IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION GENE GRAHAM, § #24053575, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:25-cv-1858-E-BN § FNU WHISENANT, ET AL. § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Gene Graham, an inmate at the Dallas County Jail, filed a pro se complaint against staff at the Dallas County Jail and Parkland. See Dkt. No. 3. United States District Judge Ada Brown referred the action to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The Court granted Graham leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Dkt. No. 4. And, after screening his claims, as detailed below, the undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Legal Standards As set out above, the PLRA authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint where it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Because this language tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court should apply the pleading standards as set out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under these standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require
that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, but it does require “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences
using speculation.”). “The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)). So, to avoid dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1915A(b)(1), plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). Analysis
Graham alleges that he has gout and has taken indomethacin 25 mg three times a day per an order from Parkland that is over ten years old. See Dkt. No. 3 at 4. He alleges that he did not receive any medication from May 25, 2025 to June 19, 2025, and then started receiving medication again but only twice a day. See id. The claim for deliberate indifference is alleged against three defendants – Whisenant, the commander at Dallas County Jail, Dr. Zia Rehman who prescribed the medication twice a day, and an unknown doctor who temporarily stopped the medication. See id. at 3. “In the context of medical care, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
when he acts with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). “‘Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet’ but can be satisfied by a ‘wanton disregard for [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.’” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756). Put another way, “[d]eliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond
mere negligence or even gross negligence; it must amount to an intentional choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, in turn, Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992))); see also Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a
grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” (cleaned up)). Alone, a disagreement with medical treatment or a failure to provide additional medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756; Norton v.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION GENE GRAHAM, § #24053575, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:25-cv-1858-E-BN § FNU WHISENANT, ET AL. § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Gene Graham, an inmate at the Dallas County Jail, filed a pro se complaint against staff at the Dallas County Jail and Parkland. See Dkt. No. 3. United States District Judge Ada Brown referred the action to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The Court granted Graham leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Dkt. No. 4. And, after screening his claims, as detailed below, the undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Legal Standards As set out above, the PLRA authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint where it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Because this language tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court should apply the pleading standards as set out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under these standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require
that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, but it does require “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences
using speculation.”). “The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)). So, to avoid dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1915A(b)(1), plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). Analysis
Graham alleges that he has gout and has taken indomethacin 25 mg three times a day per an order from Parkland that is over ten years old. See Dkt. No. 3 at 4. He alleges that he did not receive any medication from May 25, 2025 to June 19, 2025, and then started receiving medication again but only twice a day. See id. The claim for deliberate indifference is alleged against three defendants – Whisenant, the commander at Dallas County Jail, Dr. Zia Rehman who prescribed the medication twice a day, and an unknown doctor who temporarily stopped the medication. See id. at 3. “In the context of medical care, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
when he acts with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). “‘Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet’ but can be satisfied by a ‘wanton disregard for [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.’” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756). Put another way, “[d]eliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond
mere negligence or even gross negligence; it must amount to an intentional choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, in turn, Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992))); see also Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a
grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” (cleaned up)). Alone, a disagreement with medical treatment or a failure to provide additional medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino, 239 F.3d at 756; Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Smith v. Allen, 288 F. App’x 938, 939 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (determination that a prisoner was not a candidate for further surgery after two prior surgeries were not
successful “is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation” (citations omitted)). Graham’s claims are not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. All he has set out is a disagreement with the medical treatment being provided by the medical staff at Dallas County Jail, but contrary to Graham’s claims, there is no constitutional or legal requirement that jail medical staff follow the medication orders of his primary care physician. And, with respect to the claims against Whisenant who appears to be named based solely on his supervisory role at Dallas County Jail,
“[u]nder section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir.1987). So Graham’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Leave to Amend Even so, the time to file objections to this recommendation (further explained
below) allows Graham an opportunity to explain how he would cure the deficiencies identified above (that is, provide enough facts to plausibly allege any waiver of immunity and to allege all elements of each claim) and thus show the Court that this case should not be dismissed at this time and that the Court should instead grant him leave to amend his claims. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), but a movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects. Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586,
590 (5th Cir. 2016). If the plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a district court may deny leave. McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs ‘failed to amend their complaint as a matter of right, failed to furnish the district court with a proposed amended complaint, and failed to alert both the court and the defendants to the substance of their proposed amendment’).”). But, if Graham fails to show that leave to amend should be granted, the Court
should dismiss this case with prejudice. Recommendation Unless Graham shows that leave to amend should be granted, the Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: August 4, 2025
DAVIDL.HORAN }©— □ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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