Graham v. United States

CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedMarch 3, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-03053
StatusUnknown

This text of Graham v. United States (Graham v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Graham v. United States, (D. Colo. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 21-cv-03053-NYW

RICKY T. GRAHAM, and CONNIE L. ARCHULETA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION TO STAY

Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang

This matter comes before the court on the Joint Motion to Stay (the “Motion” or “Motion to Stay”) filed on March 1, 2022 by Plaintiffs Ricky T. Graham and Connie L. Archuleta (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and Defendant the United States of America (“Defendant”). [Doc. 18]. The court considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the Order of Reference for all purposes dated January 5, 2022. [Doc. 9]. Upon review of the Motion to Stay and the applicable case law, the Motion to Stay is GRANTED. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs initiated this action on November 12, 2021 pursuant to the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. See [Doc. 1]. Plaintiffs allege that they possess mineral interests in certain real property located in Adams County, Colorado, [id. at ¶¶ 2, 25, 31], which they assert were conveyed “with [an] overarching surface estate . . . without mineral reservation” to their great grandfather by Defendant via a federal patent. [Id. at ¶ 26]; see also [id. at ¶¶ 34-35, 37-39]. Defendant, however, claims that it is the lawful owner of the subject mineral interests. [Id. at ¶ 3]. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment determining the right, title, and interest in the disputed mineral rights in their favor. [Id. at ¶ 15]. This court held a Scheduling Conference on January 20, 2022, setting the discovery deadline for July 20, 2022 and a dispositive-motion deadline for August 22, 2022. [Doc. 12; Doc.

13]. On February 4, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (the “Motion to Dismiss”), wherein it argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim because it was filed outside the scope of the QTA’s statute of limitations. See [Doc. 16]. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that their QTA claim is not barred because neither Plaintiffs nor their predecessors in interest had actual or constructive knowledge of any ownership claim by Defendants to the mineral rights until 2018. See generally [Doc. 14]. The Motion to Dismiss is not yet fully briefed. The Parties jointly filed the Motion to Stay on March 1, 2022, asking the court to stay discovery in this matter pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 18]. They argue that a stay pending a determination of the court’s jurisdiction is in the best interests of the Parties

and of the court, as it will conserve time and resources that would otherwise be expended in a case that may ultimately be fully resolved on jurisdictional grounds. See generally [id.]. The court considers the propriety of a stay below. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a stay of proceedings. See String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 02-cv-01934-LTB-PA, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. March 30, 2006). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 does, however, provide that “[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order,” and the court may, “for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Whether to stay discovery is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Wang v. Hsu, 919 F.2d 130, 130 (10th Cir. 1990). Indeed, although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a stay of proceedings, the power to stay “is incidental to the power

inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763 (1931)). In determining whether a stay is appropriate, the court weighs interests such as whether defendants are likely to prevail in the civil action; whether defendants will suffer irreparable harm; whether the stay will cause substantial harm to other parties to the proceeding; and the public interests at stake. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Or. Steel Mills, Inc., 322 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003). The court may also consider the plaintiff’s interests in proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay, the burden on the defendants, and the convenience to the court (the “String Cheese factors”). String Cheese Incident, 2006 WL

894955, at *2 (citing FDIC v. Renda, No. 85-2216-O, 1987 WL 348635, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 1987)). Courts in this District generally disfavor the stay of all discovery, see Wason Ranch Corp. v. Hecla Mining Co., No. 07-cv-00267-EWN-MEH, 2007 WL 1655362, at *1 (D. Colo. June 6, 2007), but such a stay may be appropriate pending the resolution of a motion to dismiss impacting immunity or jurisdictional issues. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Glickauf, No. 18-cv-02549-CMA- NYW, 2019 WL 1897845, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2019). ANALYSIS The Parties seek to stay discovery in the instant action pending resolution of their Motion to Dismiss, arguing that (1) discovery is unavailable where the court lacks jurisdiction; (2) granting a stay is within the court’s inherent authority, and such authority should be exercised here; and (3) a stay is appropriate under the String Cheese factors. [Doc. 18 at 2-5]. The court addresses these arguments below. I. Jurisdictional Issues

First, the Parties argue that a stay is warranted because the Motion to Dismiss raises a statute-of-limitations argument and discovery is unavailable where the court lacks jurisdiction. [Id. at 2]. A statute-of-limitations argument does not, as a matter of course, implicate jurisdictional concerns. See Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that the Supreme Court has “explained time and again that statutes of limitations are not always—and, indeed, presumptively are not—jurisdictional.”). However, the Tenth Circuit has instructed that the statute of limitations contained in the QTA constitutes a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (Hybognathus amarus) v. Bureau of Reclamation, 599 F.3d 1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Timeliness under [the QTA] is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under section 2409a.”); accord Spirit Lake Tribe v.

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Related

Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation
599 F.3d 1165 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. United States
282 U.S. 760 (Supreme Court, 1931)
Landis v. North American Co.
299 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court, 1936)
Barnes v. United States
776 F.3d 1134 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota
262 F.3d 732 (Eighth Circuit, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
Graham v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/graham-v-united-states-cod-2022.