Gustavo Quiroz v. Kristi Noem, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00765
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 GUSTAVO QUIROZ, Case No. 1:25-cv-00765-KES-SAB-HC

11 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO 12 v. DISMISS AND DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 13 KRISTI NOEM, et al., (ECF No. 12) 14 Respondents.

15 16 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 17 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 18 I. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico. (ECF No. 12 at 1.1) The petition alleges that Petitioner 21 entered the United States in the 1980s.2 (ECF No. 1 at 6.) On November 18, 2004, an 22 immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s application for cancelation of removal and granted 23 him voluntary departure. (ECF No. 12-1 at 8–9.) Petitioner appealed, and on March 31, 2006, the 24 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed the appeal, reinstated voluntary departure, and 25 allowed Petitioner to voluntarily depart the United States within thirty days of the date of the

26 1 Page numbers refer to ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page. 2 Respondents have submitted the declaration of a deportation officer that states Petitioner originally entered the 27 United States on or about October 29, 1992. (ECF No. 12-1 at 3.) Respondents have submitted a copy of a Notice to Appear, dated June 1, 2000, which states that Petitioner entered the United States at or near San Ysidro, California, 1 order. (ECF No. 12-1 at 10–12.) On April 28, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the 2 Ninth Circuit. On November 4, 2008, the Ninth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part the 3 petition for review. (Id. at 15–16.) The mandate issued on December 31, 2008. (Id. at 16.) 4 Petitioner failed to voluntarily depart the United States, which resulted in an order of 5 removal. (ECF No. 12-1 at 4.) On or about June 23, 2011, Petitioner was removed from the 6 United States. (Id. at 17.) 7 On March 25, 2024, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) received an 8 anonymous tip via the Homeland Security Investigations Tip Line alleging an individual who 9 matched Petitioner’s description reentered the United States. An investigation showed a probable 10 match to Petitioner. (ECF No. 12-1 at 19.) On May 7, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and served 11 with a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order of Removal, dated May 7, 2025, 12 pursuant to section 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 13 1231(a)(5). (ECF No. 1 at 8; ECF No. 12-1 at 20.) Petitioner has been detained at the Golden 14 State Annex (“GSA”) since May 7, 2025. (ECF No. 12-1 at 4.) 15 Petitioner was referred to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service 16 (“USCIS”) for a reasonable fear review, which was conducted on May 19, 2025 without the 17 benefit of counsel.3 (ECF No. 1 at 8; ECF No. 12-1 at 4.) On May 22, 2025, USCIS issued a 18 Record of Negative Reasonable Fear Finding and referred its decision to an IJ. (ECF No. 12-1 at 19 21–25.) On May 30, 2025, an IJ concurred with USCIS’s reasonable fear determination and 20 returned the case to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) for Petitioner’s removal. (Id. 21 at 26–27.) 22 Petitioner filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. The motion also included a request for 23 an emergency stay of removal. On June 17, 2025, the BIA denied Petitioner’s stay of removal 24 without explanation. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) On June 23, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for review 25 with the Ninth Circuit along with a motion to stay removal. Petitioner’s removal has been stayed 26 and the petition for review remains pending. (ECF No. 12-1 at 4, 29–30.) 27 3 The petition alleges that USCIS called Petitioner’s counsel directly and asserted that Petitioner would be given a 1 On June 24, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for 2 temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On July 16, 2025, Respondent filed an 3 opposition to the motion for TRO. (ECF No. 10.) On July 30, 2025, Petitioner filed a notice of 4 withdrawal of the motion for TRO without prejudice. (ECF No. 11.) Respondents have filed a 5 motion to dismiss the petition, Petitioner has filed an opposition, and Respondents have filed a 6 reply. (ECF Nos. 12–14.) 7 II. 8 DISCUSSION 9 In the petition, Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: (1) ICE exceeded its 10 statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) to reinstate Petitioner’s order of removal; (2) 11 Petitioner’s detention violates substantive and procedural due process; (3) violation of the 12 Violation Against Women Act’s (“VAWA”) protective framework; (4) systematic targeting of 13 protected victims and policy violations; (5) violation of the Administrative Procedures Act; (6) 14 violation of the Villa-Anguiano Doctrine. (ECF No. 1 at 13–19.) Petitioner requests the Court to: 15 order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody immediately, declare the reinstatement 16 order is unlawful and therefore invalid and void, declare that Petitioner’s detention violates due 17 process, order Respondents to vacate the reinstatement order and either terminate removal 18 proceedings or place Petitioner in removal proceedings under INA § 240 where he may pursue 19 available relief, find that ICE lacked jurisdiction to issue the reinstatement order due to 20 regulatory violations and Petitioner’s authorized stay status, and order that Petitioner be 21 permitted to pursue his pending USCIS applications without interference from removal 22 proceedings. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) 23 In the motion to dismiss, Respondents characterize Petitioner’s six claims as relying on 24 the following three assertions that Respondents argue are meritless as a matter of law: (1) 25 USCIS’s prima facie determination on Quiroz’s VAWA petition protects him from a reinstated 26 removal order; (2) ICE did not provide him with 8 C.F.R. § 214.8(b) notice; and (3) his 27 conditions of confinement violate due process. (ECF No. 12 at 7–8.) 1 A. Jurisdiction 2 In the motion to dismiss, Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. “§ 1252(g) strips this Court of 3 jurisdiction to grant the relief Quiroz seeks.” (ECF No. 12 at 8.) In the opposition, Petitioner 4 clarifies that the “habeas petition challenges ICE’s statutory and constitutional authority to 5 detain, not the validity of the underlying reinstatement order. This distinction preserves district 6 court jurisdiction while avoiding § 1252(g) jurisdictional bars that apply to challenges to removal 7 decisions themselves.” (ECF No. 13 at 2.) 8 The Court notes that Petitioner’s clarification in the opposition is at odds with the petition 9 itself, which specifically asks the Court to “[d]eclare that the reinstatement order violates federal 10 law and constitutional due process and is therefore invalid and void,” “[o]rder Respondents to 11 vacate the reinstatement order and either terminate removal proceedings or place Petitioner in 12 removal proceedings under INA § 240 where he may pursue available relief,” “[f]ind that ICE 13 lacked jurisdiction to issue the reinstatement order due to regulatory violations and Petitioner’s 14 authorized stay status,” and “[o]rder that Petitioner be permitted to pursue his pending USCIS 15 applications without interference from removal proceedings.” (ECF No. 1 at 19.) 16 Section 1252(g) provides in relevant part: “[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any 17 cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 18 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien 19 under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. “§ 1252(g). 20 The Supreme Court has given a “narrow reading” to § 1252(g). AADC, 525 U.S. at 487, 119 S.Ct. 936; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. at 19, 140 21 S.Ct. 1891 (“Section 1252(g) is ... narrow.”). “The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to 22 ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’ ” AADC, 525 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936 (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 23 1252(g)). Instead of “sweep[ing] in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions,” the provision “refer[s] to just those three specific 24 actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (plurality opinion) (describing the holding of AADC). 25 “There are of course many ... decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process” not implicated by § 1252(g), “such as the decisions to open 26 an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the 27 1 adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order.” AADC, 525 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936. 2 3 Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2025). 4 The Supreme “Court has characterized § 1252(g) as a ‘discretion-protecting provision.’” 5 Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 996 (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 6 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999)). In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which concerned a 7 challenge to prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the Supreme Court found that of 8 the “several statutory provisions that limit the circumstances in which judicial review of 9 deportation decisions is available . . . none applies here” in part because the petitioners did “not 10 seek review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion; rather, they challenge the extent of 11 the Attorney General’s authority under the post-removal-period detention statute. And the extent 12 of that authority is not a matter of discretion.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687, 688. However, 13 § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar covers claims challenging the government’s discretionary authority 14 to decide “whether” or “when” to execute the removal order. Rauda v. Jennings, 55 F.4th 773, 15 777 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Tazu v. Att’y Gen. United States, 975 F.3d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 16 2020)). Courts have “distinguished between challenges to ICE’s discretion to execute a removal 17 order, which are barred, and challenges to the manner in which ICE executes the removal order, 18 which are not.” Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 152 (W.D.N.Y. 2025). 19 The INA contains a provision entitled “Exclusive means of review,” which reads, in relevant part: 20 Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or 21 nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, 22 a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means 23 for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) 24 of this section.

25 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (emphasis added). The language of the statute is clear. The exclusive means to challenge an order of removal is the petition for review 26 process. 27 Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012). “The INA also contains a ‘zipper clause’ that consolidates all ‘questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or 1 proceeding brought to remove an alien’ into a petition for review.” Martinez, 704 F.3d at 622 2 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)). “This statutory scheme was designed to ‘limit all aliens to one 3 bite of the apple with regard to challenging an order of removal.’” Id. (quoting Singh v. 4 Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2007)). 5 Section “1252(b)(9) has built-in limits. By channeling only those questions ‘arising from 6 any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien,’ the statute excludes from the PFR 7 [petition for review] process any claim that does not arise from removal proceedings.” J.E.F.M. 8 v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). “Accordingly, claims that are independent of or 9 collateral to the removal process do not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” Id. Thus, “an 10 immigrant c[an] challenge his [prolonged] administrative detention by filing a petition for a writ 11 of habeas corpus in district court, notwithstanding § 1252(b)(9).” Id. (citing Nadarajah v. 12 Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2006)). On the other hand, claims that “are bound 13 up in and an inextricable part of the administrative process” fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9) 14 and must be raised through the PFR process. J.E.F.M., 837 F.3d at 1033. 15 The Ninth Circuit has held a reinstatement order “qualifies as an order of removal that 16 can only be challenged in a petition for review filed directly with our court.” Morales-Izquierdo 17 v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by 18 Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 516 (9th Cir. 2012). “Moreover, because the 19 Reinstatement Order is an ‘order of removal,’ it is subject to the INA’s zipper clause. Under the 20 zipper clause, any ‘questions of law and fact’ arising from an order of removal must be raised in 21 a petition for review of that order.4” Morales-Izquierdo, 600 F.3d at 1082 (footnote in original). 22 Respondents argue that Petitioner “necessarily challenges his reinstatement order, and 23 thus the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).” (ECF No. 14 at 1.) To 24 the extent Petitioner challenges the reinstatement order itself, the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction 25 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9). See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 26 (2012) (“When a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider 27 4 In the REAL ID Act, Congress amended the zipper clause explicitly to strip district courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction to hear challenges to final orders of removal, rendering courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to 1 sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented.”); Lopez-Velazquez v. 2 Johnson, No. 16-CV-01226-EMC, 2016 WL 4073338, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (finding 3 the district court “lacks jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition because it is ultimately a 4 challenge to the reinstated final order of removal” and “[p]er Section 1252(a)(5), ‘a petition for 5 review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole 6 and exclusive means for review of an order of removal . . . .’”); Monge-Piedra v. Dep’t of 7 Homeland Sec., No. C14-0457-TSZ, 2014 WL 5782274, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 2014) 8 (finding district court lack jurisdiction over “claims either directly or indirectly challeng[ing] the 9 validity of petitioner’s reinstated order of removal”). 10 The Court finds that the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims for relief directly or 11 indirectly challenge the reinstatement order itself and/or the government’s discretionary authority 12 to decide “whether” or “when” to execute the removal order. Accordingly, this Court lacks 13 jurisdiction over those claims, and they should be dismissed. As a portion of the second claim for 14 relief challenges Petitioner’s present detention as unlawful without indirectly challenging the 15 reinstatement order itself and/or the government’s discretionary authority to decide “whether” or 16 “when” to execute the removal order, this Court has jurisdiction over that claim.5 See 17 Constantinovici v. Bondi, No. 3:25-CV-02405-RBM-AHG, 2025 WL 2898985, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 18 Oct. 10, 2025) (“Petitioner challenges his present detention as unlawful . . . this Court has 19 jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims.”). 20 Petitioner contends that “[d]etention authority presents distinct legal questions from 21 removal proceedings. Petitioner challenges whether ICE has authority to detain someone with 22 VAWA protection status, immediate adjustment eligibility, and no legitimate detention 23 purpose—not the reinstatement decision itself.” (ECF No. 13 at 5.) Although detention authority 24 may present distinct legal questions from underlying removal orders and proceedings, the first, 25 third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims as currently written do not implicate such “distinct legal 26 questions.” While the gravamen of Petitioner’s dispute with Respondents may be to challenge 27 5 The Court will address in section II(B), infra, the portions of the second claim for relief that should be dismissed 1 “whether ICE has authority to detain someone with VAWA protection status, immediate 2 adjustment eligibility, and no legitimate detention purpose,” the petition as currently written does 3 not do that. 4 B. Second Claim for Relief 5 In his second claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that his “detention violates substantive 6 due process by constituting arbitrary government action lacking any rational basis,” “ICE’s 7 process violated procedural due process,” and his “detention conditions violate due process by 8 subjecting Petitioner to punitive conditions.” (ECF No. 1 at 14.) 9 1. Substantive Due Process 10 Petitioner asserts that his detention “violates substantive due process by constituting 11 arbitrary government action lacking any rational basis,” arguing: 12 When USCIS has determined with full knowledge of relevant facts that an individual merits protection, ICE’s contradictory enforcement action is 13 fundamentally arbitrary. This arbitrariness is compounded by: (1) ICE’s targeting of a protected class Congress specifically sought to shield; (2) the pretextual 14 nature of enforcement against an individual with immediate adjustment eligibility; (3) the lack of any legitimate law enforcement purpose served by the detention; 15 and (4) the waste of government resources pursuing removal of someone likely to obtain lawful status. 16 17 (ECF No. 1 at 14.) The Court finds that this portion of the second claim for relief directly or 18 indirectly challenges the reinstatement order itself and the government’s discretionary authority 19 to decide “whether” or “when” to execute the removal order. Accordingly, for the reasons stated 20 in sections II(A), supra, this Court lacks jurisdiction and the substantive due process portion of 21 the second claim for relief should be dismissed. 22 2. Procedural Due Process 23 Petitioner asserts that “ICE’s process violated procedural due process by”: 24 (1) failing to provide constitutionally adequate notice of the basis for detention; (2) denying meaningful opportunity to contest the reinstatement determination; 25 (3) refusing to consider material evidence bearing on removability; and (4) applying enforcement priorities in a discriminatory manner. The process provided 26 fell far below the constitutional minimum required by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 27 1 procedural due process by “failing to provide constitutionally adequate notice of the basis for 2 detention,” (ECF No. 1 at 14 (emphasis added)), the petition does not provide any further 3 argument regarding how Respondents failed to provide constitutionally adequate notice of the 4 basis for Petitioner’s detention. Rather, the petition argues that “ICE failed to comply with 8 5 C.F.R. § 241.8(b) requirements for notice and opportunity to contest,” which governs 6 reinstatement of removal orders, and that “ICE categorically failed to comply with this 7 mandatory regulation. Rather than providing Petitioner with notice of the reinstatement 8 determination and an opportunity to contest it, ICE limited its process to a reasonable fear 9 interview.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Accordingly, the Court construes the petition as raising a 10 procedural due process claim regarding the failure to provide constitutionally adequate notice of 11 the basis for reinstatement of the removal order rather than a procedural due process claim 12 regarding the detention itself. The Court finds that this portion of the second claim for relief 13 directly or indirectly challenges the reinstatement order itself and the government’s discretionary 14 authority to decide “whether” or “when” to execute the removal order. Accordingly, for the 15 reasons stated in sections II(A), supra, this Court lacks jurisdiction and the procedural due 16 process portion of the second claim for relief should be dismissed. 17 3. Conditions of Confinement 18 Petitioner asserts that his detention conditions are punitive and violate due process. (ECF 19 No. 1 at 14.) Respondents contend that Petitioner cannot challenge his conditions of confinement 20 in a habeas proceeding, citing to Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 2023); Badea v. 21 Cox, 931 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1991), Brown v. Blanckensee, 857 F. App’x 289 (9th Cir. 2021), and 22 Alcala v. Rios, 434 F. App’x 668 (9th Cir. 2011). (ECF No. 12 at 12.) Petitioner does not address 23 this argument in the opposition to the motion to dismiss. 24 A claim is cognizable in federal habeas corpus when a prisoner challenges “the fact or 25 duration of his confinement” and “seeks either immediate release from that confinement or the 26 shortening of its duration.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). In contrast, a civil 27 rights action is the proper method to challenge the conditions of confinement. McCarthy v. 1 held that prisoners may not challenge mere conditions of confinement in habeas corpus.” Nettles 2 v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citing Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 3 891–92 (9th Cir. 1979)). See Shook v. Apker, 472 F. App’x 702, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2012) 4 (holding that district court did not err in treating conditions of confinement claims as arising 5 under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than 28 U.S.C. 6 § 2241); Alcala v. Rios, 434 F. App’x 668, 669–70 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that district court did 7 not err in finding that conditions of confinement claims are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. 8 § 2241). 9 In Pinson, two federal prisoners “challenge[d] the dismissals of their habeas corpus 10 petitions in which they asserted that their incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic violated 11 the Eighth Amendment and sought release from custody.” Pinson, 69 F.4th at 1062. Holding that 12 “the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations in the petition, release is legally 13 required irrespective of the relief requested,” the Ninth Circuit found that “Sands has failed to 14 allege facts to support his legal contention that his detention was unlawful because no set of 15 conditions exist that would cure the constitutional violations.” Id. at 1072, 1075. “Because 16 Sands’s claims lie outside the historic core of habeas corpus . . . the district court properly found 17 it lacked jurisdiction to hear Sands’s petition.” Id. at 1075. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit has 18 stated that “Pinson solidified the rule that a habeas claim is one challenging the fact of 19 confinement, rather than the conditions of confinement.” Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1194 20 (9th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, the conditions of confinement portion of the second claim for relief 21 should be dismissed. 22 C. Zadvydas 23 In the opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner states: 24 Further, the government asserts at pages 3-4 that Petitioner is subject to “mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2)” but fails to acknowledge that at the 25 time their own brief was filed, Petitioner has been detained since May 7, 2025— well beyond the 90-day removal period that forms the statutory basis for such 26 detention. Section 1231(a)(2) authorizes detention “during the removal period,” which is defined as 90 days from the final removal order. 8 U.S.C. 27 § 1231(a)(1)(A). After this period expires, continued detention requires additional justification and is subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny. The government 1 that extends far beyond the statutory timeframe, particularly when material circumstances have changed. Courts have recognized that post-removal-period 2 detention must be justified by ongoing necessity, not categorical mandates. Here, USCIS’s expert determination that Petitioner presumptively qualifies for VAWA 3 protection, combined with his pending adjustment application and strong community ties, eliminates any rational basis for continued post-removal-period 4 detention. He has a Motion to Reopen pending at the BIA and a Petition for Review with current stay of removal at the Ninth Circuit. This makes his 5 detention period indefinite in nature. The extended nature of Petitioner’s detention—now exceeding four months beyond the statutory removal period— 6 demonstrates that this is not the brief, administratively efficient detention Congress contemplated in § 1231(a)(2), but prolonged confinement lacking 7 legitimate justification. The government’s “mandatory detention” characterization cannot override the constitutional and statutory limits on extended immigration 8 detention, particularly when the individual poses no flight risk and is pursuing congressionally authorized victim-based relief. 9 10 (ECF No. 13 at 7.) 11 The Court notes that nowhere in the petition does Petitioner assert a prolonged detention 12 claim under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Petitioner may not use an opposition to 13 raise or argue new allegations or claims not in the petition. Cruz v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:24-cv- 14 00263-SAB, 2024 WL 3697549, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2024). See also Minor v. Fedex Off. & 15 Print Servs., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 3d 966, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (disregarding a plaintiff’s newly 16 raised claim and related allegations in his opposition because a plaintiff “may not use his 17 opposition to raise and argue new allegations or claims not in the complaint.”); Forrett v. 18 Gourmet Nut, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 3d 761, 765 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (same); Clark v. Beard, No. 11- 19 CV-03520-YGR (PR), 2015 WL 4452470, at *4 n.7 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2015), aff’d in part, 715 20 F. App’x 776 (9th Cir. 2018) (refusing to consider a claim that was not previously raised in an 21 amended complaint when deciding a dispositive motion). 22 III. 23 RECOMMENDATIONS 24 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 25 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12) be GRANTED; 26 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED. 27 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 1 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 2 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 3 | written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any 4 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 5 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days 6 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate 7 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 8 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 9 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 10 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 11 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. Se 13 | Dated: _ December 11, 2025 STANLEY A. BOONE 14 United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28