants] did not have “good cause” to file their petition less than 24 hours before the public hearing on the application, over nine days later than the filing deadline provided by Rule 12-201-40.
There was no mention of Appellants’ residency status in the
Decision. Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal to this
court.
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III. Discussion
Appellants raise the following points of error in
their opening brief:
The [MPC] reversibly erred by:
(1) Denying Appellants’ petition to intervene where Appellants’ property rights required due process, consisting in a contested case hearing in accord with HRS chapter 91, the Hawaiʻi Administrative Procedures Act (“HAPA”).
(2) Denying Appellants’ petition to intervene based on an incorrect analysis of its rules for intervention because it incorrectly interpreted “good cause” as requiring Appellants to demonstrate an absence of opportunity to have filed ten working days before the hearing or the Applicant’s noncompliance with notice requirements.
(3) Plainly erred by considering Appellants’ residency status in determining to deny their petition to intervene in violation [of] equal protection of laws of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, §5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution.
(4) Approving the Department report and Applicant’s SUP application for special uses consisting [of] “mining and resource extraction” in the agricultural district in violation of requirements of Maui County Code (MCC) chapter 19.30A.060 and Hawaiʻi Administrative Rules (HAR) §15-15-95 . . . because:
a. Applicant does not intend to conduct mining or resource extraction.
b. Applicant’s proposed operations do not meet the criteria and guidelines for permitting special uses in the agricultural district.
c. Appellants’ property rights required the [MPC] to hold a contested case hearing prior to considering the application.
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As a preliminary matter, we note that Appellants argue
they had “standing to intervene in Commission proceedings.”
Standing is not at issue in this appeal. What is at issue is
whether the Appellants should have had their petition to
intervene accepted by the MPC in the first instance because they
had shown “good cause” for its untimely filing.
A. The MPC’s interpretation of “good cause” in RPPMPC Rule 12- 201-40 was proper.
The Appellants’ second point of error concerns the
interpretation of the term “good cause” in RPPMPC Rule 12-201-
40, which states the following:
(a) Petitions to intervene shall be in conformity with section 12-201-20 herein and shall be filed with the commission and served upon the applicant no less than ten days before the first public hearing date. Untimely petitions will not be permitted except for good cause, but in no event will intervention be permitted after the commission has taken the final vote on the matter before it.
(b) The petition to intervene shall be accompanied by a filing fee in the amount established in the county budget.
(Emphases added.) “Good cause” is not defined in the MPC rules.
Thus, Appellants ask this court to construe the term consistent
with RPPMPC Rule 12-201-41(d) (eff. 2010), which states, “Leave
to intervene shall be freely granted[.]” Appellants disregard
subsection (b) of the same rule, however, which states that
“[a]ll persons who . . . can demonstrate they will be so
directly and immediately affected by the matter before the
commission that their interest in the proceeding is clearly
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distinguishable from that of the general public shall be
admitted as parties upon timely application for intervention.”
RPPMPC Rule 12-201-41(b) (eff. 2010) (emphasis added). Thus,
RPPMPC Rule 12-201-41 governs timely filed petitions for
intervention. Appellants do not show how MPC’s rules require it
to freely grant untimely petitions to intervene.
Appellants also argue that the public policy behind
the Hawaiʻi Administrative Procedures Act (HAPA), as well as HRS
Chapter 205 (governing the Land Use Commission), is to encourage
public participation, citing Life of the Land, Inc. v. West
Beach Development Corporation, 63 Haw. 529, 532, 631 P.2d 588,
591 (1981) (“[T]he legislative policy manifested in . . . HAPA
and chapter 205 . . . requires a high degree of openness in the
conduct of [Land Use] Commission affairs, dictates strict time
constraints, encourages broad public participation with
intervention to be freely granted, and mandates content
requisites and specificity in all notices to the public as to
all intended business of the Commission affecting private and
public rights.”). We recognize the importance of these
purposes. Nevertheless, again, for intervention to be freely
granted, it must first be timely. Cf. Pele Def. Fund v. Puna
Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawaiʻi 64, 67-68, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213-14
(1994) (“Appellants seeking judicial review under HRS § 91-14
must also follow agency rules ‘relating to contested case
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proceedings . . . properly promulgated under HRS Chapter
91[.]’”) (citation omitted).
Appellants ask this court to define “good cause” for
an untimely petition to intervene by adopting the “good cause”
standard for setting aside an entry of default adopted in Chen
v. Mah, 146 Hawaiʻi 157, 180, 457 P.3d 796, 819 (2020). The
court rule at issue in Chen, the circumstances of that case, and
the underlying policies therein differ markedly from this case.
Chen made it clear that whether “good cause” exists will depend
on the circumstances of the individual case. Id. Therefore, we
conclude the Chen good cause standard for setting aside an entry
of default is not appropriate in this case.
Chen involved a dispute over an oral compensation
agreement between two dentists, plaintiff Dr. Grace Chen (Chen)
and defendant Dr. Jonathan Mah (Mah). Id. at 160, 457 P.3d at
799. Chen threatened to file suit against Mah for money owed
under the agreement. Id. at 162, 457 P.3d at 801. Her attorney
sought accountings from Mah multiple times in an attempt to
resolve the dispute without resort to litigation. Id. at 162-
63, 457 P.3d at 801-02. After a final, unsuccessful attempt,
Chen’s attorney informed Mah he was recommending that Chen file
suit. Id. at 163, 457 P.3d at 802.
Chen’s complaint was filed and served upon Mah
personally and as the registered agent for his corporation,
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neither filed an answer, and Chen moved for, and was granted,
entry of default. Id. Chen later moved for default judgment.
Id. At this point in the litigation, Mah obtained counsel and
moved to set aside the entry of default. Id. He alleged that
he had only recently learned of the entry of default against him
and that he believed he was still in the process of negotiating
a resolution with Chen’s attorney. Id. at 163-64, 457 P.3d at
802-03. The circuit court denied Mah’s motion to set aside
entry of default. Id. at 164, 457 P.3d at 803. The issue of
whether the circuit court abused its discretion in so ruling was
ultimately appealed to this court. Id. at 171, 457 P.3d at 810.
We examined the “good cause” requirement in Hawaiʻi
Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 55(c), which is titled
“Setting aside default,” and which states, “For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment
by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b).” 146 Hawaiʻi at 172, 457 P.3d at
811. At the time Chen was decided, a party moving to set aside
an entry of default for good cause also had to meet the same
standard for setting aside a default judgment. Id. at 160, 457
P.3d at 799. The moving party had to show that “(1) the
nondefaulting party will not be prejudiced by the reopening, (2)
that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, and (3)
that the default was not the result of inexcusable conduct or a
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wilful act.” Id. at 172-73, 457 P.3d at 811-12 (quoting BDM,
Inc. v. Sageco, Inc., 57 Haw. 73, 76, 549 P.2d 1147, 1150
(1976)).
This court in Chen changed the standard for setting
aside an entry of default, prospectively holding that the movant
needed to show the following:
“Good cause” should exist to set aside an entry of default if: (1) the defendant did not deliberately fail to plead or otherwise defend or engage in contumacious conduct; or (b) if the defendant did deliberately fail to plead or otherwise defend or engage in contumacious conduct, there is no actual prejudice to the plaintiff that cannot be addressed through lesser sanctions.
Id. at 180, 457 P.3d at 819 (emphasis added and footnotes
omitted). “Contumacious conduct” has been defined as “willfully
defiant” or “[w]illfully stubborn and disobedient conduct.” Id.
at 180 n.27, 457 P.3d at 819 n.27 (citing In re Blaisdell, 125
Hawaiʻi 44, 50, 252 P.3d 63, 69 (2011); Shasteen, Inc. v. Hilton
Haw. Vill. Joint Venture, 79 Hawaiʻi 103, 107 n.7, 899 P.2d 386,
390 n.7 (1995)).
In reaching this holding, this court noted that “[i]t
is not possible to provide one definition of ‘good cause,’ as
standards governing whether ‘good cause’ exists depend not only
upon the circumstances of the individual case, but also upon the
specific court rule at issue.” Id. at 178, 457 P.3d at 817.
This is because “there are numerous court rules in which the
phrase ‘good cause’ appears,” and these govern contexts that
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“differ from the ‘good cause’ required to set aside an entry of
default . . . and address different policy considerations
dictating stricter or more lenient definitions of ‘good cause’.
. . .” Id. (footnotes omitted).
In the case of entries of default, this court stated
that our express policy is one of disfavoring defaults so that,
“in the interests of justice, there can be a full trial on the
merits.” Id. at 176, 457 P.3d at 815 (citations omitted). For
that reason, the “good cause” standard in the context of HRCP
Rule 55(c) is somewhat strict. Setting aside an entry of
default requires an absence of contumacious conduct; or, if
contumacious conduct is present, no actual prejudice to the
plaintiff that cannot be addressed through lesser sanctions.
Id. at 180, 457 P.3d at 819 (footnotes omitted). This “good
cause” standard is appropriate at the beginning stages of
litigation, where entry of default against a party precludes a
full trial on the merits. Where there is an absence of
contumacious conduct, the entry of default should be set aside.
In the case of an agency’s exercise of discretion in
excusing or not excusing an untimely petition to intervene,
“good cause” need not be defined so strictly. In Chen, we
emphasized the point that a finding of good cause “depends upon
the circumstances of the individual case” and “lies largely in
the discretion of the officer or court to which [the] decision
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is committed.” Id. at 178, 457 P.3d at 817 (quoting Doe v. Doe,
98 Hawaiʻi 144, 154, 44 P.3d 1085, 1095 (2002)).
This court acknowledged the Doe court’s use of a
simpler definition, taken from Black’s Law Dictionary, in
defining “good cause” as “[a] legally sufficient reason.” Id.
at 178 n.22, 457 P.3d at 817 n.22. Doe involved a child
custody proceeding that was limited to three hours long. 98
Hawaiʻi at 145, 44 P.3d at 1086. At the conclusion of the
hearing, mother lost custody of her minor daughter. Id. She
filed a Hawaiʻi Family Court Rule (HFCR) 59(a) (eff. 2000) motion
for a new trial, arguing that good cause existed to enter
additional testimony from her witnesses concerning family
violence. Id. at 148, 44 P.3d at 1089. HFCR Rule 59(a) states,
“A new trial may be granted . . . for good cause shown. On a
motion for a new trial, the court may . . . take additional
testimony. . . .” The family court denied the motion on the
basis that the proceeding was limited to three hours long. Id.
at 152, 44 P.3d at 1093.
The Doe court then examined the phrase “good cause” in
other contexts, such as in a Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure
(HRAP) Rule 4(a)(5) extension of time for filing a notice of
appeal, an HRS § 286-259(j) continuance of an administrative
driver’s license revocation hearing, or, in the employment
context, the “leaving of work” for “good cause.” Id. at 153-54,
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44 P.3d at 1094-95 (citations omitted). It noted that the
definition of “good cause” in each of those contexts varies.
Id. at 153, 44 P.3d at 1094. Like the Chen court, the Doe court
recognized that “‘[g]ood cause . . . ‘depends upon the
circumstances of the individual case, and a finding of its
existence lies largely in the discretion of the officer or court
to which [the] decision is committed.” Id. at 154, 44 P.3d at
1095 (citation omitted). The Doe court then applied the Black’s
Law Dictionary standard to mother’s HFCR Rule 59(a) motion and
concluded that the family court abused its discretion in denying
her motion for a new trial because mother’s witnesses “would
have been helpful to resolve the underlying issue of domestic
violence. . . .” Id. at 156, 44 P.3d at 1097. Such a standard
would be more appropriate in the agency context as well.
As we noted in Chen, the definition of “good cause”
“depend[s] not only upon the circumstances of the individual
case, but also upon the specific court rule at issue[,]” and
that the body to which the decision is committed possesses wide
discretion in determining what constitutes “good cause.” 146
Hawaiʻi at 178, 457 P.3d at 817. We decline to hold that the MPC
abused its discretion in using a “good cause” standard
consistent with the definition from Black’s Law Dictionary.
“Good cause,” interpreted as a “sufficient reason,” was
appropriate for the context in which it was used.
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This court has also adopted this Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of good cause for purposes of interpreting
HRAP Rule 4(a)(4) (eff. 2016).1 See Eckard Brandes, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Lab. and Indus. Rels., 146 Hawaiʻi 354, 463 P.3d 1011
(2020). The genesis of that appeal was a wage complaint by a
truck operator, Scott Foyt (Foyt), against his employer, Eckard
Brandes, Inc. (Eckard). Id. at 355, 463 P.3d at 1012. The Wage
Standards Division of the Department of Labor and Industrial
Relations (DLIR) sided with Foyt and issued a Notice of
Violation to Eckard, ordering it to pay Foyt in excess of
$60,000. Id. at 356, 463 P.3d at 1013.
Eckard appealed the Notice of Violation to the
Director of DLIR, and a hearing officer affirmed it. Id. In
that proceeding, only Eckard and the DLIR were parties; Foyt was
a witness. Id. Eckard then filed a notice of appeal to the
circuit court. Id. Again, only Eckard and DLIR were parties.
Id. at 356-57, 463 P.3d at 1013-14. The circuit court reversed
1 HRAP Rule 4 is titled, “APPEALS – WHEN TAKEN.” Subsection (a) governs “Appeals in civil cases.” HRAP Rule 4(a)(4) is titled, “EXTENSIONS OF TIME TO FILE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL.” For requests for extensions of time made before the expiration of the prescribed time to file an appeal has elapsed, the “court or agency appealed from, upon a showing of good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion. . . .” (Emphasis added.) HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(A). For requests for extensions of time made after the expiration of the prescribed time to file a notice of appeal has elapsed, the “court or agency appealed from, upon a showing of excusable neglect may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion. . . .” HRAP Rule 4(a)(4)(B).
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the DLIR Director’s decision and entered final judgment. Id. at
357, 463 P.3d at 1014.
Foyt did not find out about the decision until later,
then spent weeks trying to obtain counsel. Id. He obtained
counsel a day before the deadline to file a notice of appeal to
the ICA. Id. Foyt’s counsel then filed two motions: the first
for leave to intervene for the sole purpose of appealing the
final judgment, and the second for an extension of time to file
a notice of appeal from the final judgment. Id. The circuit
court granted both motions, with the extension of time granted
in part, due to “excusable neglect.” Id. at 358, 463 P.3d at
1015. Foyt’s counsel then filed his notice of appeal to the
ICA, but the ICA dismissed his appeal as untimely, holding that
the record did not establish excusable neglect. Id.
Foyt’s counsel later received an extension of time
from the circuit court due to excusable neglect to file his
notice of appeal. Id. at 358, 463 P.3d at 1015. He filed his
notice of appeal to the ICA, but the ICA dismissed his appeal as
untimely, holding that the record did not establish excusable
neglect. Id.
On certiorari, this court vacated the ICA’s dismissal
order and set forth definitions for “excusable neglect” and
“good cause.” Id. at 363-64, 463 P.3d at 1020-21. Relevant to
this appeal, this court favorably cited Doe’s use of the “good
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cause” definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, then favorably
cited the Chen court’s footnote of the updated definition in
Black’s Law Dictionary. Id. at 363, 463 P.3d at 1020 (citations
omitted). We then defined “good cause” for the purposes of HRAP
Rule 4(a)(4)(A) to mean “a sufficient reason, depending upon the
circumstances of the individual case, and that a finding of its
existence lies largely in the discretion of the court.” Id.
(footnote omitted). Eckard was published just three months
after Chen and reiterated Chen’s point that the definition of
“good cause” depends upon the context within which the term is
used. See id. In this case, it is neither necessary nor
appropriate to graft Chen’s “lack of contumacious conduct”
definition of “good cause” onto the MPC’s determination as to
whether to excuse the untimeliness of Appellants’ petition to
intervene.
The MPC should not be required to accept untimely
petitions to intervene on the basis that the intervenors did not
engage in “willfully defiant” or “willfully stubborn and
disobedient conduct.” See Chen, 146 Hawaiʻi at 180 n.27, 457
P.3d at 819 n.27 (citations omitted).
By the time the SUP application was ready for a public
hearing, the applicant, the MPD, and the MPC were near the
culmination of the decision-making process. Here, Goodfellow
submitted its SUP application in January 2021, and the public
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hearing on its application was held in August 2023. For this
particular SUP application, the SUP documents were available
online from January 2021; Goodfellow held an initial
informational Zoom session in September 2022 for Appellants’
homeowners association; Goodfellow notified adjoining and
abutting landowners directly in early July 2023 and published a
notice in The Maui News on July 7, 2023; and Goodfellow again
reached out in early July 2023 and held another informational
session for Appellants’ homeowners association in August 2023.
Goodfellow engaged in community outreach above and beyond the
required notice for its SUP application. As to the Appellants,
notice by publication on July 7, 2023, was the required notice.
That notice clearly stated that potential intervenors had until
July 25, 2023, to petition to intervene.
Appellants sought to intervene less than 24 hours
before the public hearing. Two of the six MPC commissioners had
not received the petition to intervene by the time the hearing
began. The proceedings had to be recessed for the commissioners
to review the petition. Under these circumstances, a “good
cause” standard consisting of a “sufficient reason” was well
suited for the determination the MPC was required to make: did
Appellants provide a sufficient reason for why their petition to
intervene was untimely filed? The MPC engaged in a detailed
inquiry to assess whether there was good cause for the untimely
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petition to intervene. Here, the MPC did not abuse its
discretion in finding and concluding that Appellants failed to
show “good cause,” meaning a “sufficient reason,” for the
untimely filing of their petition to intervene. See Chen, 146
Hawaiʻi at 178, 457 P.3d at 817 (noting that the “good cause”
determination lies largely in the discretion of the officer or
court to which the discretion is committed). Notice by
publication was required with respect to Appellants, and it was
properly given in this case. Goodfellow also made the
additional effort to twice reach out to the Makila Plantation
Homeowners Association in September 2022 and early July 2023,
and to hold two informational meetings with those homeowners.
Appellant Black attended the September 2022 informational
meeting, which was held via Zoom and thus would have allowed
those off island at that time to also participate. So for
instance, Appellant Michael Morrison, who testified he was “not
in the state” at the time, could have still attended.
Appellants failed to file their petition to intervene by the
deadline and instead waited until the afternoon of the day
before the hearing to file their petition.
In these circumstances, we hold the MPC did not abuse
its discretion in deciding that Appellants had not shown good
cause, i.e. a sufficient reason, for the untimely filing of
their petition to intervene.
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B. The MPC was not required to hold a contested case hearing on the untimely petition to intervene.
As to Appellants’ first point of error, the MPC was
not required to hold a contested case hearing with respect to
Appellants’ untimely petition to intervene within Goodfellow’s
contested case hearing on its SUP application. The MPC properly
heard Appellants’ arguments regarding why their petition to
intervene was filed the day before the hearing. Appellants
Black, Saulsbury, and Michael Morrison testified as to when they
became aware of Goodfellow’s SUP application. That information
was relevant to the MPC’s good cause decision and a contested
case hearing was not required as to whether there was good cause
for the untimely filing of the petition to intervene.
C. There is no evidence the MPC based its denial of Appellants’ untimely petition to intervene on Appellants’ residency status.
As to Appellants’ third point of error, there is no
evidence in the decision-making portion of the minutes from the
MPC’s public hearing, or in its written Decision, that
Appellants’ residency status played any role in its denial of
Appellants’ untimely petition to intervene. We conclude this
point of error lacks merit.
D. We do not reach Appellants’ fourth point of error.
Given our conclusions above, Appellants were not
parties to Goodfellow’s SUP application contested case. We
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therefore do not reach Appellants’ challenge to the merits of
the SUP approval. In order for Appellants to challenge the SUP
approval, the following requirements must be met:
[F]irst, the proceeding that resulted in the unfavorable agency action must have been a “contested case” hearing . . . , second, the agency’s action must represent “a final decision and order,” or “a preliminary ruling” such that deferral of review would deprive the claimant of adequate relief; third, the claimant must have followed the applicable agency rules and, therefore, have been involved “in” the contested case; and finally, the claimant’s legal interests must have been injured. . . .
Kaleikini v. Thielen, 124 Hawaiʻi 1, 16-17, 237 P.3d 1067, 1082-
83 (2010) (bold emphasis in original and underscored emphasis
added) (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. by Rothstein v. Haw.
Cnty. Plan. Comm’n by Fujimoto, 79 Hawaiʻi 425, 431, 903 P.2d
1246, 1252 (1995)). Here, Appellants did not meet the third
requirement.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the MPC’s Decision is
affirmed.
Linda J. Nye and /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna Lance D. Collins for appellants /s/ Todd W. Eddins
Christopher T. Goodin /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza for appellee Goodfellow Bros., LLC /s/ Ronald G. Johnson
/s/ Wendy M. DeWeese