Grillo v. Smith

144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 193 Cal. Rptr. 414, 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 1878
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 24, 1983
DocketCiv. 30062
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 144 Cal. App. 3d 868 (Grillo v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grillo v. Smith, 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 193 Cal. Rptr. 414, 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 1878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

Opinion

CROSBY, J.

The trial court granted the defense motion for summary judgment in this action “for libel and interference with business.” Plaintiff Joseph R. Grillo appeals.

Grillo was Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Municipal Court when defendants, the corporate owner and individual publisher of the Los Angeles Times, allegedly defamed him in an article published August 7, 1976 (the Article) and an editorial published October 18, 1976 (the Editorial). 1 The complaint seeks $300,000 general damages, $50,000 special damages and $5 million punitive damages. Because the following issues are dispositive of this appeal, we do not reach other contentions of the parties:

1. Are subjective words or ambiguous syntax in a news report of a judicial proceeding sufficient to present a triable issue in a libel action against a newspaper? No.
*871 2. Is hostile editorial opinion couched in terms of factual conclusions about the conduct and motives of a high public official sufficient to raise a triable issue in a libel action against a newspaper? No.

The Article and Editorial both concerned an incident which occurred Friday, August 6, 1976. On that date Grillo’s clerk, personally accompanied by the judge, served James Czarnecki, a transportation officer in the office of the Auditor of Los Angeles County, with an “Order for Issuance of Airline Transportation.” The order directed Czarnecki to issue airline tickets to Grillo and two other judges who desired to travel to Sacramento to attend hearings concerning legislation related to the operation of the municipal court. When Czarnecki refused to issue the tickets under orders from his superior, Grillo personally placed him under arrest.

Czarnecki was then escorted to Grille’s courtroom, where a contempt proceeding was held despite the attempted personal intervention of the County Counsel of Los Angeles County. At the hearing itself, a deputy county counsel represented Czarnecki, who was convicted and ordered to serve two days in jail with execution stayed until the following Wednesday. Grillo said the sentence was both coercive and punitive, i.e., designed to achieve compliance with the order to provide air transportation, as well as punish Czarnecki. He indicated he would “mitigate” the punishment, provided the tickets were furnished to the other judges forthwith; he offered to buy his own.

Grillo asserts three triable issues of fact exist with respect to the Article. First, he denies he was “angry” or “shouted” or “stormed” during the colloquy with Czarnecki. Second, he objects to the “kangaroo court” description of the August 6, 1976, proceeding. Finally, he argues the statement, “There is insufficient time to go through that red tape,” is out of context because it related to the mechanics of acquiring air tickets from the county auditor, not counsel’s complaints concerning the failure to inform Czarnecki of his rights and afford him due process.

The initial determination as to whether a statement constitutes fact or opinion is one of law. (Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 450 [175 Cal.Rptr. 157, 629 P.2d 1369]; Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 601 [131 Cal.Rptr. 641, 552 P.2d 425]; Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 673 [150 Cal.Rptr. 258, 586 P.2d 572]; Fisher v. Larsen (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 627 [188 Cal.Rptr. 216].) The words “angry,” “shouted,” “stormed,” and “kangaroo court” fall clearly on the opinion side of the line. They are subjective words and phrases of the sort which have been found to be opinion as a matter of law frequently in the past. (Okun v. *872 Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d 442, 459 [175 Cal.Rptr. 157, 629 P.2d 1369] (collecting examples); Gomes v. Fried (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 924, 935 [186 Cal.Rptr. 605].)

The First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and article I, section 2 (formerly section 9) of the California Constitution confer an absolute privilege on statements of opinion concerning the conduct of public officials in office. (Yorty v. Chandler (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 467, 473 [91 Cal.Rptr. 709].) The marketplace of ideas, not the tort system, is the means by which our society evaluates those opinions. (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 [41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805, 94 S.Ct. 2997].) Although offensive to Grillo, the subjective description of his actions in the conduct of judicial office contained in the Article is immune from legal attack. The reason is perhaps nowhere better expressed than in Desert Sun Publishing Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 49, 51 [158 Cal.Rptr. 519]): “It is an essential part of our national heritage that an irresponsible slob can stand on a street corner and, with impunity, heap invective on all of us in public office. . . .

“Our political history reeks of unfair, intemperate, scurrilous and irresponsible charges against those in or seeking public office. Washington was called a murderer, Jefferson a blackguard, a knave and insane (Mad Tom), Henry Clay a pimp, Andrew Jackson a murderer and an adulterer, and Andrew Johnson and Ulysses Grant drunkards. Lincoln was called a half-witted usurper, a baboon, a gorilla, a ghoul. Theodore Roosevelt was castigated as a traitor to his class, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a traitor to his country. Dwight D. Eisenhower was charged with being a conscious agent of the Communist Conspiracy.”

The Times’ contention that “angry,” “shouted,” and “stormed,” are simply not defamatory in any context may also have merit but we need look no further than the opinion-fact question to dispose of the issue. Also, it is of no significance that the phrase “kangaroo court” may be a quotation of a third party’s opinion. As a third party opinion it is doubly protected: “[t]he public interest in being fully informed about controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility for them.” (Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc. (2d Cir. 1977) 556 F.2d 113, 120; cited with approval in Weingarten v. Block (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 129, 148 [162 Cal.Rptr. 701].)

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Bluebook (online)
144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 193 Cal. Rptr. 414, 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 1878, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grillo-v-smith-calctapp-1983.