Gonzales v. Emeritus Corporation

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: November 23, 2019
• Docket: 3:18-cv-06630
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 FLORA GONZALES, on behalf of herself 9 and all others similarly situated and on behalf of the general public, 10 No. C 18-06630 WHA Plaintiffs, 11 v. ORDER RE MOTION TO 12 COMPEL ARBITRATION EMERITUS CORPORATION, 13 SUMMERVILLE AT ATHERTON COURT LLC, BROOKDALE LIVING 14 COMMUNITIES, INC., BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING COMMUNITIES, INC., 15 BROOKDALE VEHICLE HOLDING, LLC; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 / 18 INTRODUCTION 19 In this PAGA and wage-and-hour putative class action, defendants move to compel 20 21 arbitration. For the reasons stated below, the motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED IN PART 22 AND DENIED IN PART. STATEMENT 23 In September 2019, the California Supreme Court held that the “amount sufficient to 24 recover the underpaid wages” under California Labor Code Section 558(a) could not be brought 25 as part of a PAGA claim. ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty., 8 Cal. 5th 175 (2019). 26 In brief, under California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, an aggrieved 27 employee may seek civil penalties for Labor Code violations committed against her and other 28 1 her employer. If the aggrieved employee prevails, the California Labor and Workforce 2 Development Agency collects 75 percent of the penalties, and the aggrieved employees receive 3 the remainder. Cal. Labor Code § 2699(i) (2016). 4 Section 558(a) is one of many provisions in the Labor Code which imposes “civil 5 penalties” on employers. See, e.g., id. §§ 225.5, 226.8(b), 1174.5. Specifically, Section 558(a) 6 provides as follows (emphasis added): 7 (a) Any employer . . . who violates . . . any provision regulating hours and days of work in any order of the 8 Industrial Welfare Commission shall be subject to a civil penalty as follows: (1) For any initial violation, fifty dollars 9 ($50) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount 10 sufficient to recover underpaid wages. (2) For each subsequent violation, one hundred dollars ($100) for each 11 underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient 12 to recover underpaid wages. (3) Wages recovered pursuant to this section shall be paid to the affected employee. 13 In other words, under Section 558(a), certain employers are liable for penalties of either $50 or 14 $100 per employee for each pay period the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount 15 sufficient to recover the underpaid wages, which underpaid wages would be paid directly to the 16 affected employee. Primarily, this language begs the question of whether or not the underpaid 17 wages amount is a civil penalty or a remedy imposed by the statute in addition to the civil 18 penalty. 19 In 2012, the California Court of Appeal held that the underpaid wages constitute a civil 20 penalty. Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1112, 1144–48 (2012). 21 That is, both the $50 and $100 fines and the “amount sufficient to recover the underpaid wages” 22 could be the subject of a PAGA claim. 23 Having decided that the underpaid wages in Section 558(a) constituted a civil penalty, a 24 different issue materialized in constructing the underpaid wages of Section 558(a). That is, 25 whether the underpaid wages could be separately compelled to arbitration even if the 26 representative PAGA claims remained in court. In brief, one California Court of Appeal 27 decision said yes, and another said no. Esparza v. KS Indus., L.P., 13 Cal. App. 5th 1228, 28 1234–35 (2017), review denied, S244005 (Cal. Nov. 15, 2017); Lawson v. ZB, N.A., 18 Cal. App. 1 5th 705, 714 (2017), as modified D071279, D071376 (Cal. Dec. 21, 2017), aff’d but criticized 2 sub nom. ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty., 8 Cal. 5th 175, 193–96 (2019). 3 This split in authority bled into federal court. An unpublished opinion from our court of 4 appeals found Esparza’s reasoning more persuasive — and held that underpaid wages could be 5 separately compelled to arbitration. Mandviwala v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc., 723 F. App’x 6 415, 417–18 (9th Cir. 2018). But within months, a judge from this district disagreed and found 7 Lawson more persuasive — and held that underpaid wages could not be separately compelled to 8 arbitration. Whitworth v. SolarCity Corp., 336 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1124–26 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 9 (Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley). In between, the undersigned judge adopted our court of 10 appeals’ reasoning in Mandviwala. Cabrera v. CVS Rx Services, Inc., No. C 17-05803 WHA, 11 2018 WL 1367323 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018). 12 On March 21, 2018, the California Supreme Court granted review of Lawson seemingly 13 to decide this split in authority. The California Supreme Court resolved the split by overruling 14 Thurman. Section 558(a)’s underpaid wages were not civil penalties after all and could not even 15 be brought under PAGA, the California Supreme Court held. ZB, N.A., 8 Cal. 5th at 193–96. 16 The California Supreme Court began its analysis by admitting that “at first glance, a 17 plausible reading of [Section 558]” was that all which came after the colon were subclasses of 18 the term “civil penalty” — the term which preceded the colon in Section 558(a). Id. at 189. 19 Still, the California Supreme Court concluded that the best way to “harmonize[ S]ection 558’s 20 provisions with each other and with the broader statutory scheme,” was to give more weight to 21 the words “in addition to” in Subdivisions One and Two of Section 558(a). Id. at 193. That is, 22 “ ‘in addition to’ appears to indicate . . . that these provisions subject the employer to a civil 23 penalty on top of, not including, an amount meant to compensate for unpaid wages.” Id. at 189 24 (emphasis added). 25 In other words, on the specific question of whether PAGA claims for unpaid wages under 26 Section 558(a) could be severed and compelled to arbitration, the California Supreme Court did 27 not side with either Lawson or Esparza — it instead mooted the issue entirely. PAGA plaintiffs 28 could not bring underpaid wages claims under Section 558(a) at all. The California Supreme 1 Court then remanded to the trial court to decide whether the unpaid wages should be struck or 2 whether the complaint should be amended “to request unpaid wages under an appropriate cause 3 of action.” Id. at 198. 4 * * * 5 In this case, as alleged in the complaint, plaintiff Flora Gonzales worked as a medical aid 6 and technician for seventeen years, providing care to senior citizens in a senior citizen facility. 7 For the first fourteen of those years, either defendant Emeritus Corporation or defendant 8 Summerville At Atherton Court LLC owned and operated the facility. Then, in 2014, three 9 entities — defendant Brookdale Senior Living, Inc., defendant Brookdale Living Communities, 10 Inc., and defendant Brookdale Vehicle Holding, LLC — acquired the facility and imposed a new 11 strict mandatory dispute resolution policy on the employees (Withers Decl. ¶¶ 4–6) (Dkt. No. 1-2 12 at 4). 13 No ability to opt out of this policy existed. To the contrary, the policy bound employees 14 automatically when they showed up to work. The arbitration agreement provided: “I understand 15 that even if I do not sign this [a]greement, if I come to work after being given this agreement, I 16 am agreeing to it and so is Brookdale” (id. ¶ 6) Moreover, refusal to sign a handbook — which 17 provided mere detail on the arbitration process — would “result in [plaintiff’s] immediate 18 termination of employment.” 19 Other provisions within the arbitration agreement took away more rights in connection 20 with the ability to bring class action and PAGA claims. More specifically, Section Eight of the 21 arbitration agreement provided: “[c]lass action waiver. There is no right or authority under this 22 [a]greement for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a class or collective action” (id. 23 § 8). Section Nine of the arbitration agreement provided: “[PAGA] waiver. There is no right or 24 authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a private attorney general action.” 25 With respect to this PAGA waiver, however, the arbitration agreement also specifically provided 26 that “[t]his provision can be removed from the [a]greement in a case where the dispute is filed as 27 [a] private attorney general action and the court finds this waiver unenforceable. If that happens, 28 then the private attorney general action will be litigated in that court” (id. § 9). 1 In 2014, our plaintiff signed both the arbitration agreement and the handbook. In 2017, 2 the facility terminated plaintiff’s employment. 3 In July 2018, plaintiff initiated this PAGA and wage-and-hour putative class action 4 against defendants in Alameda County Superior Court, asserting six claims under the California 5 Labor Code, including relief under Section 558(a), and one additional claim under Section 17200 6 of the California Business and Professions Code. She asserted four of the Labor Code claims as 7 representative PAGA claims. 8 In October 2018, defendants removed the action to our district court. Defendants moved 9 to compel arbitration of all claims based on the executed arbitration agreement between the 10 parties. Plaintiff opposed (Dkt. Nos. 1, 14, 15). 11 Primarily, the parties disagreed on the following three points: (i) whether or not the 12 arbitration agreement could be enforced at all; (ii) if the arbitration agreement could be enforced, 13 whether or not the contractual “waiver” of the ability to assert PAGA claims could be enforced; 14 and (iii) if the contractual “waiver” of the PAGA claims could not be enforced, whether the 15 underpaid wages sought by the complaint under Section 558 could be separated from the rest of 16 the PAGA claims and compelled to arbitration. 17 After oral argument in December 2018, an order stayed the action in full pending the 18 California Supreme Court’s decision in Lawson (Dkt. No. 19). 19 Following the California Supreme Court’s decision, the parties filed a joint status report. 20 Plaintiff maintained that the motion to compel should be denied, but that leave be granted “to 21 amend her [c]omplaint regarding the penalties sought under Labor Code § 558” (Dkt. No. 23 at 22 2). Defendants requested that the arbitration agreement be enforced in full, but that in the 23 alternative, “the PAGA claim must be stayed pending individual arbitration” (id. at 4). An order 24 set a new hearing (Dkt. No. 25). Following that hearing, the parties provided supplemental 25 briefing. This order now follows. 26 ANALYSIS 27 This order first holds that the arbitration agreement is enforceable. All claims within the 28 scope of the arbitration agreement must be sent to arbitration. Still, the class-action “waiver” 1 provides “no right or authority under this [a]greement for any dispute to be arbitrated as a class 2 or collective action” and so, the undersigned leaves it to the arbitrator to decide whether there is 3 other authority for which plaintiff does have a right to bring a class or collective action. 4 Second, as to the PAGA claims, this order holds that plaintiff’s PAGA waiver is 5 unenforceable under binding precedent. Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, the representative 6 PAGA claims remain in the district court and will not be sent to arbitration. Third, turning to the 7 claims for unpaid wages brought under Section 558, leave to amend the complaint will be 8 permitted so that any claims for unpaid wages alleged under PAGA may comply with ZB, N.A. v. 9 Superior Court of San Diego County, 8 Cal. 5th 175 (2019). For efficiency, the representative 10 PAGA claims will be stayed pending the results of arbitration of the individual claims. The 11 details follow. 12 1. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE. 13 Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court determines “whether a valid arbitration 14 agreement exists and, if so, whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Lifescan, 15 Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the parties 16 agree that the agreement encompassed the claims at issue. The arbitration agreement provided 17 that “any legal dispute arising out of or related to [plaintiff’s] employment . . . must be resolved 18 using final and binding arbitration and not by a court or jury trial. That includes any legal 19 dispute that has to do with any of the following: wage and hour law, . . . unfair competition, 20 compensation, breaks or rest periods” (Withers Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. A. § 1) (emphasis in original). 21 Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is invalid and therefore should not be 22 enforced due to alleged unconscionability and due to a perceived ambiguity in the PAGA 23 waiver. Both arguments fail. 24 Turning to plaintiff’s first argument, the parties agree California state law applies. 25 “Under California law, a contractual clause is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and 26 substantively unconscionable.” Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 27 2007) (emphasis added) (overruled on other grounds). Here, a high degree of unconscionable 28 procedure permeates the provision at issue in that defendants imposed the arbitration agreement 1 on plaintiff without even requiring her signature (although she did sign it) and under threat of 2 terminating her fourteen-year employment. But procedural unconscionability is not enough to 3 invalidate an arbitration agreement on its own, and plaintiff has made an insufficient showing of 4 any overly harsh or one-sided result created by the agreement. 5 Plaintiff argues that the absence of “[p]laintiff’s rights to meaningful discovery” under 6 the agreement satisfies a minimalist version of substantive unconscionability. Any assertion that 7 plaintiff will be deprived of meaningful discovery in arbitration, however, glides over the 8 arbitration agreement itself. On discovery, the arbitration agreement is explicit: “[d]iscovery 9 will be conducted as directed by law or the [a]rbitrator” and the arbitrator may “issue subpoenas, 10 if needed, for witnesses or documents” (Withers Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. A. § 1). The Court therefore 11 can — and does — fully expect that reasonable discovery will be afforded by the arbitrators. 12 Next, plaintiff argues that the following sentences in the PAGA waiver create ambiguity 13 which invalidate the entire agreement: “[t]his provision can be removed from the [a]greement in 14 a case where the dispute is filed as [a] private attorney general action and the court finds this 15 waiver unenforceable. If that happens, then the private attorney general action will be litigated 16 in that court” (id. § 1) (emphasis added). The ambiguity here, according to plaintiff, is the 17 emphasized phrase “that court.” 18 Even assuming the phrase is in fact ambiguous, this provision can be severed and 19 therefore does not invalidate the entire agreement. Moreover, the PAGA waiver is also 20 self-contained in its own section of the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the arbitration 21 agreement’s main purpose is to impose arbitration. The PAGA waiver is therefore not central, 22 but collateral, to the purpose of the agreement. 23 Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable. 24 Because the agreement is valid and encompasses the claims at issue, the non-PAGA claims must 25 be arbitrated. The next section will now detail why the PAGA waiver is invalid and why the 26 PAGA claims must therefore remain in this forum. 27 28 1 2. THE PAGA WAIVER IN THE AGREEMENT IS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 2 As stated, the arbitration agreement included a waiver of all claims brought under PAGA. 3 Both the California Supreme Court and our court of appeals have specifically held that these 4 waivers are not enforceable. See Iskanian v. CLS Transport. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 5 382–84 (2014); Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 430–40 (9th Cir. 2015). 6 As such, under this binding precedent, the arbitration agreement’s PAGA waiver remains 7 unenforceable. 8 In this connection, the representative PAGA claims must remain in this forum. More 9 specifically, the arbitration agreement provided that “[t]his provision can be removed from the 10 [a]greement in a case where the dispute is filed as [a] private attorney general action and the 11 court finds this waiver unenforceable. If that happens, then the private attorney general action 12 will be litigated in that court” (Withers Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. A at § 9). The parties agree that if the 13 waiver is struck, this provision now refers to the undersigned. The PAGA claims will remain 14 here. 15 Defendants argue that Sakkab and Iskanian have been implicitly overruled by the United 16 States Supreme Court’s 2018 decision Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 17 (2018). In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court held that contract defenses which invalidated 18 arbitration agreements were a “device” that manifested “judicial antagonism” towards arbitration 19 and were therefore preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 1623. 20 When prior circuit precedent has not been explicitly overruled, the analysis turns on 21 whether “the relevant court of last resort . . . undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the 22 prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Miller v. 23 Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). As relevant here, the reasoning 24 which anchored the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems is far enough from the reasoning 25 which anchored the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian and our court of appeals’ 26 decision in Sakkab that Sakkab remains binding. 27 In Iskanian, the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement requiring an 28 employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to bring representative PAGA 1 actions in any forum is contrary to public policy. Specifically, PAGA waivers harm California 2 in two particular ways, neither of which have anything to do with arbitration. The California 3 Supreme Court stated that “agreements requiring the waiver of PAGA rights would harm the 4 state’s interests in enforcing the Labor Code and in receiving the proceeds of civil penalties used 5 to deter violations.” Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 383 (emphasis added). Based on this reasoning, our 6 court of appeals in Sakkab succinctly concluded: 7 The California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian expresses no preference regarding whether individual 8 PAGA claims are litigated or arbitrated. It provides only that representative PAGA claims may not be waived 9 outright. The Iskanian rule does not prohibit the arbitration of any type of claim. 10 803 F.3d at 434 (citations omitted). Put simply, PAGA waivers are invalid because they hurt 11 California’s interest in enforcing the Labor Code and not because of any reason that has anything 12 to do with arbitration. Therefore, our court of appeals held in Sakkab, that the Federal 13 Arbitration Act did not preempt the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian. Id. at 439. 14 For these same reasons, the holdings of Epic Systems and Sakkab are therefore not clearly 15 irreconcilable and this order remains bound by Sakkab. 16 Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing for the specific reason that none 17 demonstrates that our court of appeals’ decision in Sakkab is clearly irreconcilable with the 18 United States Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems. 19 The PAGA waiver in this agreement must be and hereby is held invalid. Under the 20 agreement, the representative PAGA claims must remain in this forum. The arbitrability of any 21 unpaid wages claims under Section 558 need not be addressed in light of the California Supreme 22 Court’s decision in ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 8 Cal. 5th 175 (2019). 23 3. LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND STAY OF PAGA CLAIMS. 24 In light of the decision by the California Supreme Court clarifying the ability to allege 25 unpaid wages under PAGA, justice requires that plaintiff be granted leave to amend her PAGA 26 claims to comply with the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in ZB, N.A. v. Superior 27 Court of San Diego County, 8 Cal. 5th 175 (2019). Accordingly, leave to amend the complaint is 28 GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff may amend the unpaid wages aspect of her 1 PAGA claims only to allege unpaid wages under a Labor Code provision other than Section 2 558(a). 3 Under 9 U.S.C. § 3, the Court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of 4 the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 5 Our court of appeals has acknowledged that this language “seems to direct that the action ‘shall’ 6 be stayed pending completion of arbitration.” Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 7 F.3d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1057 8 (9th Cir. 2013). In light of this dictum, and because plaintiff’s PAGA claims are derivative of 9 the substantive claims which will proceed to arbitration, the representative PAGA claims are 10 hereby STAYED pending the results of the arbitration proceeding.* 11 CONCLUSION 12 To the extent stated, defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED IN PART AND 13 DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s individual claims which are 14 ORDERED to individual arbitration. The motion is DENIED as to the representative PAGA 15 claims, which remain in this forum. Those claims are STAYED pending arbitration. Leave to 16 amend the complaint is GRANTED solely as to the PAGA claims for unpaid wages previously 17 brought under Section 558(a). Plaintiff shall file her amended complaint by DECEMBER 12 AT 18 NOON. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 Dated: November 23, 2019. WILLIAM ALSUP 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 * In October 2019, defendants filed a notice of settlement between our defendants 26 and a different plaintiff in a different litigation who had also asserted PAGA claims against Brookdale. See Callahan v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., et al., No. 2:18-cv- 27 10726-VAP-SS (Judge Virginia Phillips). The notice purported that the settlement, still subject to court approval, will fully settle the PAGA claims alleged by the named plaintiff 28 herein. This settlement has not yet been approved, and so, it is not sufficiently concrete to be considered in resolving this motion.