Gray v. Golden

89 So. 2d 785
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedSeptember 7, 1956
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 89 So. 2d 785 (Gray v. Golden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gray v. Golden, 89 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1956).

Opinion

89 So.2d 785 (1956)

R.A. GRAY, as Secretary of State of the State of Florida, and Metropolitan Charter Board, Appellants,
v.
Harold S. GOLDEN and Dade County League of Municipalities, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.

September 7, 1956.
Rehearing Denied October 10, 1956.

*786 Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Howard S. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for R.A. Gray, Secretary of State.

Dubbin, Blatt & Schiff, Miami, J. Lewis Hall, Tallahassee, and Paul & Sams, Miami, for appellants.

Leonard Pepper, Tallahassee, for Harold S. Golden.

Anderson & Nadeau and Edward L. Semple, Miami, for Dade County League of Municipalities.

Henry G. Simmonite, Chairman of Legislative Committee of Dade County Bar Ass'n, Miami, amicus curiae.

TERRELL, Justice.

The Legislature of 1955 adopted Joint Resolution 1046, proposing an amendment to Section 11 of Article VIII, Constitution of Florida, providing home rule for Dade County in local affairs. It provided for submission to the electors of the state for ratification or rejection at the general election in November, 1956. This suit was instituted by Harold S. Golden against the Secretary of State in the Circuit Court of Leon County praying for a declaration of his rights under said resolution and that the Secretary of State be enjoined from spending public funds to advertise and submit the proposed amendment to the electorate at the 1956 general election. The Dade County League of Municipalities and Metropolitan Charter Board were permitted to intervene. The Secretary of State and Metropolitan Charter Board moved for summary final decree, which motion was granted and the Secretary of State was enjoined from advertising or submitting the proposed amendment to the people at the November, 1956, general election. This appeal is from the summary final decree.

Statement.

At the outset appellants direct our attention to the following pertinent facts as a premise for their contention: That Dade is the most populous county in the state; that Miami in said county is the largest city in the state; that there are twenty-six municipalities in Dade County; that said county is a great railroad, manufacturing and commercial center; that it has one of the great harbors of the nation; that the airborne freight and passenger traffic originating in and passing through Dade County is national and international in scope, and that said factors constitute Dade County one of the great metropolitan areas of the world.

Our attention is also called to the fact that the present plan for county and municipal government defined in the Constitution is virtually the same as that originally embodied in the Constitution in 1885; that it is the product of an agrarian economy, geared to the needs of county and municipal government of a century ago. It is contended that such a plan of county and municipal government is inadequate to cope with the problems that constantly arise in a great and diversified modern metropolitan area. It is pointed out that in many instances the boundaries of municipalities in Dade County have long since lost any reasonable relationship to the political and economic life of the majority of the people and that such boundaries are now a relic of the bygone era that preceded the industrial growth and development of the county.

Our attention is further directed to the fact that few, if any, municipalities in Dade County are composed of a cohesive, homogeneous population since practically all of them are interdependent in many ways; that there are thousands of people in Dade County who live in one municipality, have employment, offices, positions or working places in another, shop or trade in another and whose children attend school in still another. The density of population, common transportation and communication facilities, the mutual dependence on public utilities, the unified economy of the county, the common problem of drainage, transportation, communication, *787 water supply, sewage, garbage collection and disposal, fire protection, zoning and planning for future development, demonstrate that municipal boundary lines are little more than artificial barriers that are outmoded by present needs and conditions. In order to deal more effectively with the problems arising from these conditions, to provide a unified, efficient plan of government, readily responsive to popular will, at the same time subject to the general lawmaking power of the legislature in matters of statewide interest and policy, the proposed amendment was adopted by the legislature and submitted to the people for ratification or rejection.

Opinion.

It is first contended that the chancellor committed error in holding that the proposed amendment violates Section 1, Article XVII, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. in that it attempts to revise more than one article of the Constitution. Section 1, Article XVII, is as follows:

"Method of Amending Constitution. ____ Either branch of the Legislature, at any regular session, or at any special or extraordinary session thereof * * *, may propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this Constitution. Any such revision or amendment may relate to one subject or any number of subjects, but no amendment shall consist of more than one revised article of the Constitution."

The answer to this question turns on the interpretation of the last sentence in the quoted section of Article XVII. We are concerned here with an "amendment" to a single section of the Constitution, Section 11, Article VIII. Such "amendment may relate to one subject or any number of subjects," but it "shall [not] consist of more than one revised article of the Constitution." The proposed amendment is certainly limited to a single "subject." The "subject" and the "revised article" are comprehended in the following pronouncement: "It is declared to be the intent of the Legislature and of the electors of the State of Florida to provide by this section home rule for the people of Dade County in local affairs." In other words, "home rule for the people of Dade County in local affairs," is all the proposed amendment attempts to provide for. The chancellor construed "revised article" to mean that no amendment of a single article of the Constitution can limit, restrict or modify the provisions of any other article of the Constitution.

By way of illustration, says the chancellor, the proposed amendment says that the home rule charter may vest authority in the board of county commissioners to pass ordinances relating to the affairs, property and government of Dade County and provide suitable penalties for the violation of such ordinances. It was the chancellor's view that this provision was in effect a revision of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution relating to the lawmaking powers of the legislature.

A second illustration — under the proposed amendment, the home rule charter may create courts with exclusive original jurisdiction to try all offenses against ordinances passed by the board of county commissioners. It was the chancellor's view that this provision was in effect a revision of Article V of the Constitution relating to the judicial department, despite the fact that the proposed amendment expressly provides that the jurisdiction of the circuit court shall not be impaired, nor shall any court established by the Constitution or by general law, nor the judges or clerks thereof be abolished.

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Bluebook (online)
89 So. 2d 785, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gray-v-golden-fla-1956.