The City of Coral Gables v. Gray

19 So. 2d 318, 154 Fla. 881, 1944 Fla. LEXIS 842
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedOctober 5, 1944
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 19 So. 2d 318 (The City of Coral Gables v. Gray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The City of Coral Gables v. Gray, 19 So. 2d 318, 154 Fla. 881, 1944 Fla. LEXIS 842 (Fla. 1944).

Opinion

SEBRING, J.:

Under existing law the Secretary of State of the State of Florida is charged with the duty of publishing throughout the State, and certifying to the various Boards of County Commissioners of the State for printing on the general election ballots for use in the general election, all proposed *883 amendments which have been agreed to by three-fifths of the members elected to each House of the Legislature.

The purpose of this suit is to enjoin the Secretary of State from performing this duty devolving upon him by law, so far as concerns House Joint Resolution No. 786, which was submitted at the 1943 general session of the Legislature and which proposed an amendment to the Constitution of Florida to be known as Article XX thereof. See House Joint Resolution No. 786, pp. 1138-1142, Laws of Florida, 1943. Motion to dismiss the bill of complaint was granted. This appeal is from the order of dismissal.

The only real question on the appeal is whether House Joint Resolution No. 786, which purports to relate to the consolidation of certain public offices in the counties of Orange and Dade, constitutes more than one amendment to the Florida Constitution, within the meaning of Article XVII, Section 1 thereof.

This is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. But elsewhere, in states where identical or similar constitutional provisions are in' force, much has been said on the subject. Succinctly stated, the rule announced in such states is to the effect that if a proposed amendment has but one main purpose and object in view and all else included therein is incidental thereto, and reasonably necessary to effectuate the main object and purpose contemplated, it is not susceptible to the charge that it contains more'than one amendment. In order to constitute more than one amendment the propositions submitted must not only relate to more than one subject but must also have at least two separate and distinct purposes not dependent upon or connected with each other. And even though an amendment embrace more than one subject, said subjects need not be separately submitted to the electors, if they are so connected with or dependent upon the general subject that it might be undesirable that one be adopted and not the other. Moreover, the fact that an amendment may be capable of separation into two or more propositions concerning the value of which diversity of opinion might arise is not alone sufficient to condemn the proposed amendment; provided the propositions submitted may be logically viewed as *884 having a natural relation and connection as competent parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme. Unity of object and plan is the universal test, and it is to be looked for in the ultimate and sought, not in the details or steps leading to the end. It is only when, in the light of common sense, several propositions are submitted as one and have to do with different subjects which are so essentially unrelated that their association is purely artificial, that they are not one within the constitutional mandate, for then the unity of object and purpose is not there, no matter in what form the proposal may be framed. See State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318, 11 N. W. 785; Jones v. McClaughry, 169 Ia. 281, 151 N.W. 210; State v. Herried, 10 S.D. 109, 72 N.W. 93; State v. Silver Bow County, 34 Mont. 426, 87 P. 450; People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167, 102 Am. St. Rep. 34; State ex rel Hay v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 142 P. 210; People v. Prevost, 55 Colo. 199, 134 P. 129; Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S.E. 479, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 77 Labaugh v. Cook, 127 Ia. 181, 102 N.W. 1121; State v. Mason, 43 La. Ann. 590, 9 So. 776; Gabbert v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 171 Mo. 84, 70 S.W. 891; Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 P. 595; Curry v. Laffoon, 261 Ky. 575, 88 S.W. (2nd) 307.

In view of the rule enunciated, we are asked to determine whether the proposed amendment squares with Section 1 of Article XVH, Constitution of Florida, which requires that “The proposed amendments shall be so submitted as to enable the electora te vote on each amendment separately.”

Section 1 of the resolution proposes that on and after midnight of December 31, 1944, the county tax assessors of the counties of Dade and Orange shall each become and be the assessors of all property in their respective counties with power to make all assessments of ad valorem, acreage, and other taxes that may be imposed upon real or personal property or their use, including by way of a single valuation all assessments upon property for each municipality, town, district, or special taxing district in each of their respective counties. The resolution proposes a County Board of Equalization in each of the counties whose membership is to consist *885 of the several county commissioners, and of additional members appointed from and by each municipality or town in. each county, having a population of more than 3000 at the last census. Such Board of Equalization is to be established for the purpose of equalizing all taxes on all property within the respective counties. As respects municipalities or towns in the counties, having a population of 3000 or less, provision is made for each of them to likewise appoint additional members to the Board for the purpose of equalization of taxes as respects any property within each such municipality or town, and not otherwise.

By Section 2 of the resolution it is proposed that on and after midnight, December 31, 1944, the county tax collectors of the counties of Orange and Dade shall each become the tax collectors for all ad valorem and acreage taxes levied and imposed for the calendar year 1945 and subsequent years (except taxes now required to be collected' by the clerk of the circuit court), within each of said counties, including ail county taxes and all ad valorem and acreage taxes imposed by any municipality, town, district or other taxing district within each of said counties.

It likewise empowers each of said collectors,' should the Legislature by statute so provide, to collect any and all other taxes, licenses or excises within said counties wherever and by whom lawfully imposed.

Section 3 of the proposed amendment gives to each of the municipalities in each of said counties the right to retain the power to assess and collect taxes, the amendment notwithstanding, only in the event that upon adoption of the constitutional amendment by the electors of the State each such municipality shall cause a special election to be held after the date of the adoption of the amendment at general election (November 7, 1944) and prior to December 31, 1944. At such special election only qualified freeholders of such municipality are to be eligible to participate and vote upon the question whether sections 1 and 2 of the resolution are or are not to be effective within such municipality. If by such vote the majority of such qualified freeholders elect to come under the provisions of sections 1 and 2, or if any munici *886 pality fails to hold a special election on the question within the time provided by the amendment, then, in either such event, sections 1 and 2 are to become binding and effective upon each such municipality.

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Bluebook (online)
19 So. 2d 318, 154 Fla. 881, 1944 Fla. LEXIS 842, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-city-of-coral-gables-v-gray-fla-1944.