Guangxi Jisheng Foods, Inc. v. United States

2013 CIT 112
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedAugust 23, 2013
Docket11-00378
StatusPublished

This text of 2013 CIT 112 (Guangxi Jisheng Foods, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guangxi Jisheng Foods, Inc. v. United States, 2013 CIT 112 (cit 2013).

Opinion

Slip Op. 13-112

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

GUANGXI JISHENG FOODS, INC.,

Plaintiff, Before: Richard W. Goldberg, Senior Judge v. Court No. 11-00378

UNITED STATES, PUBLIC VERSION

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

[Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency record is denied.]

Dated: August 23, 2013

Yingchao Xiao, Lee & Xiao, of San Marino, California, for plaintiff Guangxi Jisheng Foods, Inc.

Richard P. Schroeder, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant. With him on the brief were Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Devin S. Sikes, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.

Goldberg, Senior Judge: Plaintiff Guangxi Jisheng Foods, Inc. (“Jisheng”) challenges the

U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce” or the “Department”) decision to employ partial

adverse facts available (“AFA”) to complete some of Jisheng’s factors of production (“FOP”)

data during the 2009–2010 administrative review of the antidumping duty order on Certain

Preserved Mushrooms from the People’s Republic of China. See Certain Preserved Mushrooms

from the People’s Republic of China, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,732 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 14, 2011)

(final results of antidumping duty administrative review) (“Final Results”). For the reasons

explained below, the court denies Jisheng’s Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record and

sustains the Final Results as they pertain to Jisheng. Court No. 11-00378 Page 2

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Jisheng commenced this action under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i) and

1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and must

uphold Commerce’s determination unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the

record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).

Substantial evidence requires “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion,’ taking into account the entire record, including whatever

fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence.” Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744

F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229

(1938)). Therefore, the Court asks whether Commerce adequately supported its conclusion, and

not whether it would have reached the same conclusion upon independently reweighing the

evidence. See Clearon Corp. v. United States, Court No. 08-00364, 2011 WL 5909576, at *7

(CIT Nov. 18, 2011). In assessing the reasonableness of Commerce’s conclusion, this Court

affords broad deference to Commerce’s expert findings. F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S.

Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[F]actual determinations

supporting anti-dumping margins are best left to the agency’s expertise.”).

The Court employs a two-part analysis to determine whether Commerce’s statutory

construction is otherwise “in accordance with law.” See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d

1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Court first asks whether Congress has directly spoken to the

question at issue in the case. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. If it has, the Court gives effect to

that unambiguously expressed intent. Id. If Congress has not, then the Court examines whether

Commerce’s interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. To Court No. 11-00378 Page 3

satisfy that standard, Commerce need not provide “the only reasonable interpretation or even the

most reasonable interpretation” of a statutory provision. Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36

F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

DISCUSSION

In the underlying administrative review, Commerce applied partial AFA to complete

Jisheng’s FOP data for eight control numbers (“CONNUMs”) and packing usage factors for one

CONNUM. See Issues & Decision Memorandum, A-570-851 (Sept. 6, 2011) at 16–25 (“I&D

Mem.”). Jisheng argues that the use of AFA with respect to all nine CONNUMs was

unsupported by substantial evidence and otherwise not in accordance with law.

I. Background

A. Proceedings before Commerce

Commerce compares normal value to an export price or constructed export price to

determine a respondent’s dumping margin. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675. In non-market economy

(“NME”) proceedings, Commerce constructs normal value “on the basis of the value of the

factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise” plus “an amount for general

expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses.” 19 U.S.C. §

1677b(c)(1)(B). Commerce solicits FOP information in Section D of the questionnaires that it

sends to respondents.1 Section C of Commerce’s questionnaire, by contrast, “is designed to

assist Commerce in determining the U.S. price against which normal value is compared.”

Sidenor Indus. SL v. United States, 33 CIT __, __, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1352 n.1 (2009).

1 The information a respondent submits pertains to the “quantity of inputs actually used to produce the subject merchandise in the NME.” See Dep’t of Commerce, Antidumping Manual (Oct. 13, 2009), ch. 10 at 15. The Department then values the factors of production “based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market economy country.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1). The goal is to construct a hypothetical market value for a product. See Nation Ford Chem. Co. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Court No. 11-00378 Page 4

In NME cases, responding to Sections C and D of Commerce’s questionnaire results in

two databases—the U.S. sales database and the FOP database, respectively. Entries in those

databases are identified by CONNUM, and each CONNUM represents a unique product as

defined by a series of characteristics that Commerce selects at the beginning of the proceeding.

See Union Steel v. United States, 36 CIT __, __, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (2012). For

purposes of its margin calculations, Commerce requires that each CONNUM reported in the U.S.

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