Griffith Rubber Mills, a Corporation v. Henry S. Hoffar

313 F.2d 1
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 6, 1963
Docket17544
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 313 F.2d 1 (Griffith Rubber Mills, a Corporation v. Henry S. Hoffar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griffith Rubber Mills, a Corporation v. Henry S. Hoffar, 313 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963).

Opinion

BROWNING, Circuit Judge.

Henry S. Hoffar sued Griffith Rubber Mills for the infringement of two patents (Nos. 2,859,830 and 2,877,860) relating to a muffler made of an elastomer. 1 Defendant counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of invalidity of the patents. Both were found to be valid and infringed ; 2 Griffith appealed. Among the errors asserted was the failure of the District Court to grant Griffith’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that in view of the state of the art at the time of the issuance of the patents the mufflers which they described were not within the statutory definition of patentable invention. We have concluded that “the circumstances indicate that the jury * * * departed from the relevant legal criteria” for determining invention, and that Griffith’s assignment of error is therefore well taken. 3 In arriving at this conclusion, and in the discussion which follows, we have resolved in Hoffar’s favor any possible dispute as to those questions which this Court has earlier held to be questions of fact: the nature of the pri- or art and what Hoffar did to improve it. 4

Hoffar was a builder of boats. He recognized the desirability of making a muffler that would not be subject to the corrosive effects of exhaust gases, gasoline, sea water, and weather. He testified that the matter was brought vividly to his attention when he discovered that the metal mufflers on his own boat were so badly corroded that they had to be replaced. Turning his attention to the problem, he developed the device disclosed in his first patent. Hoffar’s “invention” consisted essentially of a muffler made of an elastomer, having a slitted internal baffle set across the flow of the gas. The Hoffar muffler was built of neoprene, “a synthetic rubber * * * characterized by superior resistance to oils, gasoline, sunlight, ozone, and heat and by lower permeability to gasses than rubber.” 5 Hoffar’s second patent covered an improvement consisting of a cone-shaped or cup-shaped baffle with multiple slits.

The specifications of the patents disclose that Hoffar’s muffler is resistant to deterioration by oil and acid, and is relatively small and light in weight; that it cannot be dented or readily damaged, or adversely affected by heat or freezing; and that it reduces exhaust noise with a minimum of back pressure. The silencing effect results from expansion of the walls of the body of the muffler and vibration of the slits in the baffle in rhythm with the pulsations of the exhaust gas, as well as from the tendency of the elastomer to absorb sound. 6

We are satisfied that “the differences between the subject matter * * patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject *3 matter pertains,” and that the patents are therefore invalid by statutory mandate. 7 35 U.S.C.A. § 103.

The purposes of the limitation on patentability expressed in the statute, 8 though often stated, are worth repeating. Patents are issued not for private benefit but for the public good; they grant a monopoly for a limited period as an incentive to the disclosure of innovations which in the end will add to the fund of freely available knowledge. 9 Howevei’, the public is entitled to benefit, without granting special concessions, from such advances as normally flow from the application of the ordinary skills of one in the trade to the existing fund of public knowledge. 10 Thus the statute prescribes, as a condition of patentability, that what has been accomplished must be such that it would not have been obvious to a hypothetical person skilled in all that could have been known, at the pertinent time, in the field to which the invention relates.

It follows that though a device may be new and useful it is not patentable if it consists of no more than a combination of ideas which are drawn from the existing fund of public knowledge, and which produces results that would be expected by one skilled in the art. 11 A public grant of the private power to exclude others from making, using, and selling such a device simply “withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes ".the resources available to skillful-men.” 12 No balancing public benefit results from such a patent since the fund of freely available public knowledge is reduced during the period of monopoly, and is only restored rather than enhanced when that period ends.

The rule is the same where the “invention” consists solely or in part of the substitution of one known substance for another theretofore used for the purpose. 13 Selection from among available materials of one material thought more *4 suitable for a particular use is normally within the competence of the person of ordinary skill in the art, and, generally, is for that reason not patentable. 14 Nothing is added to the sum of public knowledge when a known material is used to perform functions or produce results which could be reasonably foreseen from the material’s known characteristics. As in the case of other combinations of ideas drawn from existing knowledge, the old elements, including the known material in the new use, must perform additional and different functions in the combination than out of it; the results must be unusual and surprising — more must be derived from the combination than that which might be reasonably expected as the sum of the old ideas drawn from the public domain 15

An enlarged tube or body having internal baffles is a form well known to the muffler art. Hoffar testified that he was not the first to employ a slitted damper wall or one shaped as a cone or cup. Harley, No. 1,922,848, August 15, 1933, disclosed baffles which were both cone-shaped and slitted. Allan, No. 1,468,895, September 25, 1923, and Huntoon, No. 2,280,953, April 28, 1942, also disclosed a cone-shaped baffle. Slits or slots in a baffle were used in Hutton, No. 1,162,064, November 30, 1915, and in Schmidt, No. 1,274,943, August 6, 1918. Slack and Turner, British Patent No. 684,987, December 31, 1952, disclosed the use of flexible metal “strips” (the equivalent of “slits," but described in terms of the intervening material rather than in terms of the openings through it), and taught that a muffling effect resulted from the yielding of these strips to vibrating exhaust gases.

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Bluebook (online)
313 F.2d 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griffith-rubber-mills-a-corporation-v-henry-s-hoffar-ca9-1963.