Google LLC v. Does 1–25

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 26, 2026
Docket1:26-cv-04982
StatusUnknown

This text of Google LLC v. Does 1–25 (Google LLC v. Does 1–25) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Google LLC v. Does 1–25, (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6/26/2026 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK GOOGLE LLC, Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 26-cv-4982-VM v.

DOES 1–25, Defendants. ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Plaintiff Google LLC has filed a Complaint for injunctive and other relief to stop Doe

Defendants 1–25, a criminal enterprise (the “Outsider Enterprise” or “Enterprise”), from using a software suite called “Outsider” to facilitate widespread phishing attacks that have harmed and continue to harm over 100,000 victims and numerous businesses, including Google. Google filed a Complaint alleging claims under (1) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d) (Count I); and (2) the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A), 1125(a)(1)(B) (Count II). Google moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and 28 U.S.C. § 1651. On June 12, 2026, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and order for Defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. THE COURT HEREBY FINDS THAT:

1. This Court has federal-question jurisdiction over Google’s claims under RICO and the Lanham Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 2. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because: a. Defendants have intentionally targeted and harmed Google, a company based in the United States. Defendants had knowledge that their actions would cause harm to victims in New York and cause Google harm in New York. Google does business in New York and has done business in New York for many years, including in this District.

b. Defendants have created fake websites mimicking the New York E-ZPass website and the New York City government’s website for use in phishing schemes. c. Defendants have affirmatively directed actions at the United States, including this District, and Defendants have attempted to phish and have successfully phished personal and financial information from victims within this District and New York State. d. Defendants have used Google’s trademarks as part of fake websites used to solicit victims’ personal and financial information within this District and New York State, and have directed multiple forms of electronic communication to user devices

in this District and New York State. 3. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) because Defendants are not residents of the United States and may therefore be sued in any judicial district. Venue is also proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Google’s claims occurred in this District, because a substantial part of the harm caused by Defendants has occurred in this District, and because Defendants transact their affairs in this District. Moreover, Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this District, and no other venue appears to be more appropriate. 4. The Complaint pleads facts with the specificity required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states claims against Defendants for violations of (1) RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d) (Count I); and (2) the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A), 1125(a)(1)(B) (Count II). Preliminary Injunction Factors

5. The Court finds that Google has established each of the factors required for a preliminary injunction: (1) irreparable harm; (2) a likelihood of success on the merits and/or sufficiently serious questions as to the merits; (3) the balance of equities tips in Google’s favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction serves the public interest. See Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Trustees for Femit Tr. 2006-FF6, 368 F. Supp. 3d 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The standard[s] for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of [Civil] Procedure are identical.”). Irreparable Harm

6. Google has established that it will suffer immediate, irreparable harm if this Court denies its request for a preliminary injunction. Google has shown that Defendants—through their operation of the Outsider Enterprise to participate in and carry out numerous criminal phishing scams (the “Outsider Schemes”)—have threatened the security of the Internet by using phishing attacks to steal personal and financial information, defrauding unsuspecting targets, impairing Google’s reputation and goodwill, and causing Google (and numerous others) unrecoverable financial losses. Until the Outsider Schemes are disrupted, the Outsider Enterprise will continue to profit from its unlawful activities at the expense of Google and an ever-increasing number of victims. 7. Defendants’ conduct is injuring Google’s goodwill and damaging its reputation by falsely associating Google with fraud perpetrated by the Outsider Enterprise, and injuries to goodwill and reputation constitute irreparable harm. Google has suffered and continues to suffer economic losses from the Outsider Schemes because Google has expended (and continues to expend) substantial financial resources in developing strong brand recognition associated with its

name, logos, and products, investigating and combatting the Outsider Schemes, and identifying measures necessary to remediate the harms caused by the Outsider Schemes. These injuries constitute irreparable harm, including because Google has shown a likelihood that Defendants would avoid complying with any judgment. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 8. Google has demonstrated that its Complaint presents a sufficiently serious question as to each of its claims and that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. Sterling, 368 F.Supp. 3d at 727. 9. RICO. Google has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that

Defendants have violated and continue to violate the RICO statute, and that Defendants engaged in a RICO conspiracy. a. Google has shown that Defendants are active participants in the operation and management of the Outsider Enterprise, which uses Outsider to dupe over 100,000 people into clicking malicious links leading to fraudulent websites as part of phishing schemes. b. Google has established that Defendants constitute an enterprise. Defendants are associated-in-fact and share a common purpose to execute phishing schemes to fraudulently obtain sensitive financial information and login credentials for profit.

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Related

Victorinox AG v. B & F System, Inc.
114 F. Supp. 3d 132 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co.
368 F. Supp. 3d 723 (S.D. Illinois, 2019)
Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC
784 F.3d 887 (Second Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Google LLC v. Does 1–25, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/google-llc-v-does-125-nysd-2026.