Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed July 31, 2025. ________________
No. 3D25-1398 Lower Tribunal No. 25-12463-CA-01 ________________
City of Miami, Appellant,
vs.
Emilio Tomas Gonzalez, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie R. Manno Schurr, Judge.
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton LLP, and Dwayne A. Robinson and Brandon Sadowsky; George K. Wysong III, City Attorney, and Eric J. Eves, Assistant City Attorney Supervisor, for appellant.
Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, and C. Alan Lawson (Tallahassee), Jason B. Gonzalez (Tallahassee), Paul Huck, Jr., Mathew D. Gutierrez, Anthony J. Sirven, Matthew Casbarro, and Brian M. Trujillo, for appellee Emilio Tomás González; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Michael B. Valdes and Miguel A. Gonzalez, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee Miami-Dade County.
Before EMAS, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ. GORDO, J.
The City of Miami (“City”) appeals a final judgment entered in favor of
Emilio Tomas Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), which denied its emergency motion to
dismiss the complaint and granted Gonzalez’s motion for summary
judgment. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
In this appeal, we are tasked with deciding whether the City’s
enactment of an ordinance (“Ordinance”) changing its general municipal
elections to even-numbered years—effectively canceling its upcoming
November 2025 election and extending the terms of its elected officials
beyond their established term limits—without submission to the voters for
approval by referendum is constitutionally impermissible. We hold the trial
court correctly found the Ordinance unconstitutional and affirm.
I.
Home Rule Amendment
In 1956, the Florida Constitution of 1885 was amended to grant the
electors of Miami-Dade County the power to control the nature and structure
of their local government through the adoption of a home rule charter. Article
VIII, section 11 of the 1885 Florida Constitution (“Home Rule Amendment”)1
1 The current version of the Florida Constitution preserves the Home Rule Amendment. See Art. VIII, § 6(e), Fla. Const.
2 provided: “[t]he electors of Dade County, Florida, are granted power to adopt,
revise, and amend from time to time a home rule charter of government for
Dade County, Florida, under which the Board of County Commissioners of
Dade County shall be the governing body.” Art. VIII, § 11(1), Fla. Const.
(1885).
The adoption of the Home Rule Amendment was prompted by the
unique and growing needs of Miami-Dade County, which, by the mid-
twentieth century, had become the most populous county in Florida and was
home to the State’s largest city. As the Florida Supreme Court observed in
Gray v. Golden, 89 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1956), Miami-Dade County’s complexity
justified a more flexible and locally responsive form of government. The
Court recognized: “[t]hat Dade is the most populous county in the state; that
Miami in said county is the largest city in the state; that there are twenty-six
municipalities in Dade County; that said county is a great railroad,
manufacturing and commercial center; that it has one of the great harbors of
the nation; that the airborne freight and passenger traffic originating in and
passing through Dade County is national and international in scope, and that
said factors constitute Dade County one of the great metropolitan areas of
the world.” Gray, 89 So. 2d at 786.
3 The Home Rule Amendment was an elegant negotiation between the
voters of the State of Florida and the people of Miami-Dade County, in which
the State, through its Constitution, granted the County Home Rule authority
in certain limited and expressly enumerated provisions dealing with local
affairs and preserved its power to legislate in all matters of state interest as
expressed in the Constitution and the general law. Indeed, the purpose of
this Amendment “was not only to provide local self-government to the people
of Dade County with the board of county commissioners as the governing
body, but to preserve the supremacy of the legislature in all matters of state
interest as expressed in the Constitution and the general law.” Gray, 89 So.
2d at 788.
As the Florida Supreme Court continues to recognize, “the
metropolitan government of Dade County is unique in this state due to its
constitutional home rule amendment.” Metro. Dade Cnty. v. City of Miami,
396 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. 1980). The Home Rule Amendment “gives Dade
County numerous powers which set Dade apart from the state’s other
counties.” Id. “One such difference is Dade County’s power to enact
ordinances, when expressly authorized by the home rule amendment, which
conflict with the state constitution or with state law.” Id. (citing Art. VIII,
§ 11(5), Fla. Const. (1885)) (emphasis added).
4 Subsection (1) of the Home Rule Amendment includes ten specific
grants of authority. As to these ten matters, the Florida Supreme Court has
expressly held the Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter governs over
general law, and “[i]n all other matters the Constitution and general laws
control.” Gray, 89 So. 2d at 791. Relevant to this appeal, Article VIII, section
11(1)(g) provides Miami-Dade County the unique ability to regulate the
formation and amendment of municipal charters.
Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter
Acting under the above constitutional grant of authority, on May 21,
1957, the electors of Miami-Dade County adopted the Miami-Dade County
Home Rule Charter (“County Home Rule Charter”), becoming the first charter
county in Florida to exercise Home Rule powers. Consistent with the Florida
Constitution’s provision empowering it to adopt a “method by which each
municipal corporation in Dade County shall have the power to make, amend
or repeal its own charter,” Miami-Dade County prescribed such a framework
by enacting Article VI, section 6.03(A) of its Home Rule Charter.2 Art. VIII, §
11(1)(g), Fla. Const. (1885). Article VI, section 6.03(A) requires any
municipal charter amendment to be submitted to the electorate for approval:
2 Article VI, section 6.03, included in the original 1957 County Home Rule Charter, has never been amended.
5 Except as provided in Section 6.04 [for changes to municipal boundaries], any municipality in the county may adopt, amend, or revoke a charter for its own government or abolish its existence in the following manner. Its governing body shall, within 120 days after adopting a resolution or after the certification of a petition of ten percent of the qualified electors of the municipality, draft or have drafted by a method determined by municipal ordinance a proposed charter amendment, revocation, or abolition which shall be submitted to the electors of the municipalities. Unless an election occurs not less than 60 nor more than 120 days after the draft is submitted, the proposal shall be submitted at a special election within that time. The governing body shall make copies of the proposal available to the electors not less than 30 days before the election. Alternative proposals may be submitted. Each proposal approved by a majority of the electors voting on such proposal shall become effective at the time fixed in the proposal.
Art. VI, § 6.03(A), Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter (emphasis added).
As provided by the Florida Constitution, the amendment of a municipal
charter by referendum is the “exclusive” method for doing so. Art. VIII, §
11(1)(g), Fla. Const. (1885).
City of Miami Charter
On September 4, 1984, the City—a municipal corporation within
Miami-Dade County—adopted its current version of the City of Miami Charter
6 (“City Charter”). 3 The City Charter sets forth specific election dates and term
lengths for the mayor and city commissioners. Section 7 specifies that “[a]
general municipal election for the mayor and city commissioners shall be
held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in odd-
numbered years.” § 7, City of Miami Charter. Section 4(b) sets a four-year
term for the mayor and all commissioners and establishes a term limit of two
consecutive full terms. See § 4(b), City of Miami Charter.
Passing of the Ordinance
On June 26, 2025, the City Commission passed the Ordinance by a
three to two vote and the mayor subsequently signed it into law. The
Ordinance moved the date of the City’s general municipal election,
scheduled for November 4, 2025, to align with the national and gubernatorial
election on November 3, 2026, and, in the process, extended the terms of a
sitting commissioner and the incumbent mayor beyond their term limits.4 It
also moved the date of all subsequent elections to even-numbered years.
3 The City Charter was first adopted on May 17, 1921. 4 On June 5, 2025, prior to the passing of the Ordinance, one commissioner sought the Florida Attorney General’s opinion on whether such an act would be constitutional without the approval of the City’s electors. On June 11, 2025, the Attorney General issued an opinion that any amendment to the City Charter—either to move the date of municipal elections or to change the terms of office for elected officials—must be submitted to the voters as required by the County Home Rule Charter and the Florida Constitution. See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2025-01 (2025).
7 On June 30, 2025, Gonzalez, a putative mayoral candidate, filed a
complaint seeking a declaration that the Ordinance is unconstitutional as
violative of Article VI, section 6.03(A) of the County Home Rule Charter,
which requires any amendment to the City Charter to be made by
referendum. 5 Gonzalez argued the Ordinance effectively amended the
existing sections of the City Charter, which establishes elections in odd-
numbered years and limits elected officials to being elected to two four-year
terms. In response, the City filed an emergency motion to dismiss the
complaint, arguing the Ordinance is authorized collectively under three
general law statutes—specifically, sections 100.3605, 166.021 and 101.75
of the Florida Statutes—which the City contends supersede the County
Home Rule Charter. Gonzalez moved for summary judgment.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s emergency motion
to dismiss and granted Gonzalez’s motion for summary judgment. The trial
court then entered final judgment in favor of Gonzalez, finding the Ordinance
constitutes an impermissible amendment to the City Charter without a vote
of the electorate, as required by Article VI, section 6.03(A) of the County
Home Rule Charter and Article VIII, section 11(1)(g) of the 1885 Florida
5 The complaint also sought an injunction against enforcement of the Ordinance. That count was voluntarily dismissed, leaving only the count for declaratory relief.
8 Constitution, now contained in Article VIII, section 6(e) of the Florida
Constitution. This appeal followed.
II.
“The standard of review on orders granting final summary judgment is
de novo.” Ibarra v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 350 So. 3d 465, 467 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2022) (quoting Orozco v. McCormick 105, LLC, 276 So. 3d 932, 935
(Fla. 3d DCA 2019)). “A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action is an issue of law, and therefore, our standard of
review is de novo.” Lam v. Univision Commc’ns, Inc., 329 So. 3d 190, 197
(Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (quoting Schilling v. Herrera, 952 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (Fla.
3d DCA 2007)). “We review de novo questions of constitutional
interpretation.” Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505 n.1 (Fla. 2012).
III.
The City challenges the trial court’s declaration that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional and asks us to find that its application of the general law
statutes is permissible and supersedes its own Charter and the County
Home Rule Charter.
Specifically, the City argues the use of an ordinance to effectuate the
change to its election dates is neither an attempt by the term-limited mayor
and commissioner to improperly extend their power nor an attempt to
9 circumvent the will of the voters. Instead, it is a cost-savings measure
because consolidating its general municipal elections with statewide and
countywide elections will save voters a substantial sum of money and
generate a larger voter turnout.6
Gonzalez counters the three state statutes relied upon by the City are
permissive and must give way to the expressly enumerated power granted
to Miami Dade County via the Home Rule Amendment. He challenges the
City’s decision to employ permissive state statutes to change the election
dates by ordinance, asserting that this effectively violates both the City’s own
Charter and Article VI, section 6.03(A) of the County Home Rule Charter
requiring that such a change be passed by referendum.
We take no quarrel with the City’s ostensibly laudable goals. The
question before us is not whether the attempted change is good policy, but
rather, whether the method used to effectuate that change is constitutionally
permissible. In other words – may the City enact an ordinance which
6 We decline to address arguments advanced by the City for the first time in its reply brief or at oral argument. See Raffay v. Longwood House Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 389 So. 3d 589, 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Issues raised for the first time in the reply brief are precluded from our consideration.”); State v. City of Weston, 316 So. 3d 398, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“Issues not raised in the initial brief are considered waived or abandoned.” (quoting Rosier v. State, 276 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019))).
10 effectively amends its Charter without submission of the issue to the will and
vote of its constituents?
A. Does the City’s Ordinance make an end-run around its own Charter?
We first address the City’s contention that the Ordinance does not
“amend” or “repeal” the City Charter.
The City concedes the Ordinance7 conflicts with sections 4(b) and 7 of
its Charter requiring its elections to take place in odd-numbered years and
limiting terms of its elected officials to two four-year terms, but in the same
breath, asserts the Ordinance is not an amendment to the Charter. 8 As
William Shakespeare once wrote, “What’s in a name? That which we call a
rose by any other name would smell as sweet.”9 While the City characterizes
the Ordinance as a mere amendment to its Code of Ordinances but not to its
Charter, the language and effect of the enactment belie such a
7 See City of Miami, Ordinance No. 14376, § 16‑2 (Miami City Comm’n June 26, 2025). 8 Despite conceding this both below and in its initial brief, the City assumed a fundamentally different position during oral argument. This the City cannot do. See Sanchez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 286 So. 3d 191, 195 (Fla. 2019) (“A litigant seeking to overturn a lower court’s judgment may not rely on one line of argument in the trial court and then pursue a different line of argument in the appellate courts.”). 9 William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act II, sc. ii, l. 43-44.
11 characterization. An ordinance that changes the existing terms of a charter
is an amendment to that charter.
For our purposes of determining whether two provisions are in
“conflict,” the Florida Supreme Court has applied the “impossibility of co-
existence” test. See Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade Cnty.,
334 So. 2d 661, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (“The word ‘conflict’ in [the Home
Rule Amendment] has been construed to mean ‘contradictory in the sense
of legislative provisions which cannot co-exist.’ Legislative provisions are
inconsistent if, in order to comply with one provision, a violation of the other
is required . . . Courts are therefore concerned with whether compliance with
a[n] ordinance [r]equires a violation of a state statute or renders compliance
with a state statute impossible.” (citing State ex rel. Dade Cnty. v. Brautigam,
224 So.2d 688 (Fla.1969))). These two provisions self-evidently meet this
test, since the election of the mayor and commissioners cannot take place
both in November 2025 and November 2026.
The dates and term limits imposed by the Ordinance directly and
irreconcilably conflict with those mandated by sections 4(b) and 7 of the City
Charter. It follows that, as a result of the Ordinance, the Charter provisions
will no longer have any force or effect, such that the Ordinance has
effectively amended or repealed them. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114
12 U.S. 269, 331 (1885) (“Every amendment of a law or constitution revokes,
alters, or adds something.”); State v. Special Tax Sch. Dist. No. 5 of Dade
Cnty., 144 So. 356, 360 (Fla. 1932) (“An amendment of a Constitution [or a
charter] repeals or changes some provision in, or adds something to, the
instrument amended.”) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).
Relabeling the Ordinance does not alter its substantive character. Just
as a rose bears thorns regardless of what it is called, so too does this
enactment carry binding legal implications. It is, in truth, a charter
amendment dressed in lesser clothes—fragrant in title but thorned with
consequence.
B. Do the permissive general law statutes employed by the City to enact the Ordinance mandate a conflict with the City Charter and the County Home Rule Charter?
We next address whether the permissive general law statutes10 used
by the City to enact the Ordinance conflict with the governing charters.
As we have previously explained, “[l]egislative provisions are
inconsistent if, in order to comply with one provision, a violation of the other
is required.” Jordan Chapel, 334 So. 2d at 664. It is clear that if (pursuant
to the Ordinance) the election is not held until November 2026 this would
10 See § 100.3605, Fla. Stat.; § 166.021, Fla. Stat.; § 101.75, Fla. Stat. The statutes relied upon by the City to justify the Ordinance, however, when read in pari materia, include exceptions when in conflict with an applicable charter.
13 violate the City Charter, which requires the election to be held in November
2025.
In addition, each of the three statutes purportedly authorizing the use
of an ordinance contains the word “may” as opposed to “shall.” See The Fla.
Bar v. Trazenfeld, 833 So. 2d 734, 738 (Fla. 2002) (“The word ‘may’ when
given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term rather than the
mandatory connotation of the word ‘shall.’”); Stein v. Darby, 134 So. 2d 232,
237 (Fla. 1961) (“[T]he pivotal auxiliary verb ‘may’ . . . should not be
construed as ‘shall’ . . . .”); Boca Ctr. at Mil., LLC v. City of Boca Raton, 312
So. 3d 920, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“Per the ‘Mandatory/Permissive
Canon,’ the word ‘may’ is commonly treated as a permissive word granting
discretion.” (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 112 (2012))).
We fail to recognize how a permissive state statute would preempt the
City’s duty to follow its own governing charters and the Florida Constitution.
Indeed, these are the documents to which the City itself owes its existence
and to which it is constitutionally bound. See City of Miami Beach v.
Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 1972) (“[T]he paramount
law of a municipality is its charter, [] just as the State Constitution is the
charter of the State of Florida[.]”); Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 372 (Fla.
14 1st DCA 2004) (Wolf, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A
municipal charter is the constitution of a city and effectively limits the
legislative power of a city in the same manner the state constitution limits the
power of the Legislature.”); Club on the Bay, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 439
So. 2d 325, 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“The rules of law that govern municipal
corporations and those who deal with municipal corporations are well settled.
Municipal corporations must comply with charter provisions . . . and
municipal officials may only act in accordance with the duties as defined in
the applicable city charter.”).
The statutes relied upon by the City do not mandate a municipality to
alter its existing election dates to correspond to the dates of a national or
gubernatorial election. By reason of the Legislature’s use of the word “may,”
the general law statutes and the County Home Rule Charter (by which the
City is bound) can peacefully co-exist. 11 In other words, compliance with
Article VI, section 6.03(A), which requires a referendum before the City is
11 Because legislative enactments are presumed constitutional, it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature employed permissive language such as “may” with full awareness that several Florida counties exercise Home Rule authority. See Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 508 (Fla. 2008) (“[A] legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional.”); Cilento v. State, 377 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1979) (“Acts of the legislature are presumed to be constitutional.”).
15 authorized to change election dates and extend term limits, cannot render
compliance with the statutes impossible due to their permissive nature.
We emphasize that any “conflict” between the state statutes and the
subject Charters is a conflict of the City’s own making and is prohibited by
the Florida Constitution’s grant of Home Rule authority to Miami-Dade
County. “[I]t is settled that the [County Home Rule] Charter and the
ordinances adopted thereunder ‘must be consistent with and must do no
violence to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 11, Florida Constitution,
pursuant to which the charter is adopted.’” Miami Shores Vill. v. Cowart, 108
So. 2d 468, 469 (Fla. 1958) (quoting Dade Cnty. v. Dade Cnty. League of
Muns., 104 So. 2d 512, 516 (Fla. 1958)).
The City is duty-bound by its own Charter and the County Home Rule
Charter to make such a change by the “exclusive” method of a voter
referendum, yet is choosing instead to rely on discretionary state law to
cancel an election and extend term limits by way of an ordinance passed by
the City Commission—actions that violate both. The City was under no
obligation to utilize these statutes, but it is unquestionably obligated to abide
by its own Constitution and by the constitutional authority expressly granted
under the County Home Rule Charter.
16 C. Does the Florida Constitution render the Ordinance unconstitutional as violative of the County Home Rule Charter?
Given the City’s concession that the Ordinance is in direct conflict with
its Charter and the County Home Rule Charter, we address whether the
general law statutes relied upon by the City to enact the Ordinance
supersede the referendum requirement in Article VI, section 6.03(A) of the
County Home Rule Charter for amending municipal charters.
As we do in every case of constitutional interpretation, we follow
principles parallel to those of statutory interpretation. See Coastal Fla. Police
Benevolent Ass’n v. Williams, 838 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2003) (“The rules
which govern the construction of statutes are generally applicable to the
construction of constitutional provisions.”). Florida law is well settled that
“any inquiry into the proper interpretation of a constitutional provision must
begin with an examination of that provision’s explicit language.” Zingale v.
Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2004). “Our approach to interpreting the
constitution reflects a commitment to the supremacy-of-text principle,
recognizing that the words of a governing text are of paramount concern,
and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.” Planned
Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. State, 384 So. 3d 67, 77 (Fla. 2024)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The goal of this approach is
to ascertain the original, public meaning of a constitutional provision—in
17 other words, the meaning as understood by its ratifiers at the time of its
adoption.” Id. “In construing the meaning of a constitutional provision, we
do not seek the original intent of the voters or the framers.” Id. “Instead, we
ask how the public would have understood the meaning of the text in its full
context when the voters ratified it.” Id. “Moreover, in construing multiple
constitutional provisions addressing a similar subject, the provisions must be
read in pari materia to ensure a consistent and logical meaning that gives
effect to each provision.” Zingale, 885 So. 2d at 283 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
“[T]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language
is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Conage v. U.S.,
346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 341 (1997)); see also Gray, 89 So. 2d at 789 (“[T]he applicable
provisions of the Constitution and the statutes must be construed as a whole;
they should not be construed in isolation. This is nothing new in
constitutional interpretation. We are often put to the necessity of interpreting
both constitutional and statutory provisions with an eye to their relation to
other provisions.”).
18 With these principles in mind, we turn first to the relevant provisions of
the Home Rule Amendment—namely, Article VIII, section 11, subsections
(1), (5), (6) and (9) of the 1885 Florida Constitution.
Subsection (1), as described above, provides Miami-Dade County with
express grants of power relating to Home Rule in local affairs, including the
expressly enumerated power in subsection (1)(g) granting Miami-Dade
County the power to fix the method for municipalities within Miami-Dade
County to amend their own charters. See Art. VIII, § 11(1)(g), Fla. Const.
(1885). The plain text of this subsection commands that the method adopted
by the County Home Rule Charter is “exclusive” and the Legislature “shall
have no power” to amend or repeal the municipal charter. Id.
The remaining subsections contain limitations on Miami-Dade
County’s Home Rule authority. See Chase v. Cowart, 102 So. 2d 147, 152
(Fla. 1958) (recognizing that subsections (5), (6) and (9) contain limitations
on the home rule power). Subsections (5) and (6) relate to the Legislature’s
authority to enact general laws 12 applicable to Miami-Dade County:
12 “A general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function or instrumentality.” Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Pro. Regul. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 967 So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 2007) (quoting State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla.1934)). By contrast, “[a] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon,
19 (5) Nothing in this section shall limit or restrict the power of the Legislature to enact general laws which shall relate to Dade County and any other one or more counties in the state of Florida or to any municipality in Dade County and any other one or more municipalities of the State of Florida, and the home rule charter provided for herein shall not conflict with any provision of this Constitution nor of any applicable general laws now applying to Dade County and any other one or more counties of the State of Florida except as expressly authorized in this section nor shall any ordinance enacted in pursuance to said home rule charter conflict with this Constitution or any such applicable general law except as expressly authorized herein, nor shall the charter of any municipality in Dade County conflict with this Constitution or any such applicable general law except as expressly authorized herein, provided however that said charter and said ordinances enacted in pursuance thereof may conflict with, modify or nullify any existing local, special or general law applicable only to Dade County.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict the power of the Legislature to enact general laws which shall relate to Dade County and any other one or more counties of the state of Florida or to any municipality in Dade County and any other one or more municipalities of the State of Florida relating to county or municipal affairs and all such general laws shall apply to Dade County and to all municipalities therein to the same extent as if this section had not been adopted and such general laws
particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the state, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal.” Id.
20 shall supersede any part or portion of the home rule charter provided for herein in conflict therewith and shall supersede any provision of any ordinance enacted pursuant to said charter and in conflict therewith, and shall supersede any provision of any charter of any municipality in Dade County in conflict therewith.
Art. VIII, §§ 11(5)-(6), Fla. Const. (1885).
Subsection (9) provides a declaration of intent as to how the Home
Rule Amendment ought to be construed:
(9) It is declared to be the intent of the Legislature and of the electors of the State of Florida to provide by this section home rule for the people of Dade County in local affairs and this section shall be liberally construed to carry out such purpose, and it is further declared to be the intent of the Legislature and of the electors of the State of Florida that the provisions of this Constitution and general laws which shall relate to Dade County and any other one or more counties of the State of Florida or to any municipality in Dade County and any other one or more municipalities of the State of Florida enacted pursuant thereto by the Legislature shall be the supreme law in Dade County, Florida, except as expressly provided herein and this section shall be strictly construed to maintain such supremacy of this Constitution and of the Legislature in the enactment of general laws pursuant to this Constitution.
Art. VIII, § 11(9), Fla. Const. (1885) (emphasis added).
By a plain reading, the relevant provisions of the Home Rule
Amendment not only provide meaning to the ten express grants of authority
21 listed in subsection (1), but also emphasize that in all other contexts, general
law reigns supreme. Notwithstanding, the City invites us to read subsection
(6) in isolation and determine that it alone compels the conclusion that state
general laws always supersede Miami-Dade County’s Home Rule powers.
We decline this invitation for two reasons. First, nearly seventy years of
binding Florida Supreme Court precedent tells us otherwise. Second, to do
so would require us to vitiate the elegant negotiation of limited assignment
of powers effectuated between the people of Miami-Dade County and the
State in adopting Home Rule, rendering the entire constitutional amendment
and the County Home Rule Charter adopted thereunder meaningless. 13
In a long line of cases dating back to 1956, this Court and the Florida
Supreme Court have repeatedly held that whenever one of the specific and
enumerated constitutional grants of authority in the County Home Rule
Charter and a state general law come into conflict, the County Home Rule
Charter controls. See Gray, 89 So. 2d at 791; Dade Cnty. v. Young
Democratic Club of Dade Cnty., 104 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. 1958) (“[I]n the
13 See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“Surplusage Canon[:] If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”) (footnote omitted).
22 exercise of legislative power granted by the Charter, the electors of Dade
County were prohibited from infringing on the supremacy of the Florida
Constitution and the general laws of Florida ‘except as expressly authorized’
by specific grants of power given them by Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution, relating to home rule in local affairs for Dade County.”); Metro.
Dade Cnty., 396 So. 2d at 146 (“Th[e Home Rule Amendment] gives Dade
County numerous powers which set Dade apart from the state’s other
counties. One such difference is Dade County’s power to enact ordinances,
when expressly authorized by the home rule amendment, which conflict with
the state constitution or with state law.”); City of Sweetwater v. Dade Cnty.,
343 So. 2d 953, 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (“The matter of changing
boundaries of municipalities is one of the areas of autonomy conferred on
Dade County by the Home Rule Amendment, with the result that the method
provided therefor[e] by the Home Rule Charter, pursuant to authorization by
to Home Rule Amendment, is effective and exclusive, notwithstanding the
existence from time to time of a general state law which makes provision for
some other method.”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Dade Cnty. v. Wilson, 386
So. 2d 556, 560 (Fla. 1980) (“[T]he provisions of the Home Rule Charter and
the ordinances adopted pursuant thereto must be in accordance with general
law unless there is express constitutional authorization otherwise.”);
23 Seminole Rock Prods., Inc. v. Town of Medley, 180 So. 2d 457, 460 (Fla.
1965) (“We see no express authorization in [the Home Rule Amendment]
that could be taken as immunizing the home rule charter, ordinances enacted
in pursuance thereof, or charters of Dade County municipalities from the
operation of the constitution or of general law. Rather, we see only a general
authorization to provide for the establishment of municipalities which would
be subject to the constitution and valid general laws then in existence or
thereafter passed . . . the provisions of the constitution or of general law apply
unless there is express authorization to the contrary in one of the specific
grants of subsection (1) of the home rule amendment.”).
We must give faithful application to this long-standing precedent
recognizing the unique Home Rule authority granted to Miami-Dade County
in the Florida Constitution on certain limited and enumerated powers,
including the power to provide the “exclusive” method by which municipalities
may amend their charters. See Ramcharitar v. Derosins, 35 So. 3d 94, 98
(Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“It is axiomatic that stare decisis obligates this court to
follow Florida Supreme Court precedent.”).
The City’s isolated reading of subsection (6) renders the Miami-Dade
County Home Rule powers superfluous and nullifies the intent and purpose
of the Home Rule Amendment expressly set forth by subsections (1), (5) and
24 (9). It would defy logic to establish a Home Rule Amendment that
indisputably provides enumerated powers which “set Dade apart from the
state’s other counties” only to allow a general law of the State to supersede
it, even on purely local affairs specifically identified in subsection (1). Metro.
Dade Cnty., 396 So. 2d at 146. Such an interpretation would create an
exception that swallows the [home] rule. See Miami Shores Vill., 108 So. 2d
at 471 (“[W]e must assume that every sentence of a constitution is designed
to have some effect.”); Metro. Dade Cnty., 396 So. 2d at 146 (“The main
purpose in construing constitutional provisions is to ascertain the intent of
the framers and to effectuate the object designed to be accomplished.”);
Askew v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 336 So. 2d 556, 560 (Fla.
1976) (“In construing the Constitution every section should be considered so
that the Constitution will be given effect as a harmonious whole. A
construction which would leave without effect any part of the Constitution
should be rejected.”).
Instead, the well-established law, rules of construction and logic
require us to consider the Home Rule Amendment as a whole, read its
various subsections in pari materia and give meaning to each. It is
abundantly clear that when read in context, “[these provisions] show
conclusively that the legislature intended to preserve the effect of existing
25 general laws and its lawmaking power in relation to Dade County, except as
to those matters expressly authorized in the [Home Rule Amendment].”
Gray, 89 So. 2d at 791 (emphasis added). 14 In Gray and its progeny, the
Florida Supreme Court not only offered an alternative way 15 to reconcile the
Home Rule Amendment’s provisions; it provided the only way a court bound
by such precedent can interpret these provisions. See Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“It is [the Florida Supreme]
Court’s responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has
spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the
governing rule of law. A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative
statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of
the case giving rise to that construction.”) (footnote omitted).
The City’s chosen method to effectuate a change of its elections
substantively alters the City’s own Charter in a manner that conflicts with the
“exclusive” method provided for in the County Home Rule Charter for
amending municipal charters, which has been preempted to Miami-Dade
14 See also Wilson, 386 So. 2d at 560; Young Democratic Club, 104 So. 2d at 638; Metro. Dade Cnty., 396 So. 2d at 146; Seminole Rock Products, 180 So. 2d at 460; City of Sweetwater, 343 So. 2d at 954. While the City would have us believe this is a novel interpretation of the Home Rule Amendment, these cases show otherwise. 15 The City asserts that its reading is “the only way to reconcile subsection (1) with subsection (6).”
26 County by way of the express grants of power in the Florida Constitution.
Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Home Rule Amendment and
binding Florida Supreme Court precedent, we find the general law statutes
relied upon by the City to enact the Ordinance do not supersede the
“exclusive” method of amending municipal charters prescribed by Article VI,
section 6.03(A) of the County Home Rule Charter.
IV.
We answer the previously raised question in the negative and hold the
City may not enact an ordinance which effectively amends its Charter without
submission of the issue to the will and vote of its constituents by referendum,
as required by both the City and the Miami-Dade County Charters.
Therefore, as the trial court properly declared, the Ordinance is
unconstitutional.16
This opinion shall issue forthwith and be effective immediately
notwithstanding the filing of any post-disposition motion.
Affirmed.
16 To the extent the order under review included findings as to the constitutionality of the three general law statutes, this opinion should not be construed as affirming such findings. Because Gonzalez did not challenge the constitutionality of the statutes either below or on appeal, we do not reach that issue.