MAJORITY OPINION
PAUL C. MURPHY, Chief Justice.
After appellant Bobbie Grant (Grant) filed suit against Joe Myers Toyota, Inc. (Joe Myers) alleging religious discrimination, Joe Myers moved for a no-evidence summary judgment. The trial court granted this motion. Grant now appeals, claiming this ruling was in error. We reverse the judgment of the trial court as it pertains to Grant’s religious discrimination claims, affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the other claims raised in Grant’s petition, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Factual and ProceduRal History
Grant went to Joe Myers to seek clerical employment. She was informed by the secretary that no clerical positions were open, but there were openings in sales. Since Grant had no training, the receptionist provided her with the name of the organization providing sales training for Joe Myers, Automotive Sales Training (AST). Grant called AST from Joe Myers and arranged to attend a two-week training class. The class was to be taught by Dick Smouse, the owner and operator of AST.
When Grant went to the class, she paid a registration fee and received the class materials. Included in these materials was a copy of Og Mandino’s book, The Greatest Salesman in the World. Smouse read two paragraphs to Grant and the others in the class and asked them to memorize these paragraphs. He also asked them to recite the passage morning, noon, and night. Grant, however, found some of the ideas in the two paragraphs antithetical to her religious beliefs and refused to read more of the book because she felt Smouse was asking her to replace her religious beliefs with the ideas espoused in the book.
On the second day of class, Grant expressed her problems with the book to Smouse, telling Smouse that she could not read the book. When Smouse informed her that she had to read the book to complete the class, she told Smouse that it was against her beliefs as a Christian to read the book. Smouse then dismissed Grant from the class.
Grant went home and called Jerry Rocco, a sales manager at Joe Myers. She informed Rocco of the problems she was experiencing in Smouse’s class. She also informed him that she was a Christian and the required book “was against everything she believed as a Christian.” Rocco informed her that she would have to read the book if she wanted to take the class and must take the class to be hired.
Grant did not return to the class and was not hired. She subsequently filed a claim against Joe Myers with the Equal [422]*422Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) and the Texas Commission on Human Rights and, after exhausting her administrative remedies, instituted this suit alleging religious discrimination, retaliatory discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
After Grant’s deposition had been taken and other discovery conducted, Joe Myers filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted this motion, and Grant appealed addressing only the issue of religious discrimination.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard that we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, No-Evidence Summary Judgments Under the New Rule, in State Bar of Texas Prof. Dev. Program, 20 Advanced Civil Trial Course D, D-5 (1997). We look at the proof in the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding all contrary proof and inferences. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1799, 140 L.Ed.2d 939 (1998); Lampasas v. Spring Center, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). A trial court cannot grant a no-evidence summary judgment if the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of proof to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Moore, 981 S.W.2d at 269; Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Proof that is so weak that it only creates a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact is less than a scintilla. Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.1983). On the other hand, when the proof “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions,” the respondent has provided more than a scintilla of proof and survives summary judgment. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711.
Religious Accommodation Under the TCHRA
Although the issue is not raised by either party, it is important to note that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act allows both employees and job applicants to bring claims under the Act. The TCHRA states that an employer commits an unlawful act when the employer “fails or refuses to hire an individual, discharges an individual, or discriminates in any other manner against an individual” on the basis of “race, color disability, religion, sex, national origin or age.” Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.051(a) (Vernon 1996).1 The TCHRA, therefore, applies not only to employees, but job applicants as well. Here, even though Grant had not been hired by Joe Myers at the time she alleges the employment discrimination occurred, the company could not discriminate against her on the basis of her religion under the statute since she had applied for a job with the company.
In this case, Grant alleged accommodation-type religious discrimination. Under both Title VII and the TCHRA, employers must accommodate religious beliefs once they are informed of them. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.108 (Vernon 1996). Under Title VII, an employee establishes a prima facie religious accommodation case by showing [423]*423that: (1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; and (3) he or she suffered an adverse consequence for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 73, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); see also Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022 (5 th Cir.1984). Once this is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it could not accommodate the plaintiffs religious beliefs without undue hardship. Id.
Due to the dearth of case law interpreting the TCHRA, the Texas Supreme Court has directed Texas courts to seek guidance from federal interpretations of Title VII when construing the TCHRA. See Speer v. Presbyterian Children’s Home & Set-v. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex.1993).
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MAJORITY OPINION
PAUL C. MURPHY, Chief Justice.
After appellant Bobbie Grant (Grant) filed suit against Joe Myers Toyota, Inc. (Joe Myers) alleging religious discrimination, Joe Myers moved for a no-evidence summary judgment. The trial court granted this motion. Grant now appeals, claiming this ruling was in error. We reverse the judgment of the trial court as it pertains to Grant’s religious discrimination claims, affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the other claims raised in Grant’s petition, and remand the case for further proceedings.
Factual and ProceduRal History
Grant went to Joe Myers to seek clerical employment. She was informed by the secretary that no clerical positions were open, but there were openings in sales. Since Grant had no training, the receptionist provided her with the name of the organization providing sales training for Joe Myers, Automotive Sales Training (AST). Grant called AST from Joe Myers and arranged to attend a two-week training class. The class was to be taught by Dick Smouse, the owner and operator of AST.
When Grant went to the class, she paid a registration fee and received the class materials. Included in these materials was a copy of Og Mandino’s book, The Greatest Salesman in the World. Smouse read two paragraphs to Grant and the others in the class and asked them to memorize these paragraphs. He also asked them to recite the passage morning, noon, and night. Grant, however, found some of the ideas in the two paragraphs antithetical to her religious beliefs and refused to read more of the book because she felt Smouse was asking her to replace her religious beliefs with the ideas espoused in the book.
On the second day of class, Grant expressed her problems with the book to Smouse, telling Smouse that she could not read the book. When Smouse informed her that she had to read the book to complete the class, she told Smouse that it was against her beliefs as a Christian to read the book. Smouse then dismissed Grant from the class.
Grant went home and called Jerry Rocco, a sales manager at Joe Myers. She informed Rocco of the problems she was experiencing in Smouse’s class. She also informed him that she was a Christian and the required book “was against everything she believed as a Christian.” Rocco informed her that she would have to read the book if she wanted to take the class and must take the class to be hired.
Grant did not return to the class and was not hired. She subsequently filed a claim against Joe Myers with the Equal [422]*422Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) and the Texas Commission on Human Rights and, after exhausting her administrative remedies, instituted this suit alleging religious discrimination, retaliatory discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
After Grant’s deposition had been taken and other discovery conducted, Joe Myers filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted this motion, and Grant appealed addressing only the issue of religious discrimination.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard that we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, No-Evidence Summary Judgments Under the New Rule, in State Bar of Texas Prof. Dev. Program, 20 Advanced Civil Trial Course D, D-5 (1997). We look at the proof in the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding all contrary proof and inferences. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1799, 140 L.Ed.2d 939 (1998); Lampasas v. Spring Center, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). A trial court cannot grant a no-evidence summary judgment if the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of proof to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Moore, 981 S.W.2d at 269; Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Proof that is so weak that it only creates a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact is less than a scintilla. Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.1983). On the other hand, when the proof “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions,” the respondent has provided more than a scintilla of proof and survives summary judgment. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711.
Religious Accommodation Under the TCHRA
Although the issue is not raised by either party, it is important to note that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act allows both employees and job applicants to bring claims under the Act. The TCHRA states that an employer commits an unlawful act when the employer “fails or refuses to hire an individual, discharges an individual, or discriminates in any other manner against an individual” on the basis of “race, color disability, religion, sex, national origin or age.” Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.051(a) (Vernon 1996).1 The TCHRA, therefore, applies not only to employees, but job applicants as well. Here, even though Grant had not been hired by Joe Myers at the time she alleges the employment discrimination occurred, the company could not discriminate against her on the basis of her religion under the statute since she had applied for a job with the company.
In this case, Grant alleged accommodation-type religious discrimination. Under both Title VII and the TCHRA, employers must accommodate religious beliefs once they are informed of them. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.108 (Vernon 1996). Under Title VII, an employee establishes a prima facie religious accommodation case by showing [423]*423that: (1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; and (3) he or she suffered an adverse consequence for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 73, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); see also Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022 (5 th Cir.1984). Once this is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it could not accommodate the plaintiffs religious beliefs without undue hardship. Id.
Due to the dearth of case law interpreting the TCHRA, the Texas Supreme Court has directed Texas courts to seek guidance from federal interpretations of Title VII when construing the TCHRA. See Speer v. Presbyterian Children’s Home & Set-v. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex.1993). Thus, we find that a plaintiff seeking to bring a religious accommodation case under the TCHRA must establish a prima facie case by establishing the same elements required under the federal test. In cases where a no-evidence summary judgment is filed against a plaintiff, the plaintiff must provide more than a scintilla of proof for each of the three elements of her case to survive summary judgment.
Here, Joe Myers challenged Grant’s ability to provide proof of any of the elements of her prima facie case. Since the trial court granted Joe Myer’s motion in a general order, we must analyze the proof offered by Grant on each element to see if she has offered more than a scintilla of proof for each element of her case. Because we find that Grant has provided more than a scintilla of proof on all elements of her prima facie case, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Bona Fide Religious Belief
Joe Myers asserts on appeal that Grant has failed to provide proof that she has a bona fide religious belief. The term “religion” is not defined in the TCHRA or Title VII, so it is appropriate to look to federal regulations to discern the meaning of this term. See Norwood v. Litwin Eng’r & Constr., Inc., 962 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
The EEOC, in defining “religion” under Title VII, states that religious beliefs are “moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.” EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 1605 (1985). The EEOC has also stated that the protections of Title VII extend not only to traditional religious beliefs, but to moral and ethical beliefs as well. 45 Fed. Reg. at 72,611 (1980) (citing the analysis applied by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850 (1964), and Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970)). Even if the religious group to which the individual claims membership does not accept or follow the beliefs propounded by the individual, this fact is not determinative of whether or not those religious beliefs are worthy of protection. 29 C.F.R. 1605.1 (1985). We believe the same logic is applicable here.
Joe Myers argues in its brief that Grant fails to prove a bona fide religious belief because she was unable to provide specific tenets of Evangelical Christianity that the reading of the book violated. We disagree with this argument.
Grant stated that the requirement that she read these particular paragraphs three times a day, once in the morning, once at noon, and once at night, conflicted with her prayers and Bible reading at those times. She also claimed that she believed the required actions intimated that the ideas asserted in the paragraphs take the place of her religious beliefs. She asserted to Joe Myers that reading this book violated her beliefs as a Christian. We find the proof presented in this regard more than a scintilla of evidence that Grant held a bona fide religious belief.
[424]*424Joe Myers also argues that Grant failed to show that reading the book was an employment requirement. Grant, however, states in her deposition that she was told by Jerry Rocco that she was required to take the class before she would be considered for employment by Joe Myers. This testimony provides more than a scintilla of evidence that reading the book and performing the other actions requested by Smouse were required before Grant could be employed by Joe Myers.
Notification of Belief, Conflict, and Need for Accommodation
Grant was also required to show that she informed Joe Myers that the employment requirement conflicted with her religious beliefs and she needed an accommodation.
In support of this element, Grant points to her deposition where she discusses her call to Joe Myers after being removed from the training class. In her deposition, Grant testified that she called Jerry Rocco at Joe Myers the same day that she was removed from the training class. She informed him of what had happened and told him that the book Smouse required her to read was against her Christian beliefs. She also asked that Joe Myers provide on-the-job training or some other alternative to taking Smouse’s class. Based on this testimony, Grant contends that she has presented more than a scintilla of proof on this issue. We agree.
Adverse Consequence
Finally, Grant presented proof that she was not hired because she refused to complete the training course. Joe Myers does not contest that Grant suffered an adverse consequence for failing to complete the class. An employer’s failure to hire a job applicant based on the applicant’s religious beliefs is an adverse consequence cognizable under Title VII. See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 73, 107 S.Ct. 367 (stating that a refusal to hire is actionable under Title VII in a religious accommodation context); see, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. READS, Inc., 759 F.Supp. 1150 (E.D.Penn.1991) (recognizing a refusal to hire an applicant based on her religious beliefs is an adverse consequence actionable under Title VII). Applying this reasoning to the TCHRA, we find more than a scintilla of proof on this element of Grant’s case.
Since Grant has provided more than a scintilla of proof on each element of her prima facie case of employment discrimination, we find the trial court erroneously granted Joe Myers’ no-evidence summary judgment on that issue. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as it pertains to Grant’s religious discrimination claim and remand the case for further proceedings. However, since Grant does not contest the propriety of the summary judgment on the issues of retaliatory discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on those issues.