Grimes v. Coroner of Riverside County

District Court, S.D. California·Decided September 22, 2025·No. 3:25-cv-02291·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2291-RBM-MMP

12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE v. FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING 14 FEE REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C.

15 § 1914(a) CORONER OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, 16 JOHN DOE, MUNICPALITY OF 17 RIVERSIDE COUNTY, 18 Defendants. 19

20 Plaintiff, Jerome L. Grimes, a detainee at Larry D. Smith Correctional Facility in 21 Riverside County, has filed a pro se Complaint. (Docs. 1–2.1) Plaintiff, however, has not 22 filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, nor has he paid the 23 initial civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). For the reasons discussed below, 24 this case is DISMISSED. 25 26 27 1 The Complaint was filed on August 28, 2025 (Doc. 1) and a Supplement was filed on 28 September 15, 2025 (Doc. 2.) 1 I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 2 Any person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 3 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The case may go forward without the plaintiff prepaying the entire filing 4 fee, though, if the court grants him permission to proceed IFP. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 5 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 6 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, 7 Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 8 To pursue a case without paying the filing fee, a plaintiff must file an affidavit which 9 includes a statement of all assets, or things of value, the plaintiff possesses and must 10 demonstrate the plaintiff’s inability to pay the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); see 11 also Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). And plaintiffs who are 12 incarcerated at the time they file their civil case must also submit a “certified copy of the 13 trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period 14 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 15 King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the current version of the IFP statute, 16 “if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall 17 be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee” in increments. Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). 19 Here, Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing and administrative fee required to begin 20 this civil action. Nor has he submitted a Motion to Proceed IFP. See Escobedo, 787 F.3d 21 at 1234. Therefore, his case cannot go forward. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Cervantes, 493 22 F.3d at 1051. 23 II. LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP 24 Even if Plaintiff had filed a Motion to Proceed IFP, the Court finds that he is not 25 entitled to proceed IFP in this action for the reasons set forth below. 26 A. Legal Standard 27 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 28 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Grimes, however, “face 1 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 2 filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended § 1915 to preclude 4 the privilege to proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner: 5 . . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 6 dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 7 upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 8 9 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 10 provision.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. 11 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 12 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 13 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 14 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 15 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 16 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 17 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 18 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 19 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 20 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 21 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, § 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit of any 22 subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he “makes a plausible 23 allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 24 Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). “[T]he PLRA [also] 25 requires a nexus between [any] alleged imminent danger and the violations of law alleged 26 in the prisoner’s complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, to 27 qualify for an exception, “a three-strikes prisoner must allege imminent danger of serious 28 physical injury that is both fairly traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in his complaint 1 and redressable by the court.” Id. at 701. 2 B. Discussion 3 While Grimes has not moved to proceed IFP in this case, the Court finds it would be 4 futile for him to do so. Based on review of the dockets of many court proceedings, the 5 Court finds Grimes has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the 6 grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief 7 may be granted. 8 Courts “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 9 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” 10 Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 11 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Grimes v. Coroner of Riverside County, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Grimes v. Coroner of Riverside County (Grimes v. Coroner of Riverside County) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

United States v. Casilla
20 F.3d 600 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
Moore v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
657 F.3d 890 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc.
285 F.3d 801 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
Bias v. Moynihan
508 F.3d 1212 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
O'NEAL v. Price
531 F.3d 1146 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez
787 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2015)
Maria Escobedo v. Apple American Group
787 F.3d 1226 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Andrews v. King
398 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Adonai El-Shaddai v. Jeffrey Wang, Md
833 F.3d 1036 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Jason Lee Harris v. J. Kenneth Mangum
863 F.3d 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Edward Ray, Jr. v. E. Lara
31 F.4th 692 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Jay Hymas v. Usdoi
73 F.4th 763 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)