Greenfield v. Mather

194 P.2d 1, 32 Cal. 2d 23, 1948 Cal. LEXIS 200

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Decided: June 3, 1948
• Docket: S. F. 17343
• Status: Published

Opinions

CARTER, J.

The appeal here involved is from a judgment in an action of interpleader commenced by the administrators of the estate of Louis B. Greenfield in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco on April 12, 1935. At the time this action was commenced said administrators deposited with the clerk of said court the sum of $12,549.60 admittedly due on an allowed claim presented against said estate by A. W. Mather, respondent herein. The appellant and respondent herein were named as defendants in said action, and each filed an answer and cross-complaint in the court below in which they claimed ownership of the sum of money deposited by said administrators in said court. A former appeal in this action was decided by this court on August 3, 1939 (see Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Cal.2d 228 [93 P.2d 100]).

The record now before us discloses that: On June 16, 1933, A. W. Mather, cross-defendant and respondent herein, assigned to his then wife, Dorothy Devore Mather, cross-complainant and appellant herein, an undivided one-half interest in and to a claim against the estate of Greenfield, pending in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, the principal sum of which was approximately $75,000. At the date of the assignment there was admittedly unpaid on said claim the sum of $38,699. After this assignment was executed and delivered, Mrs. Mather gave notice thereof to the administrators of the Greenfield estate. Thereafter said administrators paid Mr. Mather the following amounts:

September 5, 1933.....................$ 7,441.00

January 1, 1934.......................$ 5,881.00

March 2, 1934.........................$ 6,327.50

July 24, 1934..'.......................$ 6,919.55

making a total paid to A. W. Mather of......$26,569.05 after the execution of the assignment. Said administrators also paid to Mrs. Mather the sum of $7,441 on September 5, 1933. She has received no other payment on account of her half of said claim. In addition to the principal of $38,699 due on said claim at the time of the assignment, interest accrued thereon amounting to the sum of $7,560.65, making a total of principal and interest of $46,259.65, of which Mr. and Mrs. Mather were each entitled to one-half or $23,129.82. Mr. Mather has received $26,569.05, or $3,439.23 more than his share. Mrs. Mather has received only $7,441, or $15,688.82 less than her share. These figures are taken from the record in this case, and their correctness is not questioned by the respondent. In fact, counsel for respondent state in their petition for hearing in this court in this case at page 52 thereof: "We have never examined the probate file, or the vouchers, and made and make no representations in regard to its contents.” This statement should foreclose counsel for respondent from attacking the correctness of the above figures as the record discloses they were taken from said file.

At the trial of this action respondent A. W. Mather offered in evidence a judgment entered in an action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County on March 29,1945, which action was commenced by him against appellant in said court on August 3,1934. This judgment purported to award one-half of the said sum of $12,549.60 on deposit in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco to respondent and the other half to appellant. The trial court admitted the judgment in evidence, held it to be res judicata, refused to admit any evidence offered by appellant, and rendered judgment awarding respondent one-half of the above-mentioned sum and the other half to appellant. This appeal followed.

To understand the background of this litigation a review of the proceedings in the Los Angeles action is necessary. The Los Angeles action was commenced by Mr. Mather on August 3, 1934. It pleaded three causes of action. The first cause of action was for rescission of a property settlement agreement entered into between himself and Mrs. Mather on June 16, 1933, upon the ground that it was induced by false representations and fraud. The second cause of action was for rescission of the same agreement upon the ground of mistake. The third cause of action was for declaratory relief, by which he sought to have the same agreement declared void upon the ground of illegality because it was entered into between a husband and wife in the Territory of Hawaii contrary to the laws of that territory. The administrators of the Greenfield estate were joined as defendants, and the complaint prayed for the issuance of an injunction restraining them from making any further payments to Mrs. Mather on account of her half interest in the claim which had been assigned to her. A restraining order was issued and served on said administrators, and they filed an answer in the nature of a disclaimer in which they admitted that they held the sum of $12,549.60 unpaid on said claim. This answer was not served on Mrs. Mather and she filed no pleading raising any issue with respect to the sum mentioned in said answer.

Mrs. Mather interposed a demurrer to the complaint filed by Mr. Mather which was sustained without leave to amend as to the third cause of action, and judgment was entered on January 4, 1935, decreeing that plaintiff take nothing by said third cause of action. The demurrer as to the first and second causes of action was overruled. The case went to trial on these causes of action on February 18, 1935, and judgment was entered as to those causes of action on March 14, 1935, denying Mr. Mather any relief. Mr. Mather appealed from the judgment of January 4, 1935, and this appeal was dismissed on the ground that said judgment was not a final judgment. (See Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal.2d 617 [55 P.2d 1174].) He attempted to appeal from the judgment entered March 14, 1935, on the first and second causes of action, but this appeal was dismissed on September 10, 1935, for failure to file transcript. In the opinion of this court in Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal.2d 617 [55 P.2d 1174], the statement is made that: “It is at once apparent that no final judgment was entered in the action until March 14,1935.”

Mr. Mather had filed an answer and cross-complaint in the interpleader action in San Francisco in which he raised the same issues as to the validity of the property settlement agreement as were raised by his third cause of action in the Los Angeles action. In this cross-complaint he attacked, the validity of the assignment to Mrs. Mather of the half interest in the claim against the Greenfield estate and contended that such assignment was invalid and void for the same reason that the property settlement agreement was invalid. Mrs. Mather joined issue with him by answer and cross-complaint in which she denied the allegations of his cross-complaint and pleaded her right to the ownership of the half interest in the claim assigned to her.

After the dismissal of the appeals from the two Los Angeles judgments, the San Francisco action came to trial and Mrs. Mather’s counsel offered in evidence a certified copy of the judgments of January 4th and March 14, 1935, in the Los Angeles action and objected to any evidence being offered by Mr. Mather in support of the allegations of his cross-complaint on the ground that the issues raised by these allegations were determined in the Los Angeles action and that the judgments of January 4th and March 14, 1935, were res judicata. The trial court sustained the objection and thereupon entered judgment in favor of Mrs. Mather awarding to her the full amount of the money deposited by the administrators of the Greenfield estate in the interpleader action as constituting the balance of her half of the claim pursuant to the assignment. On appeal to this court by Mr. Mather, this judgment was reversed upon the ground that the Los Angeles judgments were not final judgments. (See Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Cal.2d 228 [93 P.2d 100].)

The attorneys for Mrs. Mather then went into the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and moved for a new judgment in that action. The motion was heard before Judge Clarence M. Hanson who adopted the findings made by Judge Frank M. Smith on March 12, 1935, to the effect that Mrs. Mather was the owner of an undivided half interest in the claim against the Greenfield estate and entered a judgment awarding her the full sum of $12,549.60 which had been deposited in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco in the interpleader action brought by the administrators of the Greenfield estate. This judgment was entered on December 12, 1939. Mr. Mather appealed from this judgment upon the ground that it was void because it was entered without notice and that the judge who heard the motion and signed the new judgment had not presided at the trial (which was held on February 18, 1935, before Judge Frank M. Smith), and that the findings and judgment determined issues which were not before the court, namely, the right of Mrs. Mather to the $12,549.60 deposited with the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco by the administrators of the Greenfield estate in the interpleader action instituted by them. Their argument in this respect was based upon the fact that the administrators of the Greenfield estate were dismissed as parties to the Los Angeles action by stipulation of the parties to said action on June 4, 1936, and that thereafter there could be no issue in the Los Angeles action relative to the disposition of the sum of $12,549.60 on deposit in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, and that any issue in regard to the disposition of this fund must be determined in the action pending in the last mentioned court. On pages 26 and 27 of appellant’s opening brief in that case counsel for Mr. Mather state: “Not only are there new and additional findings, there are new and additional provisions in the judgment, not based upon any previous order for judgment or any previous conclusions of law. These new and additional provisions include in their operation the co-defendants, estate of Greenfield, Edna Greenfield, administratrix, Herman Wobber and Hugo D. Keil, administrators thereof. This new portion of the judgment orders these co-defendants to pay the sum of $12,549.60 to Dorothy Devore Mather co-defendant and respondent. (Cl. Tr. p. 160, lines 14-19.) There was no such provision in the previous judgment entered on March 14, 1935, or in the conclusions of law filed on that date. (Cl. Tr. pp. 151, 154.) Consequently, the new judgment is void. . . .

“The procurement of this new provision in the judgment is both an imposition on the co-defendants and appellants against whom it is directed, and upon the judge. It orders the doing of an act which is impossible. The same■ money is now in the hands of the Court in the San Francisco action. (See supra, p. 4.) Furthermore, the procurement of this judgment is in direct disregard of respondents’ later stipulation that the same money he deposited with the Court in the San Francisco action, and discharging the Estate of Greenfield and the administrators thereof of liahility to either A. W. Mather, appellant herein, or to Dorothy Devore Mather, respondent herein and in whose favor the new judgment is rendered. The estate and the administrators were not only discharged from liability by stipulation of this same Dorothy Devore Mather, dated June 4, 1936, but pursuant to such stipulation, an order of Court was entered to the same effect on June 5, 1936, more than three years before the entry of the judgment on December 12, 1939. (See supra, p. 5, see also, stipulation and order thereon in Greenfield v. Mather, at Cl. Tr. p. 59, lines 12-20 therein.) ” [Emphasis added.]

In their reply brief filed by counsel for Mr. Mather in the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, on February 3, 1942, in support of his appeal from the judgment of December 12, 1939, in the Los Angeles action, counsel state at pages 42 and 43: “But even if we were so charitably inclined as to permit respondents to call this new and different matter in the third judgment ‘surplusage’, the record would not permit it, because the new judgment, in respect to the direction to pay the money to Mrs. Mather, is directly contrary to the recitals in the second judgment and in the original findings. The second judgment recites that: ‘. . . Messrs. Lorrin Andrews and Sidney Snyder appearing as attorneys for plaintiff and Messrs. Don Lake and James R. Jaffray for defendants Anna Inez Mather and Lessie G. Williams, the other defendants not being represented in court, no relief being demanded against said other defendants, who were made parties for the purpose of ashing for restraining delivery to defendant Anna Inez Mather of certain moneys and properties mentioned in the complaint, which restraint was effectuated by the issuance of a temporary injunction in said action(Cl. Tr. p. 153, lines 16-25; Italics ours.)

“An identical recital was made in the findings of fact. (Cl. Tr. p. 133, lines 16-25.) Consequently, the record shows affirmatively that all that was sought as to Estate of Greenfield was a restraint during the pendency of the action, and that this relief was accomplished by a temporary injunction, which ‘was dissolved February 27, 1935’ (Cl. Tr. p. 151, line 20), which dissolution was confirmed in the second judgment. (Cl. Tr. p. 154, line 11.) On the face of the record, all the relief that was sought against the Greenfield Estate was obtained, and the Estate was in effect dismissed from the case on February 27, 1935, when the restraint was dissolved, and most certainly so when this dissolution was confirmed in the second judgment[Emphasis added.]

There can be no question that it was the position of counsel for Mr. Mather on the appeal from the judgment of December 12, 1939, in the Los Angeles action which terminated in the decision of Mather v. Mather, 22 Cal.2d 713 [140 P.2d 808], that the all-important question as to who was entitled to the sum of $12,549.60 on deposit in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco in the interpleader action, must be determined by a judgment in the interpleader action. However, this court reversed the judgment of December 12, 1939, in the Los Angeles action on the ground that Mrs. Mather’s counsel failed to give sufficient notice to counsel for Mr. Mather of their motion for entry of said judgment (Mather v. Mather, 22 Cal.2d 713 [140 P.2d 808]). At page 718 of its opinion in said case this court states: ‘ ‘ The judgment, being based upon a finding that Anna Inez Mather was the owner of one-half of the claim against the Greenfield estate, is erroneous in adjudging her to be the owner of the whole of said claim. Such condition of the record precludes affirmance of the judgment as a proper termination of this litigation.” [Emphasis added.]

It is obvious that the court was led into a misapprehension as to the difference between a half interest in the claim and half of the unpaid balance of the claim, as the opinion states: “The judgment being based upon a finding that Anna Inez Mather was the owner of one-half of the claim against the Greenfield estate, is erroneous in adjudging her to be the owner of the whole of said claim.” [Emphasis added.] This misconception is apparent when we refer to the finding made by Judge Hanson on which the judgment of December 12, 1939, was based, which determines that Mrs. Mather is the owner of an undivided one-half interest in said claim. This finding is in accord with all of the pleadings and decisions in the case. The confusion arose in assuming that the $12,549.60 on deposit in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco which was awarded to Mrs. Mather in said judgment, constituted the whole claim, and was undoubtedly due to the fact that no evidence was offered in the Los Angeles action relative to the payments received by Mr. and Mrs. Mather on their respective half interests in the claim which would have disclosed that Mr. Mather had already received more than his share. Of course such evidence would not have been relevant or material in the Los Angeles action because the amount which the respective parties were entitled to receive as their respective shares of the claim was not an issue in that case. It must necessarily follow that the above-quoted erroneous statement from the opinion of this court, 22 Cal.2d 713, is mere dictum because it was not within the issues in that case and therefore could not have been determined either by the trial court or this court.

After the decision of this court in Mather v. Mather, 22 Cal.2d 713 [140 P.2d 808], reversing the judgment of December 12, 1939, Mrs. Mather’s attorneys went into the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and after obtaining an order expunging the judgments of January 4th and March 14, 1935, they moved for a judgment on the merits based upon the findings made by Judge Frank M. Smith in support of the judgment entered by him on March 14, 1935. These motions were made before Judge Frank M. Smith, and on November 1, 1943, he signed a judgment which determined all of the issues in the Los Angeles action in favor of Mrs. Mather. This judgment was entered on November 1, 1943, and simply provided that plaintiff A. W. Mather take nothing by reason of his complaint; that the temporary injunction theretofore issued restraining the administrators of the Greenfield estate from making any further payments to Mrs. Mather on her half interest in the claim against said estate be dissolved; and that Mrs. Mather recover her costs. No mention was made therein with respect to the disposition of the $12,549.60 on deposit in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco in the interpleader action instituted by the administrators of the Greenfield estate. Mr. Mather appealed from this judgment and it was reversed by this court in Mather v. Mather, 25 Cal.2d 582 [154 P.2d 684], It would appear that this court held in that decision that Mrs. Mather was entitled to only one-half of the $12,549.60 on deposit in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco in the interpleader action instituted by the administrators of the Greenfield estate as distinguished from one-half of the whole claim against the Greenfield estate which, as above shown, was the phraseology used in the decision in 22 Cal.2d 713. It is clear that the opinion filed by this court at that time (25 Cal.2d 582) is based upon the misconception that there was an issue in the Los Angelees action relative to the respective interests of Mr. and Mrs. Mather in this fund, as the only issue in that action was whether or not the property settlement agreement, and incidentally the assignment executed by Mr. Mather pursuant to said agreement, was valid. This assignment dated June 16, 1933, transferred to Mrs. Mather an undivided one-half interest in the unpaid balance of the approved claim of Mr. Mather against the Greenfield estate. The last opinion of this court (25 Cal.2d 582) is, however, in conflict with its earlier opinion (22 Cal.2d 713), in that in the earlier opinion the discussion concerned the respective interests of Mr. and Mrs. Mather in the claim as a whole, while in the last opinion it spoke of their respective rights in the fund of $12,549.60, which was treated as being synonymous with the whole claim. This conflict resulted because of the failure to distinguish the difference between the issues in the Los Angeles and San Francisco actions. In the complaint filed by Mr. Mather in the Los Angeles action, he alleged that at the time this assignment was executed there was due and unpaid on said claim the sum of $38,699 plus accrued interest, and that Mrs. Mather had been paid on account of her half interest in said claim the sum of $7,441. He alleged that the assignment was invalid and that he was entitled to the return of the sum which Mrs. Mather had been paid under it and that she should not receive any further amount by virtue of the assignment. While the administrators of the Greenfield estate were joined as defendants in that action, they were joined solely for the purpose of restraining them from making any further payments to Mrs. Mather. They filed an answer in which they simply alleged that they were holding as the unpaid balance of said claim the sum of $12,549.60 subject to the determination of the validity of the assignment which Mr. Mather had executed to Mrs. Mather for an undivided one-half interest in said claim. No evidence was offered in any of the hearings in the Los Angeles action as to what, if any, payments had been made to Mr. Mather by the administrators of the Greenfield estate, and there was no showing before the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at any time that Mr. Mather at the time he commenced the Los Angeles action had already received more than his share of the proceeds of said claim if his assignment to Mrs. Mather was valid. These facts were known "to Mr. Mather, as he had signed vouchers for the payments which he had received from the administrators of the Greenfield estate showing that he had received between the date of the assignment on June 16, 1933, and the date of the commencement of the action on August 4, 1934, a total sum of $26,569.05, which was $3,439.23 more than his share of the unpaid balance of the claim at the time the assignment was executed. It is obvious that if the amount which the respective parties were entitled to receive from the proceeds of this claim was in issue in the Los Angeles action, Mr. Mather should have made a disclosure by either pleading or proof in that action that he had received these payments and that he was not entitled to receive any more of the proceeds of said claim if the assignment executed by him to Mrs. Mather was valid. But it is clear that the amount to which the respective parties were entitled from the proceeds of said claim was not an issue in the Los Angeles action, and the only issue in that action with respect to'said claim was whether or not the assignment to Mrs. Mather was valid. That issue was first determined by Judge Frank M. Smith in the findings and judgment signed by him on March 12, 1935, and again in the judgment which he signed on November 1, 1943. Neither of these judgments, nor the findings supporting the same, made any reference to the amount to which Mrs. Mather was entitled from the proceeds of the claim, because there was no evidence from which any determination of said amount could be made.

It is abundantly clear from the record that after the interpleader action was commenced in San Francisco on April 12, 1935, Mr. Mather took the position that the issue as to the disposition of the sum of $12,549.60 deposited in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco by the administrators of the Greenfield estate in the interpleader action commenced by them, was to be determined by the San Francisco court and not by the Los Angeles court. Mr. Mather through his attorneys so contended in all of his briefs and petitions until this court made the statement in its opinion in 22 Cal.2d 713, that Mrs. Mather was entitled to one-half and not the whole of said claim. This statement while correct on its face was based upon a misconception that the whole claim and the fund on deposit in the Superior Court of San Francisco in the interpleader action was one of the same thing.

After the decision of this court in Mather v. Mather, 25 Cal.2d 582 [154 P.2d 684], and on March 29, 1945, at the request of Mr. Mather’s attorneys, Judge Frank M. Smith of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County entered a judgment in the Los Angeles action awarding to Mr. Mather an undivided one-half of the fund on deposit in the superior court of San Francisco and the other half was awarded to Mrs. Mather. No appeal was taken from this judgment and it became final. This judgment was entered pursuant to the direction of this court in its last-mentioned decision without amendment to the pleadings or the introduction of any evidence relative to the payments received by Mr. and Mrs. Mather from the administrators of the Greenfield estate on account of the claim here involved. As before stated, no evidence was ever presented in the Los Angeles action relative to the respective interests of Mr. and Mrs. Mather in the fund deposited in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco by the administrators of the Greenfield estate in settlement of Mr. Mather’s claim against said estate.

It must be remembered that in the San Francisco action Mr. Mather filed an answer .and cross-complaint to the complaint in interpleader, in which cross-complaint he joined Mrs. Mather as a cross-defendant and alleged that the assignment executed by him to Mrs. Mather on June 16, 1933, of an undivided one-half interest in his claim against the Greenfield estate was invalid and void because it was executed in the Territory of Hawaii in violation of the laws of that territory, and for that reason he was entitled to the full unpaid balance of said claim. Mrs. Mather also filed an answer and cross-complaint in said action in which she joined Mr. Mather as a cross-defendant and alleged that she was the owner of the full amount deposited by the administrators of the Greenfield estate in said interpleader action by virtue of the assignment to her by Mr. Mather of an undivided one-half interest in said claim. In said cross-complaint she asked the court to determine the rights of the respective parties to said fund. It is conceded, and the record discloses, that no trial was ever had on these issues in the San Francisco action as the trial court considered the judgment of March 29,1945, entered in the Los Angeles action to be res judicata of all issues in the San Francisco action and refused to admit any evidence as to the payments which had been made to either Mr. or Mrs. Mather by the administrators of the Greenfield estate subsequent to the date of said assignment. This evidence was, however, offered by Mrs. Mather and now appears in the record before us in the form of an offer of proof of the issues in this action.

It is apparent from the foregoing that we have here a plea of res judicata, based upon a judgment rendered in an action where, in the proceedings therein, there were no pleadings or evidence on the issue claimed to be adjudicated. While in that action the issue as to the respective interests in the claim against the Greenfield estate (one-half to each) was considered, there was never involved, nor was any consideration given to the question as to what payments had been made on the respective interests in said claim by the administrators of the Greenfield estate to either of the parties. The decisions of this court in 22 Cal.2d 713, and 25 Cal.2d 582, which led to the judgment claimed to be res judicata are conflicting, and this court was obviously misled and mistaken as to the true issues involved. Inconsistent positions have been taken by both parties in these actions, and in view of the prior positions taken by Mr. Mather, he has little if any basis for reliance on the judgment in the Los Angeles action as res judicata of the issue in this action as to- the amount to which the respective parties are entitled from the fund on deposit in said court. While the litigation was pending in the Los Angeles action which led to the judgment here claimed to be res judicata, but which embraced no issue as to the rights of the respective parties in the fund, the precise question had been pfesented in an action pending in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco and was clearly set forth in the pleadings on file therein. From the offer of proof made by Mrs. Mather in the trial court it appears that Mr. Mather has been paid more than his share of the claim against the Greenfield estate, and although Mrs. Mather has made assignments of her interest in the claim, so far as appears, Mr. Mather has not, thus indicating that no intervening innocent third parties have been misled by the Los Angeles judgment. All those circumstances together with the facts and history of the litigation heretofore set forth present a situation where the doctrine of res judicata should not be applied.

We are mindful of the rule that a judgment rendered in an action in personam by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties is not void and subject to collateral attack merely because it may erroneously determine some matter not specifically raised in the pleadings, and not covered by the evidence before the trial court, and that such a judgment is res judicata. We adhere to this rule. (See, Kupfer v. Brawner, 19 Cal.2d 562 [122 P.2d 268]; Estate of Keet, 15 Cal.2d 328 [100 P.2d 1045].) But in rare cases a judgment may not be res judicata, when proper consideration is given to the policy underlying the doctrine, and there are rare instances in which it is not applied. In such cases it will not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or important considerations of policy. (See, Guardianship of Di Carlo, 3 Cal.2d 225 [44 P.2d 562, 99 A.L.R. 990]; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 592.)

By reason of the special circumstances appearing in this case, as above narrated, we are constrained to hold that the doctrine of res judicata should not be applied here, and that the issue as to the respective portions of the fund on deposit in the court below to which the parties hereto are entitled should be determined without regard to the judgment in the Los Angeles action. The judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.