Grazette v. Manpower

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 16, 2022·No. 1:21-cv-04296·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DAVID I. GRAZETTE, Plaintiff, 21-CV-4296 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL MANPOWER; STEFANI PEREZ; MAXIMUS; WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD SHELLY R. LUCAS; RODNEY MENELAS, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging “unfair business practices,” and “defamation of character.” (ECF No. 2 at 2.). By order dated May 16, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff thirty days’ leave to replead his claims. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

1 Plaintiff filed this action with an insufficient request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. By order dated September 20, 2021, the Court directed Plaintiff to pay the filing fees or submit a completed and signed amended IFP application. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff submitted an amended IFP application on September 23, 2021. (ECF No. 7.) Because Plaintiff’s ability to pay the fees remained unclear, the Court, by order dated February 15, 2022, granted Plaintiff a final opportunity to pay the filing fees or submit a second amended IFP application. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff emailed the Court on March 6, 2022, indicating that he is “still largely unemployed,” and in fear for his safety, and thus hesitant to respond to the Court’s order. The Court has granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP based upon the information contained in his amended request. Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges the following: I, David Grazette was dismissed from the New York State “COVID-19” vaccine operation with Maximus, the New York State partner with The New York State Department of Health, employed by Manpower, a job staffing human resource company on April 26, 2021 – at least what I currently believe to be the date.

The dissmissal was one sided because, I, David Grazette, wanted to save the lives of New Yorkers for as long as I was lead to believe the operation would run. Shelly R. Lucas and Rodney Menelas had other plans.

After scheduling what Ive lead to, and what appears to be most of what I believe to be the United States ‘life saving vaccines’, I, David Grazette, was let go for not setting up a network in apartment I currently reside!

Since the day I refused to comply I have been put under investigations and witheld federal and state employment protections. (ECF No. 2 at 5-6.)2 He seeks “$22,888. Insurrection. 1000 mile journey.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff has used the Court’s general complaint form and has not checked any boxes to indicate the basis for federal court jurisdiction of his claims. DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff appears to assert that he was wrongfully terminated from employment, the Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting employment discrimination claims. A. Employment Discrimination Claims At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) [a protected trait, such as his race, color, sex, age, or disability] was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). As to the second element, a plaintiff alleging age discrimination must also allege “that the relevant protected trait – [ . . . ] – ‘was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.’” Mazzeo v. Mnuchin, 751 Fed. Appx. 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). The plaintiff may state a

2 The Court quotes the complaint verbatim. All errors are in the original. claim by “alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 87. The federal antidiscrimination statutes prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.

2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful discriminatory conduct, however, is not actionable under these statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).

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