OPINION
MINZNER, Judge.
Defendant Albertsons, Inc. appeals the judgment on a verdict in favor of plaintiff Maria Rita Gutierrez (Gutierrez) in this slip-and-fall action. Albertsons makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Albertsons was negligent; (2) admission of Gutierrez’ testimony about the absence of maternity care insurance coverage for her was reversible error; and (3) Gutierrez’ failure to sue Albertsons’ allegedly negligent employee barred her claims against it as a matter of law. We affirm.
FACTS.
On May 25, 1984, Gutierrez, who was five and a half months pregnant, was shopping in aisle four of Albertsons, moving toward the front of the store. While reaching for an item on a shelf, she slipped and fell, landing on her back. She did not remember anything after she reached for the item until she was on the floor. She did not know what caused her to fall.
A nurse who was in the same aisle, also moving toward the front of the store and ahead of Gutierrez, heard her hit the floor. She turned around and saw Gutierrez on her back. She saw a puddle of clear liquid approximately six inches wide by two and a half to three feet long next to Gutierrez. Gutierrez was near the center of the aisle and the puddle was closer to the side. The nurse saw no streaks or footprints in the water.
Mr. Moulton, the assistant store manager, was the second person to arrive on the scene. He saw the water, which he described as one or two puddles, each about six inches in diameter and adjacent to where Gutierrez was lying. He was asked about the source of the liquid and said he did not know where it came from. He checked a lobster tank that was six to eight feet away at the end of aisle four, but he found no trail of water between the tank and the puddle and no leak in the tank. When asked during direct examination about the “appearance of the puddle at the time of the accident^,]” he said “I don’t remember seeing foot marks. I remember a couple cart tracks.” Subsequently, on redirect, he described what he saw as “some wheel marks.”
Mr. Kell, the store manager, described the liquid as less than four ounces, covering an area of one foot by three feet. He said that it was in several spots, rather than one solid body. He tasted the liquid to see if it contained salt, which was added to the water in the lobster tank. He determined that it was water without salt. He also cheeked the tank for leaks and found none, and was unable to determine the source of the water. He took a sample of the liquid.
Mr. Lujan, a courtesy clerk, testified on direct examination that when Gutierrez fell, he was summoned over the intercom and that, when summoned, he was getting a spot or wet mop. He also said that he saw Gutierrez on the floor. When asked during direct examination to describe the water, he said that it was “streaked,” and he said “carts had already went over it and everything.” On cross-examination he testified that the streaks he saw were there after Gutierrez had been carried out of the store.
Both the nurse and Gutierrez testified that while Gutierrez was lying where she fell, waiting for an ambulance to arrive, someone with a mop and bucket began mopping up the water that was next to her. She testified that she overheard someone say: “ ‘Look at all that water.’ ” Moulton identified himself, Kell, and Lujan as the store personnel in the aisle after the fall and said that he believed he told Lujan to bring a mop. Gutierrez said that she was asked to move so that he could mop around her.
Moulton and Kell testified about the store’s policy regarding inspections and cleaning. They said the store was cleaned every night by a professional janitorial service and ordinarily, but not always, swept again the following morning. When a new shift of clerks arrived at 4:00 each afternoon, one of their first tasks was to sweep the store before the rush at shortly after 5:00. Also, each store employee was instructed to inspect the floor for possible debris or foreign substances whenever walking through the store for any reason.
Lujan testified at trial on direct examination that he swept the entire floor before the accident and that he swept the aisle in question ten to fifteen minutes before the accident. He said there was no liquid on the floor at that time. Kell testified that he saw Lujan begin to sweep the floor of the store and saw him finish it before the fall. He did not see him sweep aisle four. Moulton said that he saw Lujan sweeping part of the aisle, although he did not determine if it was the part where Gutierrez fell.
When pressed on direct examination, Lujan testified that he was “not sure” if he swept aisle four, but had he started sweeping at the last aisle, he would have continued through aisle four. During cross-examination, Albertsons arranged for an audiotape to be played; the tape had been used to record a telephone interview between Lujan and a representative from Albertsons’ home office risk management division. The conversation occurred approximately two months after the accident. During that conversation, an exchange occurred in which Lujan may have misunderstood what he was being asked. Nevertheless, Lujan’s initial responses indicated that he had swept only aisle four; after being asked if there was something on aisle four that required clean-up, he then modified his testimony and said he had swept all aisles.
On the same tape, Lujan indicated that he was in the back at the time of the accident getting a mop because the floors were “a little bit dirty.” At trial, on direct examination, he testified he was getting a mop “to clean up produce, because produce gets — the floor gets real dirty, real black.” When pressed, however, he testified that he didn’t remember why he was getting the mop.
Albertsons moved for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence presented on behalf of Gutierrez. The record on appeal includes a partial transcript; that transcript contains the testimony offered on behalf of Gutierrez, as well as the record made in connection with the motion for directed verdict at the close of Gutierrez’ case. The record does not indicate whether Albertsons presented any evidence.
After the jury returned its verdict, Albertsons moved for judgment, notwithstanding the verdict. The motion was denied.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
The parties seem to agree that the controlling law on the matter of Albertsons’ negligence stems from De Baca v. Kahn, 49 N.M. 225, 161 P.2d 680 (1945). The supreme court held in that case that a slip- and-fall plaintiff must prove not only that there was a dangerous condition in a defendant’s premises, but also that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the condition. Id.; see also Barakos v. Sponduris, 64 N.M. 125, 325 P.2d 712 (1958); O’Neil v. Furr’s, Inc., 82 N.M. 793, 487 P.2d 495 (Ct.App.1971).
In O’Neil, this court articulated the duty owed by a store owner to a business invitee who is injured from a slip-and-fall action on the store owner’s premises. The court stated:
In order to find one negligent towards his business invitees it is necessary that the evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom establish a dangerous condition which either is known or should have been known to the proprietor; that the dangerous condition is such that the owner realizes that his invitees would not discover the danger for themselves; and with such knowledge the proprietor fails to exercise reasonable care to protect his invitees.
Id., 82 N.M. at 795, 487 P.2d at 497. See generally Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Liability of Operator of Grocery Store to Invitee Slipping on Spilled Liquid or Semiliquid Substance, 24 A.L.R.4th 696 (1983). Compare SCRA 1986, 13-1318 (Repl.1991) (adopted January 1, 1987, setting forth proprietor’s duty in slip-and-fall case where dangerous condition exists from factors not created by proprietor).
The parties also seem to agree that even if the jury was entitled to reject the evidence of due care in this case, Gutierrez still had to come forward with some positive evidence of negligence. Negligence may not be presumed from the fact that an injury occurred. See generally Williamson v. Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 80 N.M. 591, 592, 458 P.2d 843, 844 (Ct.App.1969).
As we understand Gutierrez’ theory at trial, she asked the jury to find in effect either that (1) the water had been present on aisle four, Lujan had seen it, but he had failed to mark its presence; or (2) the water had been present on aisle four and Lujan had missed it.1 Albertsons contends that the evidence was insufficient to support either theory because the evidence shows that Lujan swept the floor shortly before the accident and the water was not then present. Alternatively, Albertsons contends that, even if the jury was entitled to disregard Lujan’s testimony, then there was no evidence other than the fact of an accident resulting in an injury, and such evidence is not sufficient to support a finding of negligence. We first discuss the sufficiency of the record on appeal to support a conclusion that the appellate claim was preserved.
A. Preservation.
The docketing statement indicates that Albertsons preserved its right to question the legal sufficiency of the evidence by filing “motions” for directed verdict. Gutierrez did not challenge that assertion while this case was assigned to the summary calendar, and we accept it as true. See State v. Sisneros, 98 N.M. 201, 647 P.2d 403 (1982).
Ordinarily, appellant has the burden of producing an appellate record that is adequate to show that the issues raised on appeal were preserved and to facilitate appellate review. See Nichols v. Nichols, 98 N.M. 322, 648 P.2d 780 (1982). In this case, that burden would have been most clearly satisfied by ensuring that the transcript included a record of the motion for directed verdict made at the close of the evidence offered on behalf of Albertsons. Compare Bondanza v. Matteucci, 59 N.M. 354, 284 P.2d 1024 (1955) (where defendant’s motion for directed verdict at conclusion of plaintiff’s case was not renewed at close of entire case, defendant waived right to judgment notwithstanding verdict) with Andrus v. Gas Co. of N.M., 110 N.M. 593, 798 P.2d 194 (Ct.App.1990) (if the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case is denied and the defendant proceeds to put on its case, its claim of error is waived).
B. Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Albertsons’ motion for directed verdict at the close of Gutierrez’ case. There was evidence to support each of Gutierrez’ theories. Under these circumstances, it would have been error to grant the motion. See Jones v. New Mexico School of Mines, 75 N.M. 326, 404 P.2d 289 (1965).
First, we disagree with Albertsons that the evidence showed as a matter of law that the water was not present on aisle four shortly before the accident. Lujan’s testimony, when taken together with the tape-recorded conversation, raised a jury question regarding whether he had swept aisle four at all and, if he had swept it, whether he might have missed the water. Moreover, because both Moulton and Lujan testified that there were cart marks in the puddle of water, there was sufficient evidence to support an inference that the puddle had been in existence for some time. See Bank of N.M. v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 429 P.2d 368 (1967) (if reasonable minds may differ as to conclusion to be reached under the evidence or permissible inferences, resolution of the issue is for the jury to determine); see also SCRA 1986, 13-308 (fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence where evidence gives rise to reasonable inference of truth of fact sought to be proved).
The more difficult question is whether, if the jury was entitled to disbelieve Lujan’s testimony that he had swept aisle four and that there was no water there at that time, there was, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to support both of Gutierrez’ trial theories. See generally State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 100, 597 P.2d 280, 285 (1979) (discussing limitations on jury’s broad authority in treating the proof), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (1982); see also State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 89, 781 P.2d 1159, 1167 (Ct.App.1989) (indicating that with appropriate jury instructions, fragmentation of the evidence can be avoided). Albertsons has argued on appeal that the evidence presented equally possible logical inferences, and thus the jury was required to speculate that Albertsons knew or should have known of the puddle’s existence. For this reason, Albertsons urges this court to hold that Gutierrez failed to carry her burden of proof. See Lovato v. Plateau, Inc., 79 N.M. 428, 444 P.2d 613 (Ct.App.1968) (if facts are equally consistent with two conclusions, they tend to prove neither). Albertsons argues that Gutierrez “introduced absolutely no evidence from which a reasonable mind could conclude that Albert-son’s knew, or should have known, that there was liquid on the floor where Ms. Gutierrez slipped.”
We disagree. We think Gutierrez presented sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to actual as well as constructive notice.
Our task in resolving this issue, as described by the court in Keene v. Arlan’s Dep’t Store of Baltimore, Inc., 35 Md.App. 250, 370 A.2d 124, 127 (1977), when reviewing a similar contention, is to affirm if there is any reasonable ground that supports the decision of the fact finder at trial. The question is not whether the evidence would have supported a different verdict, but whether there is evidence to support the result that was reached. Haaland v. Baltzley, 110 N.M. 585, 798 P.2d 186 (1990). In reviewing the proof, we disregard inferences that do not support the judgment. Nosker v. Trinity Land Co., 107 N.M. 333, 757 P.2d 803 (Ct.App.1988).
In Keene, for example, a woman slipped and fell on a “ ‘clear, sleek solution’ ” in a department store as she walked toward her husband, who had been waiting in a checkout line for fifteen minutes. The only evidence suggesting that the owner in that case had actual notice of the dangerous condition in enough time to remedy it was (1) a cashier’s excited utterance immediately after the fall: “T told them if this wasn’t cleaned up, someone’s going to fall,’ ” and (2) her husband’s testimony that he did not see the cashier talk to anybody other than the customers going' through her line during his fifteen-minute wait. 370 A.2d at 126, 129. The court observed that if the jury believed the husband’s testimony, it could have inferred that the cashier gave her warning more than fifteen minutes before the fall. The court conceded that the inferences to be drawn from the evidence were “arguable at best, but the determination of the weight of the evidence is the responsibility of the jury.” 370 A.2d at 130.
The Supreme Court of Alabama confronted the issue of constructive notice in Foodtown Stores, Inc. v. Patterson, 282 Ala. 477, 213 So.2d 211 (1968). In Foodtown Stores, Inc., plaintiff slipped and fell on some snap beans in a grocery store produce department. There was no evidence regarding the condition of the beans, and the plaintiff did not see anything on the floor before falling. Defendant’s employee had been in the back room of the store for about ten minutes when the accident occurred, but testified that before going to the back of the store he had cleaned and swept the produce department, there were six or seven customers in the department when he swept, and when he left he saw nothing on the floor. Another employee testified that he also saw the group of customers. The court held that this evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury and affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, reasoning that the jury could have found the defendant negligent by inferring that (1) when the employees saw the group of customers, they knew that “vegetable matter could have very easily been knocked ... to the floor” by one of the group, and (2) the employee who swept was removing “debris of vegetable matter from the floor just ten minutes before the accident occurred.” Id. 213 So.2d at 216.
The court in Foodtown Stores, Inc. stressed that all questions of fact in slip- and-fall cases are “for the jury to consider in each case, after proper instructions from the court.” Id. 213 So.2d at 215-16. Cf. Cuevas v. W.E. Walker, Inc., 565 So.2d 176 (Ala.1990) (conflicting testimony constituted evidence sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact which precluded entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant in slip-and-fall case).
Here, as in Keene and Foodtown Stores, Inc., the jury was presented with alternative possibilities, each supported by evidence. We think the question of whether the evidence was evenly balanced was for the jury, which was instructed subsequently that “[ejvenly balanced evidence is not sufficient.” See SCRA 1986, 13-304 (Repl.1991). We first discuss the evidence regarding actual notice.
1. Actual Notice.
The fact that Lujan was in the back of the store to obtain a mop supports an inference that he was retrieving the mop to clean up the puddle in question. Thus, the jury might have determined that Lujan had actual notice of the puddle in sufficient time to have noticed its location or cleaned it up. That is, he noticed the puddle, continued sweeping the store until he was finished, and then proceeded to take care of the puddle.
Kell testified that small amounts of liquid would have been removed with paper towels from another part of the store, while a larger amount of liquid would have been removed with a wet mop. We recognize that Kell testified the amount of water present on aisle four could have been removed with paper towels and that Lujan said he was getting the wet mop to spot-clean dirty portions of the floor. However, Lujan’s testimony was inconsistent, and eventually he testified that he did not know why he was getting the mop. In addition, the puddle was large enough that it caused a bystander to comment on its size. Under these circumstances, we think the jury was entitled to accept the evidence that he was getting a mop and ignore the evidence that he was going to use the mop to clean either other aisles in the grocery section or the produce department. Cf. State v. Manus; State v. Corneau (evidence must not be so fragmented as to distort it).
Moreover, the fact that someone was mopping up the spot shortly after Gutierrez slipped and while she lay in the puddle corroborates an inference of actual knowledge. Moulton’s testimony supports an inference that it was Lujan who began mopping while Gutierrez lay in the aisle. Because this action seems such an unusual gesture under the circumstances, we think the jury was entitled to infer that Lujan was attempting to complete a task he had set out to do at an earlier time.
2. Constructive Notice.
The accident occurred during the peak shopping hours on a very busy day of the year: at approximately 5:00 p.m. on the Friday of Memorial Day weekend. The payroll records offered into evidence by Gutierrez indicated that Albertsons was understaffed at the time. Nine of seventeen “courtesy clerks” had quit or had been fired that week. Moulton testified that he made sure there were enough clerks at the checkout stands to achieve the employees’ goals of prompt service. The courtesy clerks’ responsibility for cleaning was secondary. Moreover, Moulton testified that he was watching Lujan closely on the day of the accident to time his sweeping job and to ensure that he returned to the front of the store as soon as possible to help the customers. Finally, in his deposition, Lujan conceded that he might have missed the puddle.
There was evidence that there were cart wheel marks through the puddle. This evidence, as indicated above, supports an inference that the puddle had been there for some time.
In Morton v. Lee, 75 Wash.2d 393, 450 P.2d 957 (1969), the Washington Supreme Court, in reviewing the appeal of the owners of a food market in a slip-and-fall case, considered the issue of whether appellants had actual or constructive notice of the presence of a hazardous condition that resulted in the plaintiff’s fall. The court noted:
Ordinarily, it is a question of fact for the jury, whether under all of the circumstances, a defective condition existed long enough so that it would have been discovered by an owner exercising reasonable care. Presnell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 60 Wash.2d 671, 374 P.2d 939 (1962). The permissible period of time for the discovery and removal or warning of the dangerous condition is measured by the varying circumstances of each case.
450 P.2d at 959-60. Our review of the record indicates the existence of evidence from which the jury could reasonably determine that Albertsons knew, or should have known, of the existence of the dangerous condition and failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Gutierrez and other business invitees from such hazard.
The issue on appeal regarding constructive notice in this case is whether the jury was entitled to determine that it was more likely that Lujan failed to see the puddle than that the puddle was created in the ten-minute interval between the completion of sweeping and Gutierrez’ fall. The jury was entitled to assess the opportunity for human error supported by the evidence that the store was unusually busy and by Lujan’s concession that he might have missed the puddle. Based on logical and proper inferences drawn from concededly sparse evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that it was more likely that the puddle was missed than that it was created in a ten-minute interval. Thus, a finding of constructive notice was permissible.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE.
The substance of the evidence material to this issue was that Gutierrez lost her job as a result of her injuries, and thus had no insurance coverage for maternity care. Albertsons states that Gutierrez proved this point by stating someone told her that she had maternity coverage, and she was speculating about its absence after she no longer worked for her employer. Albertsons states that it objected to this evidence on unspecified hearsay and best evidence grounds.
The record reveals the following:
Q. [by plaintiff’s attorney] What would, if you had not had the fall, what were your plans? How were you going to work at that job if you were five and-a-half months pregnant?
A. [by plaintiff I was having no trouble doing my rooms. I intended to work till until the last minute, until the last day I could work plus I had my maternity leave.
Q. How did you have maternity leave? How is that plan?
A. They let you go for a couple of months, two, three months and whenever you are ready to come back, you could come back to your job.
Q. Did they have some kind of an insurance with respect to your maternity?
A. I had hospitalization insurance.
Q. What would it cover generally?
A. It would cover—
At this point, counsel for the defense interceded with, “Objection, Your Honor, Best Evidence Rule.” There was a bench conference in which Gutierrez’ attorney stated that he intended to elicit proof of the fact of lapsed insurance coverage. The attorneys explained why there was no policy of insurance in evidence, and then the attorney for Albertsons stated, “Your Hon- or, if I could add, the best evidence is also hearsay.” The trial court allowed the evidence to come in. Gutierrez’ attorney asked whether her maternity expenses would be covered by her employer’s insurance and she answered affirmatively, all without further objection from the defense.
Albertsons adequately preserved two objections here. The first is an objection on the best evidence rule. This rule is found at SCRA 1986, 11-1002, and is only applicable when a party seeks to prove the contents of a writing. Because Gutierrez only sought to prove the fact of lost coverage rather than the contents of the insurance policies, there was no need for the original policies. See Kennedy v. Lynch, 85 N.M. 479, 513 P.2d 1261 (1973). The second preserved objection, which was based on hearsay, was not directed to Gutierrez’ testimony. The attorney for Albertsons stated, “the best evidence is also hearsay.” The only way to reasonably construe this statement is as an objection to the insurance policies, i.e., the best evidence, as being hearsay. Because the trial court properly refrained from requiring production of the insurance policies, a hearsay objection was not appropriate. Albertsons failed to preserve an issue regarding any other error in admitting Gutierrez’ testimony. See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 106 N.M. 492, 745 P.2d 717 (Ct.App.1987).
Gutierrez’ testimony on direct. examination was not proof of an out-of-court statement. Rather, she stated her personal knowledge of her status as an insured person. Thus, the testimony was not hearsay. See SCRA 1986, 11-801(C). Gutierrez stated that someone told her her employer terminated her coverage upon separation from work only during cross-examination by Albertsons. At this point, it became clear that the basis of Gutierrez’ earlier testimony was hearsay. However, Albertsons did not renew its objection or move to strike Gutierrez’ testimony about lost insurance coverage. By not objecting or moving to strike, Albertsons waived the hearsay issue it raises on appeal.
The jury was free to choose how to weigh this evidence, including the choice of rejecting it in favor of Gutierrez’ earlier testimony on direct examination. Cf. Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 89, 428 P.2d 625, 628 (1967) (where appellant contended on appeal that witness’s testimony on direct examination was nullified by his testimony on cross-examination, resolution of discrepancy was for fact finder). Albertsons’ appellate complaint that the testimony was speculative is misplaced.
III. FAILURE TO JOIN EMPLOYEE.
Gutierrez never sued Lujan, the employee who was responsible for cleaning the floor of Albertsons at the time she slipped and fell. Albertsons argues that Gutierrez’ failure to sue Lujan within the time allowed by law for such a suit precluded any suit against Albertsons based on vicarious liability for Lujan’s acts or omissions. To support this argument, Albertsons reasons that because its liability is derivative of Lujan’s, and because a right of action against Lujan no longer exists, Albertsons is not derivatively liable for a right of action against it. See generally Kinetics, Inc. v. El Paso Prods. Co., 99 N.M. 22, 653 P.2d 522 (Ct.App.1982) (discussing effect of dismissal of partnership from lawsuit on liability of partner and company of which partner was wholly-owned subsidiary).
We do not decide whether Kinetics, Inc. applies to this case or whether it is a correct statement of the law because Albertsons failed to preserve this issue. At the hearing on the motion to amend the complaint, Albertsons obtained leave from the trial court to plead release as a defense. However, it never made the “release” argument to the trial court. In arguing its motion for a directed verdict, Albertsons made no reference to any argument that it was released from liability or that under Kinetics, Inc. it could not be sued on a theory of respondeat superior.
We will not rule on a question that was not raised below. Cisneros v. Molycorp, Inc., 107 N.M. 788, 794, 765 P.2d 761, 767 (Ct.App.1988); SCRA 1986, 12-216. By failing to raise the issue, as the trial court expressly allowed it to do, Albertsons failed to adequately preserve it. Despite the fact that Gutierrez’ answer brief alerted this court to the fact that the issue was not preserved, Albertsons’ reply brief did not cite us to any part of the record indicating where the issue was preserved. See Batchelor v. Charley, 74 N.M. 717, 720, 398 P.2d 49, 50 (1965) (“The burden is upon appellant to show that the question presented for review was ruled upon by the trial court____”); see also SCRA 1986, 12-213(A)(3) (Cum.Supp.1991); -216(A).
CONCLUSION.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONNELLY, J., concurs. BIVINS, J., dissents.