Google LLC v. Does 1-25

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 1, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-04503
StatusUnknown

This text of Google LLC v. Does 1-25 (Google LLC v. Does 1-25) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Google LLC v. Does 1-25, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK GOOGLE LLC, Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 1:25-cv-04503-JPO v.

DOES 1–25, Defendants. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER Plaintiff Google LLC has filed a Complaint for injunctive and other relief to stop Doe Defendants 1–25 (the “BadBox 2.0 Enterprise”) from continuing to control and operate a botnet

of over ten million devices (the “BadBox 2.0” botnet), continuing to distribute malware to infect new devices, and continuing to carry out criminal schemes using that botnet. Google filed a Complaint alleging claims under (1) the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”) (Count I) and (2) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d) (“RICO”) (Count II). Google has moved under seal and ex parte for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and 28 U.S.C. § 1651. On May 30, 2025, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and order for Defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. On June 6, 2025, this Court extended that TRO until June 27, 2025.

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS THAT: 1. This Court has federal-question jurisdiction over Google’s claims under the CFAA and RICO pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 2. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because: a. Defendants distribute malware within this district and New York State. b. Defendants use that malware to infect user devices in this district. c. Defendants use that fraudulently installed malware to sell access to the infected user devices so that Defendants and others may use the IP addresses of the infected

devices to engage in fraudulent and criminal activity. d. Defendants send commands to infected user computers in this district and within New York State to carry out their illicit schemes. e. Google’s Complaint and moving papers demonstrate that Defendants undertook these activities intentionally with knowledge that their actions would cause harm to users in New York and cause Google harm in New York. Google does business in New York and has done business in New York for many years. 3. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) because Defendants are not residents of the United States and may be sued in any judicial district. Venue

is also proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Google’s claims occurred in this judicial district, because a substantial part of the property that is the subject of Google’s claims is situated in this judicial district, because a substantial part of the harm caused by Defendants has occurred in this judicial district, and because Defendants transact their affairs in this judicial district. Moreover, Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district and no other venue appears to be more appropriate. 4. The Complaint pleads facts with the specificity required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states claims against Defendants for violations of the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), (a)(5)(A) (Count I) and RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d) (Count II). Preliminary Injunction Order Factors 5. The Court finds that Google has established each of the factors required for a

preliminary injunction: (1) irreparable harm; (2) a likelihood of success on the merits and/or has established a substantial question as to the merits; (3) the balance of hardships tips in Google’s favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction serves the public interest. Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Trustees for Femit Tr. 2006-FF6, 368 F. Supp. 3d 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The standard[s] for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of [Civil] Procedure are identical.”). Irreparable Harm 6. Google has established that it will suffer immediate, irreparable harm if this Court

denies its request for a preliminary injunction. Google has shown that Defendants—through their participation in, and operation of, the BadBox 2.0 Enterprise—have threatened the security of the internet, including Google platforms, by transmitting malware through the internet to configure, deploy, and operate a botnet. Defendants have distributed malware on user devices that use the Android Open Source Project (“AOSP”) operating system, which Google created and retains a role in overseeing, that compromises the security of those devices, exploits those devices to carry out a variety of advertising frauds, including through the Google Ad Network, and makes those devices tools of various other cybercrimes by selling access to those devices to other threat actors so that they may connect to an infected device’s IP address and use it to mask their location. 7. The Defendants control a botnet that has infected more than ten million devices. At any moment, the botnet could be harnessed for additional criminal schemes. Defendants could, for example, enable large ransomware or distributed denial-of-service attacks on legitimate businesses and other targets. Defendants could themselves perpetrate such a harmful attack, or they could sell access to the botnet to a third party for that purpose.

8. In addition, Defendants’ conduct is injuring Google’s goodwill and damaging its reputation by falsely associating Google and the Android operating system with the fraud perpetrated by the BadBox 2.0 botnet. Google has suffered and continues to suffer economic losses from Defendants’ ad fraud on the Google Ad Network. In addition, Google has expended (and continues to expend) substantial financial resources to investigate the BadBox 2.0 botnet and to identify measures necessary to remediate the harms caused by the botnet. These injuries constitute irreparable harm, including because Google has shown a likelihood that Defendants would not comply with a judgment for money damages. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

9. Google has shown not only that its Complaint presents a substantial question as to each of its claims but that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. See Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Trs. for Femit Tr. 2006-FF6, 368 F. Supp. 3d 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 10. CFAA.

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Related

Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co.
368 F. Supp. 3d 723 (S.D. Illinois, 2019)
Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC
784 F.3d 887 (Second Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Google LLC v. Does 1-25, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/google-llc-v-does-1-25-nysd-2025.