Gustavo Maravilla-Pineda v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: 17-70213
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GUSTAVO ANTONIO MARAVILLA- No. 17-70213 PINEDA, Agency No. A206-690-232 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v.

PAMELA J. BONDI, United States Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 13, 2026** Las Vegas, Nevada

Before: BENNETT and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge.***

Gustavo Antonio Maravilla-Pineda (“Maravilla-Pineda”) is a citizen of El

Salvador, who entered the United States without a valid entry document on or

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. about April 5, 2014. Maravilla-Pineda petitions for review of the dismissal by the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), of his appeal from the order of an

immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his claims for asylum, withholding of removal,

and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both

decisions.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir.

2023) (quoting Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018)).

We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings,

including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence. See Ruiz-

Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). Under the substantial

evidence standard, “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

determination. A trier of fact may base an adverse credibility determination on the

“totality of the circumstances,” including “the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness

of the applicant,” “consistency between the applicant’s [] written and oral

statements,” and “any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Maravilla-Pineda argues the IJ did not base its credibility

2 17-70213 determination upon the totality of the circumstances, but instead cherry-picked

immaterial facts to undermine his claim. We disagree. The IJ identified multiple

credibility issues with Maravilla-Pineda. One of the stated reasons was a lack of

corroboration. However, the IJ did not provide Maravilla-Pineda “with notice and

an opportunity to either produce [corroborative] evidence or explain why it is

unavailable before ruling that the applicant has failed in his obligation to provide

corroborative evidence.” Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, we must separate the non-corroborative grounds for the adverse

credibility determination and evaluate whether the IJ’s and BIA’s determination is

supported by substantial evidence. Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th

Cir. 2016). If it is, we defer to their adverse credibility determination. Id.

a. Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination based

on the non-corroborative grounds alone. The IJ noted discrepancies in Maravilla-

Pineda’s testimony regarding who owned the pupusa stand the gang sought to

extort, Maravilla-Pineda’s work history, and whether the police in El Salvador

could protect him. See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1089 (“[E]ven minor inconsistencies that

have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity may constitute the basis for an adverse

credibility determination.”). This undercut Maravilla-Pineda’s testimony that he

left El Salvador because gang members were threatening him due to his spouse’s

affiliation with the gang, not as a result of extortion. Most notable, however, are

3 17-70213 the following two discrepancies identified by the IJ because both significantly

undercut Maravilla-Pineda’s claim. First, Maravilla-Pineda testified that he was

not familiar with Juan Perez, the gang member who allegedly took up with his

wife, which contradicted his asylum affidavit where Maravilla-Pineda stated that

he knew him from the neighborhood. Second, Maravilla-Pineda testified that he is

still married to his wife, which the IJ found to be inconsistent with his answer

during his credible fear interview that he was single despite being offered the

option to answer “separated” or “divorced.”

b. Regarding the inconsistencies in Maravilla-Pineda’s marital status, the IJ

did not err in considering his answers from the credible fear interview. The

interview was administered under oath, and there is a transcript available. We

have found that substantial evidence may support an adverse credibility

determination where the petitioner’s sworn statement during the credible fear

interview is materially inconsistent with his testimony before the IJ. See

Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 926–27 (9th Cir. 2020). Further, Maravilla-

Pineda later confirmed before the IJ that he answered he was single during the

interview. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence supporting the adverse

credibility determination because nothing in the record compels a contrary

conclusion. See Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291, 1300–01 (9th Cir. 2022).

2. In the absence of credible testimony, Maravilla-Pineda failed to

4 17-70213 demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal or relief. See Farah v. Ashcroft,

348 F.3d 1153, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2003). Maravilla-Pineda does not identify, nor

does the record contain, any independent evidence that compels the conclusion that

he is otherwise eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. See Kalulu v.

Bondi, 128 F.4th 1009, 1023 (9th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, we need not consider

Maravilla-Pineda’s remaining contentions regarding these claims because the

agency’s denial based on its adverse credibility determination is dispositive. See

Pal v. INS, 204 F.3d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that substantial evidence

supported the agency’s denial of petitioner’s asylum claim based on its adverse

credibility determination, and declining to reach the agency’s alternative grounds

for its denial); Farah, 348 F.3d at 1156 (“Because we affirm the BIA’s

determination that [petitioner] failed to establish eligibility for asylum, we also

affirm the denial of [petitioner’s] application for withholding of removal.”).

3. Lastly, substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT protection. “To

receive CAT protection, a petitioner must prove that it is ‘more likely than not’ that

he or she would be tortured if removed.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1028.16(c)(2)). An adverse credibility

determination does not necessarily defeat a CAT claim; the claim may be

established through independent documentary evidence. See id. at 1048–49. As

the IJ noted, the alleged gang threats against Maravilla-Pineda were criminal acts

5 17-70213 without the acquiescence of government officials, and the gang members who

allegedly threatened him have since been imprisoned. As such, there is no

evidence to compel a finding that it is more likely than not that Maravilla-Pineda

will be tortured if removed.

PETITION DENIED.

6 17-70213