MAJORITY OPINION
WANDA McKEE FOWLER, Justice.
Appellant Adrian Dewayne Green was convicted by a jury of murder and his punishment assessed at fifty years’ con[74]*74finement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, and a $10,000 fine. On appeal, appellant complains of errors in the court’s charge and its instructions to the jury. Because we find reversible error in the jury charge, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant and his younger brother, Jer-marxian Deandre Green, were each charged by indictment with the murder of Quinton Kelegon, the complainant. The two were tried together as co-defendants before the same jury. The jury found appellant guilty of murder and found Jer-marxian guilty of manslaughter.1
A. The Evidence Presented at Trial
Some time before 2:00 a.m. on March 13, 2005, Kelegon and three friends, Deson-yeigh Dwayne Hooper, Lebroderick Williams, and Christopher Pope, decided to go to Carrington’s, a nightclub located in a strip mall on South Main inside Loop 610. They arrived near closing time in Hooper’s vehicle, a 1990 Chevrolet Caprice Classic, and parked in the parking lot Car-rington’s shares with other businesses. The group did not go inside Carrington’s, but instead walked around the parking lot socializing and looking at girls.
Also parked in the same parking lot was an orange or tangerine colored, customized Ford Expedition owned by appellant.2 Appellant, a local rapper, and his younger brother, Jermarxian Deandre Green, were promoting appellant’s music CDs from the Expedition.
Eventually, as people began leaving the club, Kelegon and his friends decided to leave the parking lot. Hooper was driving the Caprice and Kelegon sat in the front passenger seat. Williams and Pope were seated in the back, with Pope behind Hooper and Williams behind Kelegon.
At this point, the facts developed at trial by the State’s witnesses Hooper, Williams, and Pope differ in various details and diverge significantly from those of the defense. The State’s witnesses testified generally that after they left the club’s parking lot they stopped at a red light at South Main and Westridge. At that time, they were playing music in the Caprice from a CD entitled “Tha Boss,” by rapper Slim Thug. Thug’s music talked “about rappers” and some of it included “very unflattering” and “negative” references to appellant’s rap music.
Appellant, driving the Expedition, with his brother Jermarxian as passenger, pulled up on the passenger side of the Caprice. According to the State’s witnesses, appellant could hear the music and became angry, and he and Kelegon, in the front passenger seat of the Caprice, exchanged words. Appellant appeared “riled up,” and “very angry” toward Kelegon and Hooper, the driver. Pope testified that appellant said to Kelegon, “Do you know me?” and Kelegon responded with “No, I don’t know you. Do you know me?,” which they repeated back and forth several times.3 When Kelegon saw appellant dis[75]*75playing an unloaded semiautomatic pistol, he told Hooper that appellant had a gun and said, “[L]et’s go. Dude got a pistol, he show it on the steering wheel, let’s go.” At the next red light, the Expedition pulled up next to the group on the driver’s side of the Caprice, and Hooper saw Jer-marxian Green in the passenger seat “bent down low” and “looking like he was loading a pistol.” Hooper ran the red light, and he heard a shot fired. Hooper, Williams, and Pope all testified that no firearms were in or fired from the Caprice.4
Hooper drove onto the 610 freeway heading north. The Expedition followed, pulled up alongside the passenger side of the Caprice, and several shots were fired at the Caprice. A bullet grazed Kelegon’s leg, and he exclaimed, “My leg is burning; it’s shot. This dude shot me.” Then, as the two cars sped along the freeway, the Expedition pulled up toward the driver’s side of the Caprice, and more shots were fired. One of the bullets shattered the driver’s side rear door window of the Caprice and hit Kelegon in the side of the head. Hooper exited the 610 Loop at Evergreen, and drove Kelegon to a hospital, where Kelegon later died.
The hospital contacted the Houston Police Department, and Officer A.G. Riddle of the Homicide division and several others investigated the incident. Riddle examined the Caprice and determined that there were seven fresh gunshot strikes in the vehicle, including four to the passenger side and three to the driver’s side of the vehicle. He also determined that all of the shots were fired at angles from the rear of the vehicle toward the front. Riddle found no evidence indicating a firearm had been fired from inside the Caprice. The police attempted to locate, but never found, the Expedition.
An autopsy was performed on Kelegon’s body by Dr. Morna Gonsoulin, an assistant medical examiner with the Harris County Medical Examiner’s Office. Gonsoulin determined that the cause of Kelegon’s death was a gunshot wound to the head. The bullet entered behind and slightly above the left ear, and exited on the right side of the temple. The bullet traveled from left to right, slightly back to front, and slightly downward.5 She also found a superficial abrasion on Kelegon’s right leg. Gonsou-lin testified that Kelegon was pronounced dead at 1:30 p.m. on March 13, 2005.
Herbert Thompson, Jr., a friend of Jer-marxian Green who was called by the State, testified that he saw Jermarxian some time after the incident and spoke to him about it. Thompson testified that Jer-marxian told him that he and appellant had been to Carrington’s that night and that they were in the Expedition when the shooting occurred. Thompson could not remember whether the reason Jermarxian gave for the incident was that he and his brother were being robbed or whether it was that they were being carjacked. Thompson testified that Jermarxian believed he had fired the fatal shot, and appeared remorseful.
[76]*76Appellant did not testify at trial, but Jermarxian testified in his defense. Jer-marxian’s version of events differed significantly from those of the other witnesses to the incident, particularly concerning who were the aggressors. Jermarxian was with appellant, his older brother, on March 13, 2005, to help appellant promote his CD. Appellant was a local celebrity and owned the Expedition. Appellant drove the Expedition that night.
When Jermarxian and appellant got to the traffic light at South Main and Wes-tridge, the Caprice pulled up to the driver’s side of the Expedition and Kelegon twice said to appellant, “Do you know me?,” and appellant responded, “I don’t know you.” Kelegon then said, “Well, you know what time it is,” but appellant did not say anything in response. As they were still waiting at the light, Kelegon then got out of the Caprice, and Jermarxi-an saw that Kelegon had a gun. Jermarxi-an interpreted Kelegon’s statements and actions to mean that the occupants of the Caprice were attempting to carjack them. Appellant then sped towards the 610 Freeway, but the Caprice caught up to the Expedition. Appellant told Jermarxian to hand appellant his gun, which appellant said was in the console of the Expedition. Jermarxian handed the gun to appellant, who told Jermarxian to get down.
As the Caprice pulled up to the Expedition, appellant began shooting. Then, as the Caprice came around to the passenger side of the Expedition, Jermarxian told appellant to give him the gun. Jermarxian shot twice at the Caprice, not aiming at anyone or intending to kill anyone, but just “to get those guys off of us.” He saw one of the bullets shatter the back driver’s side rear window. Jermarxian believed that this shot killed Kelegon.
Jermarxian admitted that four people rode in the Caprice because he could see them. He acknowledged that firing a loaded weapon at a car full of people was an act clearly dangerous to human life. Although Jermarxian acknowledged that seven bullet holes were found in the Caprice, he claimed he had done nothing wrong because Kelegon and the others were trying to rob him and he was trying to protect himself. He agreed that the forensic testimony showed the bullets traveled from the rear of the Caprice toward the front, but he would not agree that he and appellant were behind the Caprice when the shots were fired into it. Instead, he claimed he shot twice when the Caprice pulled alongside the Expedition and was dead even with it. After the incident, he inspected the Expedition and found no bullet holes.
B. The Court’s Charge at the Guilt-Innocence Stage
Appellant’s complaints only concern the charge. As a result, we will review it in detail.
The indictment in relevant part alleged in separate paragraphs that appellant (1) intentionally and knowingly caused the complainant’s death by shooting him with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, and (2) intended to cause serious bodily injury to the complainant and caused his death by intentionally and knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting him with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1) <& 19.02(b)(2). The trial court conducted a charge conference at the conclusion of the evidence at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial. Appellant’s trial counsel objected to the charge only on the basis that it did not include the offense of manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. The trial court agreed to include this instruction in the charge.
[77]*77As finalized, the charge included several standard definitions and instructions to the jury, including the following instructions on the law of parties:
All persons are parties to an offense who are guilty of acting together in the commission of the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.
A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Mere presence alone will not constitute one a party to an offense.
These instructions are consistent with the language of sections 7.01(a)(1) and 7.02(a)(2) of the Penal Code addressing parties to an offense.
However, in the application paragraphs, which immediately followed the above instructions on the law of parties, the trial court submitted the offense of murder to the jury as follows:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 13th day of March, 2005, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Adrian Dewayne Green, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Quinton Kele-gon, by shooting Quinton Kelegon with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 13th day of March, 2005, in Harris County, Texas, Jermarxian Deandre Green, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Quinton Kelegon, by shooting Quinton Kelegon with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 13th day of March, 2005, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Adrian Dewayne Green, did then and there unlawfully intend to cause serious bodily injury to Quinton Kelegon, and did cause the death of Quinton Kelegon by intentionally or knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely by shooting Quinton Kelegon with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 13th day of march 2005, in Harris County, Texas, Jermarxian Deandre Green, did then and there unlawfully intend to cause serious bodily injury to Quinton Kelegon, and did cause the death of Quinton Kelegon by intentionally or knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely by shooting Quinton Kelegon with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and that the defendant, Adrian Dewayne Green, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Jermarxian Deandre Green to commit the offense, if he did, then you will find the defendant guilty of murder, as charged in the indictment.
Following these application paragraphs, the charge provided the following:
You are further instructed that before a person can be guilty of murder he must have intentionally or knowingly caused the death, or he must have intended to cause serious bodily injury and have intentionally or knowingly committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of the deceased. Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is [78]*78guilty of murder, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of murder and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of manslaughter.
The jury was also charged on manslaughter, both as a principal and as a party, and on self-defense. The jury returned a general verdict finding appellant guilty of murder.
II. Analysis of Appellant’s Issues
A. Appellant’s Issues
Appellant does not challenge the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction; all of his issues are directed to the trial court’s charge as submitted to the jury. As briefed, appellant contends the trial court reversibly erred by (1) submitting the question of his criminal liability for murder as a principal on insufficient evidence; (2) allowing the jury to convict him for the murder committed by his brother, Jermarxian Deandre Green; (3) failing to instruct the jury that it must agree on the specific criminal conduct appellant committed that justified a guilty verdict of murder; and (4) failing to instruct the jury that it must agree on the predicate offense of Jermarxian Green that justified finding appellant a party to his crime.
B. Standard of Review
In reviewing jury charge error, we undertake a two-step process. See Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170-71 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). First, we must determine whether error exists in the charge. See id. at 171. Second, we review the record to determine whether sufficient harm was caused by the error to require reversal of the conviction. See id.
The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the error was preserved. Id. An error properly preserved by an objection must be reversed unless it is harmless. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). However, when the charging error is not preserved, reversal is not required unless the harm is egregious. Id.
In determining whether error is egregious, we consider the following factors: (1) the entirety of the jury charge; (2) the state of the evidence; (3) the arguments of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the trial record as a whole. See Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Errors which result in egregious harm are those which affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affect a defense theory. Sanchez, 209 S.W.3d at 121; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172. In other words, the error must have been so harmful that the defendant was effectively denied a fair and impartial trial. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172. Egregious harm is a difficult standard to prove and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 171.
C.The Trial Court Reversibly Erred by Instructing the Jury that It Could Convict Appellant of Murder If It Found that Appellant’s Brother Committed Murder.
We begin with appellant’s second issue because that issue disposes of the appeal. In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court reversibly erred by instructing the jury that it could find appellant guilty of murder if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that “Jermarxian Deandre Green [ ] did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Quenton Kelgon with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm.” (emphasis added) Appellant contends that this language, lacking the party language that usually [79]*79accompanies this type of instruction, charged the jury that it could convict appellant of murder if it found that his brother committed murder. Among other things, appellant contends this portion of the charge allowed him to be convicted for conduct that is not an offense and without requiring the jury to find the elements of party responsibility. We agree. We also find that the error caused appellant egregious harm.
1. The Charge Error
The charge as submitted authorized the jury to convict appellant of murder if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that
• Adrian Dewayne Green, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Quinton Kelegon, by shooting Quinton Kelegon with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or
• Jermarxian Deandre Green, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Quinton Kelegon, by shooting Quinton Kelegon with a deadly weapon, namely, afire-arm; or
• Adrian Dewayne Green, did then and there unlawfully intend to cause serious bodily injury to Quinton Kelegon, and did cause the death of Quinton Kelegon by intentionally or knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely by shooting Quinton Kelegon with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or
• Jermarxian Deandre Green, did then and there unlawfully intend to cause serious bodily injury to Quinton Kele-gon, and did cause the death of Quinton Kelegon by intentionally or knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely by shooting Quinton Kelegon with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and that the defendant, Adrian Dewayne Green, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Jermarxian Deandre Green to commit the offense.
The instruction italicized above was intended to offer the jury the option of convicting appellant of murder as a party, but the party language was omitted from that particular instruction (although it was included in the serious bodily injury instruction). Consequently, the jury was not instructed that, to find appellant guilty as a party to the murder Jermarxian committed, it had to find that appellant “with the intent to promote or assist” in the commission of the offense, “solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid” Jermarxian in committing murder. See Tex. Penal Code 7.02(a)(2).6 Thus, as the charge was presented, appellant could be found guilty of murder based solely on his brother’s conduct. Because the charge is the instrument by which the jury convicts, the charge must contain an accurate statement of the law and must set out all the essential elements of the offense. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 380, 339 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). A jury charge is fundamentally defective if it omits an essential element of the offense or authorizes conviction on a [80]*80set of facts that do not constitute an offense. Zuckerman v. State, 591 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
This case is like Zuckerman v. State, in which separately-indicted codefendants were tried together for the offense of burglary of a habitation. See id. at 496. The charge authorized the jury to convict the appellant for burglary if it found that his co-defendant was the guilty party, without a finding that the appellant was guilty as a party to the offense. Id. As the Court explained:
It is essential to a conviction for any offense that the accused be criminally responsible either because it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another for whom he is criminally responsible.... In this case the jury was authorized to convict appellant on a finding that his co-defendant committed the offense, without a finding that appellant personally committed the offense, or that he was criminally responsible for the acts of his co-defendant. It thus authorized conviction on a set of facts that would -not- constitute an offense for which he was criminally responsible. As such, the jury charge is fundamentally defective. -
Id. Similarly, the jury here was authorized to convict appellant of a murder committed by someone else without a finding that he was guilty as a party to the offense. That was error. See id.
The State concedes only that the charge “could have been better worded,” and argues that when read as a whole the charge “conveys the message” that the jury must apply the law of parties before it would be authorized to convict appellant for the offense of murder as a party to Jermarxian Green’s conduct. For this proposition, the State relies on Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
However, Reyes is distinguishable. There, the defendant contended the trial court erred in refusing to include a requested charge applying the law of parties to the facts of the case. Id. at 428-24. Although the application paragraph of the court’s charge did not include a parties instruction, the charge did include, at the defendant’s request, an abstract instruction on the law of parties that also applied the law to the facts of the case. Id. at 423. Based on this, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that, when read as a whole, the trial court’s instructions “encompass[ed] the substance” of the defendant’s request and was therefore sufficient to charge the jury on the law of parties and apply the law to the facts. Id. at 424.
This charge does not do that. This charge contains an abstract instruction on the law of parties, but does not contain any instruction applying this law to Jermarxi-an’s conduct in the complained-of paragraph. Thus, unlike the Reyes jury, this jury was given no guidance whatsoever concerning how it should apply the law of parties to Jermarxian’s conduct. This was error. But before we can reverse, we must determine if the error caused appellant egregious harm requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.7
[81]*812. Egregious Harm Review
To determine egregious harm, Almanza and its progeny instruct that we may consider not only the erroneous portion of the charge, but also other relevant aspects of the trial. See Sanchez, 209 S.W.3d at 121; Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 171; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. As noted above, these relevant aspects include: (1) the entirety of the charge itself; (2) the state of the evidence including contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence; (3) the arguments of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the trial record as a whole. See Sanchez, 209 S.W.3d at 121.
a. The Charge
We first consider the entirety of the jury charge. See Sanchez, 209 S.W.3d at 121. Absent evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the jury understood and followed the court’s charge. See Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 172. The jury was instructed that “[y]ou are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but the law you shall receive in these written instructions, and you must be governed thereby.” (emphasis added) In short, the jury was expressly instructed to follow the law as presented in the charge.
The jury was abstractly charged on the law of parties, meaning that the charge generally instructed the jury that a person can be criminally responsible for the actions of another if the person solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another in committing an offense. But, of utmost importance here, the application paragraph — the paragraph that authorizes the jury to accept or reject a specifically alleged offense — for murder as a party omitted the party language. Taken together, these instructions were inadequate, for, between the abstract instruction and the application paragraph on murder as a party, neither specifically explained to the jury which facts it could properly consider to convict appellant as a party. In fact, the instructions were worse than that because, rather than merely withholding information from the jury, the application paragraph affirmatively misled the jury by telling the jury it could convict appellant for a murder committed by Jermarxian Green-even if appellant was not a party to the murder. This was a legally incorrect instruction that completely misstated the law, and to worsen matters, we cannot tell if the jury convicted appellant as a party based on the legally incorrect instruction
or as a principal. See id. at 171-73; Guevara v. State, 191 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error); see also Campbell v. State, 910 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (stating it is error for a trial judge to refer to the law of parties in the abstract portion of the jury charge and not to apply that law or to refer to that law in the application paragraph of the charge). We cannot assume the jury realized that the parties language was erroneously omitted, inserted appropriate language, and then applied it correctly.
b. The Evidence
Next, we consider the evidence, including the contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence. See Sanchez, 209 S.W.3d at 121. The State offered the accounts of Kelegon’s companions, Hooper, Williams, and Pope, to demonstrate that the group of young men were out for a night of socializing by going to the parking lot of a nightclub to hang out and look at [82]*82girls. Appellant and his brother happened to be promoting appellant’s rap CDs in the same parking lot, and as the group was leaving in their Caprice, appellant heard rap music coming from the car that referred to appellant’s rap music in a derogatory way. Appellant then became angry and confrontational, and when he presented a gun, the group tried to speed away as appellant and his brother chased them in appellant’s Expedition. The evidence showed that the Caprice sustained numerous bullet holes, while there was no evidence that anyone in the Caprice had a weapon or fired it at appellant and his brother.
In contrast to the State’s account of the incident, appellant’s brother Jermarxian testified he saw Kelegon get out of the car with a gun, and, based on Kelegon’s threatening statements and conduct, he believed the group was attempting to carjack the Expedition. According to Jer-marxian, he and appellant tried to drive away from the Caprice, but the Caprice chased the Expedition and eventually pulled up next to it. He admitted that both he and appellant fired appellant’s gun at the Caprice, but he testified that he was shooting at the Caprice only to “get them off’ of them. He also testified that he believed he fired the shot that killed Kele-gon.
Thus, the contested issues included whether appellant or Jermarxian fired the fatal shot and whether the conduct was intentional or knowing, or merely reckless. The jury could have believed that Jermar-xian murdered Kelegon and that appellant was a party to Jermarxian’s conduct. Conversely, the jury could have believed that appellant fired the fatal shot and Jer-marxian was a party to appellant’s conduct. Alternatively, if the jury believed Jermarxian’s testimony and disbelieved the State’s witnesses, it could have determined that appellant and his brother acted only in self-defense. Thus, the parties fully joined the contested issue of appellant’s guilt as either a primary actor or as a party to murder.
The State argues that any error in charging on the law of parties was “necessarily” harmless because the evidence “clearly supported a finding that appellant was responsible for the complainant’s murder as a primary actor.” See Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 466 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“Even where proper objection is made at trial, we have held that where, as in the instant case, the evidence clearly supports a defendant’s guilt as the primary actor, error in charging on the law of parties was harmless.”); see also West v. State, Nos. 03-05-00206-CR, 03-05-00207-CR & 03-05-00208-CR, 2006 WL 2449856, at *10 (Tex.App.-Austin Aug.25, 2006, pet. ref'd); Evans v. State, No. 14-98-0705-CR, 2000 WL 854859, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 29, 2000, pet. ref'd). However, none of these cases involved a situation, as we have here, in which an application paragraph authorized the defendant’s conviction based on the conduct of the co-defendant. And, in any event, whether appellant or his brother were guilty of murder was disputed, and appellant’s brother, Jermarxian, was convicted' of a lesser offense even though he testified that he believed he fired the shot that killed the complainant. Therefore, we do not consider these cases dispositive of the question whether egregious harm was shown.
c. The Jury Arguments
Finally, we consider the arguments of counsel. See Sanchez, 209 S.W.3d at 121. At closing, Mr. Leitner, Jermarxian’s defense counsel, spoke first. He began by emphasizing the jury’s duty to apply the law to the evidence. Among other things, he stated that “[t]he Court’s Charge is the [83]*83law” and that it is “based on exactly what the statutes say and the Judge has set those forth in the charge.” He then went through the charge, explaining the various paragraphs, but he did not mention the erroneous paragraph specifically. Counsel then discussed the perceived inconsistencies in the State’s witnesses’ testimony, and urged the jury to consider Jermarxian Green’s testimony.
Appellant’s defense counsel, Mr. Barr, then made his closing statement. Like Mr. Leitner, Mr. Barr also urged the jury to consider the perceived inconsistencies and weaknesses in the State’s witnesses’ testimony, Jermanáan’s testimony, and the law of self-defense. He also questioned the evidence concerning the positions of the vehicles and the trajectory of the bullets, and argued that the bullets fired from the Expedition could have gone into the Caprice “from various angles.” Although it is unclear from the context, this argument could have been directed either to whether it was appellant or Jer-marxian who fired the shot that killed Kelegon, or whether the Expedition was chasing the Caprice or the Caprice was chasing the Expedition. Finally, Mr. Barr urged that the evidence did not support a finding of guilt.
The prosecutor, Ms. Bennett, spoke last. She discussed the evidence presented by the State’s witnesses. Significant to our analysis, she then argued that “[appellant] was only able to hit [Kelegon] in the leg and the medical examiner confirmed that.” Continuing, she stated, “Jermarxian hit the jackpot. He fired the gun through the back window and he killed [Kelegon].” Later, when discussing the physical evidence, Ms. Bennett stated,
Then there’s the shot that Jermarxian took, the one that killed [Kelegon], fired through the back window, that went directly through the passenger compartment and struck the victim in the head. Dr. Gonsoulin confirmed that’s the angle it had taken.
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They are both equally guilty. Jer-marxian may have fired the killing bullet, but [appellant] here certainly did his part. He chased them down. He tried to kill them, tried to shoot them, tried to commit serious bodily injury. He just wasn’t as good a shot as his brother. He can only hit him in the leg.
Thus, during her closing argument, the prosecutor urged that the evidence supported a finding that Jermarxian was guilty of murder for firing the fatal shot and that appellant was equally guilty because he gave Jermarxian the chance to shoot and kill. The charge for its part did not clarify the prosecutor’s comments for the jury and, instead, misled the jury into believing it could find appellant guilty of murder if Jermarxian committed the murder.
3. The Error Resulted in Egregious Harm
The jury found appellant guilty of murder and found Jermarxian, who testified he believed he fired the fatal bullet, guilty of manslaughter. Although the jury’s verdict may indicate that the jury believed that appellant, rather than Jer-marxian, was guilty as a primary actor and that Jermarxian was merely reckless, we cannot know whether the jury found appellant guilty of murder based on an erroneous legal theory. But we do know one important fact: the jury was told in the application paragraph in the charge that it could convict appellant on an invalid legal theory. We cannot tell from the verdict or record whether or not the jury convicted on that basis, which would be error, but we can tell that neither the rest of the charge, nor the evidence, nor the jury arguments [84]*84set the record right and that the jury was affirmatively told it must follow the law given to it in the charge. These points factor heavily in our analysis and tip the scales toward egregious harm.
One might argue that the jury could not have relied on the improper jury charge to find appellant guilty of murder because the jury did not find Jermarxian guilty of murder. However, as a reviewing court, we cannot adopt this argument.
A jury may render logically inconsistent verdicts as to different co-defendants, and “it is not our duty to unravel the ratiocina-tions of the jury’s collective logic.” See Odom v. United States, 377 F.2d 853, 857 (5th Cir.1967) (and cases cited therein); see also Ruiz v. State, 641 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no pet) (“[CJonsistency is not necessary in criminal verdicts where the verdicts are returned in a joint trial of two or more indictments.”). Moreover, the trial court’s charge included the following instruction to the jury: ‘Your sole duty at this time is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant under the indictment in this cause and restrict your deliberations solely to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant.” As a result of this instruction, we cannot speculate that the jury considered and applied the law consistently to both co-defendants. “[A]n individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based on either pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally do not undertake.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Although much of this body of law is federal, we have found no state case law that contradicts it. See Jackson v. State, 3 S.W.3d 58, 61-62 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Moranza v. State, 913 S.W.2d 718, 724 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, pet.ref'd); Ruiz, 641 S.W.2d at 366.
Appellant’s charge incorporates the idea set forth in the above case law that we review the viability of a verdict as it relates to an individual defendant, not as it relates to the group of defendants, requiring harmony among the defendants’ verdicts. The court instructed the jury to consider the two charges before it — one for Adrian and one for Jermarxian — separately, thereby requiring the jury to focus first on one of the brothers’ individual guilt or innocence and then on the other’s guilt or innocence. While looking at a particular charge, the jury was required to consider the merits of that charge alone, and none other.
As the federal case law cited above reflects, juries frequently treat co-defendants differently, and that appears to have happened here. Focusing on Adrian only, as ordered by the court, the jury apparently believed Adrian was highly culpable, finding him guilty of murder as a principal or as a result of the improper party charge. But, when the jury considered Jer-marxian’s charge, the jury apparently decided to be more lenient or believed that Jermarxian was less culpable — possibly believing that Adrian started the fatal events in motion and was primarily responsible for the death that ultimately transpired — and chose to find Jermarxian guilty only of manslaughter.8
Thus, having been told to review each charge separately, but not having been told to harmonize its findings, the jury was not to consider any potential inconsistency in its verdicts. Because of this, we cannot say that the jury did not rely on the improper party offense to find Appellant guilty of murder based on an improper party offense. As we have already noted, [85]*85such “an individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based on either pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally do not undertake.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 66, 105 S.Ct. 471. We can do neither.
For these reasons, looking only to appellant’s charge without considering Jermar-xian’s charge or verdict, we hold that the charge error affected the very basis of the case and deprived appellant of a valuable right; it authorized the jury to convict him of a murder committed by someone else without requiring the jury to find the elements of party responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt; this is not an offense under the laws of our state. This error was so harmful that appellant was effectively denied a fair and impartial trial. See Sanchez, 209 S.W.3d at 121 (holding charge error, which authorized jury to convict without finding every requisite element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, was egregious based on the entirety of the charge, the contested evidence, and the arguments of counsel); Hammock v. State, 211 S.W.3d 874, 879 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (concluding egregious harm shown when some of alternative theories in charge permitted conviction for conduct not defined as an offense); Guevara, 191 S.W.3d at 210 (holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory).9 We therefore sustain appellant’s second issue.
[86]*86III. Conclusion
In summary, the jury was given four legal theories by which it could convict appellant of murder and one of those theories was invalid. We cannot tell which ground the jury relied on to convict appellant of murder. Nothing in the charge or trial corrected the misdirection the jury was given, and it resulted in egregious harm. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
EDELMAN, J. Dissenting.