FERREN, Associate Judge:
This ease presents two questions: (1) whether the Final Decision of the Department of Employment Services (DOES)
—that petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment without good cause connected with the work
— was made in accordance with law,
and (2) whether substantial evidence supports the Director’s decision to disqualify her from benefits for seven weeks.
We answer both in the affirmative and accordingly sustain the Director’s ruling.
I.
Petitioner, Jocelyn L. Hockaday, resigned from her position as a secretary with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) effective April 5, 1980. On May 27, 1980, a DOES claims examiner found that petitioner voluntarily left her job because she felt she was overworked and underpaid. The examiner concluded that this was not “good cause connected with the work,” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a) (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a)) and disqualified petitioner from receiving unemployment compensation benefits for ten weeks. On August 4, 1980, after a hearing at which petitioner testified, an Appeals Examiner issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appeals Examiner found that increases in workload and decreases in staff adversely affected petitioner’s health “to the point that she was required to secure medical treatment for an ulcer and nervous condition.” He also found petitioner was unsuccessful in procuring a transfer or finding new work outside of the IRS. The Appeals Examiner concluded, however, that although petitioner’s reasons for leaving were
“understandable,” she did not have good cause for leaving in the “absence of medical advice to leave her work for job connected reasons of health.” The Appeals Examiner reduced petitioner’s disqualification from ten to eight weeks.
On January 23,1981, the DOES Acting Director, in his Final Decision,
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Appeals Examiner and further reduced petitioner’s period of disqualification for benefits from eight to seven weeks. Hockaday filed a timely petition for review in this court.
See
D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 46-312 (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-113); D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510; D.C. App.R. 15(b).
II.
“An individual who left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause connected with the work” must be disqualified from receiving seven to thirteen weeks of unemployment benefits. D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a) (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a)); note 2
supra.
An employee’s leaving is presumed to be involuntary, but this presumption is rebuttable.
See Thomas v. District of Columbia Department of Labor,
D.C.App., 409 A.2d 164, 171 (1979);
Carpenter v. District Unemployment Compensation Board,
D.C.App., 409 A.2d 175, 178 (1979); 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1(a) (regulations promulgated before statutory amendment of good cause standard); 28 DCR 4965,4976, § 4612.3 (effective Nov. 20, 1981).
As to the first issue, the examiner found that petitioner left her most recent work “voluntarily.” Petitioner argues that her resignation was not voluntary because she was faced with the choice of quitting or sustaining physical and mental injuries. Assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that petitioner was faced with this choice, the examiner did not err in finding that her resignation, nonetheless, was voluntary within the meaning of the statute.
Voluntariness means “voluntary in fact, within the ordinary meaning of that term.” 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1(a)(1);
see
28 DCR 4965, 4976, § 4612.2. That question must be determined by reference to whether the employee’s action was compelled by the employer rather than based on the employee’s volition. Here, petitioner’s employer did not encourage, let alone coerce, petitioner to resign.
Compare Thomas, supra
(employee resigned when given the choice to quit or be fired; separation was tantamount to discharge)
and Carpenter, supra
(employee quit in lieu of being discharged for absenteeism; resignation was coerced by representations concerning pending or threatened personnel actions). Nor were working conditions themselves so manifestly. detrimental to an ordinary worker’s health that they were tantamount to a constructive discharge. Petitioner has not cited any case in which a claimant’s resignation was held involuntary because it was based on health reasons.
The examiner did
not improperly find that petitioner left voluntarily.
Having sustained this finding, we turn to the second issue: whether petitioner voluntarily left for “good cause connected with the work.” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a) (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a)); see 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1 (regulation promulgated before statutory amendment of good cause standard) (claimant bears burden of proof); 28 DCR 4965, 4976, § 4612.4 (effective Nov. 20, 1981) (claimant has “responsibility of presenting evidence sufficient to support a finding” in his or her favor).
Petitioner testified that the stress of an increased workload adversely affected her health. She brought medical substantiation of her ulcer and nervous condition to the hearing. The Appeals Examiner asked petitioner if her doctor recommended that she quit her job. Petitioner answered, “No, he didn’t recommend that I leave the job but I knew it was getting too much for me.” Petitioner testified that she sought a transfer as well as new work, and that her boss knew of her medical condition.
The Appeals Examiner found that an increased workload caused petitioner’s ulcer and nervous condition but that, “absent medical advice to leave her work” for health reasons, petitioner had not terminated her employment “for good cause connected with the work.” The Acting Director adopted this conclusion in his Final Decision.
Petitioner argues that, in disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits, the examiners incorrectly applied the applicable statute and regulations. The Appeals Examiner concluded:
Claimant voluntarily left her most recent work and a suitable period of disqualification must therefore be assessed unless her leaving was with good cause connected with the work. Although claimant’s areas of dissatisfaction with her work situation are understandable, they did not reach the point where her leaving was justified in the absence of medical advice to leave her work for job connected reasons of health.
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FERREN, Associate Judge:
This ease presents two questions: (1) whether the Final Decision of the Department of Employment Services (DOES)
—that petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment without good cause connected with the work
— was made in accordance with law,
and (2) whether substantial evidence supports the Director’s decision to disqualify her from benefits for seven weeks.
We answer both in the affirmative and accordingly sustain the Director’s ruling.
I.
Petitioner, Jocelyn L. Hockaday, resigned from her position as a secretary with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) effective April 5, 1980. On May 27, 1980, a DOES claims examiner found that petitioner voluntarily left her job because she felt she was overworked and underpaid. The examiner concluded that this was not “good cause connected with the work,” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a) (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a)) and disqualified petitioner from receiving unemployment compensation benefits for ten weeks. On August 4, 1980, after a hearing at which petitioner testified, an Appeals Examiner issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appeals Examiner found that increases in workload and decreases in staff adversely affected petitioner’s health “to the point that she was required to secure medical treatment for an ulcer and nervous condition.” He also found petitioner was unsuccessful in procuring a transfer or finding new work outside of the IRS. The Appeals Examiner concluded, however, that although petitioner’s reasons for leaving were
“understandable,” she did not have good cause for leaving in the “absence of medical advice to leave her work for job connected reasons of health.” The Appeals Examiner reduced petitioner’s disqualification from ten to eight weeks.
On January 23,1981, the DOES Acting Director, in his Final Decision,
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Appeals Examiner and further reduced petitioner’s period of disqualification for benefits from eight to seven weeks. Hockaday filed a timely petition for review in this court.
See
D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 46-312 (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-113); D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510; D.C. App.R. 15(b).
II.
“An individual who left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause connected with the work” must be disqualified from receiving seven to thirteen weeks of unemployment benefits. D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a) (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a)); note 2
supra.
An employee’s leaving is presumed to be involuntary, but this presumption is rebuttable.
See Thomas v. District of Columbia Department of Labor,
D.C.App., 409 A.2d 164, 171 (1979);
Carpenter v. District Unemployment Compensation Board,
D.C.App., 409 A.2d 175, 178 (1979); 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1(a) (regulations promulgated before statutory amendment of good cause standard); 28 DCR 4965,4976, § 4612.3 (effective Nov. 20, 1981).
As to the first issue, the examiner found that petitioner left her most recent work “voluntarily.” Petitioner argues that her resignation was not voluntary because she was faced with the choice of quitting or sustaining physical and mental injuries. Assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that petitioner was faced with this choice, the examiner did not err in finding that her resignation, nonetheless, was voluntary within the meaning of the statute.
Voluntariness means “voluntary in fact, within the ordinary meaning of that term.” 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1(a)(1);
see
28 DCR 4965, 4976, § 4612.2. That question must be determined by reference to whether the employee’s action was compelled by the employer rather than based on the employee’s volition. Here, petitioner’s employer did not encourage, let alone coerce, petitioner to resign.
Compare Thomas, supra
(employee resigned when given the choice to quit or be fired; separation was tantamount to discharge)
and Carpenter, supra
(employee quit in lieu of being discharged for absenteeism; resignation was coerced by representations concerning pending or threatened personnel actions). Nor were working conditions themselves so manifestly. detrimental to an ordinary worker’s health that they were tantamount to a constructive discharge. Petitioner has not cited any case in which a claimant’s resignation was held involuntary because it was based on health reasons.
The examiner did
not improperly find that petitioner left voluntarily.
Having sustained this finding, we turn to the second issue: whether petitioner voluntarily left for “good cause connected with the work.” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a) (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a)); see 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1 (regulation promulgated before statutory amendment of good cause standard) (claimant bears burden of proof); 28 DCR 4965, 4976, § 4612.4 (effective Nov. 20, 1981) (claimant has “responsibility of presenting evidence sufficient to support a finding” in his or her favor).
Petitioner testified that the stress of an increased workload adversely affected her health. She brought medical substantiation of her ulcer and nervous condition to the hearing. The Appeals Examiner asked petitioner if her doctor recommended that she quit her job. Petitioner answered, “No, he didn’t recommend that I leave the job but I knew it was getting too much for me.” Petitioner testified that she sought a transfer as well as new work, and that her boss knew of her medical condition.
The Appeals Examiner found that an increased workload caused petitioner’s ulcer and nervous condition but that, “absent medical advice to leave her work” for health reasons, petitioner had not terminated her employment “for good cause connected with the work.” The Acting Director adopted this conclusion in his Final Decision.
Petitioner argues that, in disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits, the examiners incorrectly applied the applicable statute and regulations. The Appeals Examiner concluded:
Claimant voluntarily left her most recent work and a suitable period of disqualification must therefore be assessed unless her leaving was with good cause connected with the work. Although claimant’s areas of dissatisfaction with her work situation are understandable, they did not reach the point where her leaving was justified in the absence of medical advice to leave her work for job connected reasons of health.
The Appeals Examiner accordingly interpreted the statute to mean that health reasons for voluntarily quitting a job would not amount to “good cause connected with the work” unless a claimant receives “medical advice to leave her work.”
The Appeals Examiner did not purport to base his interpretation on Board regulations, an omission of analysis that complicates our review.
The only regulation on the books pertaining to the inquiry, 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1, was adopted under D.C.Code 1973, § 46-310(a),
the statutory predecessor of the statute applicable here, D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a) (effective March 3, 1979) (recodified as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a)).
See
note 2
supra.
The Board did not adopt new regulations until November 20, 1981, over a year and a half after
the events at issue here.
Thus, it is unclear whether the old regulation applies, to the extent consistent with the narrower, amended statute, or the amended statute alone applies, absent implementing regulations.
We need not resolve this question, however, for under either formulation the new statutory norm prevails, and the Final Decision conforms to it. This court must “defer to an agency’s interpretation or construction of a statute which it is charged with administering unless it is ‘unreasonable either in light of the record or prevailing law.’ ”
Thomas, supra
at 169 (citations omitted). The Director reasonably could find that an employee, leaving a job for health reasons, does not have good cause connected with the work “in the absence of medical advice to leave her work for job connected reasons of health.” It is not unreasonable to expect an employee to provide such objective, professional verification;
otherwise, there would be no way for the Director to distinguish between real and imagined health problems attributable to the work.
IIL
This court must reverse the Final Decision of the Director if his “findings and conclusions” are “unsupported by substantial evidence in the record of proceedings before the court.” D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510(a)(3)(E);
see Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd.,
D.C.App., 377 A.2d 436, 439 (1977);
Wallace v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd.,
D.C.App., 294 A.2d 177, 178-79 (1972). The term “substantial evidence” means “ ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ”
Washington Post Co., supra
at 439 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938));
Wallace, supra
at 179 (same). We may not substitute our judgment, however, for the Director’s if his findings are supported by substantial evidence and his decision follows from the findings.
See Washington Post Co., supra
at 439;
Stewart v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment,
D.C.App., 305 A.2d 516, 518 (1973).
The record contains substantial evidence to support the Director’s decision that petitioner left her employment voluntarily without good cause connected with the work. D.C.Code 1980, § 46-310(a) (recodi-fied as D.C.Code 1981, § 46-lll(a)). At the hearing petitioner stated that she resigned for health reasons but had not been advised to do so by her doctor. Petitioner’s testimony supports the Director’s determination.
In summary, the Director s determination that petitioner voluntarily left her job, but not for good cause connected with the work, D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 46-310(a) (recodified as D.C.1981, § 46-111(a)), was made in accordance with law. D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510(a)(3)(A).
Affirmed.