Gomillion v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

447 A.2d 449, 1982 D.C. App. LEXIS 375

• Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 22, 1982
• Docket: 81-86
• Status: Published

Opinions

PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired:

On this petition for review, the sole issue is whether the final decision of the Acting Director, Department of Employment Services (D.O.E.S.), disqualifying petitioner for unemployment compensation benefits,¹ is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is in accordance with law.² Finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm.

The operative facts are not in dispute. For some time prior to July 7, 1980, petitioner was employed by the BEMA Equipment Company as a concrete finisher. On that date petitioner, having given one week’s notice, quit his job for the announced purpose of taking a similar job with Macben Company, Inc. at a higher hourly wage.³ Unfortunately, when petitioner reported for work at Macben, he was informed that the job he expected and had allegedly been promised was not available.

Petitioner then applied for unemployment compensation benefits, urging his entitlement based upon the facts and circumstances outlined above. In accordance with prescribed procedures, first a Claims Deputy, next an Appeals Examiner, and finally the Acting Director, D.O.E.S., determined (1) that petitioner voluntarily left his employment with BEMA, (2) that such leaving was without good cause connected with the work at BEMA, and (3) that petitioner was for these reasons disqualified for unemployment benefits for a period of seven weeks. This petition for review followed.

D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a), recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a) provides in pertinent part:

An individual who left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause connected with the work, as determined by the Board under regulations prescribed by it, shall not be eligible for benefits with respect to the week for which he first files for benefits and with respect to not less than 6 nor more than 12 consecutive weeks of unemployment which immediately follow such week....

In the process of our review of the final decision of the Acting Director, we are required to construe the statute involved according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words employed by the drafters. Temporaries Inc. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 304 A.2d 14, 17 (1973). In this connection, the scope of our review is limited by D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1510(3)(E), recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510(a)(3)(E), to a determination whether the findings of fact, upon which the compensation authorities based their decision are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ultimate decision is in accordance with law. Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 379 A.2d 694, 696 (1977).

Since there is no dispute in the facts as found by the Appeals Examiner and sustained by the Acting Director, it remains only to determine whether the decision to disqualify petitioner for the period ordered was in accordance with law. This court must, of course, give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1802, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1583, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); Hockaday v. D.C. Department of Employment Services, D.C.App., 443 A.2d 8, 12 (1982); Coakley v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, D.C.App., 370 A.2d 1345, 1348 (1977); Watergate Improvement Associates v. PSC, D.C.App., 326 A.2d 778, 785 (1974). Consequently, we must defer to the Department of Employment Services’ interpretation of the voluntary quit provisions of the unemployment compensation statute “unless it is ‘unreasonable either in light of the record or prevailing law.’ ” Hockaday v. D.C. Department of Employment Services, supra, at 12, quoting Thomas v. District of Columbia Department of Labor, D.C.App., 409 A.2d 164, 169 (1979). See also Wolf v. D.C. Rental Accommodations Commission, D.C.App., 414 A.2d 878, 880 (1980); Tenants of 3039 Q Street, N.W. v. D.C. Rental Accommodations Commission, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 785, 787 (1978); Coakley v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, supra at 1349.

The decision of the Acting Director was that petitioner voluntarily left his job as a concrete finisher at BEMA without good cause connected with such work.⁴ Absent, therefore, any showing in the record of a complaint respecting petitioner’s working conditions at BEMA, we cannot say, in view of D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a), recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a), that the decision was not in accordance with law. See also D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1510(3)(E), recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510(a) (3)(E).

We hold therefore that the Acting Director did not err in concluding that the “good cause connected with the work” requirement was not satisfied by the considerations that motivated petitioner to leave his employment at BEMA, viz., the expectation of earning higher wages at Macben.⁵

Affirmed.

1 . D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a), recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111 (a).

2 . D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-1510(a), recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510(a)(3)(E).

3 .Petitioner had previously worked for Macben as a concrete finisher and before giving BEMA notice of his intention to quit, he had been informed by the foreman of Macben that a job was available to him at $8.38 an hour, an increase of $1.38 an hour over what he was paid at BEMA, and that Macben wanted him back.

4 . The statute explicitly requires that “good cause” be connected with the employee’s most recent work.

5 . It is regrettable that petitioner, in an effort to improve his employment pay status, found himself both without a job and without unemployment compensation. But we are constrained to sustain the determination that petitioner voluntarily left his former employment without good cause connected with the work. Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, supra. See also Stewart v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 305 A.2d 516, 518 (1973).