Gonzalez v. Dobbs Ferry Village

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 11, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-07617
StatusUnknown

This text of Gonzalez v. Dobbs Ferry Village (Gonzalez v. Dobbs Ferry Village) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gonzalez v. Dobbs Ferry Village, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK OMAYRA GONZALEZ; EG, Plaintiffs, -against- 22-CV-7617 (LTS) DOBBS FERRY VILLAGE; DOBBS FERRY ORDER TO AMEND POLICE; DOBBS FERRY HILTON HOTEL; BRONX FAMILY COURT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Omayra Gonzalez, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question and diversity jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated her federally protected rights. By order dated September 8, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which was filed by Omayra Gonzalez on her own behalf and that of her minor son, EG.1 Plaintiff now appears to reside in Dobbs Ferry, New York, but in February 2021, she resided in the Riverdale section of the Bronx. Plaintiff alleges that her former partner or spouse, whom she refers to as her “ex,” came to her Bronx home with “a knife and gasoline.” (ECF 2 ¶ III.). Plaintiff and EG escaped through a window, and they “end[ed] up” in the Hilton hotel in Dobbs Ferry. (Id.) Plaintiff “couldn’t call 911,”

1 Only Omayra signed the complaint and submitted an IFP application. (ECF 1, 2 at 7.) because her ex has “police friends in the 50th precinct.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed a police report with the Dobbs Ferry Police, who “follow[ed] it to the” 50th precinct. Plaintiff’s ex, several of his friends from the 50th precinct, and an employee from the Administration for Children’s Services [ACS] named Sally “trashed” the Riverdale apartment and changed the locks. A judge called

Plaintiff and said that ACS “wanted to go to our home,” and Plaintiff explained that “Sally” was friends with her ex. Thereafter, the precinct officers and Sally came to the hotel and told Plaintiff that, if she withdrew the police report, the ACS case would be closed. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a second police report that was “erase[d]” and not “investigated.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s ex “also made friends with” the Dobbs Ferry police, and thereafter, “ACS c[a]me again after [her] with [her] ex with his police officer [friends]. There where evidence that [her] ex was staying in the Hilton hotel and Dobbs Ferry refuse[d] to investigate.” (Id.) As a result of these events, Plaintiff became homeless, “everything was destroy[ed],” and she and EG are in “distress.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s ex beat her to the point of causing bruises and scratches. When Plaintiff called the police in the Bronx they “abuse[d]” her, illegally arrested

her, and pointed a gun at her. Plaintiff seeks “227 billions” of dollars in damages. DISCUSSION A. Nonattorney Parent Cannot Represent Child The claims that Plaintiff seeks to assert on behalf of her minor child must be dismissed. It is well established that a nonattorney parent cannot represent a minor child pro se. See Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Because pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.”); Wenger v. Canastota Central Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (minor children, “are entitled to trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected”); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., 906 F.2d 59, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1990) (“A non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.”); Fauconier v. Committee on Special Education, No. 02-CV-1050, 2003 WL 21345549, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2003) (a “court has an affirmative duty to enforce the rule that a non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel when bringing an action on behalf of his or her child”) (citing Cheung,

906 F.2d at 61). But see Maldonado v. Apfel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 296, 302-308 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (nonattorney parents may represent their minor children without assistance of counsel in appeals to district court from administrative denial of supplemental security income (SSI) benefits). Plaintiff’s claims on behalf of her minor child are therefore dismissed, without prejudice to assertion of the claims through counsel on behalf of the child.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Gonzalez v. Dobbs Ferry Village, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gonzalez-v-dobbs-ferry-village-nysd-2022.