Grabb v. Bendix Corp.

666 F. Supp. 1223, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1553, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22426, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,505
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedJuly 22, 1986
DocketS 82-470
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 666 F. Supp. 1223 (Grabb v. Bendix Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1223, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1553, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22426, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,505 (N.D. Ind. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.

The plaintiffs, Frederick G. Grabb and Thomas M. Julow, filed this ease alleging that they were separated from employment with the defendant, The Bendix Corporation (Bendix) because of their age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (ADEA) and further alleged that after their separation, they were not offered employment in other divisions of Bendix because of their age. Extensive discovery has been conducted in this case including the taking of the depositions of the principal people at Bendix re *1225 sponsible for the employment decision in this case and this case had been set on this court’s trial calendar. Bendix has filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All parties have fully briefed the issues and oral argument was heard on May 27, 1986. At that hearing, the parties were given until June 16, 1986 to file any outstanding depositions and any supplemental material with respect to the motion for summary judgment.

This court has carefully read and reviewed all of the depositions filed in this case which includes the depositions of Thomas Miner Julow, John P. Makielski, James Richard Wallace, Edgar Anthony Behrmann, Roger William Miller, Louis S. Tang, William T. Birge, Kathleen B. Hayward, Dennis Hayward, Hugo Nováis De Campos, Larry A. Portolese, John Edmund Mackiewicz, David James Lawrence, Wayne Paul Vance, George William Knox (2 volumes), Delbert James Gardner (2 volumes), Frederick George Grabb, George Paul McCabe, Jr., Thomas Robert O’Reilly, Robert Thomas DuCharme, Edward Lynn Akins, Larry Henry, Charlene Theresa Plasschaert, Russell Neal Ether, Richard Lewis Morrison, Jean H. Rideout, Howard Laurence McClelland (2 volumes), Thomas C. Schaefer, Robert H. Michaud, and Paul Meier. This court has also carefully reviewed all of the answers to interrogatories, documents produced in response to requests for production of documents, requests for admissions and affidavits filed in this case.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment must be entered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(e). The court must view the record and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Box v. A & P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1375 (7th Cir.1985); Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir.1985); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.1983). However, when a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an adverse party may not rest on mere allegations or denials in his pleadings nor is a bare contention that an issue of fact exists sufficient to raise a factual issue. Posey v. Skyline, supra at 105; Shacket v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 513 n. 8 (7th Cir.1982). The adverse party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Posey v. Skyline, supra at 105. Further, as a general principle, questions of motive and intent are inappropriate for summary judgment, Box v. A & P Tea Co., supra at 1378; see Cedillo v. International Ass’n of Bridge & Structural Iron Workers, 603 F.2d 7, 11 (7th Cir.1979), so summary judgment in discrimination cases must be approached with great caution. Huhn v. Koehring Co., 718 F.2d 239, 243 (7th Cir.1983).

Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) held that Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses tried to a jury but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the rule, prior to trial, that such claims and defenses have no factual basis. In reaching this result Justice Rehnquist speaking for the Court said:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” because the nonmov-ing party has failed to make a sufficient *1226 showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. [T]h[e] standard [for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)....” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, - (1986), 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202.

The majority opinion went on to emphasize that Rule 56 does not place upon a moving party the duty of negating an opponent’s claim.

I.

Mr. Grabb, a mechanical engineer by education, was hired by Bendix in 1951 right out of college to work in its Missile Systems Division. After working in that Division for about 17 years, Mr. Grabb was transferred to the Anti-Skid Group in 1968 which was a part of the Automotive Control Systems Group (ACSG), Department 856. In 1975, Mr. Grabb was promoted to Project Engineer in the Brake Control Systems portion of ACSG-Engineering, also in Department 856. In that position, Mr. Grabb was involved in advanced design and his responsibilities included supervising a group of 3 to 6 persons, inventing and developing new products in the “advanced booster” and vacuum pump area and serving as analytical consultant to other groups in Department 856 of ACSG-Engineering on all products.

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666 F. Supp. 1223, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1553, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22426, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,505, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grabb-v-bendix-corp-innd-1986.