1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GS HOLISTIC, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-02036 AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 ROSEVILLE SMOKE N VAPE INC d/b/a ROSEVILLE SMOKE N VAPE and 15 BALJIT SINGH, 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. ECF No. 10. 19 The motion was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(19). This motion was 20 set for hearing on the papers on May 3, 2023. ECF No. 11. Defendants have not made any 21 appearance. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends plaintiff’s motion be 22 GRANTED, and that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff. 23 I. Relevant Background 24 Plaintiff, GS Holistic, brought its complaint on November 9, 2022, presenting claims of 25 trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), and false advertising (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). ECF 26 No. 1 at 10-13. Plaintiff alleges that it is the registered owner of the Stündenglass trademarks. 27 Id. at 2. Since 2020, GS has marketed and sold products using the well-known trademark 28 “Stündenglass.” Per the complaint, the Stündenglass branded products, such as glass infusers and 1 accessories related thereto, are widely recognized nationally and internationally. Id. at 3. GS has 2 worked “to distinguish the Stündenglass brand as the premier manufacturer of glass infusers by 3 emphasizing the brand’s unwavering use of quality materials and focusing on scientific principles 4 which facilitate a superior smoking experience” for at least two years. Id. Plaintiff alleges that 5 defendant is “unlawfully selling glass infusers that have identical, or nearly identical, versions of 6 the Stündenglass Marks affixed to products that are made with inferior materials and technology.” 7 Id. at 5. 8 A summons in this case was issued to defendants on February 3, 2023. ECF Nos. 4, 5. 9 Defendants did not appear, and plaintiff moved for entry of default on February 27, 2023. ECF 10 No. 6. The clerk entered default on March 1, 2023. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff moved for default 11 judgment on March 10, 2023. ECF No. 10. Defendants did not respond to the motion for entry 12 of default judgment, and have not otherwise appeared in this case. 13 II. Motion 14 Plaintiff moves for default judgment on all counts, seeking an award of $150,000.00 15 ($50,000 per Mark) in statutory damages, along with costs in the total amount of $921.24, 16 consisting of the filing fee ($402.00), the process server fee ($130), and plaintiff’s investigation 17 fees ($389.24). ECF No. 10 at 10. Defendant has not appeared or filed any response. 18 III. Analysis 19 A. Legal Standard 20 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 21 against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend 22 against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not 23 automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 24 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th 25 Cir. 1986)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) (governing the entry of default judgments). Instead, the 26 decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies within the district court’s sound 27 discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this 28 determination, the court may consider the following factors: 1 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake 2 in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether 3 the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 4 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 5 disfavored. Id. at 1472. 6 As a general rule, once default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative 7 complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 8 v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. 9 Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); see also Fair Housing of Marin v. 10 Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Although well-pleaded allegations in the complaint 11 are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, 12 and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. 13 of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 14 (9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 15 defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”) 16 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Abney v. Alameida, 334 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 17 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not be entered on a legally insufficient claim.”). A party’s 18 default conclusively establishes that party’s liability, although it does not establish the amount of 19 damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560; cf. Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th 20 Cir. 1990) (stating in the context of a default entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 37 that the default conclusively established the liability of the defaulting party). 22 B. The Eitel Factors 23 1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 24 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 25 judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff weighs in favor of granting a 26 default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would suffer 27 prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment because it would be without recourse for 28 1 recovery. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor favors the entry of default judgment. 2 2. Factors Two and Three: Merits of Claims and Sufficiency of Complaint 3 The merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the sufficiency of the complaint are 4 considered here together because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The court must consider 5 whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim that supports the relief 6 sought. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175. Here, the merits 7 of the claims and sufficiency of the complaint favor entry of default judgment. 8 Plaintiff brings two causes of action: (1) trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114, and 9 (2) false advertising (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). Although plaintiff has alleged two distinct claims, 10 “the essential elements of the federal claims are identical[.]” Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Shalabi, 11 352 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West 12 Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 n.6, 1047 n.8 (9th Cir. 1999)). 13 a. Trademark infringement 14 To state a claim for trademark infringement, the complaint must allege that the plaintiff: 15 “(1) ...has a protectable ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that the defendant’s use of the 16 mark is likely to cause consumer confusion, thereby infringing upon the [plaintiff’s] rights to the 17 mark.” Department of Parks and Recreation for State of California v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 18 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 19 804 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under the 20 Lanham Act, a trademark holder must show that the defendant's use of its trademark is likely to 21 cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”). “The test for likelihood of confusion is 22 whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the 23 origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks.” Dreamwerks Production Group, Inc. v. 24 SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). In evaluating the likelihood of confusion, the 25 court employs an eight factor test. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th 26 Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 27 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). 28 //// 1 Plaintiff made the requisite allegation of protectable ownership in its complaint, and 2 supported the allegation with trademark registration numbers as follows: (1) U.S. Trademark 3 Registration Number 6,633,884 for the standard character mark “Stündenglass” in association 4 with goods further identified in registration in international class 011; (2) U.S. Trademark 5 Registration Number 6,174,292 for the design plus words mark “S” and its logo in association 6 with goods further identified in the registration in international class 034; (3) U.S. Trademark 7 Registration Number 6,174,291 for the standard character mark “Stündenglass” in association 8 with goods further identified in registration in international class 034. ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff 9 alleged that “Stündenglass Trademarks are exclusive to GS and appear clearly on GS’s 10 Stündenglass Products, as well as on the packaging and advertisements related to the products. 11 GS has expended substantial time, money, and other resources in developing, advertising, and 12 otherwise promoting and protecting these Trademarks.” Id. at 4. 13 Plaintiff also successfully addresses each factor of the Sleekcraft test for likelihood of 14 confusion: (i) strength of the mark; (ii) proximity of the goods; (iii) similarity of the marks; (iv) 15 evidence of actual confusion; (v) marketing channels used; (vi) type of goods and degree of care 16 likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (vii) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (viii) 17 likelihood of expansion of the product lines. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.3d at 348-49. The court now 18 addresses these factors in turn. 19 (i) Strength of the mark 20 A “strong,” or distinctive, mark is afforded greater protection under trademark law than a 21 mark that is not strong. See, e.g., Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Madrona Vineyards, L.P., No. C 22 05-0587 MHP, 2005 WL 701599, *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2005) (“The strength of protection 23 afforded to a trademark is proportionate to the likelihood that the public will remember the mark 24 and associate it with the source of the trademarked goods” (citations omitted)). When evaluating 25 the strength of a mark, courts consider both conceptual and commercial strength. Id. 26 The conceptual strength of a mark “is determined by its placement on a continuum of 27 marks from ‘generic,’ afforded no protection; through ‘descriptive’ or ‘suggestive,’ given 28 moderate protection; to ‘arbitrary’ or ‘fanciful’ awarded maximum protection.” E. & J. Gallo 1 Winery, 967 F.2d at 1291 (quoting Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Industries, Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 2 605 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks omitted)). The nature of a mark is determined by the 3 “imagination test” and a “need test.” Id. (citing Earthquake Sound Corp. v. Bumper Industries, 4 352 F.3d 1210, 1221 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003)). Using the “imagination test” the court asks how much 5 imagination a consumer must use to associate a given mark with the goods or services it 6 identifies, and using the “need test” the court examines the extent to which competitors need a 7 mark to identify their goods or services. Earthquake Sound Corp., 352 F.3d at 1221 n. 4 (quoting 8 Miss World (UK) Ltd. v. Mrs. America Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1449 (9th Cir. 1988)). 9 Applying these tests, the court finds that the “Stündenglass” mark is best classified as a 10 “suggestive” mark. The word “stündenglass” means “hourglass” in German. The mark, while 11 directly translating to a word that describes a general shape, nonetheless “suggests, rather than 12 describes, an ingredient, quality or characteristic” of the product. Thus, the mark is entitled to 13 moderate protection. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at 1291. 14 Finally, taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, the “Stündenglass” mark has commercial 15 strength. According to plaintiff, GS’s Stündenglass Products have become some of the most 16 popular of their kind in the world and have also been the subject of extensive unsolicited publicity 17 resulting from their high-quality and innovative designs. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16. Because of these 18 and other factors, the Stündenglass brand, and GS’s Stündenglass Trademarks are famous 19 throughout the United States. Id. Because the mark is entitled to moderate rather than maximum 20 protection, but nonetheless has commercial strength, this factor weighs in favor of finding a 21 likelihood of confusion. 22 (ii) Proximity of the goods 23 “Where goods are related or complementary, the danger of consumer confusion is 24 heightened.” E.&J. Gallo Winery, 967 at 1291. Here, plaintiff asserts defendants are 25 intentionally selling counterfeit goods using a false designation of origin. ECF No. 10 at 7-8. 26 This factor weighs strongly in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. 27 //// 28 //// 1 (iii) Similarity of the marks 2 The “similarity of the marks” portion of the Sleekcraft test “is the most crucial factor in 3 determining the likelihood of confusion.” Sutter Home Winery, Inc., 2005 WL 701599 at *5. 4 Here, the infringing goods are counterfeit, imitating plaintiff’s registered mark. This factor 5 weighs strongly in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. 6 (iv) Evidence of actual confusion 7 While evidence of actual confusion is not necessary to prevail on an infringement claim or 8 to secure injunctive relief, it can provide persuasive evidence that future confusion is likely. See 9 Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 10 1456 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff submitted in a declaration that its research has revelated that at 11 least 3 out of every 10 products sold purporting to be plaintiff’s products are counterfeit. ECF 12 No. 10-4 at 2. This factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. 13 (v) Marketing channels used 14 An analysis of marketing channels accounts for overlapping advertising streams. Because 15 plaintiff’s Trademarked products are sold at the same type of shops that the counterfeit products 16 are sold, this factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. 17 (vi) Type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchase 18 “[A] Stündenglass brand glass infuser is priced at $599.95, while a non-Stündenglass 19 branded product is also being sold for up to $600, with a range of $199 to $600. ECF No. 10 at 4. 20 While not inexpensive, infusers purchased at retail stores are not the type of product generally 21 expected to involve an exceptionally high degree of care exercised by the purchaser. This factor 22 weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. 23 (vii) Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark 24 Plaintiff alleges that defendant intentionally appropriated its mark to sell counterfeit 25 infusers, masquerading as the plaintiff’s infusers. Plaintiff’s allegation of the intentional false 26 designation of origin by defendants favors finding a likelihood of confusion. 27 //// 28 //// 1 (viii) Likelihood of expansion of product lines 2 This factor evaluates whether a parties’ product line is likely to expand to create 3 competition; where the parties are already in direct competition with one another, this factor is 4 not relevant. See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 5 1078 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The final factor, ‘[a] likelihood of expansion in product lines,’ 6 warrants no discussion as it is ‘relatively unimportant where two companies already compete to a 7 significant extent,’ ” quoting Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1060). 8 Based on a review of the entire record, the court finds that plaintiff has demonstrated 9 protectable ownership in its mark and a likelihood of confusion stemming from defendant’s 10 unauthorized use. Accordingly, the second and third Eitel factors are satisfied as to the claims 11 related to trademark infringement. 12 3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action 13 Under the fourth Eitel factor, the court considers the amount of money at stake in relation 14 to the seriousness of defendant’s conduct. Here, plaintiff seeks an award of and statutory 15 damages in the amount of $50,000 per Mark. The amount at issue is proportionate to the 16 seriousness of defendant’s conduct and this factor favors entry of default judgment. 17 4. Factor Five: Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts 18 The facts of this case are relatively straightforward, and plaintiff has provided the court 19 with well-pleaded allegations supporting its claims and affidavits in support of its allegations. 20 Here, the court may assume the truth of well-pleaded facts in the complaint (except as to 21 damages) following the clerk’s entry of default and, thus, there is no likelihood that any genuine 22 issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra Entm't Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 23 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after 24 the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material 25 fact exists.”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 26 1177. 27 //// 28 //// 1 5. Factor Six: Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect 2 Upon review of the record before the court, there is no indication that the default was the 3 result of excusable neglect. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Plaintiff served the 4 defendant with the summons and complaint. ECF Nos. 4 and 5. Moreover, plaintiff served 5 defendant by mail with notice of its application for default judgment. ECF No. 13. Despite 6 ample notice of this lawsuit and plaintiff’s intention to seek a default judgment, defendant failed 7 to defend itself in this action. Thus, the record supports a conclusion that the defendant has 8 chosen not to defend this action, and not that the default resulted from any excusable neglect. 9 Accordingly, this Eitel factor favors the entry of a default judgment. 10 6. Factor Seven: Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 11 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 12 F.2d at 1472. However, district courts have concluded with regularity that this policy, standing 13 alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. 14 PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 15 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010). Accordingly, although the court is cognizant of 16 the policy favoring decisions on the merits – and consistent with existing policy would prefer that 17 this case be resolved on the merits – that policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default 18 judgment. 19 7. Conclusion: Propriety of Default Judgment 20 Upon consideration of all the Eitel factors, the court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to 21 the entry of default judgment against defendant. What remains is the determination of the amount 22 of damages to which plaintiff is entitled. 23 C. Terms of Judgment 24 Upon entry of default, the complaint’s factual allegations regarding liability are taken as 25 true, but allegations regarding damages must be proven. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 26 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir.1987). Plaintiff’s motion seeks an award of statutory damages under 27 the Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) in the amount of $150,000.00 ($50,000 per Mark). The 28 Lanham Act provides for statutory damages for trademark infringement, but in an amount “not 1 less than $500 or more than $100,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, 2 offered for sale, or distributed, as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1). According to 3 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b), “in a case involving use of a counterfeit mark . . . the court shall, unless the 4 court finds extenuating circumstances, enter judgment for three times such profits or damages, 5 whichever amount is greater. . . .” See, Mophie, Inc. v. Shah, No. SACV 13-1321-DMG (JEMx), 6 2015 WL 12683786, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2015). 7 Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Christopher Folkerts, Chief Executive Officer of 8 plaintiff GS Holistic, LLC. ECF No. 10-4 at 1. Folkers avers that the sale of counterfeit 9 Stunglass products in general – not specific to defendant’s sales – cost the company an estimated 10 $28,800,000.00 in 2021 alone. ECF No. 10-4 at 2-3. While plaintiff’s request for $50,000.00 per 11 mark is not justified by the affidavit, the court notes that the statutory damages provision was 12 added in 1995 precisely “because ‘counterfeiters’ records are frequently nonexistent, inadequate, 13 or deceptively kept ..., making proving actual damages in these cases extremely difficult if not 14 impossible.” Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. Luban, 282 F. Supp. 2d 123, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing 15 S.Rep. No. 104–177, at 10 (1995)). Thus, “statutory damages are appropriate in default judgment 16 cases because the information needed to prove actual damages is within the infringers’ control 17 and is not disclosed.” Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F.Supp.2d 874, 882 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 18 “Statutory damage awards by courts vary widely.” Sream, Inc. v. Singh, No. 1:18-cv- 19 00987 DAD BAM, 2018 WL 5819455, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018), report and 20 recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-cv-00987 DAD BAM, 2019 WL 2160358 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 21 2019). The Sream plaintiffs had presented evidence of a single counterfeit sale and there was no 22 evidence to determine how many counterfeit items were sold. The court accordingly awarded 23 $20,000 rather than the requested $200,000. Id. Other illustrative cases cited by the Sream court 24 and relevant here are Otter Products LLC v. Ace Colors Fashion, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00141- 25 ODW(ASx), 2014 WL 1512189, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (awarding $35,000 upon 26 evidence of the sale of eleven counterfeit items after the plaintiff requested $100,000)); E.I. Du 27 Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Drabek, No. CV 12-10574 DDP AJWx, 2013 WL 4033630, at *7 28 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) (declining to issue the statutory maximum award because the plaintiff 1 presented no evidence regarding the extent of sales by the defendant, but awarding $25,000 per 2 product based on evidence of 21 products bearing the plaintiff’s marks); Sream, Inc. & Roor 3 International BV v. Andy's Smoke Shop, Inc., No. 18-cv-1676 MMA (RBB), 2018 WL 5279130, 4 at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2018) (awarding statutory damages for one infringed trademark totaling 5 $25,000); Sream, Inc. v. Walsh, No. EDCV 16-2538 JGB (KKx), 2017 WL 8230031, at *6 (C.D. 6 Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (awarding $10,000 based on sale of one infringing product where plaintiff 7 requested $300,000); Sream, Inc. v. Hanoun, No. ED CV 16-01394 AB(JCx), 2016 WL 8 11002361, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016) (finding $50,000 to be reasonable statutory award for 9 willful conduct on evidence of one product sold); Sream, Inc. v. Elgawly, No. CV 16-840-R, 10 2016 WL 4967710, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2016) (awarding statutory damages in the amount 11 of $50,000.01 for willful conduct and evidence of one product sold). 12 Here, the complaint alleges that on October 24, 2022, its investigator purchased a Glass 13 Infuser with a Stündenglass Mark from defendant at the price of $323.24. ECF No. 1 at 6-7. 14 Inspection of the infuser revealed it was counterfeit. Id. The complaint is silent as to the quantity 15 of counterfeit products sold by defendant or the damages plaintiff has sustained as a result of 16 defendant’s personal conduct (as opposed to damages caused by the counterfeit market overall). 17 The affidavits in support of the default judgment motion present no evidence regarding the 18 quantity of counterfeit products sold by defendant or damages attributable to defendants 19 specifically. ECF Nos. 10-3, 10-4. Accordingly, based on a review of the evidence and 20 judgments in similar cases, the court concludes plaintiff’s request is excessive and recommends 21 an award of $25,000 per mark ($75,000 in total) as reasonable statutory damages. 22 Finally, plaintiff seeks an award of costs. ECF No. 10 at 10.1 “An award of reasonable 23 attorneys’ fees and costs is expressly provided for in ‘exceptional cases’ of trademark 24 infringement.” Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008) 25 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)). The term “exceptional cases” is generally accepted to mean cases 26 in which trademark infringement is “deliberate and willful.” See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 27 1 The court notes that plaintiff did not request an award of attorneys’ fees, nor did plaintiff 28 request injunctive relief. ECF No. 10 at 5-10. 1 |} 982 F.2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the term “exceptional” to apply when “the 2 || infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.”). Plaintiff submitted an acceptable 3 || affidavit from counsel indicating that it accrued costs in the total amount of $921.24 consisting of 4 | the filing fee ($402.00), the process server fee ($130), and Plaintiffs investigation fees ($389.24). 5 || ECF No. 10-5 at 1. The court finds that the costs are reasonable appropriate. 6 IV. Conclusion 7 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly assign a 8 | district judge to this action. 9 It is RECOMMENDED THAT: 10 1. Plaintiffs March 10, 2023 motion for default judgment, (ECF No. 10) be granted; 11 2. The court award plaintiff $75,000 in statutory damages for defendant’s violations of 12 the Lanham Act; 13 3. The court grant plaintiffs request for costs in the amount of $921.24; and 14 4. This case be closed. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 16 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty one days 17 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 18 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 19 || document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 20 || Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all 21 | parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file 22 || objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 23 || Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 24 | (9th Cir. 1991). 25 || DATED: June 14, 2023 “ 26 thin — Clone ALLISON CLAIRE 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 12